认知科学基础
Fundamentals of Cognitive Science
《认知科学基础》借鉴了心理学、哲学、人工智能、语言学、进化论和神经科学的研究成果,为这一跨学科领域提供了引人入胜且易于学生理解的入门介绍。本书不仅围绕传统的认知心理学主题,涵盖注意力、学习理论、记忆力、信息处理、思维和决策等内容,还探讨了神经网络、认知神经科学、具身认知和魔术等概念,以阐释认知科学的原理。
Fundamentals of Cognitive Science draws on research from psychology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, linguistics, evolution, and neuroscience to provide an engaging and student-friendly introduction to this interdisciplinary field. While structured around traditional cognitive psychology topics, from attention, learning theory, and memory to information processing, thinking, and decision making, the book also looks at neural networks, cognitive neuroscience, embodied cognition, and magic to illustrate cognitive science principles.
本书围绕着关于心智及其与世界关系的思考历史展开。它探讨了认知的演化,并揭示了我们当前对认知过程的思考如何源于前科学哲学和常识,源于心理学家在探索认知科学和构建人工智能的过程中对心智和行为的实证探究。本书贯穿始终地运用了认知架构,并提出了一种对认知架构的综合,涵盖了从传统符号系统架构到具身认知和贝叶斯预测处理领域的最新研究。本书也探讨了认知架构的实际应用和政策含义,但最终的解决方案留给读者自行探索。
The book is organized around the history of thinking about the mind and its relation to the world. It considers the evolution of cognition and how it demonstrates how our current thinking about cognitive processes is derived from pre-scientific philosophies and common sense, through psychologists’ empirical inquiries into mind and behavior as they pursued a science of cognition and the construction of artificial intelligences. The architectures of cognition are also applied throughout, and the book proposes a synthesis of them, from traditional symbol system architectures to recent work in embodied cognition and Bayesian predictive processing. Practical and policy implications are also considered but solutions are left for the readers to determine.
本书运用扩展案例研究来阐述最重要的主题、思想和发现,适合心理学及相关领域的高年级本科生和研究生课程。本书也适合对通俗易懂的认知科学及其实践意义感兴趣的普通读者。
Using extended case studies to address the most important themes, ideas, and findings, this book is suitable for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in psychology and related fields. It is also suitable for general readers interested in an accessible treatment of cognitive science and its practical implications.
请访问www.fundamentalsofcognitivescience.com获取本书的更多资源。
Please visit www.fundamentalsofcognitivescience.com for further resources to accompany the book.
托马斯·哈迪·莱希是美国弗吉尼亚联邦大学名誉教授。他曾任理论与哲学心理学会和心理学史学会主席。他是美国心理学会会员,也是心理科学协会的创始会员之一。
Thomas Hardy Leahey is Professor Emeritus at Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. He has been President of the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology and the Society for the History of Psychology. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and a founding fellow of the Association for Psychological Science.
认知科学基础
Fundamentals of Cognitive Science
思想、大脑、魔法和进化
Minds, Brain, Magic, and Evolution
托马斯·哈代·莱希
Thomas Hardy Leahey
封面图片:© Getty Images
Cover image: © Getty Images
首次出版日期:2023 年,
作者:Routledge,
地址:605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
First published 2023
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© 2023 托马斯·哈代·莱希
© 2023 Thomas Hardy Leahey
根据 1988 年版权、外观设计和专利法第 77 和 78 条的规定,Thomas Hardy Leahey 有权被认定为该作品的作者。
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这本书比典型的教科书更具个人色彩,因此我以一个非典型的序言开始。
This book is more personal than is typical for a textbook, and therefore I begin with an atypical preface.
《基础》一书的独特之处在于它确实出自一位作者之手。许多教科书看似出自一人之手,但一个名字往往掩盖了一个团队。科学家可能会让研究生列出研究主题、研究思路并撰写草稿。出版商或有预付款的著名作家可能会聘请专业的研究人员、作家和编辑。我教授认知科学35年,现已退休,书中的每一个字都是我写的(除了一位目光敏锐的文字编辑修改的几个字),并且每一条参考文献都是我找到的。
Fundamentals is personal in being genuinely written by a single author. Many textbooks appear to be written by one person, but the one name often conceals a team. A scientist might have grad students draw up lists of topics, research ideas, and write drafts. A publisher, or a famous author with an advance, might hire professional researchers, writers, and editors. I taught cognitive science for 35 years, am now retired, and I wrote every word (except a few changed by an eagle-eyed copy editor) and found each reference.
基础知识之所以变得如此个人化,是因为2019年秋天我经历了一场灾难性的健康危机,差点送我去两家医院,在康复中心待了三个月,最后在新冠疫情爆发前被送进了辅助生活机构,幸运的是,我没有感染。因此,我放弃了在撰写手册和百科全书文章时使用的那种权威与作者并存的“上帝之声”,转而采用一种更轻松的博客或通讯风格。我的目标不仅是提供信息,更是为了给你提供一个关于认知科学的视角和观点。最重要的是,我想把它置于一个知识的语境中。
Fundamentals became especially personal because in the fall of 2019 I experienced a catastrophic health crisis that put me in two hospitals near death, in physical rehab for three months, and into assisted living just in time for COVID-19, which, fortunately, I did not get. So I have eschewed the authorial Voice of God I use in writing handbook and encyclopedia articles, where authority and authorial go together, for a more relaxed blog or newsletter style. My aim is not only to inform, but also to give you a perspective, a point of view, on cognitive science. Above all else, I want to place it in an intellectual setting.
其核心在于哲学家威尔弗雷德·塞拉斯对人类显性形象和科学形象的区分。1显性形象是我们对自身作为个体和社会存在的理解。我们都运用一种名为“心智理论”的理论心理学,它在日常生活中发挥着重要作用,也是宪法、法律、政治和其他正式制度的基础。然而,显性形象源于充斥着错误宇宙观念的过去,这些观念已被科学所取代。而科学——认知科学——正在构建一个与之竞争的人类科学形象。《基础》的首要目标是勾勒出这一形象;之所以说是勾勒,是因为本书篇幅短小,领域广阔,也因为形象的边缘不完整,细节也不够丰富。在勾勒的过程中,我将探索新兴的科学形象与显性形象的契合点和分歧点,并探究其对我们造成的影响。
At the center is a distinction made by the philosopher Wilfred Sellars between the manifest image of human beings and the scientific image.1 The manifest image is our understanding of ourselves as personal and social beings. We all use a theoretical psychology called Theory of Mind that serves us well in daily life and that underlies constitutions, law, politics, and other formal institutions. However, the manifest image comes to us from a past littered with wrong ideas about the universe that have been replaced by science. And science—cognitive science—is building a rival scientific image of human beings. The foremost aim of Fundamentals is to sketch this image; to sketch because the book is short and the field is large and because the image is neither complete at the edges nor filled in with detail. As I draw the sketch, I will explore the ways in which the emerging scientific image agrees with and disagrees with the manifest image and investigate the consequences for us.
我试图通过编写不同类型的教科书来实现这两个目标,这些教科书围绕为草图提供框架的主题进行组织。我曾经在一个工作组工作,该工作组旨在衡量我们弗吉尼亚联邦大学的学生在毕业时在其专业中所学到的知识。我领导的团队旨在评估自然科学知识。我们最具启发性的发现是,专业学生确实学到了很多关于他们所学科学的事实,但每个事实都是独立的。我称之为乒乓球思维——科学知识是一袋事实,可以从中取出考试的正确答案,但每个学生的袋子里都有不同的一堆球,而不是有组织的知识。在《认知科学基础》中,我努力为你做得更好。
I attempt to achieve both aims by writing a different sort of textbook, organized around themes that provide a frame for the sketch. I once worked on a task force designed to measure what our VCU students had learned in their major at graduation. The team I led aimed to assess knowledge in the natural sciences. Our most revealing finding was that majors had indeed learned many facts about their science, but that each fact stood alone. I call this the ping-pong ball mind—knowledge of science was a bag of facts from which right answers for tests could be grabbed, but each student had a different bunch of balls in the bag, not organized knowledge. In Fundamentals of Cognitive Science, I strive to do better by you.
我的第一个统一主题是历史/哲学。我认为整理乒乓球的一个好方法是将其置于历史和观点的网格中。大部分显性图像是由历史上的思想家(主要是哲学家)构建的,他们提出了系统地不同的思维方式来思考心灵。当科学心理学于19世纪兴起时,这些不断发展的观点及其提出的问题塑造了心理学对意识和心理过程的实验研究。用认知科学的一个重要术语来说,心理学家继承了一套图式,这些图式指导着他们提出的问题、对研究结果的解读以及他们构建的理论。我运用这些图式来呈现认知科学作为一个大体上(尽管并非完全)连贯的学科的图景。
My first unifying theme is historical/philosophical. I think a good way to organize the ping pong balls is on a grid of history and viewpoints. Most of the manifest image was historically constructed by thinkers, mostly philosophers, who proposed systematically different ways of thinking about the mind. When scientific psychology began in the 19th century, these evolved viewpoints and the questions they posed shaped psychology’s experimental investigation of consciousness and mental processes. To use an important technical term from cognitive science, psychologists inherited a set of schemata that guided the questions they asked, their interpretations of the results they found, and the theories they devised. I use these schemata to present a picture of cognitive science as a largely—though not entirely—coherent enterprise.
与此相关的是我对认知架构的强调。认知科学的内隐图式并非完全无意识的,而是表现为不同的准哲学观点(意识形态),关于心智是什么、心智的用途是什么以及心智如何运作,这些观点指导并证明了信徒们所追求的研究和理论。这个短语源于认知科学的人工智能分支。如果一个人打算从头开始构建心智,那么他需要一个构建指南——一个需要填充的架构。这些架构有时结盟,有时交战,正如反对拿破仑的七次联盟战争塑造了世界历史2一样,各种架构的倡导者之间的批评和相互支持也塑造了认知科学。
Related is my emphasis on architectures of cognition. The implicit schemata of cognitive science are not entirely unconscious but are manifested as different quasi-philosophical viewpoints—ideologies—about what minds are, what they are for, and how they work, and these viewpoints guide and justify the research and theory that adherents pursue. The phrase arose from the artificial intelligence branch of cognitive science. If one sets out to build a mind from scratch, one needs a guide to construction—an architecture to fill in. The architectures sometimes ally and sometimes do battle, and just as the seven contentious Coalition wars against Napoleon shaped world history,2 so have the critiques and mutual support among advocates of the various architectures shaped cognitive science.
第三个主题将我们引向显性意象与科学意象之间的冲突。认知科学的研究和理论,从最简单的感觉和知觉研究,到思考和决策研究,以及认知神经科学,都汇聚到一个重要的结论:我们并不像我们思考的那样了解自己、了解我们的思想以及我们行为的原因。3我在整本书中都强调这些发现,并试图在此过程中理解它们——以及认知科学。
The third theme takes us to the conflict of the manifest image vs. the scientific image. Research and theory in cognitive science, from the simplest studies of sensation and perception to research on thinking and decision making, as well as in cognitive neuroscience, converge on a big conclusion: We do not know ourselves and our minds and the causes of our actions as well as we think.3 I stress these findings throughout the book and try to make sense of them—and cognitive science—along the way.
最后一个主题是个人、实用和乐趣。我进入认知科学的第一条途径是通过魔术。小时候,我看电视上每周一次的魔术节目(马克·威尔逊),然后开始阅读魔术书籍,并花我的零花钱在华盛顿特区的艾尔魔术店看魔术。魔术是最初的应用认知科学,它至少可以追溯到古埃及人。我的第一个研究是使用魔术来评估皮亚杰认知发展的发展。我从没想过要成为一名魔术师,因为我没有合适的性格。曾经有人邀请我夏天在一家酒店休息室演出,但一想到要和吵闹的醉汉打交道,我就畏缩不已。从好的方面来说,表演魔术是对教学的好练习。如果你能克服因表演失误而看起来像个傻瓜的毛病,你就能克服怯场。
The final theme is personal, practical, and fun. My first route into cognitive science was through magic. As a kid, I watched a weekly magic show on TV (Mark Wilson) and began to read magic books and spend my allowance on magic tricks at Al’s Magic in Washington, DC. Magic is the original applied cognitive science, and it goes back at least to the ancient Egyptians. My first research was using magic tricks to assess development of Piagetian cognitive development. I never thought to become a magician, because I’ve not got the right personality. I was once offered a summer gig at a hotel lounge but quailed at the thought of dealing with obstreperous drunks. On the plus side, performing magic is good practice for teaching. If you can survive looking a fool by muffing a trick, you can beat stage fright.
我应该谈谈我的职业背景。我十几岁时读了艾萨克·阿西莫夫的科幻小说《基地》三部曲,从而对心理学和历史产生了兴趣。它让我接触到了心理史学的概念,这在历史学领域确实存在,但它并非阿西莫夫的本意,即利用心理科学来预测长远的未来。我在大学期间发现了乔姆斯基和皮亚杰的全新认知心理学,并在伊利诺伊大学香槟分校的研究生院师从威廉·F·布鲁尔继续深造。布鲁尔曾在一篇书评中被誉为“自传体记忆先生”,因为他在20世纪70年代复兴了认知心理学的研究。我的毕业论文是关于推理的,学位论文是关于认知发展的。然而,我真正的才华在于心理学史和心理学哲学,而我在那里的工作也为我赢得了声誉。
I should say something about my professional background. I got into psychology and history by reading Isaac Asimov’s science fiction Foundation trilogy as a teen. It introduced me to the idea of psychohistory, which does exist in the profession of history, but it’s not what Asimov meant, using psychological science to predict the long-term future. I discovered the brand-new cognitive psychology of Chomsky and Piaget in college and pursued it in grad school at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign under William F. Brewer, once called in a book review “Mr. Autobiographical Memory” for reviving its study in the 1970s. I did my thesis on reasoning and my dissertation on cognitive development. However, my real talents lay in the history of psychology and the philosophy of psychology, and my work there made my reputation.
我尝试对认知科学进行简短而广泛的论述,深入地给出一些对我来说有趣且重要的细节图景,我希望对你来说也是如此。
I try to give a brief but broad treatment of cognitive science, swooping down to give detailed pictures of interest and importance to me and, I hope, to you too.
关于版本。《基础》有电子书和纸质书两种版本。鉴于电子教科书的兴起,我撰写本书时考虑的是电子书版本。我添加了许多视频和其他资料的链接(但都提供了完整地址)。我已尽量提供参考文献的doi地址,以便在电子版中可以点击。
A word on editions. Fundamentals is available as an ebook and a dead-tree book. Given the rise of etextbooks, I have written with the ebook version in mind. I have put in lots of links to videos and other materials (but with the full address given). I have tried to give the doi addresses for the references, so in the e-version they should be clickable.
人工智能是认知科学的一部分,如今人们担心工作岗位会被人工智能抢走,并害怕(或欢迎)人工智能末日(或奇点)。人工智能“深层思维”(Deep Mind)的国际象棋和围棋水平无人能及,GPT-3 也能撰写简单的新闻报道。但请思考一下:人类最古老的工作之一击败了昂贵的人工智能:根本不存在“砌砖机器人”。
Part of cognitive science is artificial intelligence, and people today worry about losing jobs to AIs, and fear (or welcome) the AI apocalypse (or Singularity). The AI Deep Mind plays chess and Go better than anyone, and GPT-3 can write simple news stories. But ponder this: One of the oldest human jobs defeats expensive AIs: There is no robot bricklayer.
现在,想想泥瓦匠的社会地位。
Now, think about the social status of bricklayers.
最后,我建立了一个网站,fundamentalsofcognitivescience.com。
Finally, I have set up a website, fundamentalsofcognitivescience.com.
托马斯·哈迪·莱希
弗吉尼亚州里士满,2022 年 3 月 15 日
Thomas Hardy Leahey
Richmond, Virginia, March 15, 2022
内容
现实主义1.0。(朴素现实主义):感觉揭示:我们看到的世界是这样的
Contents
Folk Psychology, or Theory of Mind
Socrates and the Problem of Knowledge
Knowledge (Reality) vs. Opinion (Appearances)
What Is the Object of Knowledge?
Plato’s Master Formulation of the Problem
Four Classical Positions in Cognitive Science
Realism 1.0. (Naïve Realism): Sensation Reveals: We See the World as It Is
Idealism 1.0 (Plato): Sensation Deceives: Truth Is in Heaven
Computationalism 1.0 (Stoicism): Ignore Sensation: Truth Is Propositional
Impact of the Scientific Revolution: Origins of Cognitive Science
The Death of Realism and the Rise of Psychology
The Mechanization of the World Picture
Which Sensations Are Real? The Creation of Consciousness
The Cartesian Paradigm: The Immaterial Soul in the Mechanical Body
The Way of Ideas as Cognitive Science: Three-Dimensional Perception
The Way of Ideas’ Revisions to the Classic Positions in Cognitive Science
Empiricism 1.1: Associationism’s Lego Theory of the Mind
Realism 1.1: Scottish Common Sense Psychology: A New Brief for Perception
你家有多少扇窗户?
How many windows do you have at home?
虽然我曾经有个学生只是因为刚刷完窗户就能记住它们的数量,但大多数人都会使用心理意象,在脑海中勾勒出一幅家的画面,并在其中漫步数着窗户。尽管心理意象很常见(尽管有些人没有,这种情况称为心盲症;Dawes 等人,2020 年),但它们的存在意味着我们外部世界和我们头脑中通常称为心灵的世界之间存在重要区别。一旦我们做出了这种区分,就会出现一个关于世界上的事物和我们头脑中的想法之间关系的重要问题。我们对事物有想法,但必须承认它们并不总是正确的。例如,你可能忘记数你家前门上方的一个装饰性小窗户了。心灵与世界、知识(真实想法)与观点(可能是错误想法)之间的区别构成了认知研究的起点。
Although I once had a student who simply remembered his number of windows because he had just finished painting them, most people use mental imagery, calling up to their mind’s eye an inner picture of home through which they stroll counting windows. As familiar as mental images are (though some people don’t have them, a condition called aphantasia; Dawes et al., 2020), their existence implies an important distinction between the world outside us and a world in our heads generally called mind. Once we make this distinction an important question arises about the relation between things in the world and ideas in our minds. We have ideas about things, but we must acknowledge that they are not always true. For example, you might have forgotten to count a small decorative window above your front door. The distinctions between mind and world and between knowledge (true ideas) and opinion (potentially false ideas) form the starting line of the study of cognition.
在每种文化中,我们都会发现,人们会用“只有生物才有灵魂”的说法来区分非生物和生物。例如,心理学名称的来源——古希腊词“psyche”(灵魂)——意为生命的气息。据说,当一位战士死去时,他的灵魂便离开了肉体。“psyche”并非不朽,也不具备任何精神。它既不负责死者,也不负责认知功能。希腊人将这些功能赋予了位于身体其他部位(例如眼睛(感知)或心脏(情感))的大约十几个微型灵魂。由于该理论认为生物是由身体和灵魂两部分构成的,因此被称为二元论。
In every culture, we find that people separate nonliving from living things by saying that only living things have souls. For example, the ancient Greek word psyche, from which psychology takes its name, meant the breath of life. When a warrior died, it was said that his psyche had left his body. Psyche was not immortal and did not carry the personality of the deceased, nor did it perform cognitive functions, which the Greeks assigned to about a dozen mini-souls located in other parts of the body such as the eye (perception) or the heart (emotion). Because it says living beings are made of two things, body and soul, this idea is called dualism.
灵魂作为人整个人格的承载者,承担着道德责任,并能在肉体死亡后继续存在,这一概念似乎最早出现在印度教思想中,并且在除佛教之外的所有世界主要宗教中都有体现。佛教是唯一的例外,它否认灵魂的存在。意识被承认,但被视为一个过程,而非独立于身体之外的事物。由于它与科学唯物主义相容,许多认知科学家对佛教持赞赏态度,并实践佛教正念(Blackmore,2005a,b)。
Soul as a bearer of a person’s entire personality, morally responsible, and capable of surviving bodily death seems to have appeared in Hindu thought and is found in all but one of the great world religions. The exception is Buddhism, which denies the existence of souls. Consciousness is acknowledged but is regarded as a process rather than a thing separate from the body. Because it is compatible with scientific materialism, many cognitive scientists regard Buddhism favorably and practice Buddhist mindfulness (Blackmore, 2005a, b).
除了宗教对心灵或灵魂的理解之外,还有另一种普遍的人类心理学,它不包含形而上学的信仰或关于身体位置的主张。它被称为常识心理学(社会心理学)、民间心理学(哲学)或心智理论(发展心理学)。它非常强大,使我们能够毫不费力地解释行为,是人类重要的适应性特征。
Alongside religious conceptions of the mind, or soul, there is another universal human psychology, without metaphysical commitments or claims about bodily location. It is called common sense psychology (in social psychology), folk psychology (in philosophy), or Theory of Mind (TOM) (in developmental psychology). It’s powerful, giving us the ability to explain behavior with little effort and is an important human adaptation.
请看下面的视频。你看到一个孩子在厨房里,厨房里有两个柜子,一个在左边,一个在右边。孩子从左边的柜子里拿出一个罐子,拿了一些糖果,把罐子放回左边的柜子里,然后离开。另一个孩子进来,从罐子里拿出糖果,放在右边的柜子里。第一个孩子回来后,视频停止,你被问到他会打开哪个柜子去拿糖果罐。成人和四岁以上的儿童会说是左边的柜子,而年龄较小的孩子则说回来的孩子会尝试打开右边的柜子,因为糖果罐实际上就在那里。
Consider the following video. You see a child in a kitchen with two cabinets, one on the left and one on the right. The child gets a jar from the left cabinet, takes some candy, replaces the jar in the left cabinet, and leaves. Another child enters, takes candy from the jar, and places it in the right cabinet. The first child returns, the video is stopped, and you are asked which cabinet the child will open to fetch the candy jar. Adults and children over about age four say that it will be the left cabinet, while younger children say the returning child will try the right cabinet, where the candy jar really is.
在这项错误信念测试1(Bretherton & Beeghly,1982;Wellman,1985;Slaughter,2015)中,年纪较大的参与者表明他们知道其他人有思想,并能将错误的信念归咎于他们。心智理论假设两种心理状态相互作用导致行为。第一种状态是欲望,它为行动提供动机;在这种情况下,它是饥饿或对甜食的享受。另一种状态是信念,即关于世界如何的想法。非常年幼的孩子不会将内心的信念归因于行动者,他们会说回来的孩子会在第二个孩子给的新位置寻找糖果罐。年龄较大的儿童和成人会将一种关于糖果罐最后已知位置的私人心理状态归因于第一个孩子,并预测孩子会根据这种错误信念采取行动。
In this false belief test1 (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Wellman, 1985; Slaughter, 2015), older participants show they know others have minds and can ascribe false beliefs to them. Theory of Mind posits two mental states that interact to cause behavior. The first state is desire, which provides motivation for action; in this case, it is hunger or enjoyment of sweets. The other state is belief, an idea about how the world is. Very young children do not attribute inner beliefs to actors, saying that the returning child will look for the candy jar in the new location given to it by the second child. Older children and adults attribute to the first child a private mental state about the last known location of the candy jar and predict that the child will act upon that mistaken belief.
假设私人心灵的存在,就提出了知识的问题,也就是认知科学的起源。我们可以这样总结这个问题:我们想要知识关于世间万物的认知,而信仰是精神的。因此,真理在于事物与信仰之间的对应。
Positing the existence of private minds raises the problem of knowledge, the origin of cognitive science. We can summarize the problem this way: We want knowledge about things in the world, but beliefs are mental. Truth, therefore, lies in correspondence between things and beliefs.
认知科学的哲学传统始于哲学家苏格拉底(约公元前470-399年)。他定义了知识问题,并将其提升到西方哲学思想的首要地位。
The philosophical tradition leading to cognitive science began with the philosopher Socrates (c. 470–399 BCE). He defined the problem of knowledge and raised it to the paramount position in Western philosophical thought.
知识问题如同硬币,有两面。一面是哲学层面的,由哲学的一个分支——认识论——来探究:什么是知识?知识(即真理)与未经证实的知识候选对象(即观点)之间的区别是什么?硬币的另一面是心理学层面的:心灵通过哪些心理过程获得观念并确定哪些观念是真实的?苏格拉底对这个哲学问题提出了强有力的、具有历史意义的论断,但他对心理学问题则留下了开放的余地,有待进一步探讨。
Like a coin, the problem of knowledge has two sides. One side is philosophical, investigated by the branch of philosophy called epistemology: What is knowledge? What distinguishes knowledge, i.e., truth, from unproven candidates for knowledge, i.e., opinion? The other side of the coin is psychological: By what mental processes does the mind obtain ideas and determine which are true? Socrates made a strong and historically decisive claim on the philosophical question, but he left the psychological question open for development.
苏格拉底的对话者认为,如果一个想法与某事物相对应,那么它就是正确的;因此,如果我说我家有 17 扇窗户,那么这个说法就是正确的,也就是知识,当且仅当我家有 17 扇窗户。然而,苏格拉底拒绝将与事物相对应作为知识的定义。假设我伸手到裤兜里掏出一些硬币,握在拳头里,问你我有多少找零。现在,你可能会猜 77 美分,而且你是对的(三个 25 美分 + 两个 1 美分)。你的猜测(想法)与我手中的找零(事物)的总和相对应,但苏格拉底会说,而且你也可能会同意,你的猜测只是偶然正确。对苏格拉底来说,这意味着一个想法要算作知识,它需要的不仅仅是与世界的对应。
Socrates’ interlocutors suggested that an idea is true if it corresponds to some thing; thus, if I claim I have 17 windows at home, that claim is true, i. e., is knowledge, if and only if my house has 17 windows. Socrates, however, rejected correspondence to things as the definition of knowledge. Suppose I reach into my pants pocket and dig out some coins, holding them in my fist and asking you how much change I have. Now, you might guess 77 cents, and you would be right (three quarters + two pennies). Your guess (idea) corresponds to the sum of the change (things) in my hand but Socrates would say, and you would likely agree, that your guess was only accidentally true. To Socrates, this meant that for an idea to count as knowledge it needs more than just correspondence to the world.
为了说明这一点,苏格拉底做出了一个典型的举动,指向专业知识。如果你想了解美食,你会向谁寻求?一位伟大的厨师。如果你想了解美,你会向谁寻求?一位艺术鉴赏家。如果你想了解正义,你会向谁寻求?一位伟大的法学家。因为他们擅长烹饪、收藏和判断,所以这些专家一定具备烹饪、美和正义的知识,因此应该能够解释善、美和正义。
To show what this is, Socrates makes a characteristic move, pointing to expertise. If you want knowledge of good food, whom do you seek? A great chef. If you seek knowledge of beauty, whom do you seek? An art connoisseur. If you seek knowledge of justice, whom do you seek? A great jurist. Because they cook well, collect well, and judge well, these experts must possess knowledge of cookery, beauty, justice, and should therefore be able to explain the good, the beautiful, and the just.
苏格拉底认识到,厨师、鉴赏家或法官有时难以清晰地表达他们的知识,他贬低这些“专家”只掌握了部分真理。他们做得不错,但却无法向他人证明自己的行为是合理的。重要的是,他不接受正确的行动可能源于直觉,而是坚持认为专家判断依赖于知识,即使这种知识是隐性的,就像在一位无法解释自身行为或决定的专家。他著名的苏格拉底式方法旨在通过一系列深入的问题,引出潜意识的知识。因此,苏格拉底并非将自己描述为真理的教师,而是真理的助产士。
Socrates recognized that sometimes a chef, connoisseur, or judge might have trouble articulating their knowledge, and he disparaged such “experts” as possessing halfway truth. They acted well but could not justify their actions to others. Importantly, he did not accept that right action might flow from intuition but insisted instead that expert judgment depended upon knowledge, even when that knowledge was tacit, as it would be in an expert who could not explain his actions or decisions. His famous Socratic method was designed to draw out unconscious knowledge through a series of penetrating questions. Socrates described himself therefore not as a teacher of truth but as a midwife of truth.
因此,对于苏格拉底来说,知识不是真正的信念,而是明确的、合理的真正信念。
For Socrates, then, knowledge was not true belief but explicit and justifiable true belief.
苏格拉底认识论的另一个重要特征对研究高级认知过程具有重要意义。让我们回到我口袋里的零钱。当你检查我的25美分和1美分硬币时,仔细观察其中一枚25美分硬币,发现它不太对劲;它有点太亮、太轻、太薄,而且一侧还有高顶礼帽的徽章。我似乎在口袋里放了魔术师称之为“掌上硬币”的东西,它和真硬币大小相同,但更容易操纵。乍一看,这似乎只是表象(乍一看像25美分)和现实(哎呀!这不是25美分;别想花掉它!)之间差距的简单例证。你一开始形成了一个无法证实的错误感知信念。
Another important feature of Socrates’ epistemology has important implications for studying the higher cognitive processes. Let’s go back to the change in my pocket. As you inspect my quarters and pennies, a closer look at one of the quarters shows it’s not quite right; it’s a little too shiny, too light, and too thin, and it has a top hat insignia on one side. I seem to have left in my pocket what magicians call a palming coin, made in the same size as a real coin, but easier to manipulate. At first glance, this appears to be a simple illustration of the gap between appearances (it looks like a quarter at first) and reality (oops! It’s not a quarter; don’t try to spend it!). You at first formed a false perceptual belief that could not be justified.
然而,这其中还有更多不为人知的奥秘。苏格拉底可能会问,为什么这枚手掌硬币不是真正的25美分硬币?你可能会说,因为它用了错误的金属,雕刻也错误。但假设我用和美国铸币局一样的白铜合金制造我的手掌硬币,并使用先进的3D打印机制造,使其在各个方面都与美国铸币局的25美分硬币难以区分,材质和外观上没有任何区别,那又如何呢?财政部仍然不会将其视为合法的、可支配的货币,而且它也没有像区块链这样的加密货币的保障。
However, there’s more here than your fooled perception. Why, Socrates might ask, is the palming coin not a real quarter? You would probably say it’s because it’s made of the wrong metal and carries the wrong engravings. But suppose that I made my palming coins out of the same cupro-nickel alloy as the US Mint, and used an advanced 3-D printer to manufacture the coin so that in every physical aspect it was indistinguishable from a US Mint quarter, there being no differences whatsoever in material or appearances? The Treasury Department would still not regard it as legitimate, spendable money, and it’s not guaranteed by blockchain-like cryptocurrencies.
苏格拉底认为,知识有两种类型,分别对应不同的认知对象。一种是感知性知识,主要针对具体事物,例如我口袋里的硬币或视频中的猫。另一种是有关对象所属类别的知识,例如 QUARTER、COIN 或 CAT。哲学中,这些对象和类别的名称是个体(或特有的)和普遍的。如今,哲学家倾向于使用token来表示个体,使用type来表示普遍的。因此,每个实体的 25 美分硬币都是 QUARTER 和 COIN 类型的 token,而每只猫都是 CAT 类型的 token。
Socrates saw that there are two types of knowledge having different objects to be known. There’s the largely perceptual knowledge of particular things, such as the coins in my pocket or a cat in a video. On the other hand, there is knowledge of the classes to which objects belong, such as QUARTER, COIN, or CAT. The names used in philosophy for these objects and classes are individuals (or particulars) and universals. Today, philosophers tend to use the terms token for individuals and type for universals. Thus, every physical quarter is a token of the types QUARTER and COIN, and every cat is a token of the type CAT.
苏格拉底说,最完美的知识是关于普遍性的知识。科学定律并非只适用于少数对象。牛顿将他的万有引力定律称为普遍引力定律,适用于宇宙中任何质量的任何两个物体。然而,普遍性的存在使得知识必须被真信念所证实的要求变得复杂。苏格拉底在处理专业知识时看到了这个问题。一位鉴赏家说,一座希腊的库罗斯(年轻人的雕像)很美,莫奈的睡莲很美,或者一次高难度的达阵接球非常漂亮。它们有什么共同点,使它们成为“美丽”这一通用类别的成员?
The most perfect knowledge, said Socrates, is knowledge of universals. The laws of science do not apply only to a few objects. Newton called his law of gravity the universal law of gravity, applying to any two objects of any mass anywhere in the universe. However, the existence of universals complicates the requirement that knowledge be justified true belief. Socrates saw the problem when dealing with expertise. A connoisseur says that a Greek kuros (statue of a young man) is beautiful, that Monet’s water lilies are beautiful, or a difficult touchdown catch was beautiful. What do they have in common that makes them members of the universal category BEAUTY?
普遍性问题对于认知科学本身及其应用都至关重要。动物是否拥有普遍的概念,还是它们只对即时刺激做出反应?儿童拥有学习语言的动力,语言中蕴含着丰富的普遍术语,他们几乎无需任何指导就能掌握。这种动力来自何处?儿童如何从几个月的特定经历中形成普遍的观念?普遍性是否局限于特定文化?还是像许多人认为的人权一样,它们真正具有人类的普遍性?如果人工智能 (AI) 真的能够像人类一样思考和决策,我们如何对它们进行编程,使它们能够理解我们自身往往难以理解的东西?它们能学会成为专家吗?或者成为有道德的战士吗?
The problem of universals is important for cognitive science both as science and as application. Do animals have universal concepts or do they respond only to immediate stimuli? Children possess a drive to acquire language, which is rich in universal terms, and they pick it up with minimal teaching. Where does the drive come from and how do children arrive at their universal ideas from a few months of particular experiences? Are universals parochial to cultures or are they truly universally human, as many people believe human rights are? If artificial intelligence (AI) is to truly be able to think and decide as humans do, how do we program them to know what we often only dimly grasp ourselves; can they learn to be experts? Or ethical soldiers?
苏格拉底给认知科学留下了诸多难题。他的学生柏拉图(约公元前429-347年)将苏格拉底的洞见、传统希腊关于灵魂的观念,以及刚刚渗入希腊世界的印度教宗教观念融合在一起,形成了一个强大的框架,用于思考心灵、身体和知识,并延续了数千年。
Socrates bequeathed a tangle of problems to cognitive science. His student Plato (c. 429–347 BCE) melded Socratic insights, traditional Greek ideas about souls, and Hindu religious notions just infiltrating the Greek world into a powerful framework for thinking about mind, body, and knowledge that endured for millennia.
很少有认知科学家读过柏拉图,但他的思想却深深植根于我们的思想,以至于在不知不觉中影响着科学。我们研习古典学的意义,就像佩恩和泰勒揭示了一个伟大的魔术:有时,了解秘密会让魔术更加令人印象深刻。
Few cognitive scientists have read Plato, but his ideas are so deeply embedded in our thought that they influence science unconsciously. The point of our exercise in the classics is like Penn and Teller revealing a great magic trick: Sometimes knowing the secret makes the trick more impressive.
苏格拉底和柏拉图经历了伯罗奔尼撒战争最激烈的时期,柏拉图对人类性格的描述中也蕴含着军事色彩。贵族武士传统上乘坐战车前往战场,尽管他们徒步作战。柏拉图告诉我们,从心理上来说,我们也是战车。身体是战车,两匹马和车夫是栖息在战车内的微型灵魂。
Socrates and Plato lived through the most dramatic years of the Peloponnesian wars, and there’s a military aspect to Plato’s description of human personality. Aristocratic warriors traditionally rode chariots to the place of battle, though they fought on foot, and Plato tells us that psychologically we are chariots, too. The body is the chariot, and its two horses and its driver are the mini-souls dwelling within.
最重要的灵魂是位于头部的理性灵魂。它是不朽的,死后离开肉体升入天堂,并会轮回转世。理性灵魂(理想情况下)控制并引导另外两个灵魂,即精神灵魂和欲望灵魂,它们分别位于胸部和腹部及生殖器,与马匹相对应。由于它们拉着战车,马匹灵魂提供了人格的动力能量,但它们的方面有所不同。精神灵魂的动机是名誉和荣耀,这是前现代战士的传统财富。柏拉图将精神灵魂——马——描绘成美丽且易于控制的,因为它至少想要一件好事——名誉,并且应该很容易被引导到其他美好的事物,例如正义。另一方面,欲望灵魂被描绘成丑陋而不羁,要求立即满足动物身体最基本的欲望:食物、饮料和性。它必须被无情地束缚,被无情地殴打,直到它被迫接受理性的统治,尽管这总是充满困难。
The most important soul is the rational soul, located in the head. It is immortal, leaves the body for heaven at death, and will be reincarnated. The rational soul (ideally) controls and directs the other two souls, the spirited soul and the desiring soul, corresponding to the horses and located in the chest and in the belly and genitals, respectively. Because they pull the chariot, the horse souls provide the motivational energy of the personality, but their aspects are different. The spirited soul’s motives are fame and glory, the traditional goods of premodern warriors. Plato depicts the spirited soul-horse as beautiful and easy to control, because it wants at least one good thing, fame, and should be easy to guide to other good things such as justice. The desiring soul, on the other hand, is depicted as ugly and unruly, demanding immediate gratification of the basest desires of the animal body, food, drink, and sex. It must be reined in ruthlessly and beaten mercilessly until it is forced to accede to be ruled, albeit always with difficulty, by reason.
柏拉图的心理学对于认知科学有两点启示。
Plato’s psychology has two implications for cognitive science.
柏拉图深化并整理了其老师关于认知挑战、表象与现实之间的差距以及个体与普遍性之间难以捉摸的关系的洞见。在他最具影响力的著作《理想国》中,柏拉图提出了几个隐喻来阐述他的知识理论。其中之一就是“线的隐喻”(图1.1)。
Plato sharpened and codified his teacher’s insights about the challenges of cognition, the gap between appearance and reality and the elusive relationship between individuals and universals. In his most influential work, The Republic, Plato proposed several metaphors to display his theory of knowledge. One of them is the Metaphor of the Line (Figure 1.1).
苏格拉底在户外授课时,在沙地上画了一条垂直线,标出感知或已知的事物(线左侧)与表征这些事物的心理状态(线右侧)之间的区别。然后,他用一条水平线将垂直线一分为二,水平线下方是感知到的事物及其心理表征,上方是已知事物及其心理表征。
Teaching outdoors, Socrates drew a vertical line in the sand to mark the difference between objects perceived or known, on the left side of the line, from the corresponding mental states that represent them to us, on the right side of the line. He then bisected the vertical line with a horizontal that marked things perceived and their mental representations, below the line, from things known and their mental representations, above it.
最贫乏的知识对象是图像,比如水中的倒影。一位爱开玩笑的人曾经说过,护照能让你到处旅行而不被人认出来。一个相关的问题是多对一问题,即个体与普遍性之间的区别。即使在我们一致认同的照片中,你也会因为年龄、体重、发型或面部表情的变化而显得不同。你的照片版本有很多,但你只有一个,我们想了解你,而不是你的照片。Instagram 和 Zoom 滤镜会撒谎。
The poorest objects of knowledge are images, such as reflections in water. A wag once said that a passport lets you travel everywhere unrecognized. A related problem is the many-to-one problem, the distinction between individuals and universals. You look different even in photos that we agree really look like you, across changes in age, weight, hairstyle, or facial expression. There are many image versions of you, but only one you, and we want to know you, not your images. Instagram and Zoom filters lie.
看到一个人或一个物体,就像苏格拉底知识阶梯上的一个阶梯,它引发的是信念而非想象。但感觉会产生知觉,即对世界物体的心理图像,而感觉是一种不可信的身体过程。想象一下,在一个冬夜,两个人进入一个有暖气的房间。A 一直在楼下给煤炉加煤,炉子的温度是 100 华氏度(约 37 摄氏度)。B 从外面进来,炉子的温度是 0 华氏度(约 0 摄氏度)。A 会觉得房间凉爽宜人,而 B 会觉得房间温暖宜人。但究竟是凉爽还是温暖呢?A 和 B 由于身体的物理状态不同,对房间的感知也不同:每个人都知道自己的私人体验;但他们都无法感知房间的真实温度。由于经验取决于我们(不可靠的物理)身体的状态,经验不会导致真正的信念,而只会改善观点。多对一问题仍然存在。正如你有许多图像版本一样,也有许多实体猫,每只猫都是独一无二的,但我们用一个术语“猫”来概括它们。
Seeing a person or an object is a step-up Socrates’ ladder of knowledge, causing beliefs rather than imaginings. But sensations create perceptions, mental pictures of objects in the world, and sensation is a bodily process not to be trusted. Think of two people entering a heated room one winter night. Person A has been downstairs stoking a coal furnace where the temperature was 100 degrees. Person B enters from outside where the temperature was 0 degrees. A will find the room pleasantly cool, while B will find it pleasantly warm. But which is it, cool or warm? A and B sense the room differently because of the different physical states of their bodies: Each knows their private experience; neither senses the True temperature of the room. Because experience depends on the state of our (unreliable physical) bodies, experience does not cause true belief, only improved opinion. The many-to-one problem remains, too. Just as there are many image versions of you, there are many physical cats each of which is unique, yet we apply one term, CAT, to all of them.
此时,柏拉图和苏格拉底的许多学生陷入了困境,因为似乎无法弥合可错经验与认识论真理之间的鸿沟。事实上,苏格拉底的大多数追随者认为,真正的知识并非人类所能获得,于是他们成为了怀疑论者(不完全相信任何事物)、愤世嫉俗者(不信任社会),以及后来的实用主义者(真理就是有用的,不追求真理)。
At this point, Plato and many of Socrates’ students faced an impasse because there seemed no way to overcome the gap between fallible experience and epistemological Truth. Indeed, most of Socrates’ followers concluded that genuine knowledge was not attainable by human beings and became skeptics (don’t believe anything 100%), cynics (don’t trust society), or, later, pragmatists (truth is what works, and don’t ask for Truth).
然而,学习毕达哥拉斯几何学却让柏拉图解答了苏格拉底怀疑论的难题:存在一个由普遍性构成的非物质现实,它们可以被非物质的理性灵魂所认知。在高中几何课上,你可能证明了勾股定理,即以直角三角形斜边(c )为界的正方形面积等于其余三边( a和b )的平方和,即 a2 + b2 = c2 。你并没有依靠观察来证明这个定理。你可能画了一个三角形来帮助你思考,但它在逐步展开证明的过程中并没有发挥任何作用。你也没有使用科学方法。你没有从同学那里收集 30 张三角形图像,仔细地在各个边上竖立正方形,测量它们,计算它们的面积,并检查这些值是否符合方程 a2 + b2 = c2 ,在某个测量标准误差 p < 0.05 的范围内。2
Learning Pythagorean geometry, however, gave Plato an answer to the Socratic skeptical conundrum: There is a non-physical reality populated by universals, and they are knowable by the non-physical rational soul. In high school geometry you probably proved the Pythagorean Theorem, that the area of a square erected on the hypotenuse (c) of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the remaining sides (a and b), that is a2 + b2 = c2. You did not rely on observations to produce the proof. You may have drawn a triangle to help you think, but it played no part in the step-by-step unfolding of the proof. Nor did you use the scientific method. You did not collect 30 images of triangles from your classmates, carefully erect squares on all sides, measure them, calculate their areas, and check to see if the values fit the equation a2 + b2 = c2 within some standard error of measurement, p < 0.05.2
你的证明是基于几何学的第一原理或公理的逻辑推导,没有受到任何感觉的污染。简而言之,这是纯粹理性和逻辑灵魂的体现。对柏拉图来说,最重要的是,你提供的是一个真正的证明,它确立了勾股定理并非一个可错的观点,而是一个必然真理,对任何能够理解其逻辑的人来说都是令人信服的。苏格拉底已经表明,知识本身并非信念比观点更需要有理有据。柏拉图现在断言,理据是逻辑证明,而非经验观察。
Your proof was a logical deduction from the first principles, or axioms, of geometry, uncontaminated by sensation. In short, it was a pure act of the rational, logical soul. Most importantly for Plato, what you produced was a real proof that established the Pythagorean Theorem not as a fallible opinion but as a necessary Truth compelling to anyone capable of following its logic. Socrates had shown that to be knowledge rather than opinion a belief had to be justifiable. Plato now asserted that justification was logical proof rather than empirical observation.
然而,多对一的问题依然存在。你画的三角形,你同学画的三角形,或者任何人画的三角形,都是一个固定不变的直角三角形的有缺陷的复制品。柏拉图大胆地宣称,这种众多个体与一个真实模型(或形式)的关系适用于世间万物。
The many-to-one problem, however, remained. Your drawn triangle, your classmates’ drawn triangles, or anybody’s drawn triangles are individual flawed copies of a single fixed and eternal, Right-Angled Triangle. Plato boldly proclaimed that this relationship of many individuals to one True model, or Form, applies to everything in the world.
柏拉图给他的继承者们留下了一个指导框架,用于思考观点与知识之间、人类思想与身体之间以及追求真理之间的关系。
Plato bequeathed to his successors a guiding framework for thinking about the relationships between opinion and knowledge and between the human mind and body and the pursuit of Truth.
现在,我们可以把焦点从知识问题——什么是知识?——转移到认知科学中关于知识的问题——人类思维是如何获取知识的?我们将从大多数人认为是常识的认知——即知者与被知者之间的关系——开始。
We can now shift our focus from questions about knowledge—what is knowledge?—to the cognitive science question about knowledge—how does the human mind acquire knowledge? We will begin with an account of cognition—the relation between knower and known—that most people hold as a matter of common sense.
由于它是大多数人的常识性认知理论,哲学家们将这种版本的认知科学称为朴素实在论。然而,事实上,在苏格拉底之前,它已经被几位思想家发展成为一种知觉的因果理论,包括医生恩培多克勒(约公元前492-432年)和阿尔克迈翁(约公元前475年),以及哲学家和原子论的提出者德谟克利特(约公元前460-370年)。
Because it is the common sense cognitive theory of most people, philosophers call this version of cognitive science naïve realism. However, it had, in fact, been developed as a causal theory of perception by several thinkers before Socrates, the physicians Empedocles (c. 492–432 BCE) and Alcmaeon (c. 475 BCE) and the philosopher and proposer of atomism Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE).
德谟克利特认为物体由原子构成,并认为每个原子都是更大物体的微小复制品。他的认知理论提出,被称为“eidola” (意为“灵”)的原子源自物体,漂浮于空间,并进入人类和其他动物的血液。然后,它们被带到心脏。德谟克利特和大多数希腊人一样,认为心脏是意识的源泉。心脏的跳动将各种“eidola”融合在一起,产生了意识和思维。尽管德谟克利特将自己的理论以科学的形式呈现,但他却悄悄地采用了认识论的实在论,因为它断言,我们通过假设感知的准确性(反过来,假设“eidola”是物体的复制品)来感知世界,从而无误地看到了世界。
Democritus believed that objects were comprised of atoms and thought that each atom was a tiny copy of the larger object. His theory of cognition proposed that atoms called eidola emanated from objects, floated through space, and entered the bloodstream of humans and other animals. They were then carried to the heart, which Democritus, like most Greeks, regarded as the seat of consciousness. The heart’s beating mixed the eidola together to produce awareness and thinking. Although he presented his theory as science, Democritus quietly adopted epistemological realism because it asserted that we see the world as it really is, without error, by assuming that perception is accurate by assuming, in turn, that eidola are copies of objects.
柏拉图自己的认知科学与朴素现实主义截然相反,它相当超脱世俗。它之所以被称为唯心主义,是因为柏拉图认为,最终的永恒现实并非我们周围的物质世界,以及我们头顶之上的天国形式世界。对于柏拉图和《X档案》来说,真理就在那里。柏拉图式的唯心论者不相信感官,因为它们是易犯错的身体过程,它们会给我们关于物理对象的有缺陷的信息,而这些物理对象本身并不完全类似于形式,它们是形式有缺陷的复制品。
Plato’s own cognitive science is the opposite of naïve realism and is rather otherworldly. It’s called idealism because Plato says that the ultimate permanent reality is not the physical world around us but the heavenly world of Forms above us. For Plato and the X Files, the Truth is up there. The Platonic idealist does not trust the senses because they are fallible bodily processes giving us flawed information about physical objects that themselves do not properly resemble the Forms of which they are flawed copies.
在柏拉图的多篇对话录中,他的代言人苏格拉底都被问及,如果不通过观察,如何才能认识“形式”。苏格拉底提出了两条通往知识的途径。我们已经提到过其中一条,即通过数学,而数学是柏拉图理想共和国精英统治者教育的重要组成部分。然而,从心理学的角度来看,柏拉图认为只有精英才能掌握“形式”的知识,而且这需要长期的专业教育,这种观点存在问题。
In various of his dialogues, Plato’s spokesman, Socrates, is asked how the Forms can be known if not through observation. Socrates offered two paths to knowledge. We have alluded to one already, a path through mathematics, and mathematics was a key part of the education of the elite rulers of his ideal Republic. From a psychological perspective, however, there is a problem with Plato’s notion that only the elite can possess knowledge of the Forms, and that doing so requires lengthy, specialized education.
普通儿童很快就能轻松掌握语言,能够正确区分和命名猫和狗、马和牛、岩石和河流。柏拉图让苏格拉底提出另一种理论,认为对“形”的认知是与生俱来的,这借鉴了印度教的轮回论。人死后,灵魂会升入天堂,在“形”中居住一段时间,用理性的灵魂而非肉体直接感知它们。轮回之后,对“形”的认知会被肉体的邪恶需求所遮蔽和压抑,灵魂会忘记它在天堂学到的知识。
Ordinary children quickly and with little effort acquire language, becoming able to correctly distinguish and name cats and dogs, horses and cows, rocks and rivers. Plato has Socrates offer another theory, that knowledge of the forms is innate, borrowing from the Hindu thesis of reincarnation. When you die, your soul goes to heaven and dwells for a while amidst the Forms, seeing them directly with the rational soul rather than the body. Upon reincarnation, knowledge of the Forms is obscured and repressed by the wicked demands of the body, and the soul forgets what it learned in Heaven.
然而,这种知识仍然处于潜伏状态,并通过联想学习逐渐被激活。由于物体与其形态部分相似,看到一只猫会略微唤醒关于猫形态的先天知识,而看到一棵树则会略微唤醒关于树形态的先天知识。最终,形态会完全活跃起来,引导对世界的有效认知。由此开启了心理学中最古老的争论——先天与后天之争,柏拉图主张先天观点,而他的学生亚里士多德则持后天观点。
However, that knowledge remains latent, and is gradually activated by associative learning. Because objects partially resemble their Forms, seeing a cat slightly awakens the innate knowledge of the Form of CAT, while seeing a tree slightly awakens the Form of TREE. Eventually, the Forms become fully active, and guide effective knowledge of the world. Here began the oldest debate in psychology, the nature/nurture question, with Plato upholding a version of the nature side. His student Aristotle took the nurture view.
亚里士多德(公元前384-322年)虽然师从柏拉图,但他本质上是一位科学家。他的座右铭是让事实指导我们的理论,解决我们的争议。他没有老师那种宗教和神秘主义的一面。因此,在拉斐尔的名画《雅典学院》(约公元1510年)中,柏拉图指向上方的形式,在那里可以找到真理,而亚里士多德则指向下方,指向我们世界的实践知识。
Although Aristotle (384–322 BCE) studied with Plato, he was fundamentally a scientist. His motto was to let facts guide our theories and settle our disputes. He did not have his teacher’s religious cum mystical side. Thus, in Raphael’s famous painting The School of Athens (c. 1510 CE), Plato points upward to the Forms where Truth is to be found, while Aristotle points down to practical knowledge of our world.
亚里士多德相信感官,但他意识到朴素实在论过于相信经验。因此,他提出了一种对人类经验的心理学解释,以证明他的哲学主张:正确运用感知可以证明真实的信念(图1.2)。
Aristotle trusted the senses but realized that naïve realism put too much faith in experience. Therefore, he proposed a psychological account of human experience to justify his philosophical claim that rightly used, perception could justify true beliefs (Figure 1.2).
从认识论的角度来看,他的关键举措是将感觉与知觉区分开来。德谟克利特的朴素实在论断言,当一个物体的幻象进入我们的血液时,我们会在瞬间在精神上把握住这个物体。然而,亚里士多德认为经验是一个漫长的建构和解释过程。它始于特殊的,或者更好的说法是专门的视觉、听觉、触觉、味觉和嗅觉,可以记录感知对象的特定方面。
From an epistemological perspective, his key move is separating sensation from perception. Democritus’ naïve realism asserted that when the eidolon of an object enters our bloodstream, we mentally grasp that object in a single moment. Aristotle, however, sees experience as a drawn-out constructive and interpretive process. It begins with the special, or, better, specialized, senses of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, which register particular aspects of a perceived object.
该物体尚未被分类;这项工作留给常识,即各种特殊感官的输出组合成一幅完整物体的图像。在提出常识时,亚里士多德正在处理认知神经科学中所谓的绑定问题。视觉始于视网膜中的光激活细胞,它们的神经输出被处理到大脑后部的视觉皮层。听觉始于耳蜗中细胞的刺激,它们的输出被处理到听觉皮层,其他感官也是如此。尚未解决的问题是大脑如何将这些独立的区域绑定在一起形成意识。
The object is not yet categorized; that job is left to common sense, where the outputs of the special senses combine into a picture of the complete object. In positing common sense, Aristotle is dealing with what’s called in cognitive neuroscience the binding problem. Vision begins with light activating cells in the retina whose neural outputs are processed to the visual cortex in the back of the brain. Hearing begins with stimulation of the cells in the cochlea, whose output is processed to the auditory cortex, and so on for the other senses. The still unsolved problem is how the brain binds these separate areas together into consciousness.
因此,感觉——对感官信息片段的记录——与知觉(将一组感官识别为猫或狗)是分离的且先于知觉。这种心理学上的区别使亚里士多德能够为经验作为通往知识的途径进行辩护。这里有一个基于亚里士多德的例子。我的女儿贝丝在弗吉尼亚联邦大学主修艺术,我们很自然地会在校园里见面。然而,有另一个艺术系的学生长得非常像贝丝,有时我差点挥手叫她的名字,却发现我看到的人不是贝丝,而是她的分身。乍一看,这个例子似乎支持对经验准确性的怀疑,但亚里士多德指出,我的特殊感官都是正确的:我看到了一个特定身高、特定头发颜色等等的年轻女子。错误在于我做出了认知判断,认为常识拼凑在一起的感官片段构成了贝丝。
Sensation—the registering of pieces of sensory information—is thus separate from and prior to perception, the recognition of a collection of sensations as a cat or a dog. This psychological distinction allows Aristotle to mount a defense of experience as a path to knowledge. Here’s an example based on one given by Aristotle. My daughter Beth was an art major at Virginia Commonwealth University, and we would naturally see each other around campus. However, there was another art student who looked very much like Beth, and sometimes I would nearly wave and call Beth’s name only to realize that the person I saw was not Beth but her doppelganger. At first glance, this example seems to support skepticism about the accuracy of experience, but Aristotle pointed out that my special senses were all correct: I saw a young woman of a particular height, a particular hair color, and so on. The error was the cognitive judgment I made that the sensory pieces assembled together by common sense constituted Beth.
与柏拉图相反,原始感觉是准确可靠的;错误知觉并非源于感觉,而是思维根据组合起来的知觉进行推理时产生的错误。常识在我们心中构建了由特殊感官的输出组合而成的经验对象的表征,我们用这些表征进行思考,并思考这些表征。柏拉图拒绝经验太过极端。我们需要警惕的是大脑根据输入得出的结论,而不是输入本身。
Contra Plato, raw sensation is accurate and reliable; misperception occurs not in sensation, but when thinking makes inferential errors from the assembled percept. Common sense creates in us representations of experienced objects assembled from the outputs of the special senses, and we think with and about these representations. Plato’s rejection of experience was too extreme. We need to beware the conclusions our minds reach given its inputs, not the inputs themselves.
感知到的物体的表征会被传递到想象力,想象力指的是心灵即使在没有物体的情况下也能将感知保持在意识中的能力。然后,图像可以存储在记忆中,以供日后检索。常识、想象力和记忆构成了内在感官,因为它们都与感官体验的各个方面有关,无论是第一手的(常识),还是短期的(想象)或长期的(记忆)。动物和人类的心灵都具有这些能力。动物,即使是我们最亲近的亲戚——类人猿,也会在发现和记忆世界时了解和应对它,但它们不会构建普遍的概念(Tomasello,2019)。猫会追逐老鼠、田鼠和鼩鼱,还会追逐弹珠和激光点,但它们不会创造这些概念。
Representations of perceived objects are passed to the mental faculty of imagination, which refers to the ability of the mind to hold a percept in consciousness even in the absence of the object. The image can then be stored in memory, becoming available for later retrieval. Common sense, imagination, and memory comprised the interior senses because they all dealt with aspects of sensory experience, either at first hand (common sense) or in short-term (imagination) or long-term (memory) memory. They are shared by animal and human minds. Animals, even our closest relatives, the great apes, know and cope with the world as they find it and remember it, but they do not construct universal concepts (Tomasello, 2019). Cats chase mice, voles, and shrews, plus marbles and laser dots, but they don’t create the concepts.
亚里士多德与柏拉图都认为,从有限的个体经验中形成普遍概念的能力是人类心灵的独特力量。他将心灵分为两种能力:主动心灵和被动心灵。粗略地说,主动心灵包含一系列过程,这些过程会记录不同个体之间的异同,构建每个个体的程式化图像,然后将其存储在被动心灵中。普遍性知识必须通过学习获得。
Aristotle shared with Plato the idea that the ability to form universal concepts from the limited experience of individuals is the unique power of the human mind. He divided mind into two faculties, active mind and passive. Roughly speaking, active mind comprises a set of processes that note similarities and differences between various individual cats, dogs, and so on, building up stylized pictures of each that are then stored in passive mind. Knowledge of universals must be learned.
亚里士多德的认知心理学采用了现代认知科学的一个关键策略,即解释分解。以记忆为例。我们(和动物)会记住事物,但亚里士多德并没有提出一个单一的记忆系统,而是提出了两个以不同方式组织起来的记忆系统:动物记忆和被动思维。它们类似于一种重要的现代记忆类型学(Tulving,1972),介于情景(或自传体)记忆和语义记忆(或知识)之间。动物记忆储存了由常识和想象力整合的先前经验。当被要求回忆一段个人记忆时,比如“你的第一只宠物是什么?”,你会回溯多年,找到一张比如你的宠物狗乔的图像。情景记忆的组织原则是时间,找到正确时代的图像来回忆。另一方面,如果我问你什么是狗,时间并不重要。相反,被动思维的组织原则是意义——能够将乔归类为狗和宠物这两个普遍概念的成员。重要的是,我们发现,与我们的直觉相反,我们并没有一个包罗万象的记忆系统,而是至少有两个。
Aristotle’s cognitive psychology adopts a key strategy of modern cognitive science, explanatory decomposition. Consider memory. We (and animals) remember things, but instead of positing a single MEMORY system, Aristotle posits two, which are organized in different ways: Animal memory and passive mind. They resemble an important modern typology (Tulving, 1972) of memory, between episodic (or autobiographical) memory and semantic memory (or knowledge). Animal memory stores previous experiences integrated by the faculties of common sense and imagination. Asked to recall a personal memory, such as “What was your first pet?”, you search back through the years to find an image of, say, your pet dog, Joe. The organizing principle of episodic memory is time, finding the right era’s images to recall. On the other hand, if I ask you what a dog is, time is unimportant. Instead, the organizing principle of passive mind is meaning—being able to classify Joe as a member of the universal concepts DOG and PET. Importantly, we see that, contrary to our intuition, we don’t have one all-encompassing memory system, but at least two.
迄今为止,古代认识论的一个共同特征是知识以感知为模型。对德谟克利特学派而言,知识的对象实际上是一个在心中翻腾的原子物理复制品。对柏拉图而言,我们的灵魂在天堂中看到了形式本身。对亚里士多德而言,活跃的思维构建了普遍性的猫和狗的图景。在被动思维中。从认识论的角度看,这三个体系都认为,当心理图像与现实世界中对应的对象相匹配时,真理就会出现。
A common feature of ancient epistemologies so far is knowledge being modeled on perception. For the Democritean, the object of knowledge was literally an atomic physical copy sluicing around in the heart. For Plato, our souls see the Forms themselves in heaven. For Aristotle, the active mind builds up pictures of the universals CAT and DOG in passive mind. Epistemologically, all three systems say truth happens when a mental picture matches up with the corresponding object in the world.
斯多葛主义( Epictetus,2019)是一种古老的哲学,如今因其对日常生活和伦理道德的解读而广受欢迎。它提供了一种全新的认识论方法。斯多葛学派认为,真理是我们用语言表达的一种关系,而非某个物体的图像复制。例如,猫的图像既非真亦非假,它仅仅是一个存在。为了探究认识论,我们必须描述一些关于猫的内容,例如“我收容所里的新宠物科伦拜恩是一只猫”,或者“这只猫在垫子上”,或者“所有的猫都有尾巴”。这些都是断言、命题,可以被检验并赋予真值,在本例中为真、假(刚才)和假(马恩岛猫没有尾巴)。
An ancient philosophy now popular for its approach to daily living and ethics,3 Stoicism (Epictetus, 2019) offered a novel approach to epistemology. Stoics proposed that truth is a relation we express in language, not an image-copy of an object. An image of, for example, a cat is neither true nor false, it simply is. We have to say something about the cat to venture into epistemology, such as “My new shelter pet, Columbine, is a cat,” or “The cat is on the mat,” or, “All cats have tails.” These are assertions, propositions, which can be tested and assigned truth-values, in this case True, False (just now), and False (Manx cats have no tails).
早期希腊认识论中笨拙的形象化特征消失了。科伦拜恩的特殊感官特征,例如大小和颜色,对于她是一只猫的断言来说无关紧要;垫子的颜色、大小和编织方式也无关紧要,我们只需找到一只天生没有尾巴的猫,就能证伪最后一个命题。从认识论中去除形象化也有好处。首先,它有助于我们处理诸如“善”之类的抽象概念。柏拉图说,“善”是最高形式,类似于太阳,但这是一个模糊的比喻,并没有告诉我们太多信息,反而会引发误导性的想法;“善”是否炽热,因此危险?其次,专注于语言会削弱感知在确定真理中的作用。例如,人们可以通过多种感官方式了解到明天会下雪。你可以在收音机里听到;你可以在电视节目下方的爬行器上阅读;你可以在天气预报雷达图上看到天气预报的展开;你或许可以用盲文阅读。预测的实用性和可能的真实性取决于它所包含的信息,而不是传达它的视觉、听觉和感觉。
The awkward pictorial aspect of earlier Greek epistemology falls away. Columbine’s particular sensory features such as size and color don’t matter to the assertion that she is a cat; the color, size, and weave of the mat are extraneous as well, and all we need to do to falsify the last proposition is find one cat that naturally has no tail. Dropping pictures from epistemology has benefits. First, it helps us deal with abstract concepts such as The Good. Plato says that The Good is the highest Form and resembles the sun, but this is a vague metaphor that doesn’t tell us much and suggests misleading thoughts; is The Good fiery hot and therefore dangerous? Second, focusing on language reduces the role of perception in determining truth. One could learn, for example, that it’s going to snow tomorrow by many sensory modalities. You could hear it on the radio; you could read it on a crawler underneath a TV show; you could see the prediction unfold on a predictive weather radar map; you might read it in Braille. What counts for the prediction’s usefulness and possible truth is the information it contains, not the sights, sounds, and feels that convey it.
“信息”一词将我们引向斯多葛学派思想中最重要的方面:思考即计算,即通过形式规则对表征进行操控。因为不仅文字比图像更抽象,而且文字本身也可以被更抽象的符号所取代。请思考以下命题断言。
The word information takes us to the most important aspect of the Stoic idea, that thinking is computation, the manipulation of representations by formal rules. For not only are words more abstract than pictures, but also words themselves can be replaced by even more abstract tokens. Consider these propositional assertions.
这些句子虽然每个都关乎不同的事物,但都遵循一个通用的逻辑形式:如果p,那么q,并且对它们的推理也遵循相同的步骤。例如,如果我们得知p为真,我们就可以推断q也为真,无论断言的内容如何。我们既可以用数字,也可以用思想来计算。
Each of these sentences is about something different, but all follow a universal logical form, if p, then q, and reasoning about them will follow the same steps. For example, if we learn that p is true, we can infer that q is also true, regardless of the content of the assertion. We can compute with ideas as well as numbers.
我曾试图回避形而上学,但形而上学的思想引发了人们对人类在自然界中地位的普遍反思,并使认知心理学不仅成为一门可能的科学,而且成为一门重要的科学。第一个变化,关于共相的本质(多对一问题),削弱了认识论的权威,反过来提升了心理学的权威。第二个变化,认识到许多人类感觉是精神创造而非物理事实,创造了一个新的探索世界——意识的内在世界。第三个变化,机器思维的兴起,创造了现代科学和人工智能。
I have tried to avoid metaphysics, but metaphysical ideas set in motion a general rethink of the place of humans in nature, and they made cognitive psychology not just a possible science, but also an important one. The first change, about the nature of universals (the many-to-one problem) drained epistemology of its authority, elevating, in turn, the authority of psychology. The second, the realization that many human sensations were mental creations rather than physical facts, created a new world for exploration—the inner world of consciousness. The third, the rise of machine-thinking, created modern science and artificial intelligence.
柏拉图主义和亚里士多德主义都信奉一种名为形而上学实在论的学说,这与感知实在论不同。他们相信,普遍性的形式(柏拉图)或本质(亚里士多德)独立于人类思维,真实存在(即真实存在)。如果没有人类,那么CAT和OAK将存在于理念领域。现在翻译为形式的希腊词最初是ιδεα。
Platonism and Aristotelianism were both committed to a doctrine called metaphysical realism, which is not the same as perceptual realism. They believed that the Forms (Plato) or the essences (Aristotle) of universals actually existed (i.e., were real) independent of human thought. Were there no people, the CAT and the OAK would exist in the realm of ideas. The Greek word now translated as Form was originally ιδεα.
现实主义一直是形而上学的教条,直到 14 世纪,威廉·奥卡姆(约 1285/87-1347 年)等思想家将亚里士多德对共相的心理分析推向了更高的境界。亚里士多德说,人类思维会注意到它所遇到的对象之间的相似点和不同点,并形成 CAT 或 OAK 的普遍抽象概念。奥卡姆和其他激进的亚里士多德主义者认为,没有理由相信我们的抽象心理概念对应于思维之外的任何事物,这些概念是帮助我们思考的发明概念。新观点被称为名义主义:共相是我们赋予概念的名称。这样,希腊语ιδεα就变成了英语idea、法语idée和德语Idee;精神对象,而不是天体对象。奥卡姆的提议也是他的剃刀原理的一个例子,该原理认为,如果简单的理论和复杂的理论同样有效,人们应该选择简单的理论而不是复杂的理论。
Realism was dogma in metaphysics until the 14th century, when thinkers such as William of Ockham (c. 1285/87–1347) pushed Aristotle’s psychological analysis of universals farther than he had. Aristotle said that the human mind noted similarities and differences among the objects it encountered and formed universal, abstract concepts of CAT or OAK. Ockham and other radical Aristotelians argued that there was no warrant to believe that our abstract mental concepts correspond to anything outside the mind, being invented concepts that help us think. The new view was called nominalism: Universals are names we give to concepts. In this way, Greek ιδεα became English idea, French idée, and German Idee; mental objects, not heavenly OBJECTS. Ockham’s proposal is also an example of his Razor, the principle that one should prefer simpler theories to complex ones if both work equally well.
认知科学的结果是形而上学失去了权威。不再存在一个超越真理的领域,可以用来衡量人类的概念。认识论成为了认知科学的一部分,它进行自我批判,探寻心智如何以最佳方式构建知识;而认知心理学则研究我们如何自然地构建知识。
The upshot for cognitive science was that metaphysics lost its authority. There is no transcendental realm of Truth against which human concepts can be measured. Epistemology became part of cognitive science, the part that is self-critical, seeking how the mind should best go about constructing knowledge, while cognitive psychology studies how we naturally construct knowledge.
两种不同却又兼容的隐喻主导着古代关于宇宙的思想:宇宙如书,宇宙如生命。柏拉图主义鼓励使用书籍隐喻。感知世界是形式的一种表达,正如我们阅读散文是为了领悟作者的内在含义,我们也可以阅读物理对象的“散文”,以辨别其含义,将其作为通往隐藏形式的线索。斯多葛学派认为,宇宙是一个随着时间而发展的生命体。它的发展是预先确定的,而我们最幸福的方式就是接受发生在我们身上的一切,将其视为神圣进程的一部分。
Two different, compatible, metaphors dominated ancient thinking about the universe: Universe as book and universe as living being. Platonism encouraged the book metaphor. The perceived world was an expression of the Forms, and just as we read prose to discern an author’s inward meaning, so we can read the “prose” of physical objects to discern their meaning as clues to the hidden Forms. Stoicism taught that the universe was a living being developing over time. Its development was pre-determined, and we can best be happy by accepting what happens to us as part of a divine process.
科学革命的核心是用机器的隐喻取代了宇宙的书籍/存在隐喻。自希腊和罗马时代以来,工匠们就一直在制造机器,但这些机器主要用于娱乐或宗教目的。很大程度上是因为奴隶可以从事繁重的体力劳动,机器并没有被用来提高经济生产力。在文艺复兴时期和近代早期——科学革命时期——娱乐性机器制造蓬勃发展,从贵族宅邸和花园中的自动机到四处游荡的机械棋手(Riskin,2003;2016)。
Central to the Scientific Revolution was replacing the book/being metaphor for the universe with the machine metaphor. Artisans had been building machines since Greek and Roman times, but they were built for entertainment or religious purposes. Largely because of the availability of slaves to do heavy work, machines were not deployed to increase economic productivity. In the Renaissance and early modern period—the time of the Scientific Revolution—there was an explosion of entertaining machine-building, from automata populating aristocratic mansions and gardens to a traveling mechanical chess player (Riskin, 2003; 2016).
对机器的熟悉启发了我们思考宇宙、动物身体,甚至行为和思维的新视角。科学将宇宙描述为一个巨大的钟表,由上帝创造并启动,但其行为却由其自身的运作自主支配。
Familiarity with machines suggested new ways to think about the universe, animal bodies, and even behavior and mind. Science described the universe as an immense clockwork created and set in motion by God, but whose behavior was governed autonomously by its own workings.
机器隐喻影响深远。在一个宗教战争四分五裂的时代,科学家们可以研究和构建物质世界理论,而无需触犯神学的痛处。无论创造宇宙的上帝本质如何,他都将其创造得完美无缺,并使其按照固定不变的永恒法则运转,这些法则可以被科学家和其他人类观察、记录并用于人类的目的。机器隐喻揭开了书籍隐喻的神秘面纱,因为宇宙时钟受数学定律(例如牛顿运动定律和万有引力定律)的支配,因此所有未来事件,例如哈雷彗星的回归,都可以被精确预测。牛顿定律的数学意义不容小觑。如果牛顿只是简单地说苹果会掉落,没有人会对此感到惊奇。但能够预测苹果掉落的确切时间,则表明了预测和控制事件的可能性。钟表宇宙最大的吸引力在于,了解它的数学弹簧和齿轮意味着人类不再需要在自然面前感到被动,而是能够运用来之不易的科学知识来控制宇宙这台机器,服务于人类的目标。正如科学革命的思想家弗朗西斯·培根(1561-1626)所言:“知识就是力量。”
The machine metaphor was influential. In an age fractured by religious warfare, scientists could study and theorize about the physical world without stepping on sore theological toes. Whatever the nature of the God who had fashioned the universe, He had made it perfect and set it in motion governed by fixed, eternal rules that could be observed, written down, and used by scientists and other human beings for human ends. The machine metaphor removed the mystery of the book metaphor, as the universe-clock was governed by mathematical laws such as Newton’s Laws of Motion and Gravity so that every future event, such as the return of Halley’s comet, could be precisely predicted. The mathematics of Newton’s laws should not be underestimated. If Newton had simply said that apples fall, no one would have been impressed. But being able to predict the exact duration of an apple’s fall suggested the possibility of anticipating and controlling events. The greatest appeal of the clockwork universe was that to know its mathematical springs and gears meant that human beings need no longer feel passive in the face of nature but could use hard-won scientific knowledge to control the universe-machine to serve human ends. As Francis Bacon (1561–1626), the ideologist of the Scientific Revolution, wrote, “Knowledge is power.”
由于当时许多流行的机械自动机模仿的是生物,动物,甚至人类,可能是机器的想法逐渐受到关注。医学研究进一步证实了这一观点,解剖揭示了人体是机器,即由相互连接的物理部件组成的更大整体。然而,动物身体与人造机器的类比并不清楚。动物仅仅是钟表,行为像钟表一样可预测的机器吗?或者,动物只是像钟表一样,由物理部件组成,却拥有某种人类机器所缺乏的自主生命力,能够自我调节。机器能够以时钟无法做到的方式适应不断变化的环境吗?如果真是这样,工程师们能否制造出像动物一样,拥有学习能力和自主行为能力的机器?(Riskin, 2016)
Because many of the popular mechanical automata of the day imitated living things, the idea that animals, and perhaps humans, might be machines gained traction. Research in medicine reinforced the notion when dissection revealed that bodies were machines, that is, collections of interconnected physical parts comprising a larger whole. However, the analogy of animal body to human-made machine was ambiguous. Were animals just clockwork, machines whose behavior was as predictable as a clock? Or were animals simply like clockwork, made of physical parts yet possessing something, an autonomous life-force, that human machines lacked, able to adjust themselves to changing environments in a way clocks can’t? If so, could engineers build machines that were like animals, capable of learning and autonomous behavior (Riskin, 2016)?
机械身体的含义通过最著名的自动机之一——机械鸭子(Riskin,2003b)(图 1.3)戏剧性地体现出来,它是由自动机界的元老雅克·德·沃康松(Jacques de Vaucanson,1709–1782)制造的。
The implications of machine bodies were made dramatically manifest by one of the most famous of all the automata, the mechanical duck (Riskin, 2003b), Figure 1.3, built by the doyenne of automatists, Jacques de Vaucanson (1709–1782).
鸭子使用弹簧、齿轮、管子和滑轮来行走和嘎嘎叫。然而,沃康松增加了一个新技巧:他的鸭子看起来像鸭子,走路像鸭子,叫得也像鸭子,但它排便也像鸭子(具体方式尚不清楚)。将肌肉运动视为机械运动很简单,但将消化和废物清除视为机械运动则更具挑战性,因为种子和粪便之间存在质的变化。然而,鸭子(似乎)做到了,而且它是人造机器,而不是有机生长的动物。如果动物的消化器官(真实的和机械的)可以产生粪便,那么也许动物和人类的大脑可以“像肝脏分泌胆汁一样分泌思想”,正如法国医生皮埃尔·卡巴尼斯(1757-1808)后来声称的那样。人工消化意味着人工智能。
The duck used springs, gears, tubes, and pulleys to make it walk and quack. However, Vaucanson added a new trick: His duck looked like a duck, walked like a duck, and quacked like a duck, but it also defecated like a duck (by means still unclear). Thinking of muscular movement as mechanical is straightforward, but thinking of digestion and waste removal as mechanical is more challenging because there’s a qualitative change between seeds and feces. Yet the duck (appeared) to do it, and it was a human-built machine, not an organically grown animal. If animal digestive organs, real and mechanical, could produce feces, perhaps animal and human brains can “secrete thought as the liver secretes bile,” as French physician Pierre Cabanis (1757–1808) claimed later. Artificial digestion implied artificial intelligence.
正如古典思想家们认为人类概念与外部形式相对应一样,他们也认为人类的每一种感觉都与感知对象的真实特征相对应。德谟克利特的朴素实在论者认为,幻象是他们留下的物体的复制品,因此如果我们体验到的是红苹果,那是因为苹果幻影是红色的。同样,亚里士多德认为,眼液会呈现出所见物体的颜色。
Just as they assumed that human concepts correspond to external Forms, classical thinkers supposed that every human sensation corresponds to a real feature of a sensed object. Democritean naïve realists thought that eidola were copies of the objects they left, so that if we experience a red apple, it was because the apple eidolon was red. Similarly, Aristotle thought that the fluid of the eye takes on the colors of the objects it sees.
然而,将世界视为一台类似时钟的机器,却让科学家们对这一合理的假设产生了怀疑。他们想要一个物理世界的机械解释,在这个物理世界中,物体凭借其物理属性(例如质量、动量和数量)发生因果相互作用,这些属性是可量化的,并且能够被代入方程式。但并非所有感官属性都具备这些特征。伽利略在其论文《试金者》(1623)中写道:
However, viewing the world as a clock-like machine caused scientists to doubt this plausible assumption. They wanted a mechanical account of the physical world in which objects causally interact by virtue of their physical properties, such as mass, momentum, and number, properties that were quantifiable and capable of being entered into equations. But not all sense properties have these characteristics. Galileo wrote in his essay, The Assayer (1623):
每当我构想任何物质或实体时,我……都会将其视为有界的,具有各种形状;有大有小,有动有静……我无法用任何想象力将某种物质与这些状态区分开来。但它必须是白色或红色、苦或甜、嘈杂或寂静、散发着甜臭或恶臭,我的大脑并不会被迫将其作为必要的伴随物引入……因此,我认为味道、气味、颜色等等……只存在于意识中,如果生物被移除,所有这些特质都会被抹去并消灭。
Smith 于 1990 年引用,第 739 页
Whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance I… think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small [and] as being in motion or at rest… From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments…. Hence, I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on… reside only in the consciousness [so that] if the living creature were removed all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
quoted by Smith, 1990, p. 739
伽利略在这段文字中做出了非凡的举动。首先,他的目标是形而上学的,旨在提出这样一种观点:物理世界是一台拥有少量物理属性的机器,这些属性规律地相互作用,使钟表宇宙自行运转,无需上帝或巫术的干预。然而,他将感知到的物理属性(现在称为“主要感知属性”)与心灵添加的属性(次要感知属性)区分开来的论点,则带有心理学色彩。
Galileo makes remarkable moves in this passage. First, his goal is metaphysical, to present the idea that the physical world is a machine possessing a small number of physical properties that interact lawfully to make the clockwork universe operate by itself without intervention by God or sorcery. However, his argument separating sensed physical properties (known now as the primary sense properties) from those that the mind adds (the secondary sense properties) is psychological.
此外,他的心理学论证建立在内省之上。从朴素实在论者到斯多葛学派,古典思想家们都认为心灵的存在是理所当然的,但他们从未探索过自己的心灵,也没有基于自身经验提出重要论断(例如,宇宙是一台机器)的论证。
Moreover, his psychological argument rests on introspection. From the naïve realists to the Stoics, the Classic thinkers took the existence of mind for granted, but they never explored their own minds, nor did they propose arguments for important claims (e.g., that the universe is a machine) based on their own private experience.
最后,在《试金者》中,伽利略引入了一个在古代心理学著作(罗蒂,1979)中找不到的词:意识。研究意识将成为认知科学的起点:如果像颜色这样的次要感官属性并非像实在论者和经验论者所认为的那样,简单地从自然中习得,那么我们为什么会看到颜色呢?伽利略关于哪些感官属性是主要、哪些是次要的,是否正确?
Finally, in The Assayer, Galileo introduces a word that we don’t find in ancient psychological writing (Rorty, 1979): consciousness. Investigating consciousness will be the starting point of cognitive science: If a secondary sense property such as color is not simply picked up from nature, as realists and empiricists supposed, why do we see colors? Is Galileo right about which sense properties are primary and secondary?
正如科学革命期间的许多其他事物一样,一种新机器——暗箱(图 1.4)——提供了一个隐喻,这次是指意识。
As in so much else during the Scientific Revolution, a new machine, the camera obscura (Figure 1.4), offered a metaphor, this time for consciousness.
它已经为眼睛提供了一个模型,它与眼睛非常相似,其聚焦透镜将物体的图像投射到盒子的背面。艺术运用为隐喻诠释增添了新的层面。为了捕捉线性透视,艺术家使用暗箱在画布上投射出他们所描绘物体的二维图像。想要画画。他们利用投影进行炭笔素描,捕捉深度感知的线索,然后画下他们的画作(Andersen,2013)。作为意识的隐喻,画家成为内在自我——伽利略的自我——而画布则是意识,是自我与世界之间的屏障。这道屏障是如何产生的,成为了认知科学的研究主题。由于智能,即自我,如何运作,成为一个令人望而生畏的谜团,因为它并没有被投射到屏幕上。自我变成了一个黑洞,认知科学围绕着它运作,却无法解释。
It had already provided a model for the eye, which it closely resembles with its focusing lens projecting an object’s image on the back of the box. Artistic use added a new layer for metaphorical interpretation. In order to capture linear perspective, artists used cameras obscura to cast on canvas a two-dimensional image of the objects they wanted to paint. They used the projection to make a charcoal sketch, capturing cues to depth perception, and then painted their picture (Andersen, 2013). As a metaphor for consciousness, the painter becomes the inner self—Galileo’s self—and the canvas is consciousness, a screen between self and world. How the screen is created became the subject matter of cognitive science. How intelligence, the self, worked, became a forbidding mystery because it was not projected on the screen. The self became a black hole around which cognitive science operated but could not explain.
科学家们似乎发现了一个精神的新世界——意识。认知心理学探索意识的蓝图是由勒内·笛卡尔(1596-1650)绘制的。他将科学革命的各种倾向和隐喻整合、提炼、强化和整理,形成了一种关于心智、身体、意识和智力的思考方式,这种思考方式在认知科学领域主导了两个多世纪。
Scientists seemed to have discovered a mental New World, consciousness. The chart for its exploration by cognitive psychology was set by René Descartes (1596–1650), who pulled together, refined, strengthened, and ordered the various tendencies and metaphors of the Scientific Revolution into a way of thinking about mind, body, consciousness, and intelligence that dominated cognitive science for more than two centuries
笛卡尔生活于欧洲历史上一个变革的世纪。从政治到地球的形状,一切都悬而未决。科学与神学、政治、权力和战争相互交织。任何深刻思想家的思想都需要仔细的阐释,但笛卡尔的需要出于特殊的原因。我们知道,在得知伽利略被宗教裁判所判罪后,他压制了自己的物理学著作《世界》 ,并停止了其姊妹篇《人》的创作。他放弃这些思想是因为它们是异端邪说吗?他是否暂时压制它们,直到他能够将它们与他的天主教信仰相协调?他是否……保留它们,却又用各种逃避的借口来掩饰?我们无法确定。在阐述我所谓的笛卡尔范式时,我将强调笛卡尔对认知科学影响最大的诠释,即使这些诠释可能并非笛卡尔的本意(Leahey,2018;Riskin,2016)。
Descartes lived in a transformative century in European history. Everything from politics to the shape of the globe was up for grabs. Science rubbed up against theology, politics, power, and war. Any profound thinker’s ideas need careful exegesis, but Descartes’ need it for special reasons. We know he suppressed his work on physics, The World, and stopped working on its companion, The Human, after learning of Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition. Did he give up his ideas because they were heretical? Did he temporarily silence them until he could reconcile them with his Catholic faith? Did he keep them, yet hide them in a bodyguard of evasions? We cannot be sure. In setting out what I call the Cartesian Paradigm, I will emphasize the interpretations of Descartes that had the greatest influence on cognitive science, even if they may not have been exactly what Descartes meant (Leahey, 2018; Riskin, 2016).
他那个时代那些精巧的自动机为笛卡尔关于生物体运作的理论提供了模型。他将自动机的齿轮、轮子和弹簧具体化为生理学概念,其中最重要的就是感觉运动反射。
The clever automata of his time provided models for Descartes’ theories about how living bodies operate. He literally fleshed out automatists’ gears, wheels, and springs into physiological concepts, the most important of which was the sensory-motor reflex.
图 1.5中的人的脚 (B) 离火 (A) 太近了,火会拉动笛卡尔所说的“绳子”(C),该绳子连接到大脑的松果体 (F)。松果体感受到拉力,反射性地向后拉,将脚从火中拽出。笛卡尔的反射并不依赖于思维——它是一种与生俱来的、预先设定的回避反应。目前尚不清楚这种反射是否依赖于疼痛感。在笛卡尔时代,批评家(以及一些笛卡尔的追随者,尽管不是笛卡尔[Cottingham, 1978])断言它并不依赖于疼痛感,并得出结论:动物不会感到疼痛,只是会做出类似疼痛的行为。在现代认知科学方面,关于哲学僵尸(没有感觉但行为像正常人一样的生物4 )的猜测很多,或者感觉体验对于适应性行为是否如此重要以至于计算机永远不可能变得智能。
The person in the drawing in Figure 1.5 has got his foot (B) too close to a fire (A), which pulls what Descartes calls a “string” (C), connecting to the brain’s pineal gland (F). Feeling the pull, the pineal gland reflexively pulls back, yanking the foot from the fire. Descartes’ reflex does not depend on thought—it’s an innate, pre-wired, avoidance response. It’s not clear whether the reflex depends upon sensations of pain. In Descartes’ time, critics (and some of Descartes’ followers, though not Descartes [Cottingham, 1978]) asserted that it did not, concluding that animals don’t feel pain, but only act as if they do. In modern cognitive science, speculations abound about philosophical zombies—creatures with no sensations but who act like normal people4—or whether sensory experience is so important to adaptive behavior that computers can never be intelligent.
笛卡尔抛弃了过时的古代思想,在自己内心寻找哲学和科学的新基础。
Discarding ancient thought as obsolete, Descartes looked inside himself for new foundations for philosophy and science.
他始于苏格拉底的怀疑论,系统地怀疑每一种信仰、观点、知识,无论它有多么珍贵。我可能会问,上帝存在吗?我凭着信念而不是证据来接受它,所以我可以怀疑上帝的存在。我真的坐在舒适的火炉旁吗?不,因为我可能在做梦。笛卡尔继续怀疑许多事情,但发现在他所有的怀疑中,在怀疑的行为中,总有一些东西。他不能怀疑自己怀疑,因为那是自相矛盾的。怀疑是一种思想形式,笛卡尔的结论是,有一件事是绝对的、不容置疑的、必然的真理:我思故我在(Cogito, ergo sum)。
He began with Socratic skepticism, systematically doubting every belief, opinion, piece of knowledge, no matter how precious it might be. Does God exist? I might ask. I take it on faith, not evidence, so I can doubt that God exists. Am I really sitting here next to a comfortable fire? No, because I might be dreaming. Descartes continued to doubt many things, but found that something abides amongst all his doubting, the act of doubting. He cannot doubt that he doubts, for that is self-contradictory. Doubt is a form of thought, and Descartes concluded that one thing is absolutely, indubitably, and necessarily True: I think, therefore I am (Cogito, ergo sum).
他也将自己的真理表述为“我是一个会思考的东西”。然而,这远远超出了他的内省所确立的范围(James, 1904)。他已经表明,意识思维过程贯穿于各种经验之中,但他并未确定进行思考的东西——灵魂或思想——的存在,尽管他认为自己已经确定了。笛卡尔玩弄了智力上的花招,甚至欺骗了自己,他制造了认知科学的最大挑战和最邪恶的陷阱,即意识和创造性智慧与机械身体之间看似不可逾越的鸿沟。
He also put his truth as I am a thing that thinks. However, this goes well past what his introspection established (James, 1904). He’s shown that processes of conscious thought persist through all kinds of experience, but he has not established the existence of a thing that does the thinking—a soul or mind—although he believes he has. In what amounted to an act of intellectual sleight of hand that fooled even himself, Descartes created cognitive science’s greatest challenge and its most nefarious trap, the seemingly insurmountable divide between consciousness and creative intelligence, on one hand, and the mechanical body, on the other.
宗教与科学的共同作用,使得比较动物与人类的心理能力比亚里士多德之前认为的更加困难,也更加重要。亚里士多德认为所有生物都拥有灵魂,因此也拥有心理功能,因此他能够接受从动物到人类认知能力的连续性。然而,笛卡尔的宗教认为动物没有灵魂,而他的科学则认为动物是机器,对外界刺激做出反射性而非深思熟虑的反应。他需要对动物和人类心理做出新的解读。
Religion and science conspired to make comparing the psychological abilities of animals with those of humans more difficult and more important than it had been for Aristotle. Thinking that all living beings possess souls, and thus psychological functions, Aristotle could accept a continuum of cognitive capacities from animals to people. However, Descartes’ religion taught that animals don’t have souls and his science taught that they are machines responding reflexively, not thoughtfully, to external stimuli. He required a new picture of animal and human psychology.
笛卡尔说,动物和人类在三个方面存在越来越根本的区别。
Descartes said that animals and humans differed in three increasingly more fundamental ways.
笛卡尔提出了我们所见过的最激进的二元论,但其中的一些困难很快就显现出来。
Descartes proposed the most radical dualism we’ve seen, and some difficulties with it became quickly apparent.
首先,笛卡尔部分承认了他人心灵的问题。我知道我是一个会思考的个体,你也知道你是一个会思考的个体,这通过笛卡尔用来证明“我思故我在”的内省论证得以实现。然而,我无法触及你的意识,你也无法触及我的意识。然而,我们有时会将思想归因于他人,有时甚至动物。我们何时有理由这样做呢?笛卡尔认为,语言的使用是思考的产物,因此也是灵魂存在的产物。
One, the problem of other minds was partly recognized by Descartes. I know I am a thinking thing, and you know you are a thinking thing via the introspective argument Descartes deployed to prove cogito ergo sum. However, I have no access to your consciousness, nor do you have access to mine. Nevertheless, we attribute thought to other people and sometimes to animals. When are we justified in doing so? Descartes argued that use of language is the product of thinking, and therefore of the presence of a soul.
值得注意的是,判断计算机是否具备真正人工智能的标准是图灵测试,该测试要求计算机能够进行对话。5 19世纪进化论的出现也带来了一个相关的问题。对笛卡尔来说,你要么有灵魂,要么没有灵魂;没有中间地带。但进化论意味着早期和晚期生命形式之间的连续性,使得笛卡尔式的思维进化场景6不太可能发生。
Significantly, the standard test for a computer having genuine artificial intelligence is the Turing Test, which requires that a computer be able to carry on a conversation.5 A related problem popped up with the arrival of evolution in the 19th century. For Descartes, either you have a soul or you don’t; there is no middle ground. But evolution implies continuity between earlier and later forms of life, making a Cartesian scenario6 for the evolution of mind unlikely.
笛卡尔的一位哲学通信者是波西米亚公主伊丽莎白·斯图亚特(1596-1662)。她问笛卡尔灵魂和肉体是如何相互作用的。答案似乎是肯定的:当我把书掉在脚上时,我会感到疼痛;当我抬起右臂时,它会抬起来。然而,伊丽莎白问道,一个纯粹非物质的灵魂如何能够推动机械躯体的杠杆和齿轮?感觉运动反射的机制又如何能够在非物质的灵魂中引发体验?笛卡尔回答说,松果体是相互作用的中心,身体的神经在这里汇聚,接受灵魂的操控。但伊丽莎白并没有因此而平静下来——灵魂是非物质的,而松果体是机械物质。
One of Descartes’ philosophical correspondents was Elizabeth Stuart, Princess of Bohemia (1596–1662), who asked him how soul and body interacted. It certainly seems they do: When I drop a book on my foot it hurts, and when I choose to lift my right arm it goes up. Yet, Elizabeth asks, how can a purely immaterial soul move the levers and gears of a mechanical body, and how can the mechanics of the sensory-motor reflex cause experiences in the immaterial soul? Descartes replied by saying the pineal gland is the locus of interaction, where the nerves of the body come together to be manipulated by the soul, but Elizabeth was not mollified—the soul is immaterial and the pineal gland is mechanical matter.
最后,伊丽莎白的批评中隐含着笛卡尔二元论最深层的难题,即“侏儒”(homunculus,意为“小人”)问题。在一幅基督教图像中,上帝将亚当的灵魂置于他的身体中。亚当的灵魂被描绘成亚当自身的缩小版,在上帝行神迹之后,灵魂将与亚当的身体共存并指引他的身体。然而,灵魂的运作方式并未得到解释。亚当灵魂体内是否还有一个更小的亚当灵魂?而那个亚当灵魂体内是否还有一个更小的亚当灵魂?笛卡尔认为每个人体内都有灵魂,这种观点是传统的,或许能安慰那些寻求来世的人(Brown,2015),但它无法从科学上解释任何事情,因为灵魂的运作方式超出了科学探究的范围。7
Finally, implicit in Elizabeth’s criticism is the deepest difficulty of Cartesian dualism, the problem of the homunculus (“little man”). In one Christian image, God is shown placing Adam’s soul into his body. Adam’s soul is depicted as a smaller version of Adam himself, and after God’s miracle the soul will dwell with and direct Adam’s body. However, the operations of the soul are not explained. Does Adam-soul have a smaller Adam-soul inside him? And is there a still smaller Adam-soul inside that one? Descartes positing a soul inside every human is traditional, and it may be comforting to those looking for an afterlife (Brown, 2015), but it cannot scientifically explain anything because the operations of the soul are placed beyond scientific inquiry.7
在笛卡尔看来,柏拉图式的ιδεα s 变成了精神理念。图 1.6出自他的《人》,将他的认知模型描绘成一个巨大的暗箱,或者用认知哲学家丹尼尔·丹尼特 (1991) 的话来说,是笛卡尔剧场。
With Descartes, Platonic ιδεα s became mental ideas. Figure 1.6, from his L’Homme, depicts his model of cognition as a grand camera obscura, or, in the phrase of cognitive philosopher Daniel Dennett (1991), the Cartesian Theater.
我们看到眼睛看着一支箭。箭的每个部分,箭头 (A)、箭杆 (B) 和箭羽 (C),都通过点 1、3 和 5 处的光线记录在视网膜上。神经 2、4 和 6 将机械刺激传递到大脑,将 A、B 和 C 的图像投射为概念 a、b 和 c,投射到松果体的光滑表面上,在那里它们被灵魂 H 理解。我们并不是直接体验世界,而是像电影院的观众一样,通过表征,这是古典认知科学的定义概念之一。此外,正如机器由较小的部件组装成较大的整体一样,简单的想法也可以组合成更大的整体。箭是一台简单的机器,由三部分组成:箭头 (A)、箭杆 (B) 和箭羽 (C)。同样,我们对箭的复杂概念也是由箭头 (a)、箭杆 (b) 和箭羽 (c) 等简单概念组装而成的。伽利略的两个世界由此展现。一个是由简单部分构成的物体组成的物理世界,另一个则反映在由简单观念构成的复杂观念所构成的精神世界中。因此,认知科学的研究方向变成了揭示物理世界如何映射到精神世界,发现支配观念的精神规则,并揭示当物理世界仅具有主要机械属性时,经验的次要属性是如何产生的。
We see eyes looking at an arrow. Each part of the physical arrow, arrowhead (A), shaft (B), and fletching (C), is registered on the retina by light rays at points 1, 3, and 5. Nerves 2, 4, and 6 carry mechanical stimulation to the brain, casting images of A, B, and C, as ideas a, b, and c, on the smooth surface of the pineal gland, where they are comprehended by the soul, H. We do not experience the world directly but as audiences in a movie theater, by representations, one of the defining concepts of classical cognitive science. Moreover, as machines are made of smaller pieces assembled into a larger whole, simple ideas can be combined into larger wholes. An arrow is a simple machine, made up of three parts: Arrowhead (A), shaft (B), and fletching (C). Similarly, our complex idea of an arrow is assembled out of simpler ideas, of the arrowhead (a), of the shaft (b), and of the fletching (c). Galileo’s two worlds are on display. There is a physical world made up of objects constituted of simpler parts, and it is reflected in a mental world made up of complex ideas constituted of simpler ideas. The research program for cognitive science, therefore, became one of showing how the physical world maps onto the mental world, discovering the mental rules that govern ideas and showing how the secondary properties of experiences arise when the physical world has only primary, mechanical, properties.
哲学家兼圣公会主教乔治·贝克莱(George Berkeley,1685-1753)首次详细尝试展现外部世界如何映射到笛卡尔剧场。贝克莱的目标是哲学性的,旨在找出哪些人类信念可以算作知识,但他这样做是秉持着科学革命的精神,并采用了一种受笛卡尔范式缓和的经验主义。他的思想倾向于认为,或许根本不存在任何合理的信念,认知从根本上来说都是一种心理学。
The first detailed attempt to show how the external world mapped onto the Cartesian Theater was made by philosopher and Anglican bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753). Berkeley’s aim was philosophical, to find out which human beliefs counted as knowledge, but he did so in the spirit of the scientific revolution and a version of empiricism tempered by the Cartesian paradigm. His thought tended to suggest that perhaps there were no justifiable beliefs whatsoever, that cognition was psychology all the way down.
为了探讨我们的目的,我们将探讨贝克莱对深度知觉过程的深刻分析。我们从视觉感知的暗箱模型开始。光线将二维图像投射到画布上,或者在眼睛的视网膜上,例如文艺复兴时期艺术家正在描绘的宫殿。视网膜/画布图像忠实地反映了宫殿的两个空间维度:高度和宽度。然而,我们对宫殿的意识体验存在于三个维度:高度、宽度以及与我们之间的距离,例如60码外八号铁杆击球的距离。如果距离没有记录在视网膜图像中,那么它从何而来?
For our purposes, we’ll look at Berkeley’s penetrating analysis of the process of depth perception. We start with the camera obscura model of visual perception. Light rays cast a two-dimensional image, perhaps of a palace being painted by a Renaissance artist, onto the canvas or, in the eye, the retina. The retinal/canvas image faithfully reflects two spatial dimensions of the palace, its height and width. However, our conscious experience of the palace exists in three dimensions, height, width, and distance from us, say a 60-yard eight iron shot away. If distance is not recorded on the retinal image, where does it come from?
贝克莱提出,三维空间的感知是由一系列刺激或线索构建的,这些刺激或线索引导我们推断出一个空间维度,即深度,而这些维度和深度并非直接由感觉提供。画家会利用其中一些线索,例如线性透视,在平面画布上营造出深度错觉。其他线索则利用了我们的双眼视觉系统。视网膜视差就是一个例子,你可能从未注意到过。将一根直立的食指尽量远离你的脸。现在,将另一只手的食指伸直,举到距离鼻子仅几英寸的地方。将你的视线聚焦在远处的手指上,但将注意力集中在近处的手指上;你会看到两个这样的手指。现在,将注意力集中在近处的手指上,同时注意远处的手指;你会看到两个这样的手指。由于我们的视觉系统会同时处理每只眼睛视网膜上的平行点,因此视觉焦点处的刺激会在意识中创建一个表征,而非对应视网膜点处的刺激则会创建两个表征。通常,我们的大脑会抑制重影,但我们可以通过实验发现它们。
Berkeley proposed that perception of 3-D space is a construction from a set of stimuli, or cues, that leads us to infer a spatial dimension, depth, not given directly in sensation. Some of these cues, such as linear perspective, were used by painters to create the illusion of depth on a flat canvas. Others exploit our binocular visual system. An example is retinal disparity, which you have probably never noticed. Hold one upright forefinger as far away from your face as possible. Now bring the other hand up, forefinger extended, to just a couple of inches from your nose. Focus your vision on the far finger but pay mental attention to the near finger; you will see two of them. Now focus on the near finger while paying attention to the far finger; you will see two of them. Because our visual systems process parallel points on the retinas of each eye together, stimuli at the focal point of vision create one representation in consciousness, while stimuli at non-corresponding retinal points create two. Normally, our brains suppress the doubled images, but we can discover them experimentally.
然而,如果这种解释正确,我们对深度的感知就如同颜色一样,是一种次要的感官属性,取决于我们生理构造的偶然特征,而非对现实世界的忠实表述。据推测,尽管我们都生活在同一个物理宇宙中,但像鱼这样的动物,它们的眼球无法协调,或者昆虫拥有成千上万个眼球,它们体验到的主观世界与我们截然不同。
However, if this account is correct, our perception of depth is a secondary sense property like color, depending upon accidental features of our physiological makeup, not on faithful representations of the world as it is. Presumably, animals such as fish, whose eyes do not coordinate, or insects, who have thousands of eye-lenses, experience a subjective world different from the one that we do even though all of us live in the same physical universe.
由于我们意识不到大脑如何构建第三维度,朴素实在论对三维空间的信仰与其说是一种知识,不如说是一种信仰。贝克莱扩展了他对我们日常信念的怀疑论分析,进而质疑外部世界的存在。我坐在这里打字,却满怀信心地相信我的车就停在门前。这种信念是否合理,因此也算是一种知识?还是一种基于反复经验的信仰?唯一能确定它仍然存在的方法就是走到前门向外看,将它带入我的直接体验中。或者,更哲学地说,我相信任何特定事物存在的唯一依据就是感知它。此时,认识论正面临着融入心理学或神学(世界的存在取决于上帝的全知)的威胁:
Because we are unconscious of how our brain constructs the third dimension, naïve realism’s belief in 3-D space is more an act of faith than an act of knowledge. Berkeley extended his skeptical analysis of our ordinary beliefs to question the existence of the external world. As I sit here typing, I confidently believe that my car is parked out front. Is this belief rationally justified, and therefore knowledge, or is it an act of faith based on repeated experience? The only way to be sure it still exists is to go to the front door and look out, bringing it into my direct experience. Or, to put it more philosophically, the only warrant I have for believing any particular thing exists is to perceive it. At this point, epistemology threatens to dissolve into psychology or into theology (the world’s existence depends on God’s omniscience):
有一个年轻人说上帝
一定觉得这非常奇怪,
当他发现那棵树
继续
当四方院里没有人的时候。
亲爱的先生,你的惊讶很奇怪
我总是在四方
这就是为什么这棵树
继续
自从您忠实的上帝观察到以来。
罗纳德·诺克斯(1888-1957)的诗
There was a young man who said God
Must think it exceedingly odd,
When he finds that the tree
Continues to be
When no one’s about in the Quad.
Dear Sir, your astonishment’s odd
I’m always about in the Quad
And that’s why the tree
Continues to be
Since observed by, yours faithfully, God.
Poem by Ronald Knox (1888–1957)
我们对现实感知的基础是皮亚杰(1954)所谓的“物体恒存性” ——相信物体在我们不再看到时依然存在。然而,正如他所论证的,这种信念并非与生俱来,而是在婴儿时期逐渐发展形成的。8这也是魔术师们一直以来都在违背的信念。或许最古老的魔术就是“杯球戏法”,在这个戏法中,球可以随意出现和消失。
Basic to our sense of reality is what Piaget (1954) called object permanence—believing that objects continue to exist when we no longer see them. However, as he demonstrated, this belief is not innate, but develops in stages during infancy.8 It’s also a belief magicians violate all the time. Probably the oldest trick in magic is the cups and balls, in which a ball is made to appear and disappear at will.
贝克莱对“理念之路”的开发及其根本含义有助于激发对古典认知心理学的修正。
Berkeley’s development of the Way of Ideas—and its radical implications—helped provoke revisions to the classical cognitive psychologies.
根据“理念之道”,世界存在两个。一个是物质世界,由原子构成,它们有序地组合成更大的结构,并受牛顿定律支配。另一个是精神世界,由简单的原子理念构成,这些理念具有主观属性,例如颜色,但它们有序地组合成更大的结构,例如一支箭或一座宫殿,这无法用物理定律来解释,因为理念并非物质的。因此,某种非物质的力量,例如引力,必然支配着心灵。新经验主义提出,这种力量就是理念联想,其最重要的倡导者是大卫·休谟(1711-1776),他称之为心灵的引力。
According to the Way of Ideas, there are two worlds. There’s the physical world comprised of atoms whose orderly combinations into larger structures are governed by Newton’s Laws. On the other hand, there is the mental world composed of simple atomic ideas that possess subjective qualities such as color, but whose orderly combinations into larger structures such as an arrow or a palace cannot be explained by physical laws because ideas are not physical. Therefore, some non-physical force like gravity must govern the mind. That force, the new empiricism proposed, was association of ideas, whose most important exponent was David Hume (1711–1776), who called it the gravity of the mind.
联想主义者认为联想的引力依据自然法则发挥作用。休谟提出了三条法则,即相似性法则、邻近性法则和因果性法则。根据相似性法则,想到一个想法 X 会自动让人想起与之相似的想法。因此,如果我看到我家的猫 Columbine 的照片,我就会不由自主地想起她。根据邻近性法则,如果我过去同时经历过两个想法,那么经历其中一个就会自动让人想起另一个。因此,如果我有两个朋友总是在一起,但遇到其中一个单独出现,我就会不由自主地想起那个失踪的朋友。根据因果性法则,想到或遇到一个原因会让我想到它的结果,反之亦然。因此,当我触摸应用程序图标时,我希望它会打开,如果我在手机上发现一个打开的应用程序,我会认为我是错误地打开了它。
Associationists proposed that the gravity of association operated according to natural laws. Hume proposed three, the laws of similarity, contiguity, and causality. According to the law of similarity, to think of an idea X automatically brings to mind ones that are like it. Thus, if I see a picture of our cat, Columbine, I automatically think of her. According to the law of contiguity, if I have experienced two ideas together in the past, experiencing one will automatically call to mind the other. Thus, if I have two friends who are always together, but meet one alone, I automatically think of the missing friend. According to the law of causality, thinking of or meeting a cause makes me think of its effect, and vice versa. Thus, when I touch an app’s icon, I expect it to open, and if I find an open app on my phone, I think that I opened it by mistake.
联想会自动发生。我不会刻意去想那位失踪的朋友,也不会刻意去追寻科伦拜恩的照片和她之间的相似之处。而且,联想的力量强大,难以抗拒,有时甚至会背负情感包袱。我从20世纪70年代中期开始教书,那时能源价格昂贵。一个冬天,作为一名身无分文的助理教授,我在圣诞假期期间教了一门为期11天的心理学入门课程。期末考试结束后,我静静地坐在桌旁,处理着一些文书工作。我当时并不知道,为了节约能源,学校在每个教室都安装了运动传感器,几分钟后就会关闭房间的灯。突然,房间一片漆黑!我担心房间里有人关灯了(不是停电——走廊里还亮着灯)。恐惧让我动了动;移动激活了运动传感器,灯光又回来了;我松了一口气,明白了发生了什么事。
Associations occur automatically. I do not will the thought of the missing friend, nor do I consciously trace the points of similarity between Columbine’s photo and her. Moreover, associations are powerful and hard to resist, sometimes bearing emotional baggage. I started teaching in the mid-1970s, when energy was expensive. One winter, being an impecunious assistant professor, I taught an 11-day Intro Psych course during the Christmas holidays. After the final exam, I sat still at a table, doing some paperwork. Unknown to me, to save energy the university had installed motion sensors in every classroom, which turned off the room’s lights after a couple of minutes. Suddenly, the room went dark! I feared someone was in the room and had switched off the lights (not a blackout—lights were on in the hall). Fear made me move; moving activated the motion sensor and light returned; with relief, I figured out what had happened.
思想联想通过提供解释和预测行为的规律(从学习理论到今天的联想神经网络)帮助了认知科学。
Association of ideas helped cognitive science by providing laws for explaining and predicting behaviors from learning theory to today’s associative neural networks.
尤其是在休谟的运用下,联想主义强化了人们对物理世界和精神世界之间可能存在错配的怀疑。“理念之路”的一个关键原则是区分简单理念和复杂理念。在图1.6中,我们可以看到笛卡尔之箭的心理表征是如何由更简单的理念构成的。其结果是一种关于心理对象的乐高理论。乐高消防站是一个由许多更简单的原子乐高积木组成的复杂对象。如果我们像旧朴素现实主义者和早期经验主义者那样,将意识视为现实的简单镜像,正如笛卡尔的图1.6似乎假设的那样,那么物体的本来面目和我们感知到的物体之间不可能存在错配。然而,联想是一种心理引力,我们可以像乐高积木一样轻松地将其断开和断开,从而将乐高消防站变成乐高医院,或者变成乐高宇宙飞船,或者其他什么。因此,我可以请你想象一匹白马,给它加上一个圆锥形的角,瞧,你就创造了一只虚构的独角兽。
Especially as deployed by Hume, associationism strengthened skepticism about the potential for mismatch between the physical and mental worlds. A key tenet of the Way of Ideas was the distinction between simple and complex ideas. In Figure 1.6 we see how the mental representation of Descartes’s arrow is made up of simpler ideas. The result is a sort of Lego theory of mental objects. A Lego fire station is a complex object made up of many simpler, atomic Lego bricks. If we think of consciousness as simply mirroring reality, as the old naïve realists and early empiricists did, and as Descartes’s Figure 1.6 seems to assume, there can be no mismatch between objects as they are and objects as we perceive them. However, association is a mental gravity that we can snap and unsnap as easily as Lego bricks, turning a Lego firehouse into a Lego hospital, or into a Lego spaceship, or something else. So, I can ask you to imagine a white horse, add to it a conical horn, and voilà, you’ve created a fictional unicorn.
那么,我们的头脑中可能充斥着复杂的观念,而这些观念与任何现实都毫无关联。休谟的无神论确实令人震惊;他认为上帝的概念很复杂,是由我们的头脑将善、力量和知识等观念组合起来,创造出一个虚构的全善、全能、全知的存在,它并不比独角兽更真实。
It’s possible, then, that our minds may be populated with complex ideas that correspond to nothing real. Indeed, Hume was shocking for his atheism; he held that the idea of god was a complex one, conjured up by the mind taking ideas of goodness, power, and knowledge, and combining them together to create a fictional all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing Being, no more real than a unicorn.
休谟将他的推理应用于他的联想定律,并得出结论:因果律是一头独角兽。让我们回到我独自坐在教室里的情景。我一直相信,按下电灯开关,房间里的灯就会灭。休谟指出,我相信这一点是因为邻近律;过去,每次我按下电灯开关,灯都会灭;而且,除了停电(这里排除这种可能性)之外,房间里的灯灭了,肯定有人把它们关了。
Hume applied his reasoning to his laws of association and concluded that the law of causality was a unicorn. Let’s return to me sitting alone in my classroom. I already believed that when one pushes a light switch down, a room’s lights go off. I believe this, Hume points out, because of the law of contiguity; every time in the past when I have pushed a light switch down the lights turned off; and except for power failures (ruled out here), when room lights have gone out, someone switched them off.
但为什么我会因为灯灭而感到不安呢?邻近律解释了为什么任何两个同时发生的想法都会产生联系,但我不会轻易得出结论说灯不会自动熄灭(p < 0.001);我持有这种观点的可能性更大。我上面所说的某些联想的“情感包袱”,休谟现在认为是因果律的一个基本组成部分,即我们在某些邻近情况下强烈地期望事件A发生时事件B必然随之发生。这是一种内在的情感,而非理性的结论。因果关系的概念本身并非基本的、简单的联想律,而是一个由邻近性+必然性感觉构成的复杂概念。而且,由于因果律是一头独角兽,它可能会误导我们对事件模式做出不真实的假设。
But why am I disturbed by the lights’ going out? The law of contiguity explains why any two ideas that occur together become linked, but I don’t coldly conclude that lights still don’t turn themselves off, p < 0.001; the odds are with me. What I called above the “emotional baggage” of some associations, Hume now sees as an essential component of the law of causality, the powerful expectation we have in some cases of contiguity that when Event A occurs Event B must follow. This is an in-built emotion, not a reasoned conclusion. The concept of causality itself is not an elementary, simple law of association, but a complex idea made up of contiguity + feeling of necessity. And because the law of causality is a unicorn, it can lead us astray to make assumptions about patterns of events that aren’t true.
对休谟来说,知识——可证伪的真实信念——似乎是不可能的。任何关于某事为真的断言——即使是明天太阳会升起——都是基于我们迄今为止的经验,明天就可能被证伪。哲学家们最喜欢举天鹅的例子。直到18世纪,欧洲人还认为所有的天鹅都是白色的。然而,在新西兰发现了一些形状像天鹅、行走像天鹅、叫声也像天鹅的鸟类,但它们是黑色的。对许多思想家来说,无法获得确定的知识不仅令人不安,而且危险。如果真理仅仅取决于个人迄今为止的经验,那么人类又怎么可能就任何事情达成共识呢?
It seems that for Hume, knowledge—justifiable true belief—is impossible. Any assertion that something is True—even that the sun will come up tomorrow—is based on our experience so far and might be falsified tomorrow. Philosophers’ favorite example concerns swans. Until the 18th century, Europeans thought that all swans were white. However, in New Zealand there were found birds that were shaped like swans, walked like swans, and sounded like swans, but they were black. For many thinkers, living without the possibility of certain knowledge was not only disconcerting but also dangerous. If Truth depended solely on one’s personal experience so far, how could human beings ever agree on anything?
休谟的苏格兰同胞们对休谟和贝克莱的怀疑论进行了反击。在托马斯·里德(1710-1796)的领导下,他们被称为“常识学派”,因为他们拥护类似朴素实在论的思想,并捍卫未受教育者的直觉。事实上,里德认为过多的哲学思考会导致形而上学的疯狂。他认为笛卡尔“理念之路”的问题在于,它毫无根据地将一种心理能力——理性——置于其他能力之上。针对贝克莱对客体恒存性的质疑,里德写道:
Hume’s fellow Scots pushed back against Hume’s and Berkeley’s skepticism. Led by Thomas Reid (1710–1796), they became known as the Common Sense school because they endorsed something like naïve realism, and they defended the intuitions of untutored people. Indeed, Reid thought that too much philosophizing caused metaphysical lunacy. He argued that the problem with Descartes’s Way of Ideas was that it privileged without warrant one mental faculty, reason, above the others. Addressing Berkeley’s doubts about object permanence, Reid wrote:
怀疑论者问我,你为什么相信你所感知的外部物体的存在?先生,这种信念并非我所制造;它源自大自然的结晶;……怀疑论者说,理性是真理的唯一裁判者,你应该抛弃一切不基于理性的观点和信念。先生,为什么我应该更相信理性的能力而不是感知的能力?——它们都出自同一作坊,出自同一位艺术家之手;如果他把一件赝品放在我手里,又有什么能阻止他再放一件呢?
Reid (1764/1997),第 168-169 页
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object which you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of Nature; … Reason, says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception?—they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another?
Reid (1764/1997), pp. 168–169
大自然赋予人类一套不容置疑的基石信念,例如物体恒存性,以及可靠的能力,例如理性和感知,以便我们能够认识祂的世界;上帝并非骗子。但感知和理性都值得同等的尊重。美国《独立宣言》基于里德的论点:“我们认为这些真理是不证自明的。 ” 它们并非从形式中推导出来,而是通过经验的证据来领悟的。
Nature had endowed humans with a set of unimpeachable bedrock beliefs, such as object permanence, and reliable faculties, such as reason and perception, so that we should know His world; God is not a deceiver. But the faculties deserve equal respect, perception as much as reason. The US Declaration of Independence depends on Reid’s thesis. “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” They are not deduced from a Form, they are apprehended by the evidence of experience.
苏格兰人捍卫了感知实在论:我们看到的世界是真实的,而非通过笛卡尔剧院银幕上的内在表征。怀疑论的产生,仅仅是因为我们会担心观念与客体之间可能存在的不匹配。然而,如果没有表征,没有笛卡尔剧场,那么世界与心灵之间就不可能存在不匹配。正如机器人学家布鲁克斯(1991)所说,我们不需要想法,因为世界本身就是它自己的模型。
The Scots defended perceptual realism: We see the world as it is, not through an inner representation on the screen of the Cartesian theater. Skeptical doubt arises only because we can be made to worry about the possible misfit between ideas and objects. If, however, there are no representations, no Cartesian Theater, then there can be no mismatch between world and mind. As roboticist Brooks (1991) will put it, we don’t need ideas because the world itself is its own model.
在德国,伊曼努尔康德 (1724-1804) 对新经验主义提出了更为复杂的回应。从认知科学的角度来看,思考怀疑论的一种方式是:我们都生活在同一个世界吗?如果 (a) 我们确实如此,并且 (b) 我们都以同样的方式感知和思考它,那么怀疑论的担忧(或疯狂)就是不合适的。当然,正如亚里士多德所允许的,我们也会犯感知或判断的错误,但如果我们在得出结论时谨慎,我们就能获得真正的知识。就柏拉图而言,他接受了感知的易错性和物理世界的不可知性,他用完美的、可理解的(即可知的)形式领域取而代之。但贝克莱和休谟的论证比关于感知的古典怀疑论要深入得多,他们质疑我们对空间、物体永久性和因果关系的直觉信念。里德让上帝回来反驳经验主义;康德恢复了形而上学,并且以某种心理学的方式恢复了形式。
In Germany, a more complicated reply to the new empiricism came from Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). From the standpoint of cognitive science, one way to think about skepticism is this: Do we all live in the same world? If (a) we do, and (b) we all perceive and think about it the same way, then skeptical worry (or lunacy) is out of place. Certainly, we make mistakes of perception or judgment, as Aristotle allowed, but if we are careful in our conclusions, we can have genuine knowledge. For his part, Plato accepted the fallibility of perception and the unknowability of the physical world, and he replaced it with the perfect, intelligible (i.e., knowable) realm of the Forms. But Berkeley’s and Hume’s arguments cut much deeper than classical skepticism about perception, questioning our intuitive beliefs in space, object permanence, and causality. Reid brought back God to rebut empiricism; Kant brought back metaphysics and, in a sort of psychological way, the Forms.
与苏格兰人不同,康德接受了经验主义者对存在于我们之外的世界(他称之为本体世界)和在意识中呈现给我们的世界(现象世界)的划分。但他指出,经验主义者理解错了两者之间的关系,这是可以理解的。他们天真地认为意识被动地顺应世界——它是自然的一面镜子——而事实上,世界顺应了建构性的人类心灵。
Unlike the Scots, Kant accepted the empiricists’ division between the world as exists apart from us (the noumenal world in his terminology) and the world as it presents itself to us in consciousness (the phenomenal world). But he argued that empiricists understandably got the relation between the two wrong. They naively assumed that consciousness passively conformed itself to the world—it was a mirror to nature—when, in fact, the world conformed itself to The constructive human mind.
康德认为,人类心智,实际上任何理性心智,都会将一套与生俱来的无意识结构强加于感觉之上,这套结构被称为“理解范畴”。这些结构包括三维空间、因果关系、数字以及物体的永久性等。经验主义者认为这些概念是通过联想习得的。因此,婴儿出生时看到的是二维笛卡尔屏幕上的物体,但要学会将可用的线索与三维世界表征联系起来。康德认为,三维空间并非后天习得的,而是一种由心智强加于感觉数据之上的、预先存在的认知结构。
Kant held that the human mind, indeed any rational mind, imposes on sensations an innate set of unconscious structures called the Categories of Understanding. These structures include things such as 3-D space, cause and effect, number, and object permanence. Empiricists thought these ideas were learned by association. Thus, infants are born seeing objects on the 2-D Cartesian screen but learn to associate available cues into a 3-D representation of the world. Kant held that 3-D space was not learned, but it was a preexisting cognitive structure imposed on sense data by the mind.
康德现在可以以一种新的方式声称,所有人类——同样,所有理性存在——都生活在同一个世界,但这并非如经验主义者所想,因为我们生活在同一个物理世界。我们的确生活在同一个物理世界,但那是我们永远无法直接感知的本体世界。9相反,我们都共享意识的现象世界,并非凭借感觉和知觉,而是凭借知性范畴。康德的认识论是一种唯心主义,因为最终人类所知道的是现象意识的认知结构思想。
Kant could now claim in a new way that all humans—again, all rational beings—live in the same world, but it is not, as empiricists thought, because we live in the same physical world. We do, but that is the noumenal world we can never directly perceive.9 Instead, we all share the phenomenal world of consciousness, not by virtue of sensation and perception, but by virtue of the Categories of Understanding. Kant’s epistemology is a form of idealism because ultimately what humans know are the cognitively structured ideas of phenomenal consciousness.
让·皮亚杰 (1896-1980) 的发生认识论深受康德影响。他同意康德的观点,即人类心智将结构强加于经验,但他认为这些结构是经过一系列阶段发展而来的。他在诸如《儿童的数字概念》或《儿童的空间概念》等书中描述了它们的发展。皮亚杰著作中最具启发性的标题是他对客体永久性的研究,即《儿童的现实建构》(1954 年)。苏格兰现实主义者可能会写《儿童对上帝现实的发现》,而经验主义者可能会写《孩子们如何学会相信现实世界(以及如何让你的孩子更快地做到这一点! )》 10。但作为康德主义者,皮亚杰认为现实是位于每个孩子普遍心灵中的理性建构。
Greatly influenced by Kant was Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) genetic epistemology. He agreed with Kant that the human mind imposed structures on experience, but he argued that they developed through a sequence of stages. He described their development in books with titles such as The Child’s Conception of Number, or The Child’s Conception of Space. The most revealingly titled of Piaget’s books was his study of object permanence, The Construction of Reality in the Child (1954). A Scots realist might write, The Discovery of God’s Reality by the Child, and an empiricist might write, How Children Learn to Believe in a Real World (and How to Get your Kids to Do It Faster!10). But as a Kantian, Piaget said reality was a rational construction located in each child’s universal mind.
关于人类心智,我们目前有三种描述。从构建心智科学的角度来看,经验主义者提供了最丰富、最详尽的描述。他们提出了一套心理能力,信息通过这些能力从感觉、知觉到记忆进行处理,为科学研究项目开辟了新的前景。
We have three sketches of what the human mind is like. From the perspective of building a science of the mind, the richest and most detailed sketch was offered by empiricists. They proposed a set of mental faculties through which information is processed from sensation to perception to memory, opening vistas for scientific research programs.
现实主义和唯心主义也影响了认知科学。有时,它们作为反对联想主义的抗议运动而有所贡献。现实主义认为,心智并非局限于头脑,而是与世界相连;唯心主义则认为,心智并非世界镜像,而是积极地构建我们对世界的图景。近年来,它们催生了各自的研究项目。现实主义研究我们与世界的身体互动如何塑造我们的认知;唯心主义则推动了认知神经科学中预测加工理论的兴起。
Realism and idealism have influenced cognitive science, too. Sometimes they contributed as protest movements against associationism. In the case of realism, arguing that mind was not locked up in the head but connected to the world; in the case of idealism that mind did not mirror the world, but actively constructed our picture of it. More recently they have spawned their own research programs. In the case of realism by studying how our bodily interaction with the world shapes our cognition; in the case of idealism in the rise of the predictive processing theory in cognitive neuroscience.
本章的主要收获也是认知心理学的一个重要教训。我们成年人的心智受到两种遗传的影响:一种来自进化,一种来自经验。后者大部分源于我们的文化,而且最重要的是,我们所相信的几乎所有东西都是隐性的,或者说是内隐性的。作为历史延续的参与者,我们通过间接和推理来继承知识和传统。本章试图阐明认知科学家继承下来的关于人性和人类思维的隐性信念和理论。了解这些信念和理论将有助于我们更好地理解认知理论和研究为何会发展到如今的水平,并将极大地阐明不同观点之间的争论。我们往往比争论的双方更能理解这些信念和理论。
The main important takeaway from this chapter is also a major lesson from cognitive psychology. Our adult minds are shaped by two kinds of inheritance, one from evolution and one from experience. Most of the latter is imbibed from our cultures, and, most importantly, almost all of what we believe is tacit, or implicit. We inherit knowledge and traditions by indirection and inference, as participants in the continuing story of history. What this chapter has tried to do is make conscious the implicit beliefs and theories cognitive scientists inherited about human nature and the human mind. Knowing what they are will help us better understand why theory and research on cognition have developed as they have and will throw much light on arguments among rival views. We will often understand them better than the contesting sides.
本章的主题主要涉及科学哲学、心灵哲学和心理学史。
The topics in this chapter draw mostly from philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and history of psychology.
更多关于心理学史的内容,请参阅我的《心理学史:从古代到现代》(伦敦:Taylor & Francis/Routledge出版社,2018年)。阅读哲学心理学家的著作,请访问网站https://psychclassics.yorku.ca。关于认识论的入门,请参阅Jennifer Nagel的《知识:非常简短的导论》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2014年),该书是优秀“非常简短”系列丛书的一部分。关于魔术,请参阅Joshua Jay的《魔术师如何思考》(纽约:Workman出版社,2021年)。
For more on the history of psychology, see my A History of Psychology: From Antiquity to Modernity (London: Taylor & Francis/Routledge, 2018). To read works by philosophical psychologists, see the website https://psychclassics.yorku.ca. For an introduction to epistemology, see Jennifer Nagel, Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), part of the excellent Very Short series. For magic, see Joshua Jay, How Magicians Think (New York: Workman, 2021).
牛津的 Short 系列还包括 P. Okasha 的《科学哲学:非常简短的介绍》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2002 年)。
Oxford’s Short series also includes P. Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
关于心灵哲学的两本著作分别是P. Mandik的《心灵哲学导论》(纽约:Wiley出版社,2013年);以及A. Kind的《心灵哲学:基础》(伦敦:Taylor & Francis出版社,2020年)。最佳五本书的列表请访问https://fivebooks.com/best-books/philosophy-mind-keith-frankish/。
Two books on philosophy of mind are P. Mandik, This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (New York: Wiley, 2013); and A. Kind, Philosophy of Mind: The Basics (London: Taylor & Francis, 2020). A list of Best Five is at https://fivebooks.com/best-books/philosophy-mind-keith-frankish/.
我会推荐一些与认知科学相关的电影。这里我推荐印第安纳大学,它有一个精选认知科学相关电影的网站:https://cogfilms.sitehost.iu.edu。它的起源可以参见B. Motz的《大众电影中的认知科学:认知科学电影索引》,载于《认知科学趋势》第17卷(2013年):第483-485页。http ://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.08.002。
I’ll be recommending some movies relevant to cognitive science. Here I point you to Indiana University, which hosts a curated site on films related to cognitive science: https://cogfilms.sitehost.iu.edu. Its origin is described in B. Motz, “Cognitive Science in Popular Film: The Cognitive Science Movie Index,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (2013): 483–485. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.08.002.
最古老的魔术或许是杯球魔术,这在埃及象形文字中得到了证实。佩恩和泰勒非常擅长表演杯球魔术,即使你能看到他们的每一个动作,他们也能表演成功。详情请见:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =8osRaFTtgHo 。网上有很多教程,你可以选择自己最喜欢的一个。现在有一个魔术科学协会 (SoMA):https://scienceofmagicassoc.org。
The oldest trick in magic is probably the cups and balls, attested by Egyptian hieroglyphics. Penn and Teller are so good at performing the cups and balls that it works even when you can see every move they make. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8osRaFTtgHo. There are several tutorials on the web, you can pick the one you like best. There is now a Science of Magic Association (SoMA): https://scienceofmagicassoc.org.
内容
Contents
Turing’s Cathedral: From Calculation to Computation
World War II: Emergence of Machine Intelligence
Cybernetics: Self-Guiding Systems, Feedback, and Information
Codes and Interpreted Formal Systems: Alan Turing, Enigma, the Bombe, and Colossus
Artillery and the Atomic Bomb: John von Neumann and ENIAC
The Turing Test and the Possibility of Artificial Intelligence
Explanation in Cognitive Psychology
What to Explain: Two Concepts of Mind
Can Two Competing Theories Be True at the Same Time?
Proximate Causation: Answering How Questions
Ultimate Causes: Answering Why Questions
Mind Design: Cognitive Science as Reverse Engineering
Natural Mind Design: Cognitive Psychology
Artificial Mind Design: Two Kinds of AI
Strategies for Cognitive Science
Strategy for Theory: David Marr’s Levels of Analysis
Strategy for Research: Inference to the Best Explanation
A Mind Map: Two Mental Systems
认知科学是一门丰富的跨学科领域,但其贡献最大的两个领域是认知心理学和人工智能(AI)。认知心理学是一门研究人类和动物智能(即地球上进化的自然智能)的科学。人工智能是一门实践学科,是一种工程形式,其目标是构建新事物,在这里指的是人类设计的智能设备。
Cognitive science is a richly interdisciplinary enterprise, but its two largest contributors are cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence (AI). Cognitive psychology is the scientific study of human and animal intelligence, that is, natural intelligence as it has evolved on earth. Artificial intelligence is a practical discipline, a form of engineering, whose goal is the construction of new things, in this case, intelligent devices of human devising.
科学与工程的目标和方法通常是协调合作的,但它们并不完全相同(Leahey,2005b)。工程学的两个特点对认知科学尤为重要。首先,在某些情况下,工程师试图创造自然界中已有事物的人工版本,例如模仿鸟类、蝙蝠和蝴蝶的比空气重的飞行器;而在其他情况下,他们创造真正全新的事物,例如调制解调器。人工智能显然属于第一类。其次,人工智能的目标是实际的成功,制造出可以运行的飞机或调制解调器,而不是解释现有事物。工程学的这些特殊性向心理学家提出了一些问题,例如,如果工程学是人工的,那么科学家,自然研究者,为什么要关心它呢?为了预测普遍的发现,人工智能的研究已经揭示了关于人类思维和人工智能的能力和局限性的一些非凡之处:我们认为自然困难的事情,例如国际象棋,人工智能可以轻松完成,尽管通常不像人类那样;而我们认为自然容易的事情,例如驾驶汽车,人工智能几乎无法做到。此外,将心理学理念转化为可操作的人工智能,使得心理学家很难像我们一样,用模糊的解释来逃避现实。人工智能需要关注具体的细节。
The goals and methods of science and engineering are often co-ordinate and cooperating, but they are not identical (Leahey, 2005b). Two features of engineering are especially important for cognitive science. First, in some cases, engineers try to create artificial versions of things that already exist in nature, such as heavier than air flying craft imitating birds, bats, and butterflies, while, in other cases, they create things genuinely new, such as modems. AI clearly falls into the first category. Second, the goal of AI is practical success, building working airplanes or modems, not giving explanations of existing things. These special features of engineering raise questions for psychologists, such as if engineering is artificial, why should scientists, students of the natural, care? To anticipate a general finding, work in AI has demonstrated something remarkable about the powers and limits of both the human mind and artificial minds: What we find naturally hard, such as chess, AI can do easily, if often inhumanly, but what we find naturally easy, such as driving a car, AI can barely do at all. Furthermore, translating psychological ideas into working AI makes it hard for psychologists to get away with vague explanations as we often do. AI demands attention to specific details.
任何足够先进的技术都与魔法无异。
阿瑟·克拉克(克拉克第三定律)
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
Arthur C. Clarke (Clarke’s Third Law)
智能手机符合条件。人们可能知道一些流行词,例如“5G”、“带宽”和“千兆字节”,但数字世界内部的技术相当晦涩难懂。其核心理念很简单。
The smartphone qualifies. People may know a few buzzwords like “5g,” “bandwidth,” and “gigabytes,” but the technology inside the digital world is pretty opaque. The core idea is simple.
它始于计算,即用数值进行计算,而计算的本质在于将正式定义的规则(例如加法和减法)应用于诸如 4 或 7 之类的数量;因此 4 + 7 = 11。这看起来很简单,但请注意,你不需要知道你加的是什么。它可能是金币;也可能是……可能是美元或夸特卢;也可能是奈杰尔的放大器能达到多高。1如果你正确遵循算术规则,无论你加什么,你都会得到正确的答案。下一个重要的步骤是看到固定数值可以用变量代替,表达数学的普遍真理;因此a + b = c。数学思维规则与关于数量的思维内容分离了。
It begins with calculation, i.e., computation with numerical values, and what’s essential to calculation is applying formally defined rules, such as addition and subtraction, to quantities such as 4 or 7; hence 4 + 7 = 11. This looks innocent enough but observe that you don’t need to know what you’re adding up. It could be pieces of gold; it could be dollars or quatloos; it could be how high Nigel’s amp goes.1 If you correctly follow the rules of arithmetic, you’ll get the right answer no matter what things you’re adding up. The next important step was seeing that fixed numerical values could be replaced by variables, expressing general truths about mathematics; thus a + b = c. The rules of mathematical thought were separated from the content of thought about quantities.
计算的下一步是建造一台可以进行数值计算的机器,即安提基特拉机械装置。2这个非凡的装置于 1901年在地中海的一艘沉船中被发现,其历史可追溯到公元前 100 年左右。利用轮子和齿轮,它可以精确地预测天文事件,对于体育迷来说,还可以预测奥运会的日期。因为它是在船上发现的,所以通常被认为是一种导航辅助设备,但现在有些人认为它是一种教授天文学的设备。后一种解释有助于解释为什么该设备在真正意义上是独一无二的:只有一个。在现代之前,人们建造机器并不是为了经济实用的目的。对许多古人来说,天文学是通往柏拉图神圣形式的途径,学习天文学应该秘密进行(Dzielke,1995)。世界上第一台计算机是一个秘密,它随船沉没了。
The next step toward computation was building a machine that could carry out numerical calculation, the Antikythera mechanism.2 This remarkable device was discovered in 1901 in a shipwreck from the Mediterranean, dating to about 100 BCE. Using wheels and gears, it could calculate exquisite predictions of astronomical events and, for sports fans, the dates of Olympic games. Because it was found on a ship, it’s been usually thought to be a navigational aid, but some now think it was meant to be a device for teaching astronomy. The latter explanation helps explain why the device is unique in the truest sense: There’s only one. Prior to the modern age, people did not build machines for economically practical purposes. For many ancients, astronomy was a pathway to Plato’s divine forms, and learning about it should be done in secret (Dzielke, 1995). The world’s first computer was a secret and it went down with a ship.
在第二次世界大战期间电子机器发明之前,对于安提基特拉机械装置及其后继者,有三点观察。
There are three observations to make about the Antikythera mechanism and its successors until the invention of electronic machines during World War II.
在科学革命时期,宇宙和动物身体都是机器的观念逐渐兴起。笛卡尔接受了这种关于身体的新机制,并开始将其扩展到人类思维。包含他著名的“我思故我在”论证的著作名为《论正确运用理性和在科学中寻求真理的方法》(1637年),后来的著作名为《心灵指引规则》。 (1684)认为,如果人类思维有时混乱易错,那么如果我们训练它遵循精确的规则,它就能找到真理。他的同代英国人托马斯·霍布斯(1588-1679)则走得更远,他深受毕达哥拉斯几何学的影响,将思考比作几何证明。德国哲学家戈特弗里德·莱布尼茨(1646-1716)梦想着一台能够用任何语言思考的机器。
During the Scientific Revolution the idea grew that the universe and animal bodies were machines. Descartes accepted the new mechanism about bodies and began to extend it to the human mind. The book that contained his famous cogito ergo sum argument was titled Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637), and a later work was titled Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1684), suggesting that if human thought was sometimes chaotic and thus error-prone, if we disciplined it to follow precise rules, it could find truth. His English contemporary, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), went further, being deeply impressed by Pythagorean geometry, and likened thinking to doing geometrical proofs. The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) dreamed of a machine that could think in any language.
工业革命期间,英国工程师查尔斯·巴贝奇(Charles Babbage,1791-1871)发明了两种计算设备:差分机和分析机。围绕着制造这两台机器的巴贝奇和他的合作伙伴艾达·洛芙莱斯(Ada Lovelace,1815-1852)——拜伦勋爵的女儿——一直存在争议,洛芙莱斯为这两台机器撰写了重要的著作。巴贝奇似乎仍然将自己的发明视为大型数值计算器,但洛芙莱斯却发现它们可以发挥更大的作用,它不仅可以将规则应用于数字,还可以应用于任何思维。她还编写了第一个在机器上运行的程序算法。
During the Industrial Revolution, the British engineer Charles Babbage (1791–1871) built two calculating devices, the Difference Engine and the Analytic Engine. Controversy swirls around Babbage, who constructed the machines, and his collaborator Ada Lovelace (1815–1852), daughter of Lord Byron, who wrote important works for and about them. It appears that Babbage continued to think of his creations as large-scale numerical calculators, but Lovelace saw that they could be more, applying rules not just to numbers, but also to any bit of thought at all. She also wrote the first programmed algorithm to have run on a machine.
虽然巴贝奇的机器和洛夫莱斯的理念是现代计算机的先驱,但它们并没有催生数字时代、认知科学和人工智能。战争才是真正的催生者(Dyson,2012;Morris,2014)。
While Babbage’s machines and Lovelace’s ideas are forerunners of modern computers, they did not give birth to the digital age or to cognitive science and AI. War did (Dyson, 2012; Morris, 2014).
在讨论机械自动机时,我们忽略了它们与生物体之间的一个重要区别。正如艾达·洛夫莱斯(Ada Lovelace,1842)所指出的,机器只能执行我们设计或编程让它们执行的操作。例如,斯特拉斯堡钟无论周围发生什么,都会报时;在笛卡尔的动物行为反射模型中,固定的刺激会引起固定的反应。但现实中的动物会适应环境,并根据不同的情境对刺激做出不同的反应。最值得注意的是,现实中的动物可以灵活地追寻移动的目标,就像猎豹追逐小羚羊一样。
In discussing mechanical automata, we’ve passed over an important difference between them and living things. As Ada Lovelace (1842) noted, machines can only do what we have built them, or programmed them, to do. The Strasbourg clock, for example, rings the time regardless of what’s going on around it, and in Descartes’ reflex scheme of animal behavior, fixed stimuli give rise to fixed responses. But real animals are attuned to their environment and respond differently to stimuli depending on context. Most notably, real animals can flexibly pursue a moving goal, as when a cheetah chases a dik-dik.
战争或许总是愚蠢的,但19世纪和20世纪初的战争却极其愚蠢且代价高昂。第一次世界大战中的炮火可能投入数十万甚至数百万枚炮弹,但对敌方阵地造成的损害往往很小,因为一旦发射,由于没有精确瞄准而导致炮弹不准确,就会遵循牛顿运动定律,形成弹道。即使在人类炮手的引导下,也需要数百枚防空炮弹才能击落一架缓慢移动的轰炸机。第二次世界大战期间,控制论(该术语的词根源于希腊语,意为“指挥或操控”)的创始人(Rosenblueth、Wiener 和 Bigelow,1943/1966)向人工智能迈出了一大步,他们证明了机器可以有目的地行动,并发明了反馈和信息这两个关键概念(Lloyd,2019)。
War may always be stupid, but the wars of the 19th and early 20th centuries were appallingly stupid and expensive. Artillery barrages in World War I could involve hundreds of thousands, even millions, of shells inflicting often minor damage to enemy positions because, once fired, inaccurately without precise targeting, projectiles go ballistic, following Newton’s laws of motion. Even guided by human gunners, it took many hundreds of anti-aircraft shells to take down a single slow-moving bomber. During World War II, the founders of the field of cybernetics—the term’s root is in Greek words meaning to direct or steer (Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow, 1943/1966)—took a huge step toward artificial intelligence by showing that machines could behave purposively, inventing the key concepts of feedback and information (Lloyd, 2019).
引导的基本问题是设定目标并采取行动去接近(或有时是避免)它。任何目标导向系统都需要三个组件:一个用于检测目标并确定我们与目标关系的传感器;一个用于改变我们与目标关系的行动系统;以及一个将传感器与行动系统连接起来的控制系统(图 2.1)。
The basic problem of guidance is setting a goal and acting to approach (or, sometimes, avoid) it. Any goal directed system needs three components: A sensor that detects a goal and determines our relation to it, an action system that changes our relation to the goal, and a control system that connects the sensor to the action system (Figure 2.1).
反馈系统的一个例子是恒温器。它有一个简单的目标(将室温保持在 74 华氏度),并调节热泵来实现这一目标。请注意,简单的恒温器本身就是一个与环境相互作用的有机体。当温度偏离其目标时,恒温器会利用热泵来改变环境。当此动作影响环境时,恒温器会停止工作,这以其自身的方式改变温度,直到需要再次启动热泵。正如控制论术语所示,恒温器会不断地将其与环境的关系引导到理想状态。这就是为什么反馈被恰当地称为反馈回路,因为恒温器作用于环境,环境反过来作用于恒温器。
An example of a feedback system is the thermostat. It has a simple goal (keep room temperature at 74 degrees F) and regulates a heat pump to do so. Notice that the simple thermostat is in its own way an organism that mutually interacts with its environment. When temperature is off its target, the thermostat acts to change the environment by using the heat pump. When this action affects the environment, the thermostat ceases to act, which in its own way changes the temperature until the heat pump needs to be called on again. True to the term cybernetics, the thermostat continuously steers its relationship with the environment into an ideal state. That is why feedback is properly called a feedback loop, because the thermostat acts on the environment and the environment acts on the thermostat reciprocally.
这个想法看似简单—— “反馈”这个词虽然经常被误用,却也如此常见——以至于很难理解它带来的巨大影响。一次简单却毁灭性的打击,它表明,机器并非仅仅是机械装置,至少在某种意义上可以体现智能,能够在特定环境中有效运作。目的并非思维的专属领域,而是可以在机器中实现的。
The idea seems so simple—and the term feedback is so familiar, if often misused3—that it’s hard to understand the huge impact it had. At one simple, yet devastating, blow, it showed that machines need not be mere clockwork but could be intelligent by at least one meaning, behaving effectively in one’s environment. Purpose was not the exclusive realm of mind but could be implemented in a machine.
控制论的另一个关键概念是信息,这在今天也是一个常见的术语,其影响已被视为理所当然。在物理学中,物体通过力和/或粒子的交换相互影响,物理定律将它们作为方程中的变量。然而,在控制论中,物理相互作用的地位低于那些最好被称为“通过思想来做事”的事物(Haugeland,1985)。
The other key concept of cybernetics is information, again a commonplace term today whose impact is taken for granted. In physics, objects affect one another by exchange of forces and/or particles, and physical laws include them as variables in equations. However, in cybernetics, physical interaction takes second place to what can best be labeled regulation by ideas that do things (Haugeland, 1985).
我们稍后会看到,恒温器的工作可以由几种物理上不同的设备完成:读取温度计的人工服务、带有弯曲电线的传统恒温器,或各种现代的计算机化智能恒温器。每种情况都涉及物理原理,因为热是物体原子的活动状态。然而,使恒温器工作的是有关空气温度的信息,而不是空气分子的运动。信息看起来像一个传统的物理概念,因为我们经常会这样对待它。因此,我们可以问:“我们有多少关于俄罗斯军队调动的信息?”就像我们可以问“俄罗斯有多少储备汽油?”一样。但是,如果两辆坦克共用100加仑汽油,它们之间仍然只有100加仑。当它们上路并燃烧汽油时,最终就用完了。换句话说,这就是质能守恒。但是,如果一位将军向所有指挥官分发一份包含俄军动向信息的备忘录,这位将军仍然拥有原始的信息储备;事实上,由于信息共享,将军的部队现在拥有了更多信息。而且,这些信息在战斗中被调用时也不会消失。信息处理发生在迄今为止人们对其代表世界的理念层面上,但只要正确利用,它不仅可以代表世界(如斯多葛学派所见),还可以改变世界(如控制论所表明的那样)。
As we’ll see in a moment, the thermostat’s job can be done by several physically different devices: A human servant reading a thermometer, a traditional thermostat with its bending wire, or a variety of modern computerized smart thermostats. In each case, there are principles of physics involved, because heat is the activity state of an object’s atoms. However, what made the thermostat operate is information about the air temperature, not the movements of the air’s molecules. Information looks like a traditional physical concept because we can often appear to treat it as such. So, we can ask, “How much information do we have about Russian troop movements?” in the same way as we can ask, “How much reserve gasoline do the Russians have?” But if two tanks share 100 gallons of gasoline, there’s still only 100 gallons between them. When they hit the road and burn the gas, eventually there’s none left. In other words, there’s conservation of mass-energy. But if a general circulates a memo to all commanding officers containing the information about Russian movements, the general still has the original store of information; indeed, there’s now more information in the general’s unit, as the information is shared. Nor does the information disappear as it’s called upon during battle. Information processing takes place at a heretofore dimly recognized level of ideas that represent the world, but it can, when harnessed correctly, not just represent the world, as the Stoics saw, but also change the world, as cybernetics showed.
1940年,德国闪电战成功入侵法国,其技术并非源于其劣势且数量上处于劣势的坦克,而是源于开创了德军机动作战方式的通信系统。4每辆德军坦克都配备了无线电,用于接收指挥命令并与其他坦克进行协调。德军各部队之间的通信受到早在……之前就已开发的复杂密码系统的保护。1939 年,出现了三种日益复杂的密码系统,陆军和空军使用的代号为 Enigma 的密码系统,海军使用的更为复杂的 Enigma 密码系统,以及希特勒及其高级指挥官所使用的最复杂的系统 Lorenz。
The technology that made possible the success of the German Blitzkrieg into France in 1940 was not its tanks, which were inferior and outnumbered, but the communication system that created the mobile German way of war.4 Every German tank had a radio for taking command orders and coordinating with other tanks. Communication among German units was protected by sophisticated cipher systems developed long before 1939. There were three increasingly sophisticated systems, code-named Enigma for the Army and Air Force, a more sophisticated Enigma for the Navy, and the most sophisticated system, Lorenz, used by Hitler and his high command.
盟军意识到,破解德军密码对于击败德军至关重要。早期,波兰情报部门缴获了一台陆军基础版恩尼格玛密码机,并破译了其密码,甚至还制造了一台代号为“炸弹”(Bombe)的机器,用于解密德军信息。然而,随着恩尼格玛密码机日益复杂,波兰被占领,波兰人将他们掌握的信息交给了英国情报部门,后者在英国布莱切利园设立了一个专门用于拦截和解密德军通信的机构。5
The Allies realized that cracking the German codes could be vital to defeating the Germans. Early on, Polish intelligence had captured a basic Army Enigma machine, cracked its code, and even built a machine, code-named Bombe, for decrypting German messages. However, as Enigma grew more sophisticated and Poland was occupied, the Poles passed what they had to British intelligence, which set up a facility in Bletchley Park, England, devoted to intercepting and decoding German communication.5
对于认知科学来说,在该领域工作的最重要的人物是数学家艾伦·图灵 (1912–1954) (Hodges, 2014)。从心理学角度来看,使用代码支持并放大了信息的概念。代码中重要的不是通过无线电传输的点和划,而是标记所代表的思想,即它们包含的信息。图灵在布莱切利取得的军事成功是将他已经深入研究的一种新的语言处理方法自动化,即将语言作为一种解释形式系统。在 1937 年的一篇论文中,图灵表明任何形式系统,包括语言,都可以被现在称为图灵机的理论上的通用数字计算机操纵(即计算)。在布莱切利,他建造了一台改进的机电 Bombe,与图灵机非常接近。
For cognitive science, the most important person working there was mathematician Alan Turing (1912–1954) (Hodges, 2014). Psychologically, working with codes supports and magnifies the concept of information. What counts in a code is not the dots and dashes transmitted over the air, but the ideas that the marks represent, i.e., the information they contain. The military success Turing achieved at Bletchley was the automation of a new treatment of language he was already deeply involved with, language as an interpreted formal system. In a paper in 1937, Turing had shown that any formal system, including language, could be manipulated, that is computed, by a theoretical general-purpose digital computer now known as a Turing machine. At Bletchley, he built an improved electro-mechanical Bombe, a near thing to a Turing machine.
让我们通过一个简单的例子来说明将语言视为一种解释形式系统(见表2.1)。
Let’s work through a simple example of treating language as an interpreted formal system (see Table 2.1).
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• 1. Fonebone 或 Rocco 谋杀了 Captain Klutz。 • 1. Either Fonebone or Rocco murdered Captain Klutz. • 2. 如果是 Fonebone 所为,那么刀上就有他的 DNA。 • 2. If Fonebone did it, his DNA is on the knife. • 3. 刀上没有 Fonebone 的 DNA。 • 3. Fonebone’s DNA is not on the knife. • 4. 因此,Fonebone 没有谋杀 Klutz;并且 • 4. Therefore, Fonebone did not murder Klutz; and • 5.因此,罗科谋杀了克鲁兹船长。 • 5. Therefore, Rocco murdered Captain Klutz. |
• (1) FVR • (1) F V R • (2) F ¬ D • (2) F ¬ D • (3) ~ D • (3) ~ D • 所以: • THEREFORE: • (4)~F(根据MODUS TOLLENS从2和3得出) • (4) ~ F (FROM 2 AND 3 BY MODUS TOLLENS) • (5) R(根据1和4通过析取三段论得出) • (5) R (FROM 1 AND 4 BY DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM) |
左边是一系列您可能在犯罪节目中听到的陈述。每个陈述至少包含一个命题和一个关于其真假的断言,或者当通过逻辑运算符或规则连接到另一个命题时,关于其真假的断言。因此,#1 包含两个命题,(a),Fonebone 谋杀了 Klutz 船长和 (b),Rocco 谋杀了 Klutz 船长,并断言其中一个为真,如逻辑连接词或所示。#2 再次包含命题 (a),断言如果 (a) 为真,则使用如果 ... 则蕴涵运算符,命题 (c), Fonebone 的 DNA 在刀上也为真。#3 包含命题 (c),使用蕴涵逻辑规则推断其为假,用逻辑运算符 非或 ~表示结论。最后,#5 根据析取三段论规则推断,命题 (c) Rocco 谋杀了 Klutz 船长为真。
On the left are a series of statements that you might hear on a crime show. Each statement contains at least one proposition and an assertion about its truth or falsity, or about its truth or falsity when connected to another proposition by a logical operator, or rule. Thus #1 contains two propositions, (a), Fonebone murdered Captain Klutz and (b), Rocco murdered Captain Klutz, and asserts that one or the other is true, as indicated by the logical connective or. #2 contains again proposition (a), asserting if (a) is true, then the proposition (c), Fonebone’s DNA is on the knife is also true, using the if … then operator of implication. #3 contains proposition (c), deducing its falsity using the logical rule of implication, modus tollens, indicating the conclusion with the logical operator not, or ~. Finally, #5 deduces by the rule of disjunctive syllogism that the proposition (c) Rocco murdered Captain Klutz is true.
现在我们将命题转化为正式的密码,用字母变量代替命题,用任意符号代替逻辑运算符。这在表 2.1的右侧列中完成。重要的是,一个受过逻辑训练的人,或者一台被编程为遵循逻辑规则的机器,也就是说,一台图灵机,可以被赋予初始命题作为通过逻辑规则连接起来的无意义的字母集,但却能够得出关于 Rocco 有罪的正确结论,同时根本不了解命题的任何内容。这就是图灵改进的 Bombe 所做的,并且,正如图灵很快意识到的那样,这开辟了解释动物和人类智力以及建造人工智能机器的前景。
Now we turn our propositions into a formal cipher, substituting letter variables for the propositions and arbitrary symbols for the logical operators. That’s done in the right-hand column of Table 2.1. What’s important is that a person instructed in logic, or a machine programmed to follow logical rules, i.e., a Turing machine, could be given the initial propositions as meaningless sets of letters connected by logical rules, but nevertheless reach the correct conclusion about Rocco’s guilt, while never knowing anything at all about the content of the propositions. It’s what Turing’s improved Bombe did, and, as Turing was soon to realize, opened the prospects of explaining animal and human intelligence, and of building artificially intelligent machines.
在美国,工程团队正在致力于构建电子计算机,但不用于密码学。其中一项研究涉及模拟原子弹爆炸。另一项研究是计算火炮表。准确的炮火乍一看像是牛顿物理学练习,但现实的复杂性——空气密度随高度和湿度而变化,从而阻力也随之变化;不同口径的炮弹在空中的飞行方式不同;炮弹在空中时地球在炮弹下方自转等等——使得变量的数量无法用铅笔和纸快速计算出来。第一台为此目的而制造的美国计算机是 ENIAC,升级为 EDVAC。与 Colossus 不同,ENIAC 和 EDVAC 在二战后解密,成为第一批“电子大脑”。
In the United States, engineering teams were working on building electronic computers, but not for cryptography. One line of research involved simulating atomic bomb explosions. The other was computing artillery tables. Accurate artillery fire looks at first glance like an exercise in Newtonian physics, but the complexities of reality—air changes density and thus resistance with height and humidity; shells of different calibers travel differently through the air; the earth is rotating under the shell as the shell is in the air, and so on—are such that the number of variables can’t be quickly computed by pencil and paper. The first American computer built for these purposes was ENIAC, upgraded as the EDVAC. Unlike Colossus, ENIAC and EDVAC were declassified after World War II, and became the first “electronic brains.”
美国计算机史上的关键人物是普林斯顿高等研究院的约翰·冯·诺依曼(1903-1957),在那里他聚集了一群富有创造力的数学家、逻辑学家和工程师。图灵在20世纪30年代访问过普林斯顿,冯·诺依曼试图留住他,但图灵更愿意为英国工作。图灵在他的理论图灵机中设想了存储程序计算机,但冯·诺依曼用ENIAC(戴森,2012)实现了它。它的结构将计算机划分为内存、CPU 和输入/输出通道仍然是当今大多数计算机的基本“冯·诺依曼体系结构”。冯·诺依曼在认知科学的另一个领域——决策制定中也发挥了重要作用,例如他创立了博弈论。
The key figure in the history of American computing was John von Neumann (1903–1957) at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where he gathered around him a group of creative mathematicians, logicians, and engineers. Turing visited in the 1930s, and von Neumann tried to get him to stay, but Turing preferred to work for England. Turing envisioned the stored-program computer in his theoretical Turing machine, but von Neumann built it with the ENIAC (Dyson, 2012). Its structural division of a computer into memory, CPU and input/output channels is still the basic “von Neumann architecture” of most computers today. Von Neumann is also important in another part of cognitive science, decision making, for creating game theory.
1950 年,图灵发表了《计算机器与智能》。这篇文章并没有发表在数学或工程学期刊上,而是发表在第一本英文心理学期刊《心智》上。图灵开篇说道:“我打算思考这个问题:‘机器能思考吗?’”(第 433 页),并提出了模仿游戏,这是一种用人类标准衡量机器智能的测试。他刻意避免对机器或智能进行定义。在一起淫秽案件中,波特·斯图尔特大法官表示,尽管他无法定义色情内容,但他看到时就知道是色情内容。模仿游戏的理念也是如此:智能或许难以被定义,但当我们遇到它时,我们就知道是智能。
In 1950, Turing published “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” It did not appear in a mathematical or engineering journal but in what had been the first English journal of psychology, Mind. Turing began, “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’” (p. 433), and he introduces the imitation game, a test by which to measure machine intelligence against a human standard. He deliberately avoids defining either machine or intelligence. In a case of obscenity, Justice Potter Stewart remarked that although he could not define pornography, he knew it when he saw it. The idea of the imitation game is the same: Intelligence may evade being pinned down, but we know it when we meet it.
最初,游戏由一名询问者(图灵的思想中仍保留着间谍的影子)以及一男一女组成。这名男子和一名女子被单独安置在不同的房间里,并通过电传打字机与询问者匿名互动。询问者的工作是向每位参与者提问,目的是找出哪个是男性;参与者可以根据自己的意愿撒谎或回避问题,以隐藏自己的性别。现在,想象一下女性被一台候选智能机器取代。图灵问道:“当游戏以这种方式进行时,询问者做出错误判断的概率会像在男女之间进行游戏时一样吗?这些问题取代了我们最初的问题:‘机器能思考吗?’”(第434页)。他评论道:
Initially, the game consists of an interrogator (shades of espionage remain in Turing’s thought) and a man and a woman. The man and woman are placed alone in separate rooms and anonymously interact via teletype with the interrogator. The interrogator’s job is to ask questions of each participant with the goal of figuring out which is the man; the participants may lie or evade the questions as they see fit, aiming to hide their sex. Now, imagine the woman is replaced by a candidate intelligent machine. Turing asks, “Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’” (p. 434). He remarks:
这个新问题的优势在于,它能够在人类的体能和智力之间划出一条相当清晰的界限。没有工程师或化学家声称能够制造出一种与人类皮肤难以区分的材料。或许在未来的某个时候,我们能够做到这一点,但即使假设这项发明能够实现,我们也应该觉得,试图用这种人造血肉来让一台“思考机器”更像人类,也毫无意义。6
图灵,1950 年,第 434 页
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this might be done, but even supposing this invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to make a “thinking machine” more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh.6
Turing, 1950, p. 434
结合我们提出的三种认知架构,图灵揭示了符号系统架构中强大的笛卡尔传统,因为他假设智能行为与动物或人类的身体无关,而只与它们的思维有关。在详细描述了通用数字计算机之后,图灵乐观地认为,到2000年,没有人会认为思考机器是不可能的。
Considering our three architectures of cognition, Turing reveals the powerful Cartesian heritage of the symbol system architecture, in that he assumes intelligent behavior has nothing to do with animal or human bodies, but only with their thoughts. After going on to describe general-purpose digital computers in some detail, Turing is optimistic that, by 2000, no one will regard thinking machines as impossible.
图灵思考了对机器智能可能性的反对意见,包括来自神学甚至超感知觉(ESP)的反对意见。从我们的角度来看,其中一些意见尤为突出。其一是洛夫莱斯夫人(Lady Lovelace)的反对意见,她认为计算机只能执行指令。其二是神经系统是连续的而非数字的机器;然而,由于数字机器是通用计算机,它们可以模仿数字机器。第三种混乱的反对意见是来自意识和艺术情感的反对意见,这些反对意见似乎与计算机的内心世界格格不入。还有一组混乱的论点,来自行为的非形式性,或者用今天的话说,行为的社会嵌入性。这些论点将成为具身认知支持者反对主流认知科学的论据的一部分。图灵最后思考了哪些领域最适合研究机器智能,并做出了惊人的预言(第460页):“许多人认为像下棋这样非常抽象的活动是最好的。”他的另一个“最佳”想法是制造和抚养一个机器孩子。
Turing considers objections to the possibility of machines being intelligent, including ones from theology and even ESP. From our perspective, a few stand out. One is Lady Lovelace’s objection that computers can only do what they are told. Another is the fact that the nervous system is a continuous rather than digital machine; however, since digital machines are universal computers, they can imitate digital ones. A messy third are objections from consciousness and artistic feelings that seem to have no place in a computer’s heart. Another messy set are arguments from the informality of behavior, or as it would be put today, the socially embedded nature of behavior. These will be part of the case against mainstream cognitive science by partisans of embodied cognition. Turing ends wondering about what fields would be best for investigating machine intelligence and is strikingly prophetic (p. 460): “Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing of chess, would be best.” His other “best” idea was building and raising a machine child.
人工智能的灵感源自英国的图灵,但它的名字和资金支持却源于美国。1955年8月31日,由达特茅斯学院数学家约翰·麦卡锡领导的一支即将成为人工智能界巨擘的团队向洛克菲勒基金会提交了“达特茅斯学院人工智能夏季研究项目提案”(McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 1955)。21世纪的主导技术就此诞生。这项技术花了一段时间才得以发展。罗切斯特当时担任IBM的研发主管,但股东们担心人工智能往好了说是无用,往坏了说是危险,于是关闭了IBM的人工智能研究。
AI got its inspiration from Turing in England, but it got its name and its funded existence in the United States. On August 31, 1955, a team of soon-to-be AI luminaries led by Dartmouth mathematician John McCarthy submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation, “A proposal for the Dartmouth summer research project on Artificial Intelligence” (McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 1955). The dominant technology of the 21st century was born. It took a while to get going. Rochester was head of research and development at IBM, but shareholders, afraid that AI would be at best useless and at worst dangerous, shut down AI research at IBM.
图灵、冯·诺依曼和达特茅斯团队提出了机器可以智能的想法,但他们回避了其工作对人类的影响:他们创造了人工智能,但没有创造认知心理学。认知心理学和认知科学的创始人是达特茅斯项目的后来者,他们是赫伯特·西蒙和艾伦·纽厄尔 (1956)。他们在符号系统假说中将图灵的智能是受规则支配的符号操作的想法扩展到人类:智能就是符号操作,无论是在计算机硬件中执行,还是在动物和人类的大脑中进行:“很明显,任何能够执行人类功能的机器都可以通过改变视角转变为行为模型”(Newell & Simon,1956,第 2 页)。
Turing, von Neumann, and the Dartmouth group advanced the idea that machines could be intelligent, but they danced around the implications of their work for human beings: They created AI but not cognitive psychology. The creators of cognitive psychology and thus cognitive science were latecomers to the Dartmouth project, Herbert Simon and Allen Newell (1956). They extended Turing’s idea that intelligence was rule-governed symbol-manipulation to humans in their symbol-system hypothesis: Intelligence just is symbol-manipulation, whether carried out in the hardware of computers or in the brain of animals and people: “It is clear that any machine that can perform human functions can be turned into a model of behavior simply by a change in viewpoint” (Newell & Simon, 1956, p. 2).
到目前为止,我们对“心智”一词的使用较为宽泛,但现在我们需要更加精确。大卫·查尔默斯(David Chalmers,1996)曾指出,“心智”的定义和运用方式有两种截然不同的方式:因果性心智概念和意识性心智概念。前者根据心智状态与行为的关系来定义心智状态;后者根据心智状态与意识的关系来定义心智状态。
So far, we’ve used the term “mind” loosely, but now we need to be more precise. David Chalmers (1996) has usefully pointed out that “mind” has been defined and deployed in two quite different ways, the causal concept of mind and the conscious concept of mind. The former defines mental states with regard to their relation to behavior; the latter defines mental states with regard to their relation to consciousness.
让我们从因果概念开始,因为它存在于民间心理学中。假设我因为口渴而翻冰箱,并且我相信里面有一瓶可乐。我的口渴和我的信念相互作用,引发了我的寻找,两者都是有意识的,在图2.2中被称为因果体验。现在假设我在校园里往自动售货机里投入2美元,同时抱怨部门运营预算削减。我相信把钱投入机器就能得到一瓶水,这导致了我的行为,但由于我的心智在其他地方,用笛卡尔的话来说,它目前不在意识中,尽管它可以很容易地被带入意识。因此,这个信念属于图中的认知无意识部分。最后,假设有人问我:“法国的首都是哪里?”我回答:“巴黎。”在我回答的时候,我的脑海中可能浮现出某种意象。在我写作的时候,对很多人来说,脑海中浮现的画面可能是巴黎圣母院大火的场景(2019年4月15日)。然而,这幅画面不太可能让我回答“巴黎是法国的首都”。早在巴黎圣母院起火前,我就已经将答案作为长期记忆中的事实。此外,不同的人可能会报告不同的画面;有些人可能回忆起巴塔克兰剧院的恐怖袭击;另一些人可能回忆起埃菲尔铁塔之旅,或在香榭丽舍大街享用的美味午餐,或学校地理课本上的地图。有些人则完全没有提到任何画面(Beenfeldt,2013;Leahey,2014)。潜意识搜索所需信息可能会(也可能不会)触发记忆,但该记忆的图像在回忆巴黎是法国首都方面并未发挥任何作用。用哲学术语来说,图像是一种附带现象的体验,是一种不会引起行为的意识事件。
Let us start with the causal concept because it’s found in folk psychology. Suppose I’m rooting around in my fridge because I’m thirsty and I believe that there’s a Coke inside. My thirst and my belief interact to cause my search, and both are conscious, located in Figure 2.2 as Causal Experience. Now suppose I’m on campus feeding $2.00 into a vending machine while complaining about cutbacks to my department’s operating budget. My belief that putting money in the machine will get me a bottle of water causes my behavior, but because my mind is elsewhere, in Descartes’ phrase, it’s not currently conscious, though it could be readily brought to consciousness. This belief is thus in the Cognitive Unconscious part of the Figure. Finally, suppose I’m asked, “What is the capital of France?” I reply, “Paris.” It’s possible that as I reply, I have a mental image of some sort. For many people, as I write, the image may be of the cathedral of Notre-Dame burning (April 15, 2019). However, it is highly unlikely that this mental image caused me to reply that Paris is the capital of France. I knew the answer as a fact stored in long-term memory years before Notre-Dame caught fire. Moreover, different people may report different images; some may recall the Bataclan terror attack; others may recall a trip to the Eiffel Tower or a pleasant lunch on the Champs-Élysées or a map from a school geography text. Some people will report no images at all (Beenfeldt, 2013; Leahey, 2014). Unconscious search for the requested information may (or may not) trigger a memory, but the image of that memory played no role in recalling that Paris is the capital of France. In philosophical parlance, the image is an epiphenomenal experience, a conscious event that does not cause behavior.
在笛卡尔之前,像亚里士多德这样的思想家强调心灵的因果性,很少探讨意识。笛卡尔彻底颠覆了古代的优先次序,从本质上将意识发明为哲学关注的一个领域。在认知科学中,厘清这些不同类型的心理事件和过程,尤其是它们之间的关系,将引发争议和困惑。本书将讨论以下问题:
Prior to Descartes, thinkers such as Aristotle emphasized the causal aspect of mind, having little to say about consciousness. Descartes radically reversed ancient priorities, essentially inventing consciousness as a domain of philosophical concern. In cognitive science, becoming clear about these different kinds of mental events and processes, and especially the relations between them, will cause controversy and confusion. Here are issues we will discuss in this book:
这些问题和争议的结果是,认知心理学对意识的研究和讨论并不多。如果说意识是当今的热门话题,那么人们关注的焦点在于它的神秘性,而不是它的实用性。大脑中的物理过程如何产生(表面上)非物理的意识领域?人工智能领域的研究人员通常对意识视而不见,除非他们偶尔担心机器是否也能拥有意识。
The upshot of these questions and issues is that cognitive psychology has not investigated or discussed consciousness very much. If consciousness is a hot topic today, the focus is on its mystery rather than its utility. How can physical processes in the brain give rise to the (apparently) non-physical realm of consciousness? Workers in AI just ignore consciousness, except on the rare occasions when they worry if machines could become conscious.
现在,我们将研究科学哲学中应用于认知科学的几个主题。
Now, we will look at a few topics in philosophy of science as they apply to cognitive science.
提出这个问题似乎令人担忧,因为在所有人类机构中,我们都期望科学能带给我们真理,并高呼“相信科学!”的口号。然而,大众对科学的普遍印象过分强调数据收集和从谬误中筛选真理。科学旨在从事实中寻找模式,然后提出解释事实的理论,而这些理论通常包含对我们无法观察到的物体和结构的推论(例如现代量子物理学的多维弦)。它们可能存在,也可能不存在,我们的推论也可能是错误的。哲学家们长期以来一直在争论,并且仍在争论(Leahey,2018),科学应该在多大程度上超越事实,探究隐藏的原因。现实主义者认为应该这样做;反现实主义者则认为不应该这样做。
Asking this question may seem alarming because of all human institutions we expect science to bring us truth, chanting the slogan, “Believe the science!” However, the popular image of science over-emphasizes collection of data and winnowing truths from falsehoods. Science aims to find patterns in facts and then to produce theories that explain the facts, and these theories typically contain inferences to objects and structures we can’t observe (such as the multidimensional strings of modern quantum physics). They may or may not exist, and our inferences can be wrong. Philosophers have long argued, and still argue (Leahey, 2018), about to what degree science ought to go beyond facts to hidden causes. Realists say they should; anti-realists say they shouldn’t.
实在论者追求真理。也就是说,他们认为科学理论应该如实地描述世界的实体和运作,无论它们可见或隐藏。因此,在实在论的物理学论述中,电子是物质的组成部分,无论人们是否能够观察到它们;引力是一种真实的力,即使我们观察到的是引力的效应而不是引力本身。
Realists aim for truth. That is, they say scientific theories should describe the entities and operations of the world, whether visible or hidden, as they really are. Thus, in a realist account of physics, electrons are constituents of matter, whether or not people can observe them, and gravity is a real force, even though we observe the effects of gravity rather than gravity itself.
实在论的反对者是一群乌合之众,通常被称为反实在论者,但我坚持使用一个更古老、更具描述性的名称——工具主义。工具主义者就像亚里士多德与柏拉图之比。柏拉图说,形式存在于人类经验之外,但仍然是真实的。亚里士多德说,实在论对科学的要求过高。科学的职责是为人类提供一个可用的解释——一种工具——以便理解和处理与我们生活的世界息息相关,仅此而已。对自然进行实际的预测和控制就足够了。当牛顿的批评者抱怨他的万有引力定律仅仅假设了一种吸引力,而没有解释它是如何运作的时,他回应说,这样的假设是不必要的;重要的是他的方程式精确地描述和预测了发生的事情,更重要的是,预测了苹果和小行星必然会发生什么。对于反现实主义者来说,科学关乎预测和控制,而非形而上学。
Opponents of realism are a motley crew usually dubbed anti-realists, but I’ll stick with an older, more descriptive name, instrumentalism. Instrumentalists are like Aristotle compared to Plato. Plato said that Forms exist outside human experience but are nevertheless real. Aristotle said that realism demands too much of science. The job of science is to give human beings a usable account—an instrument—with which to grasp and deal with the world we live in, but nothing more. Practical prediction and control of nature are sufficient. When Newton’s critics complained that his law of gravity simply posited an attractive force without explaining how it worked, he replied that such hypotheses were unnecessary; what mattered was that his equations precisely described and predicted what happened, and, more importantly, what must happen to apples and asteroids. For the anti-realist, science is about prediction and control, not metaphysics.
工具主义有严格和宽松两种形式。严格工具主义者是真正的反实在论者,他们认为科学家应该完全避开隐藏的原因。较为自由的工具主义者则允许使用不可观察的实体和过程来解释行为,只要我们不要将它们仅仅视为有用的概念。
Instrumentalism comes in strict and loose forms. Strict instrumentalists are the true anti-realists, maintaining that scientists should eschew hidden causes altogether. More liberal are instrumentalists who allow use of non-observable entities and processes to explain behavior, as long as we don’t take them to be more than useful concepts.
再次查看图 2.2,并注意神经事件区域。几乎没有认知科学家支持非物理二元论。大多数人认为,无论有意识与否,心理状态和过程都取决于潜在的神经状态和过程。因此,一个关于脑功能生理理论与心理功能认知理论之间关系的问题出现了。自科学革命以来,将两种不同解释层次的理论联系起来的问题就一直存在,并且有两种解决方法:简化和替代。但与心理学家通常的想法相反,简化是好的。对于心理学而言,消除是坏的(Leahey,2008)。
Look again at Figure 2.2 and note the region of Neural Events. Vanishingly few cognitive scientists endorse non-physical dualism. Most view mental states and processes, conscious or not, as depending on underlying neural states and processes. A question therefore arises about the relationship between physiological theories of brain function and cognitive theories of mental function. The problem of relating two theories at different levels of explanation has been around since the Scientific Revolution, and there are two resolutions, reduction and replacement, but contrary to what psychologists usually think, reduction is good. Elimination is bad, for psychology (Leahey, 2008).
在科学革命早期,实验物理学家们建立了你可能在高中就学过的气体定律。这些定律定量地关联了任何气体的三个变量:压力、温度和体积。虽然气体定律是定量的,但它们只是描述性的,无法解释这些定律成立的原因。
Early in the Scientific Revolution, experimentalists established the gas laws you probably learned in high school. These laws quantitatively relate three variables of any gas, its pressure, temperature, and volume. Although the gas laws were quantitative, they were descriptions, offering no explanation of why the laws held.
随后在18世纪,物质的原子理论复兴,为气体定律提供了解释。原子论认为,气体由分子组成,分子分散在空间中,而不是连接成固体。新理论提出,热量仅仅是衡量气体分子运动速度的一个可测量指标;当能量进入气体时,其分子运动加快;当能量离开时,分子运动减慢。反过来,气体中能量的大小会影响气体定律的另外两个变量。如果体积保持不变,例如在高压锅中,气体分子运动加快,从而增加测得的温度(热量);如果体积发生变化,那么能量的增加会导致气体分子与容纳气体的物体发生更剧烈的碰撞,导致气体体积增大。如果能量离开系统,分子运动减慢,气体的温度和/或体积就会降低。
Then in the 18th century, atomic theory of matter was revived, providing an explanation of the gas laws. Gases, atomism said, were made up of molecules, dispersed in space rather than linked up into a solid. The new theory proposed that heat was simply a measurable index of the rapidity of motion of the molecules composing a gas; when energy entered a gas, its molecules moved more rapidly, and when energy left, its molecules moved more slowly. In turn, the degree of energy in a gas affected the other two variables of the gas laws. If volume was kept constant, as in a pressure cooker, the gas’ molecules moved faster, increasing measured temperature (heat); if volume changed, then increasing energy caused the gas’ molecules to bang harder on whatever contained the gas, causing its size to increase. If energy left the system, molecules moved more slowly and the temperature and/or the volume of the gas decreased.
这个故事是一个将高层次理论简化为低层次理论的例子。经典气体定律适用于宇宙的一部分,即气体领域,并且由于它是定量的,因此可以用来预测和控制……的行为。从高压锅到热气球,各种气体都适用。新原子理论应用于气体,解释了气体定律的工作原理,并将其编织成一幅更广阔的宇宙科学图景。孟德尔假设的基因被分解成DNA片段的过程也经历了类似的过程。
The story is an example of the reduction of a higher-level theory to a lower-level theory. The classical gas laws were true about one part of the universe, the realm of gases, and because it was quantitative, it could be used to predict and control the behavior of gases from pressure cookers to hot air balloons. Applied to gases, the new atomic theory explained why the gas laws worked and wove them into a larger scientific picture of the universe. A similar story holds for the reduction of Mendel’s hypothetical gene to segments of DNA.
然而,早期现代热与物质科学的其他组成部分却遭遇了不同的命运。在原子论复兴之前,热及其相关现象,例如生锈、呼吸作用和电流,都是通过引用诸如燃素和热质之类的流体从一个物体流向另一个物体来解释的。例如,热质从火中流向附近的物体,使其变热。新的原子物质理论将热重新定义为分子运动的程度,使得热质和燃素不再必要,从而将它们从科学中剔除。更普遍地说,当一个旧理论被证明不充分,并被一个新的、更好的理论取代时,就会发生淘汰。
Other components of the early modern science of heat and matter, however, fared differently. Prior to the revival of atomism, heat and related phenomena, such as rusting, respiration, and electric current, were explained by citing the movement of fluids, such as phlogiston and caloric, from one object to another. Thus, for example, caloric flowed from a fire into a nearby object, making it hot. By redefining heat as degree of molecular movement, the new atomic theory of matter made caloric and phlogiston unnecessary, and thus eliminated them from science. More generally, elimination occurs when an old theory is shown to be inadequate and is replaced by a new, better, one.
在认知科学中,一个迫在眉睫的问题是,对大脑过程的生理学解释是否会减少——即解释心理状态和过程如何运作,同时保持它们在解释层面上的有效性——或者将它们作为虚构而消除。
In cognitive science, a looming question is whether physiological accounts of the brain processes will reduce—that is, explain how mental states and processes work while leaving them valid at their level of explanation—or eliminate them as fictions.
临床抑郁症的治疗方式多少体现了其中的利害关系。在20世纪上半叶,抑郁症,尤其是精神分析学家,被认为是一种心理障碍,其成因在于童年早期经历,其治疗必须依靠分析性谈话疗法。超我等心理实体和压抑等心理过程被认为是患者痛苦的解释。然而,在20世纪80年代,人们发现百忧解等药物可以有效治疗抑郁症,而无需解决所谓的童年抑郁症病因,也无需改变患者超我的运作或对压抑的管理。人们开始怀疑超我和燃素一样,都是虚构的,抑郁症和流感一样,是一种生理疾病。抑郁症逐渐被视为一种可以通过药物治疗的脑部疾病。简而言之,一种关于精神状态的生理理论即将取代心理理论,而美国心理学会预见到了这一趋势,开始倡导赋予临床心理学家开处方的特权。
Something of the size of the stakes involved can be seen in how clinical depression is treated. For the first half of the 20th century, depression was regarded, especially by psychoanalysts, as a psychological disorder whose causes lay in early childhood experience and whose treatment had to come from the analytic talking cure. Psychological entities such as the superego and processes such as repression were offered as explanations for patients’ distress. Then, in the 1980s it was found that drugs such as Prozac could effectively treat depression, without addressing the supposed childhood causes of depression nor altering the operations of a patient’s superego or management of repression. The suspicion arose that the superego was as much a fiction as phlogiston, and that depression was as much a physiological disorder as the flu. Depression came to be seen as a brain disorder treatable by drugs. In short, a physiological theory of a mental state was poised to replace psychological ones, and, seeing the writing on the wall, the American Psychological Association began to advocate prescription-writing privileges for clinical psychologists.
虽然职业收入并非认知科学的焦点,但神经科学蚕食认知心理学的威胁却是一个现实问题。例如,考虑休谟提出的联想心理过程。休谟认为联想是一种精神引力,一种使一个想法与另一个想法联系在一起的真实的精神力量。另一方面,从巴甫洛夫时代开始,神经科学家就一直试图探索当动物学习将一个想法(例如铃声)与另一个想法(例如食物的想法)联系起来时,神经系统会发生什么。假设我们发现联想学习总是涉及加强动物神经系统中至少两个神经元之间的突触联系。这或许是一个简化的例子:休谟的邻近定律,“两个同时出现的想法会联想”,可以简化为赫布定律,“同时放电的神经元会连接在一起”。另一方面,我们可以用休谟的赫布定律与此类似。然而,心理联想论者可能会用休谟的相似性定律来反驳。如果我对你说“睡觉”这个词,并让你用脑海中浮现的第一个词来回答,你很可能会用一个意思相近的词来回答,比如“休息”、“小睡”或“打盹”,而且很难看出语义意义如何与神经元或神经递质相对应。
Although professional income is not at issue in cognitive science, neuroscience’s threat to cannibalize cognitive psychology is a live issue. For example, consider the psychological process of association proposed by Hume. Hume thought that association was a sort of mental gravity, a real mental force that caused one idea to bind to another. On the other hand, from the days of Pavlov, neuroscientists have tried to discover what happens in the nervous system when an animal learns to associate one idea (e.g., the sound of a bell) with another idea (e.g., the idea of food). Suppose we discover that associative learning always involves strengthening synaptic bonds between at least two neurons in an animal’s nervous system. This might be an example of reduction: Hume’s law of contiguity, “Two ideas that occur together become associated” reducing to Hebb’s law, “Neurons that fire together wire together.” On the other hand, we might replace Hume’s law with Hebb’s. A psychological associationist might push back, however, with Hume’s law of similarity. If I say to you the word “sleep” and ask you to reply with the first word that comes into your mind, you are likely to reply with a word of similar meaning, such as “rest” or “nap” or “snooze,” and it’s hard to see how semantic meaning could correspond to a neuron or neurotransmitter.
英语中有两个词表示提问:How和why。虽然它们有时互换使用,但它们反映了提出和解答谜题和问题的两种不同方式。考虑一起谋杀案。发现一具尸体,犯罪现场调查员和法医开始工作。他们确定死因,即死者的死亡机制。例如,一颗 .38 口径的子弹击碎了死者的大脑,导致其立即丧失重要功能。侦探们补充了因果关系,查明是谁、在哪里以及在什么情况下扣动了扳机。然而,我们仍然想知道谋杀案发生的原因:什么动机导致枪手夺走另一个人的生命?这两个问题是独立的;也许可以完全确定谋杀案是如何发生的,但无法确定谋杀案为什么会发生,因为动机太多或太少。在法律上,人们使用民间心理学来回答“为什么”问题,但科学的进步可能会对其动机归因提出有争议的挑战。在精神错乱辩护中,被告可能会辩称自己患有脑瘤,导致无理的杀人狂怒。因此,杀人动机不明,也缺乏真正的民间心理学依据。此类案件凸显了认知科学和认知神经科学中最令人不安的方面之一:大脑就像物理宇宙一样,是一台遵循自然规律的机器,因此即使在神志清醒的人身上,也根本不存在自由意志。
We have two words in English for asking questions: How and why. Although they are sometimes used interchangeably, they reflect two different ways of posing and answering puzzles and problems. Let’s consider a murder. A body is found dead, and Crime Scene Investigators and Medical Examiners go to work. They determine the cause of death, that is the mechanisms by which the decedent died. So, for example, a 38-caliber bullet shattered the decedent’s brain, causing immediate loss of vital functions. Detectives add to the causal story, working out who pulled the trigger on the gun, where, and in what circumstances. However, we still want to know why the murder occurred: What motive led the shooter to take another human life? These questions are independent; it might be possible to completely determine how the murder happened but not to determine why it happened because there are too many motives or too few. In law, why questions are answered using folk psychology, but advances in science can controversially challenge its attributions of motive. In an insanity defense, it might be argued that a defendant was suffering from a brain tumor causing irrational homicidal rage. Thus, there is no real motive, no real folk psychology why answer to the killing. Cases such as these raise one of the most socially disturbing aspects of cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience: That the brain is a machine following natural laws just as does the physical universe, so there is no free will at all, even among the sane.
第一种近因解释表明,事件的发生是由于自然定律的作用,例如牛顿运动定律和引力定律,或上文提到的气体定律。因此,天文学家通过获取相关天体(例如太阳、地球和彗星)在太空中的当前位置和运动,并运用牛顿定律预测它们未来的路径,从而找到三者的交点,来预测彗星的回归;或者,物理学家通过将体积和压强值代入气体定律,并读出预测的温度来确定高压锅的温度。根据这种观点,解释只是表明,根据物理系统的初始状态加上适用的自然定律的知识,可以预测某个事件(Hempel & Oppenheim,1948)。
The first kind of proximate causal explanation showed that an event happened because of the operation of natural laws, such as Newton’s laws of motion and gravity, or the gas laws mentioned above. Thus, astronomers predict the return of a comet by taking the present position and motion of the relevant bodies in space (e.g., the sun, the earth, and the comet) and use Newton’s laws to predict their future paths to find the intersection of the three; or physicists determine the temperature in a pressure cooker by plugging into the gas laws the values of the volume and pressure and reading off the predicted temperature. In this view, explanation is simply showing that an event could have been predicted from the initial state of the physical system plus knowledge of the applicable natural laws (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948).
用定律来解释,这种解释在认知科学中很早就出现了。休谟说,他的联想定律支配着精神世界,正如牛顿定律支配着物理世界一样。认知科学中的第一条定量定律是古斯塔夫·西奥多·费希纳(1801-1887)的心理物理学定律,它将感觉的主观强度绘制成引起该感觉的刺激物理强度的对数函数:S = k logR,其中 S 表示感觉,R 表示刺激强度,ka 表示常数,取决于所涉及的感觉。其他早期认知心理学家也试图寻找类似的意识规律,而寻找学习规律正是认知科学在行为阶段的主要目标。
Explanation by laws appeared early in cognitive science. Hume said his laws of association governed the mental universe just as Newton’s laws governed the physical universe. The first quantitative law in cognitive science was Gustav Theodor Fechner’s (1801–1887) law of psychophysics, which plotted the subjective intensity of a sensation as a logarithmic function of the physical strength of the stimulus causing it: S = k log R, where S is the sensation, R the stimulus strength, and k a constant depending on which sense was involved. Other early cognitive psychologists sought to find similar laws governing consciousness and searching for laws of learning was the major goal of cognitive science in its behavioral phase.
然而,当认知科学开始将大脑比作一台运行思维软件的计算机时,一种与医学和工程学相关的不同解释风格应运而生,被称为机制(Bechtel & Abrahamsen,2005;Craver,2007;Glennan,2017)。在这种解释中,你会看到一个物理结构(或者在认知理论中,是计算结构)在执行某些功能,例如泵血的心脏或行走的工匠鸭子。然后,人们会展示如何将该结构分解为协同运作以实现其功能的机制。就心脏而言,它包含各种腔体、动脉和静脉,它们将血液泵送到肺部,并在每次心跳时将血液从身体中回收。就沃康松的鸭子而言,鸭子内部有齿轮、弹簧和滑轮,外部有机械腿,使鸭子行走。
However, when cognitive science began to adopt the metaphor that the brain was a computer running mind as its software, a different style of explanation associated with medicine and engineering came to the fore, called mechanism (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; Glennan, 2017). In this type of explanation, you have a physical (or in cognitive theory, computational) structure that fulfills some function, such as a heart that pumps blood or an artisan’s duck that walks. Then, one shows how the structure can be broken down into mechanisms operating together to accomplish the structure’s function. In the case of the heart there are the various cavities, arteries, and veins that pump blood to the lungs and recover it from the body with each beat of the heart. In the case of Vaucanson’s duck, there are the gears, springs, and pulleys inside the duck and the mechanical legs on the outside, which make the duck walk.
在机械论解释中,几乎不存在对普遍规律的诉求。事实上,任何给定的机制都可能是独一无二的,可能是由某个物种进化而来的,也可能是由某个工程师为某个设备制造的,因此它们独一无二而非普遍适用。机械论解释的关键概念是结构和功能,而不是规律。乍一看似乎很神秘的事情——血液如何在体内流动,或者铁鸭子如何行走——可以通过将大型任务分解成一系列更简单的任务来揭开神秘面纱,每个任务都可以由大型机器内部的更简单的机器完成。设备的持续功能定义了需要解释的内容,而不是像彗星回归这样的单一事件。
In mechanistic explanation, there is little, if any, appeal to universal laws. In fact, any given mechanism might be unique, assembled by evolution in just one species or built by an engineer for just one device, unique rather than universal. The key concepts in mechanistic explanation are structure and function, not laws. What appears to be mysterious at first glance—how does blood move in the body or how does an iron duck walk—is de-mystified by breaking the large task down into a set of simpler tasks, each of which can be accomplished by a simpler machine inside the larger machine. The device’s ongoing function defines what needs to be explained rather than a single event such as a comet’s return.
在医学、工程学和认知科学中,“功能”的概念尤为重要,因为功能可以建立其他学科所没有的规范。我们不会谈论质子功能失常,但我们会谈论心脏或计算机芯片功能失常,当然也会谈论心智功能失常。当我们谈论这些时,我们会从近端问题——血液如何在体内循环或大脑如何产生意识——转向终极问题——血液为什么在体内循环或我为什么有意识?关于心智,我们可以问:如果人类是理性的,为什么我们会做出错误的决定?
In medicine, engineering, and cognitive science, the concept of function is especially important because functions establish norms, which don’t exist in other disciplines. We don’t speak about malfunctioning protons, but we do speak about malfunctioning hearts or computer chips, and we certainly speak about malfunctioning minds. When we do, we pass from proximate questions—how is blood circulated through the body or how does the brain produce consciousness—to ultimate questions—why is blood circulated through the body or why am I conscious? And we can ask with regard to minds, if humans are rational, why do we make bad decisions?
在认知科学中,“为什么”的问题可以在两个层面上得到解答:个体生物体层面和物种层面。在每种情况下,“为什么”的问题都考察生物体或物种的战略行为与其目标之间的关系。由于战略是由目标导向的,因此可以提出一些在解释非生物行为时不会出现的规范性问题。我们可以用牛顿定律来解释行星如何围绕其太阳旋转,但行星没有目标;我们不能问一个这颗行星在执行其轨道时表现得好或坏,因为它实际上并没有试图完成任何事情。
Why questions can be answered at two levels in cognitive science, the level of the individual organism and the level of a species. In each case, why questions examine the relationship between an organism’s or species’ strategic behaviors and its goals. Because strategies are goal-directed, it is possible to ask normative questions that do not arise in accounting for the behavior of non-living things. We can use Newton’s laws to explain how a planet revolves around its sun, but planets do not have goals; we cannot ask if a planet is doing a good job or a bad job in executing its orbits because it’s not actually trying to accomplish anything.
生物也是如此。试想一下我们假设的凶手。从道德规范的角度来看,谋杀当然是错误的,但考虑到凶手的目的,我们可以思考他的行为是否经过精心设计,是否有利于实现其策略;事实上,这是评估凶杀现场和抓捕凶手的关键。例如,如果受害者的钱包不见了,我们假设这起谋杀是抢劫计划的一部分。如果钱包还在,那么犯罪可能是一时冲动的冲动表现。
Living things are. Consider our hypothetical murderer. From a moral normative perspective, of course, murder is wrong, but given the murderer’s goal, we can ask if his or her behavior is well chosen to further his or her strategy; indeed, doing so is a key part of evaluating a murder scene and catching the killer. For example, if a victim’s wallet is missing, we hypothesize that the murder was part of a robbery plan. If the wallet remains, the crime may have been a spontaneous expression of passion.
自希腊时代起,思想家们就认为人类是所有生物中特别理性的,甚至是独一无二的理性者,通常会选择实现目标的最佳途径。这种关于人类内在理性的思想,在启蒙运动时期将科学思维扩展到人类社会中至关重要(Smith,2019)。然而,认知科学和社会科学领域的大量研究对这一假设泼了一盆冷水,并对经济和公共政策产生了深远的影响。
From the time of the Greeks, thinkers have assumed that human beings are especially rational, even uniquely rational, among living creatures, typically choosing the best means of achieving their goals, and this idea of intrinsic human rationality was central to the Enlightenment’s extension of scientific thinking to human society (Smith, 2019). However, a great deal of research in cognitive and social science has thrown cold water on this assumption, with deep implications for economic and public policy.
达尔文进化论的应用,对生物普遍的战略行为提出了类似的问题。生存竞争赋予每种生物最终目标:繁衍其基因,将其贡献给其所属物种的持续基因库。因此,正如我们可以探究工人的幸福退休目标是否与其投资策略相符(Schrager,2019),我们也可以探究松鼠的坚果采集和储藏策略是否能带来繁殖成功。即使是树木也会“理性地”追求目标,以最佳的方式生长和伸展叶片,使其能够更好地接受阳光照射。松鼠和树木并没有有意识地提前计划,但它们的行为却常常像在做计划一样。
Application of Darwin’s theory of evolution raises parallel questions for the strategic behavior of living things in general. The struggle for existence sets for each creature the ultimate goal of reproducing its genes, contributing them to an ongoing gene pool of the species of which it is a member. Thus, just as we can ask if a worker’s goal of a happy retirement is well served by his or her investment strategies (Schrager, 2019), we can ask if a squirrel’s nut foraging and caching strategies will lead to reproductive success. Even trees pursue goals “rationally,” growing and spreading their leaves in patterns optimal to exposing them to the sun. Squirrels and trees don’t consciously plan ahead, but they frequently act as if they do.
终极因果关系和“为什么”的问题将我们引向认知科学与自然科学及其应用分支——人工智能——最显著的特征:心智是设计的产物(Haugeland,1985,1997)。就动物和人类而言,设计者是进化;就人工智能而言,设计者是我们自己。因此,认知科学的策略是逆向工程。
Ultimate causation and why questions bring us to the most distinctive feature of cognitive science compared to the natural sciences, and to its applied branch, artificial intelligence: Minds as the product of design (Haugeland, 1985, 1997). In the case of animals and humans, the designer is evolution; in the case of AI, we are. The strategy of cognitive science is thus reverse engineering.
人类长期以来一直渴望飞翔,从代达罗斯和伊卡洛斯的古典时代到文艺复兴时期,发明家们一直从鸟类及其羽毛中寻找灵感。7 鸟类提供了工程师们所谓的“存在性证明”。如果你想建造某样东西,看看它是否曾经被大自然或其他工程师完成过。鸟类是重于空气的飞行的自然存在证明,因此飞行是可能的。因此,实现工程目标的一种策略是逆向工程:从一个能完成你想要的功能的设备开始逆向设计,然后模仿或复制它(Engard,2016)。
Humans have long wanted to fly, and from the classical days of Daedalus and Icarus and through the Renaissance, inventors looked to birds and their feathers for inspiration.7 Birds provide what engineers call an existence proof. If you want to build something, see if it’s been done before, either by nature or by other engineers. Birds are a natural existence proof of heavier than air flight, so flying is possible. One strategy to achieve an engineering goal is thus reverse engineering: Work backward from a device that does what you want and imitate or replicate it (Engard, 2016).
这里有一个真实的例子(Hackman,2004)。20 世纪 80 年代初,英特尔公司垄断了 IBM 架构家用电脑所用 8088 处理器的生产。由于 8088 芯片受专利和版权保护,任何人打开芯片复制硬件或下载软件都是违法的。一家之前获得英特尔授权生产芯片的公司——超微半导体公司 (AMD)——决定尝试逆向工程。AMD 的具体做法极其复杂,也引发了诸多诉讼,但基本上,他们无需窥探 8088 芯片内部结构,就构建了一个芯片和模拟其输入输出功能的软件。从功能上(如果不是从内部机制来看),AMD 芯片就是8088 芯片,AMD 可以以低于英特尔 8088 芯片的价格将其出售给 PC 制造商,从而结束了英特尔的垄断。英特尔在后来的一些芯片上也重复了这一过程,例如20世纪90年代的80386和80486。最终,AMD推出了与之竞争的芯片架构,但由于各种原因,其业务走向衰落(Singer,2012)。
Here’s a real-life example (Hackman, 2004). In the early 1980s, Intel Corporation exercised a monopoly on the manufacture of the 8088-processor used to power the IBM architecture home computers. Because the 8088 was protected by patents and copyrights, it was illegal for anyone to simply open the chip to copy its hardware or to download its software. A company that had previously made chips under license from Intel, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), decided to try reverse engineering. The details of how AMD did it were fearsomely complex and much litigated, but basically, without peeking into the 8088, they constructed a chip and software that emulated its input-output functions. Functionally, if not internally in its mechanisms, the AMD chip was an 8088 chip, and AMD could sell it to PC manufacturers for less than Intel sold the 8088, ending Intel’s monopoly. They repeated the process with some of Intel’s later chips, such as the 80386 and 80486 in the 1990s. Eventually, AMD offered rival chip architectures, but for various reasons its business went into decline (Singer, 2012).
认知心理学的目标是科学地研究和解释人类智力。尽管人类心智/大脑不受专利和版权保护,但认知心理学家发现自己的处境与AMD大致相同。我们无法内省无意识的心理结构和过程,例如联想;尽管神经科学取得了进展,我们也无法细致地了解大脑的运作。因此,认知心理学家进行逆向工程。在实验中,我们操纵人类心智的输入(用心理学术语来说,即自变量),记录由此产生的行为输出(因变量),并提出关于将输入转换为输出的功能和结构的理论。
The goal of cognitive psychology is to scientifically investigate and explain human intelligence. Although the human mind/brain is not protected by patents and copyrights, cognitive psychologists find themselves in much the same position as AMD. We cannot introspect unconscious mental structures and processes, such as association, and, despite advances in neuroscience, we cannot see the operations of the brain in fine-grained detail. Thus, cognitive psychologists practice reverse engineering. In experiments, we manipulate the inputs to the human mind (in psychology’s jargon, independent variables), record the resulting behavioral outputs (dependent variables), and propose theories about the functions and structures that convert the inputs to the outputs.
人工智能也始于逆向工程,但目标不同。在认知心理学中,目标是科学性的,运用逆向工程策略来解释人类智能的运作方式。在人工智能中,目标是实用性的,运用逆向工程策略来构建可运行的自主设备,例如自动驾驶汽车。人工智能比认知心理学受到的限制更少,因为尽管它最初研究人类是为了证明智能的存在,但工程师们发现,智能可以通过非人类的方式实现。想要制造飞行器的工程师最初研究的是鸟类和羽毛,但人类的飞行器没有羽毛。
Artificial intelligence also begins with reverse engineering, but with a different goal. In cognitive psychology, the goal is scientific, using the strategy of reverse engineering to explain how human intelligence works. In artificial intelligence, the goal is practical, using the strategy of reverse engineering to construct working autonomous devices such as self-driving cars. AI is less constrained than cognitive psychology because, although it began by studying humans as the existence proof of intelligence, engineers have found that intelligence may be achieved in non-human ways. Engineers who wanted to build flying machines began by studying birds and feathers, but human aircraft don’t have feathers.
认知心理学与人工智能之间的关系错综复杂。区分两种类型的人工智能至关重要;这种区别可能比较模糊,但务必牢记。维度的一端是计算机模拟,另一端是纯人工智能。
The relationship between cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence is a complex one. It is useful to distinguish two kinds of AI; the distinction can be fuzzy but it is important to keep in mind. The first end of the dimension is computer simulation, and the other is pure AI.
用国际象棋来说明这种差异是一个很好的例子。国际象棋被称为人工智能中的果蝇,因为它比任何其他人类任务都得到了更广泛、更深入的研究和逆向工程,或许是因为它似乎是纯粹、理性、无私智慧的巅峰。此外,国际象棋还有一些特殊之处,使其从程序编写的角度来看颇具吸引力。它的规则明确而正式,战斗结果和胜利条件定义明确。它在有限的、明确界定的场地上进行。它是一种信息完全对称的游戏:双方都知道所有棋子的身份和位置,而不仅仅是自己的棋子。最后,它是一种古老的游戏,几个世纪以来一直被人们玩、讨论、分析和记录。至少从表面上看,与其他智力活动相比,关于国际象棋的一切已知信息都已为人所知,这使得在人工智能计算机中编码国际象棋智能成为可能。
A good way to illustrate the difference is with chess. Chess has been called the drosophila of AI because it has been investigated and reverse-engineered more extensively and intensively than any other human task, perhaps because it seems to be a sort of pinnacle of pure, rational, disinterested intelligence. In addition, chess has special features that make it attractive from a program-writing perspective. Its rules are explicit and formal, and outcomes of combat and conditions of victory are well defined. It is played on a limited, well-defined playing field. It is a game of complete and symmetrical information: both players know the identity and placements of all pieces, not just theirs. Finally, it’s an ancient game played, discussed, analyzed, and recorded for centuries. It appears, on the surface at least, that, compared to other intellectual endeavors, everything that can be known about chess is known, making it possible to encode chess intelligence in an artificially intelligent computer.
第一批国际象棋程序,例如AT&T贝尔实验室的Belle,紧密遵循认知心理学的逆向工程策略,将人类的国际象棋策略重写为计算机代码。简而言之,Belle是对人类国际象棋水平的模拟,尽管工程师的目标是提高国际象棋水平,而不是对人类思维进行科学解释。然而,随着计算机计算能力的爆炸式增长,模拟策略变得不再实用。人类,即使是国际象棋大师,也常常不善于详细阐述自己的战术,而且他们受到记忆力和思维速度的限制。而计算机则能够每秒计算数百甚至数千个位置。在人工智能领域,国际象棋的蛮力攻击方法盛行。工程师们放弃了模仿人类,转而依靠计算机纯粹的数字运算能力来击败速度较慢但更狡猾的人类。简而言之,国际象棋人工智能放弃了计算机模拟,转而追求纯粹的人工智能。其目标是胜利,而不是与人类相似。最近,在征服被许多人认为比国际象棋更复杂的中国围棋游戏时,人工智能工程师完全跳过了模拟,而是追求纯粹的人工智能策略,让他们的人工智能自学——他们根本没有编写围棋程序——并掌握游戏。
The first chess programs, such as AT&T Bell Labs’ Belle, hewed closely to the reverse-engineering strategy of cognitive psychology, rewriting human chess strategies as computer code. In short, Belle was a simulation of human chess mastery, even though the engineers’ goal was good chess-playing rather than a scientific explanation of the human mind. However, as the computing power of computers exploded, the simulation strategy became less useful. People, even grandmasters of chess, were often poor at articulating their tactics in detail, and they were subject to limitations of memory and speed of thought. Computers, on the other hand, could calculate hundreds, then thousands of positions a second. The brute-force approach to chess prevailed in AI. Engineers gave up on imitating humans and relied on the sheer number-crunching ability of computers to defeat slower, if more cunning, humans. In short, chess AI abandoned computer simulation for pure artificial intelligence. Victory, not human likeness, was the goal. More recently, in conquering the Chinese game Go, considered by many to be more complex than chess, AI engineers skipped simulation altogether and pursued a pure AI strategy, allowing their AI to teach itself—they wrote no Go program at all—and master the game.
计算机模拟(和逆向工程认知心理学)之间的区别看似微不足道,但事实并非如此。当人工智能遇到自然愚蠢时,很容易从构建模拟滑向构建纯人工智能,同时仍将其误认为是人类认知的模型(McDermott,1976)。人们可能从一个非常简单的目标开始,例如建立一个人类如何玩井字游戏的模型,从井字游戏推理理论开始,并编写代码来执行该理论。然后程序崩溃了。你在代码中找到一个错误并修复它,安装程序员所说的hack或kluge。程序再次崩溃。你重复这种乏味的辛劳,直到程序顺利运行。
The distinction between computer simulation (and reverse-engineered cognitive psychology) may seem trivial, but it is not. It is easy to slide from building a simulation to building a pure AI, while still mistaking it for a model of human cognition, when artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity (McDermott, 1976). One may start with a very simple goal, such as building a model of how humans play tic-tac-toe, beginning with a theory of tic-tac-toe reasoning and writing code to execute the theory. And then the program crashes. You locate a mistake in your code and fix it, installing what coders call a hack or a kluge. The program crashes again. You iterate this tedious toil until the program runs smoothly.
但它充满了黑客攻击。它仍然是你理论的计算版本,还是已经变成了别的东西,某种人造的东西?认知心理学中任何理论的计算实例都可能被问到同样的问题。科学家们最初的目标是创建一个心理过程的计算机模拟,比如解决问题,将他们的理论转化为可运行的代码,但为了让程序运行,他们发现必须安装一些不属于他们心理学理论的“临时解决方案”,但这些方案确实能让程序运行。结果是,随着他们修改程序,他们从计算机模拟转向了纯粹的人工智能,逐渐创建了一个可以工作的逆向工程设备,但它可能不再能够计算人类思维的运作,而这恰恰是他们最初的目标。
But it’s full of hacks. Is it still a computational version of your theory or has it become something else, something artificial? The same question may be asked of a computational instantiation of any theory in cognitive psychology. Scientists may begin with the goal of creating a computer simulation of a mental process, such as problem-solving, translating their theory into working code, but to get the program to run they find they must install kluges that are not part of their psychological theory, but which do allow the program to run. The upshot is that as they modify the program they drift from computer simulation to pure artificial intelligence, incrementally creating a reverse-engineered device that works but that may no longer compute the operations of the human mind, their original goal.
我们会发现,理解成功的人工智能哪些部分能够阐明人类智能的某些方面,哪些部分仅仅是人工智能的魔术,是深刻而持久的。当我们谈到当今应用人工智能的最大趋势——深度学习、Facebook 背后的算法、自动驾驶汽车以及计算机医生时,这一点尤为重要。有了深度学习,程序可以自行编码,没有人知道它们内部是如何运作的。
We will find that coming to understand which parts of successful AI illuminate aspects of human intelligence and which are just AI magic tricks is deep and durable. It will be especially important when we come to today’s biggest trend in applied AI, deep learning, the algorithms behind Facebook, self-driving cars, and computer physicians. With deep learning, programs code themselves and no one knows how they work inside.
试图仅通过研究神经元来理解感知,就像试图仅通过研究羽毛来理解鸟类飞行一样:根本行不通。为了研究鸟类飞行,我们必须了解空气动力学:只有这样,羽毛的结构和鸟类翅膀的不同形状才有意义。
马尔,1982年
Trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to understand bird flight by studying only feathers: it just cannot be done. In order to study bird flight we have to understand aerodynamics: only then do the structure of the feathers and the different shapes of bird wings make sense.
Marr, 1982
大卫·马尔 (1945-1980) 是一位英国认知神经科学家,他在其巨著《愿景》出版后不久因恶性脑瘤不幸逝世。 《愿景》是对贝克莱老问题的开创性、革命性探究,即当深度知觉始于投射在视网膜上的二维图像时,我们如何看待三维空间。然而,更重要的是,马尔为认知科学贡献了一个框架,阐明了逆向工程的过程。上面的段落通常浓缩为“研究飞行,而不是羽毛”,告诉我们要通过仔细分析生物体或设备必须解决的问题来开始逆向工程,而不是迷失在其机制的细节中。古典哲学家认为(有些人继续认为 [Fodor, 2000])拥有思想是为了发现真理,但认知科学的核心思想是,思想是达尔文生存的工具的集合(Boyer, 2018)。
David Marr (1945–1980) was a British cognitive neuroscientist who tragically died from an aggressive brain tumor shortly after the publication of his great book, Vision. Vision was a pioneering, revolutionary inquiry into Berkeley’s old problem, how we see 3-D space when depth perception begins with a 2-D image cast on the retina. More importantly, however, Marr contributed to cognitive science a framework that illuminated the process of reverse engineering. The passage above, often condensed to “study flight, not feathers,” tells us to begin reverse engineering by carefully analyzing the problem the organism or device must solve rather than getting lost in the details of their mechanisms. Classical philosophers assumed (and some continue to assume [Fodor, 2000]) that having a mind was for discovering Truth, but a central idea of cognitive science is that mind is instead a collection of instruments for Darwinian survival (Boyer, 2018).
Marr 提出,认知科学中的逆向工程应该在三个层面进行:认知层面,它回答这个问题:一个给定的心理过程解决了什么达尔文问题?算法层面,它回答这个问题:该过程在解决问题时遵循什么规则?实施层面,它回答这个问题:大脑和神经系统如何执行这些规则?(图 2.3)。
Marr proposed that reverse engineering in cognitive science should proceed at three levels, the cognitive level, which answers the question, what Darwinian problem does a given mental process address?, the algorithm level, which answers the question, what rules does the process follow in addressing its problem?, and the implementation level, which answers the question, how are the rules executed by the brain and nervous system? (Figure 2.3).
至关重要的是要记住,马尔的分析水平是像认知科学家一样思考的工具。学生们经常将它们与认知心理学中一个听起来类似的框架——处理水平——相混淆,后者的想法是,根据实验中的指示,人们根据浅层物理特征(例如,听列表中押韵的单词,如big-dig)或深层语义(例如,听意思相同的单词,如big-large)来处理刺激。马尔的层次不是心智的信息处理组成部分。它们构成了实践认知科学的策略。
It is crucially important to keep in mind that Marr’s levels of analysis are tools for thinking like a cognitive scientist. Students often confuse them with a similar-sounding framework in cognitive psychology called levels of processing, in which the idea is that depending on instructions in an experiment, people process stimuli in terms of their shallow physical features (e.g., listen for words in a list that rhyme such as big-dig) or their deeper semantic meanings (e.g., listen for words meaning the same thing, such as big-large). Marr’s levels are not information processing components of the mind. They comprise a strategy for practicing cognitive science.
让我们用一个物理工程的例子——不起眼的恒温器——来看一下每个层面。幸运的是,我们不必担心热泵的热力学原理来调节它。8我们的系统应该追求的目标很简单,就是保持建筑物温度均匀,不太热也不太冷。传统的哲学目标诸如获取知识!或做正确的事!等目标过于模糊,无法用于对心智进行逆向工程,因此必须将其细分为一系列更小的目标。
Let’s look at each level by using a physical engineering example, the humble thermostat. Fortunately, we don’t have to worry about the thermodynamics of a heat pump to regulate one.8 The goal our system should pursue is easily stated, to maintain a building at an even temperature, not too hot and not too cold. Traditional philosophical goals such as achieve knowledge! or do the right thing! are too vague to be useful for reverse engineering the mind and will have to be subdivided into sets of smaller goals.
为了实现我们的目标,我们需要三样东西,其中之一就是热泵,我们已经有了。接下来假设现在是冬天,我们只使用暖风。第二样东西,我们需要一种测量温度的方法,这样我们就能知道什么时候温度合适,以及一种通过测量来控制热泵的开关的方法。
To reach our goal we need three things, one of which, the heat pump, we already have. In what follows assume it’s winter and we use only heated air. The second thing we need is a way of measuring the temperature, so we’ll know when it’s right, and a way of turning the heat pump on and off controlled by the measurement.
但是按照 Marr 的说法,我们不会直接着手制造一台机器。相反,我们接下来会看看是否存在一组规则或算法,当设备遵循这些规则或算法时,它们会控制热泵。让我们首先问一下,一个人会怎么做才能将某个区域保持在目标温度,例如 74 华氏度。要测量温度,请将温度计放在房间内方便的位置。然后定期观察温度。当温度低于 74 华氏度时,就下楼打开热泵(或者像以前一样,启动燃煤锅炉)。回到温度计旁,等待温度升到 74 华氏度。当温度升到 74 华氏度时,就下楼关掉热泵或锅炉。重复。我们可以将这些规则重写为计算:
But following Marr, we don’t jump right in to build a machine. Instead, we next see if there is a set of rules, algorithms, that, when followed by a device, will control the heat pump. Let’s begin by asking what a person would do to keep an area at a target temperature of, for example 74 degrees Fahrenheit. To measure the temperature, place a thermometer at a convenient spot in the room. Then regularly observe the temperature. When it gets below 74, go downstairs and turn on the heat pump (or in the old days, stoke the coal-fired boiler). Go back to the thermometer and wait for the temperature to rise to 74. When it does, go downstairs and turn off the heat pump or boiler. Repeat. We can rewrite these rules as computations:
遵循或受这些算法控制的系统将是智能的,即自适应的,尽管仅限于其狭窄的专业领域。
A system that follows or is governed by these algorithms will be intelligent, i.e., adaptive, albeit only in its narrow domain of expertise.
现在到了实际工程阶段,建造一个装置——恒温器——来调节真实房间的温度。这也是认知架构、认知科学中的实在论以及关于简化和替代的争论变得严肃而充满争议的时刻。
Now comes the practical engineering, building a device—a thermostat—that regulates the temperature in real rooms. This is also the point at which debates among the architectures of cognition, about realism in cognitive science, and about reduction and replacement become serious and contentious.
让我们先来看看数字时代之前制造的老式恒温器。如果你有机会接触到这样的恒温器,可以揭开前盖,看看它的内部工作原理,但这并没有什么意义。它的关键部件可能几乎看不见,但它是一个大约1/16英寸厚、1/8英寸宽、只有几英寸长的小金属条,被卷成一个直径约1到2英寸的线圈,安装在恒温器的背板上。它由两根纵向延伸的细金属条组成,每根金属条对温度变化的响应不同。一根金属条响应迅速,另一根响应缓慢。因此,随着温度的变化,金属条会略微向左或向右弯曲,并可以放置在接触电触点的位置,从而接通或断开电路。当你设定所需的温度(74华氏度)时,金属条会移动,以免接触触点。然而,随着空间冷却,金属条会向触点弯曲,直到温度达到约72华氏度时才接触触点。接触打开了加热器,空间变暖。杆放松直到断开接触,关闭加热器,让房间冷却。该过程不断重复,使房间温度保持在 74 华氏度(约 23 摄氏度),不会太热也不会太冷。请注意,算法层规则描述了恒温器的行为,但它们并不包含在内,恒温器本身也没有真正执行这些规则。它受物理定律的支配。
Let’s begin by looking at old-fashioned thermostats built before the digital age. If you have access to one, you can pull off the front cover and see its inner workings, which won’t mean much. The key component may be barely visible, but it’s a small metal bar about 1/16 of an inch thick and 1/8 of an inch wide, and just a few inches in length, formed into a coil about an inch or two across, mounted on the backplate of the thermostat. It’s made of two thinner bars running lengthwise, each of which responds differently to changes in temperature. One bar responds quickly; the other slowly. As a result, the bar will bend slightly left or right as the temperature changes and can be placed so as to touch an electrical contact, making or breaking an electrical circuit. When you set your desired temperature, 74 degrees F, the bar is moved so as to not touch the contact. However, as the space cools, the bar bends to the contact until it makes contact at about 72 degrees. Contact turns on the heater, and the space warms. The bar relaxes until it breaks contact, turning off the heater, allowing the space to cool. The process iterates, keeping the space at about 74 degrees, not too hot and not too cool. Note for now that the algorithm level rules describe the behavior of the thermostat, but they are not in it, nor is the thermostat actually executing the rules. It is governed by the laws of physics.
现在,让我们来看看现代物联网智能恒温器。揭开前面板,你对它的工作原理了解得比老式恒温器更少,因为你会看到密封的计算机芯片。在智能恒温器中,算法被编程到恒温器中并控制它。在大型现代建筑中,例如教室,温度控制更加复杂,每个房间都有自己的温度传感器,并向中央计算机(例如机械室)报告,中央计算机根据规则对建筑物内每个房间和大厅的空气流量进行不同的调节。
Now, let’s look at a modern Internet-of-things smart thermostat. Pull off the front plate, and you’ll learn even less about how it works than the old thermostat because you’ll see sealed computer chips. In a smart thermostat, the algorithms are programmed into the thermostat and control it. In large modern buildings, such as classroom buildings, temperature control is even more sophisticated, with each room having its own temperature sensor reporting to a central computer (look around for a mechanical room), which uses rules to regulate the flow of air differently to each room and hall in the building.
这个关于非常简单、边缘智能的人工智能的故事包含了一些关于认知科学的要点。
This story about a so-simple, marginally intelligent bit of AI contains some essential points about cognitive science.
马尔的分析层次为我们提供了逆向工程思维和构建心理结构与功能理论的工具。现在的科学问题是如何检验这些理论。
Marr’s levels of analysis have given us tools for reverse engineering the mind and constructing theories of mental structure and function. The scientific question now becomes testing these theories.
与笛卡尔的观点相反,大多数心理过程发生在意识之外,无法被其拥有者观察或内省(Beenfeld,2013;Leahey,2014)。康德接受了这一观点,并得出结论:心理学不可能成为一门科学,因为其研究对象无法通过经验观察。然而,事实证明,即使我们无法看到心理过程,也能够推断出它。这种技术被称为最佳解释推理,有趣的是,它更多地基于规律而非科学。
Contrary to Descartes, most mental processes take place outside awareness and cannot be observed, or introspected, by their possessor (Beenfeld, 2013; Leahey, 2014). Accepting this, Kant concluded that psychology could not be a science because its object of study could not be empirically observed. However, it has proved possible to infer, even when we cannot see, mental processes. The technique is called inference to the best explanation, and interestingly it’s based more on law than science.
如果你看过侦探剧,你一定见过推理是如何得出最佳解释的。除非闭路电视或手机拍下了犯罪过程,或者有目击证人,否则犯罪事件必须根据无声证据推断出来。侦探和律师会仔细研究犯罪线索,收集证词、法医证据等等,拼凑出一个犯罪故事。关于谁、什么、何时、何地以及为什么,可能存在不止一种解释,但通常其中一种解释会成为最佳解释,案件会被提交审理,尽管辩方可能会提出另一种犯罪理论。
If you have watched detective shows you have seen inference to the best explanation at work. Unless CCTV or someone’s phone has caught a crime on video, or there are eyewitnesses, the events of a crime must be inferred from mute evidence. Detectives and lawyers go over clues to the crime, collect statements, forensic evidence, and so on to put together a story of the crime. There may be more than one possible explanation of who, what, when, where, and why, but usually one of them emerges as the best explanation and the case is brought to trial, though the defense may offer an alternative theory of the crime.
我们在认知心理学中也做着同样的事情,而且还具备实验的优势。与侦探或历史学家不同,科学家可以创造新的事实来阐明隐藏的过程。一个关于工作记忆的经典实验(Sternberg,1966)就是一个很好的例子。
We do the same thing in cognitive psychology, with the added advantage of running experiments. Unlike a detective or a historian, a scientist can create new facts to illuminate hidden process. A classic experiment on working memory (Sternberg, 1966) provides an elegant example.
当时已确定工作记忆的容量约为七项(Miller,1956)。Sternberg 想了解人们如何搜索存储在工作记忆中的一组项目。在一系列试验中,Sternberg 向他的参与者(当时称为“受试者”)展示了屏幕上一秒多一点的 1 到 6 个数字的列表。然后,参与者看到一个探测数字,并被问及该探测数字是否在列表中;一半时间答案是肯定的,一半时间答案不是。Sternberg 测量了延迟时间,即响应时间:参与者花了多长时间回答这个探测问题?这项任务非常简单,几乎没有出现任何错误。
It had already been established that the capacity of working memory was about seven items (Miller, 1956). Sternberg wanted to find out how people search a set of items stored in working memory. In a series of trials, Sternberg presented his participants (“subjects” in those days) a list of one to six numbers on a screen for just over a second. Then, participants saw a probe digit and were asked whether the probe digit was on the list; half the time it was and half the time it wasn’t. Sternberg measured latency, or response time: How long did it take participants to answer the probe question? The task is very easy and was carried out virtually without error.
斯特恩伯格发现,在负面探测(不在列表中)中,列表大小决定了潜伏期的长度:列表越长,回答“否”所需的时间就越长。这表明人们会一次搜索一个存储的条目列表,即串行搜索。在负面试验中,这意味着要搜索记忆中的每个条目,因此必须搜索整个列表才能做出反应。更令人惊讶的是,同样的模式也出现在正向探测试验。列表越长,参与者回答“是”所需的时间越长。人们可能认为探测在列表中的位置会决定反应时间,因此如果探测出现在列表中的第二个位置,它会比出现在第四个位置时更快地被检测到。这本来是一个串行的自我终止搜索,在找到探测时结束,无需继续寻找已经找到的内容。然而,即使检测到了探测,参与者似乎仍然搜索了整个列表。正向和负向搜索都是详尽的串行搜索。
Sternberg found that on negative probes (it was not in the list) list size determined the length of latency: the longer the list, the longer it took to respond “No.” This indicates that people search a stored list of items one at a time, i.e., serially. On a negative trial, this meant searching every slot in memory for the probe, so that the whole list had to be searched before responding. More surprising was that the same pattern emerged on the positive probe trials. The longer the list, the longer it took participants to respond “Yes.” One might have expected that a probe’s position in the list would have determined reaction time, so that if the probe had occurred in the list at position two it would be detected more quickly than if it were at position four. This would have been a serial self-terminating search, ending when the probe is found, there being no need to continue looking for what had already been found. Instead, it appeared that even when a probe was detected, participants nevertheless searched the whole list. Both positive and negative searches were exhaustive serial searches.
因此,就像在刑事调查中一样,心理侦探斯滕伯格无法直接观察参与者的搜索过程,但他可以通过可测量的反应时间推断出来。通过进行多个实验(我这里只描述了一个),他排除了相互竞争的理论,并最终找到了最佳解释。
Thus, as in a criminal investigation, Sternberg, the psychological detective, could not directly observe his participants’ search processes, but he could infer them from measurable reaction times. By running multiple experiments (I have described here just one), he eliminated rival theories and zeroed in on the best explanation.
自米勒和斯特恩伯格时代以来,认知科学领域积累了大量数据,几位认知科学家,首先是斯莫伦斯基 (1988),然后是更有影响力的卡尼曼 (2011) 和海特 (2006),将这些发现综合成了一幅内容丰富的人类信息系统图。重要的是要认识到,像任何地图一样,他们的理论并不是人类信息处理理论,而是基于数千个实验的有用指南。该图的技术名称是双系统理论;对于流行心理学来说,更吸引人的是海特关于大象和骑手(驯象人)的比喻(图 2.4)。表 2.2列出了每个系统的定义特征和对比特征。
A lot of data has piled up in cognitive science since the days of Miller and Sternberg, and several cognitive scientists, first Smolensky (1988), and then more influentially Kahneman (2011) and Haidt (2006), have synthesized these findings into a rich map of the human information system. It’s important to realize that like any map, theirs is not a theory of human information processing but a useful guide based on thousands of experiments. The technical name for the map is two-system theory; the catchier for pop psychology is Haidt’s metaphor of the elephant and its rider (mahout) (Figure 2.4). Table 2.2 lists the defining and contrasting features of each system.
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效仿卡尼曼,我们可以通过考察两个典型案例来阐明每个系统的关键特征。想象一下,首先,你看到一张愤怒的脸出现在你面前。其次,快!在心算中计算 27 × 13 = 。
Following Kahneman, we can illustrate the key features of each system by examining two paradigmatic examples of each at work. Imagine, first, seeing an angry face thrust before you. Second, quick! In your head multiply 27 × 13 = .
系统 1 是无意识的,其运行快速且自动。当你看到一张愤怒的脸时,你立刻就知道此人生气了。你不会有意识地从线索推断出愤怒,而是体验到愤怒。你的大脑确实会使用线索来推断他的愤怒,但这些计算是深度无意识的。该过程是如此自动,它很可能是系统 1 中一个独立运行的模块化子系统的示例。与此形成鲜明对比的是,简单的算术问题是有意识地完成的,需要集中的脑力劳动,并且几乎任何其他活动都可能打断它。卡尼曼指出,如果你和朋友一起散步,并被要求计算 27 × 13,你几乎肯定会停下脚步去做算术!系统 2 过程需要深思熟虑才能遵循学到的算术规则。另一方面,最重要的(但不是唯一)系统 1 过程是联想记忆,它执行联想定律。从心理学发展初期开始,心理学家就区分了两种注意力:非自主注意力(即外部刺激吸引注意力)和自主注意力(即主动努力去关注重要刺激,例如聚会上的对话)。这两种注意力分别对应系统1和系统2。
System 1 is unconscious, and its operations are fast and automatic. When you see an angry face, you know immediately that the person is angry. You do not consciously work out from cues to anger, you experience it. Your brain does use cues to infer his anger, but these computations are deeply non-conscious. The process is so automatic, it’s likely an example of a modular sub-system of System 1 that operates on its own. In strong contrast, the simple arithmetic problem is done consciously, requiring concentrated mental effort, and it can be disrupted by almost any other activity. Kahneman points out that if you were strolling with a friend, and were asked to multiply 27 × 13, you would almost certainly stop walking to do the math! System 2 processes require deliberation in order to follow the learned rules of arithmetic. The most important (though not the only) System 1 process, on the other hand, is associative memory, which executes the laws of association. From the earliest days of psychology, psychologists distinguished two forms of attention, involuntary, when an external stimulus captures your attention, and voluntary, when you make an active effort to attend to an important stimulus, such as a conversation at a party. These types of attention map onto System 1 and System 2, respectively.
笛卡尔将他的意识,即他的系统2,视为他的本质自我,而我们往往也认同他的直觉。我们承担和分配道德责任,很大程度上是基于有意识的行为意图。因此,一级谋杀需要“预谋恶意”,而如果一个人能够合理地辩称自己在情绪压力下“突然崩溃”,他们可能会被判过失杀人罪,甚至可能被无罪释放。至少所有哺乳动物都具备感知威胁的能力,而且我们通常从动物身上继承了系统1。祖先。系统 2 中人类独有的心理过程很大程度上是由我们的文化通过模仿和正式学习而建立的 (Boyer, 2018; Tomasello, 2019)。
Descartes regarded his consciousness, his System 2, as his essential self, and we tend to share his intuition. We take and assign moral responsibility largely on the basis of conscious intention to act. Thus, first-degree murder requires “malice aforethought,” while if a person can plausibly argue that they “just snapped” under emotional strain, they may be found guilty of manslaughter or even acquitted. The ability to detect threat displays is found in at least all mammals, and in general we inherit System 1 from our animal ancestors. The distinctively human mental processes of System 2 are largely installed by our cultures, through imitation and formal learning (Boyer, 2018; Tomasello, 2019).
卡尼曼将系统 1 的工作概括为不断构建世界模型来指导我们的行为。我们无法选择阻止模型的构建和呈现——即使我们被告知视觉错觉是错觉,它们也不会消失,而表演出色的魔术也会愚弄那些知道如何表演魔术的魔术师;对魔术的最高赞美是“我甚至欺骗了我自己!”最重要的是,我们心理生活的世界是由系统 1 构建的世界。卡尼曼将此事实称为 WYSIATI:你所看到的就是这里的一切。 在 本书 中 ,我们将了解卡尼曼在提出预测处理假设时低估的一个WYSIATI 方面。我们生活的世界不是世界的模型,而是系统 1 预测的不久的将来的世界的模型。这听起来令人震惊,但正如卡尼曼强调的那样,大象非常擅长它的工作。它的预测和预期反应几乎总是正确的。骑象人可以放心地让大象独自一人,愉快地在它的背上放松。只有当预测失败时,系统1才需要唤醒系统2,而解决新问题则需要有意识的思考。它们之间的关系具有高度的适应性,因为从生物学角度来看,系统1的运行成本很高,正如我们在算术问题中看到的那样。
Kahneman summarizes the job of System 1 as continuously building a model of the world for guiding our behavior. We can’t choose to stop the model from being built and presented—optical illusions don’t go away even when we are taught that they are illusions, and good magic tricks performed well nevertheless fool magicians who know how they are done; the highest praise for a magic trick is, “I even fool myself!” Most importantly, the world we psychologically live in is the world constructed by System 1. Kahneman dubs this fact WYSIATI: W hat Y ou S ee I s A ll T here I s. In this book, we will meet an aspect of WYSIATI that Kahneman under-appreciated when he suggested the predictive processing hypothesis. The world we live in is not a model of the world, it is a model of the world as System 1 predicts it to be in the immediate future. This sounds alarming, but, as Kahneman stresses, the elephant is very good at its job. Its predictions and anticipated responses are almost always right. The rider can simply leave the elephant alone, happily relaxing on its back. System 1 need wake System 2 only when a prediction fails, and conscious thought is needed to solve a new problem. Their relationship is highly adaptive because System 1 is biologically expensive to run, as we saw with the arithmetic problem.
到目前为止,我们已经在本书中讨论了许多关于心灵的隐喻,例如柏拉图的战车、双系统地图以及海特的大象和骑象人。你可能还听过其他一些隐喻,例如弗洛伊德的马(本我)和骑象人(自我),或者心灵是冰山一角,大部分都隐藏在水面之下,当然,还有如今无处不在的计算机。在其他心理学课程、书籍或文章中,你也会遇到“模型”。它通常被用来指适用于少数现象的小规模理论,例如斯滕伯格的短期记忆序列穷举搜索模型。然而,我们需要稍微谈谈隐喻和模型,因为前者可能会悄悄地误导人,而后者在科学哲学中的用法比心理学家给出的更为精确。
We have discussed a number of metaphors for mind in this book so far, Plato’s chariot, the two-system map, Haidt’s elephant and rider. You may have heard others, such as Freud’s horse (id) and rider (ego) or mind as iceberg with most below the water’s surface, and, of course, the now-ubiquitous mind as a computer. In other psychology courses, books, or articles, you have met “models,” too. It’s usually deployed to mean a small-scale theory applying to a small number of phenomena, such as Sternberg’s serial exhaustive search model of short-term memory. However, we need to say a little about metaphors and models because the former can be quietly misleading, and the latter has a more precise use in philosophy of science than psychologists give it.
我们总是用比喻来表达难以捉摸的想法和感受,但它们可能难以捉摸,有时意图比表面更多,有时更少。“我的爱就像一朵红红的玫瑰”,听起来不错,但作者是想让我们思考它的刺吗?还是过敏?“我能否将你比作夏日?”炎热潮湿,午后还可能有雷雨?在科学等不那么浪漫的语境中,比喻是引导人们思考新奇陌生事物的有效方式,如果直接呈现,这些事物可能会令人望而生畏。因此,老师会将新事物与旧事物进行比较,例如将心智的双系统观比作大象和它的骑手。Haidt 的比喻也利用了你可能已经知道的比喻,例如弗洛伊德的马和骑手。海特故意用大象代替马,以强调大象的体型——系统 1 比系统 2 运行更多的流程——以及与马相比,大象的体型使其更难驾驭的事实。
We use metaphors all the time to help us express elusive ideas and feelings, but they can be slippery, intending sometimes more, sometimes less, than what’s on the surface. “My love is like a red, red rose,” sounds nice, but did the author want us to think about the thorns? Or allergies? “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?” Hot and humid with a chance of afternoon thunderstorms? In less romantic contexts such as science, metaphors are useful ways of inviting someone to consider something new and unfamiliar that, presented directly, might seem daunting. So, a teacher will compare a new thing to an old one, such as the two-system view of the mind to an elephant and its rider. Haidt’s metaphor also takes advantage of metaphors you may already know, such as Freud’s horse and rider. Haidt deliberately replaced the horse with the elephant to emphasize the elephant’s size—System 1 runs many more processes than System 2—and the fact that, compared to horses, their bulk makes elephants harder to steer.
然而,在任何隐喻中,新事物和它的隐喻之间都会有相似之处和不同之处;有些是有意为之,有些则不是,但就像玫瑰的刺一样,其他的可能以模棱两可的状态潜伏在背景中。Haidt 有意表现大小相似,但他肯定不是在暗示系统 2 有一个可卷曲的鼻子。但是大象的大耳朵呢?Haidt 的意思是系统 1 对环境特别警觉,能够意识到小耳朵的系统 2 所没有的东西吗?事实上,这个问题是注意力心理学中的一个严肃问题,但目前尚不清楚 Haidt 是否对此表明了立场。最后,隐喻可能会暗示提出者从未想过的某些思路。在印度,大象通常不仅载着骑手,还载着乘客,比如告诉骑手去哪里的王公。添加大君会改变这个比喻,从而为许多人从认知科学中得出的令人不安的推论提供新的解释,即我们没有自由意志。
In any metaphor, however, there will be similarities and differences between the new thing and its metaphor; some will be intended and some not, but as with the rose’s thorns, others may lurk in the background in an ambiguous state. Haidt intended the similarity of size, but he surely did not mean to imply that System 2 has a prehensile trunk. But what about the elephant’s big ears? Did Haidt mean to imply that System 1 is especially alert to the environment, being aware of things the small-eared System 2 isn’t? This question is, in fact, a serious one in psychology of attention, but it’s not clear if Haidt is taking a position on it. Finally, metaphors may suggest certain lines of thought never meant by their proposer. In India, elephants often carried not just a rider, but a passenger such as a maharaja who tells the rider where to go. Adding the maharaja changes the metaphor in a way that throws new light on a disturbing implication that many people draw from cognitive science, that we have no free will.
模型是一种隐喻,因为它部分地表征了某个对象。但在科学哲学中,它们还有更严谨的含义,超越了心理学家将“模型”用作小层次理论的范畴(Suppe,1989)。模型是对世界将会是什么样子的一种表征,前提是该理论所假设的对象和力恰好是世界上起作用的。这种用法始于伽利略从物理学中摒弃次要的感觉属性。由于它们不影响物体的因果相互作用,因此运动的数学动力学可以安全地忽略它们。但伽利略也忽略了其他确实会影响运动的因素,例如摩擦力,包括空气阻力。在高中物理课上,你可能学过如何解斜面问题,其中摩擦力以及物体的形状和物质与你对其加速度的计算无关。严格来说,科学的预测和解释是关于理论模型的理想化世界,而只是间接地或隐喻地关于现实世界。
Models are metaphors in that they partly represent an object. But in philosophy of science, they also have a more rigorous meaning that also goes beyond psychologists’ use of “model” as small-level theory (Suppe, 1989). A model is a representation of what the world would be like if only and exactly the objects and forces posited by the theory were the ones operative in the world. This usage began to emerge with Galileo’s dismissal of the secondary sense properties from physics. Because they did not affect objects’ causal interactions, they could be safely ignored by the mathematical dynamics of motion. But Galileo ignored other factors, too, that do affect motion, such as friction, including air resistance. In high school physics, you probably learned how to do inclined plane problems, where friction and the shape and matter of an object don’t matter to your calculations of its rate of acceleration. Scientific predictions and explanations are, strictly speaking, about a theoretical model’s idealized world and only indirectly, or metaphorically, about the real world.
心理学和其他社会科学领域也是如此。斯滕伯格的模型(隐含地)是关于一位身体状况良好、动机十足的参与者专注于记忆任务。有些人可能感到无聊、宿醉或还没喝咖啡,但这些动机因素并不在斯滕伯格的模型范围内。这就是为什么需要进行统计分析,并对许多参与者进行多次试验和设置条件,以便让这些特质因素相互抵消。事实上,其他科学家可以使用像斯滕伯格这样的经过充分测试的程序来研究药物对行为的影响或评估脑损伤等问题,因为它们提供了正常行为的基线。
The same is true in psychology and other social sciences. Sternberg’s model was (implicitly) about a perfectly well-motivated participant in good physical shape paying sole attention to the memory task. Some may have been bored, hung-over, or hadn’t had their coffee yet, but such motivational factors were outside Sternberg’s model. This is one reason for statistical analysis and running many trials and conditions with many participants, to allow such idiosyncratic factors to cancel each other out. In fact, well-tested procedures such as Sternberg’s can be used by other scientists to study things, such as the effects of drugs on behavior, or to assess brain damage, because they provide baselines of normal behavior.
然而,认知科学关于模型及其应用的标准假设也带来了一些挑战。例如,最近人们普遍认为,心理学家倾向于认为文化对许多事情的影响并不大。人类行为。认知科学和社会科学研究中的绝大多数受试者来自北美,其中也混杂着西欧人。然而,所有这些受试者都是WEIRD型(Henrich、Heine & Norenzayan,2010)。也就是说,他们都成长并生活在西方、受教育程度高、工业化程度高、富裕且民主的国家。许多重复性良好的实验都针对WEIRD型受试者群体进行,但或许正是因为他们的社会背景相似,也就是说,这是一个无意的控制变量,导致我们对人性的看法可能存在狭隘性。
However, certain challenges arise from cognitive science’s standard assumptions about models and their use. For example, it has lately been accepted that psychological scientists have tended to assume that culture was not an important influence on much of human behavior. The vast, vast majority of people studied in cognitive science and social science are drawn from North America, with a mixture of western Europeans. However, all these participants are WEIRD (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). That is, they all grew up and live in countries that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic. Many well-replicated experiments have been done with the WEIRD participant pool, but it just may be that because their social background is similar, i.e., it has been an inadvertent control variable, our view of human nature may be parochial.
最后,工程师,例如认知科学应用分支——人工智能领域的工程师,不能忽视理论模型中忽略的变量。埃及工程师沿着堤道搬运方形石块建造金字塔,新石器时代的工程师将巨大的砂岩搬运到巨石阵,罗马工程师搬运石块修建道路和渡槽,巴黎圣母院的建造者将石块运到现场进行雕刻,他们不可能仅仅假设摩擦力就消除。他们必须克服它。人工智能程序必须成功运行才能在真实的高速公路上安全行驶,就像自动驾驶汽车项目的目标一样。认知科学与实用人工智能认知工程之间的差异,在优雅但受限的科学模型与现实世界的混乱之间,形成了创造性的张力。
Finally, engineers, such as the engineers in cognitive science’s applied branch, AI, cannot ignore the variables ignored in theoretical models. The Egyptian engineers who hauled square stones around a causeway to build the pyramids, the Neolithic engineers who hauled the great sarsen stones to Stonehenge, the Roman engineers who moved stones to build their roads and aqueducts, and the cathedral builders of Notre Dame bringing stone on-site for sculpting could not have just assumed friction away. They had to overcome it. Programs in artificial intelligence must be successful in order to safely drive on real highways, as self-driving car projects aim to do. The difference between cognitive science and practical AI cognitive engineering makes a creative tension between the elegant but restrictive models of science and the messiness of the real world.
一些科学家反对双系统模型(Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018a;Pennycook 等人,2018 对此进行了辩护;Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018b 对此进行了回应),认为它不足以支撑认知科学,这当然是错误的。它就像一个比喻,一张探索心智的松散地图,对我们大有裨益。最终,它会被更精确的 GPS 所取代。
Some scientists reject the two–system model (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018a; defended by Pennycook et al., 2018; reply by Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018b) as an insufficient theory for cognitive science, which of course it is. It’s a metaphor, a loose map for exploring the mind that will serve us well. Eventually it can be replaced by a more precise GPS.
我们有时会想象问一只蜈蚣一个糟糕的问题:“一百条腿怎么走路?”这对蜈蚣来说简直是灾难,因为它一想到要走路,就感到困惑,根本走不了。走路最好留给大象去处理,留给系统1的无意识处理。
We sometimes imagine asking a centipede a disastrous question, “How do you walk with a hundred legs?” It’s a disaster for the centipede because as soon as it thinks about walking, it gets confused and can’t walk. Walking is best left to the elephant, to the unconscious processing of System 1.
但如果你像我一样失去了行走的能力,你必须重新思考如何才能再次行走。物理治疗就是学习如何有意识地去做你一生中无意识地做的事情。电影和电视对物理治疗的描述往往具有误导性或错误性。一个常见的桥段是,警察或士兵受伤后,在双杠上重新学习行走,放弃希望,而朋友、爱人或严厉的老板会大喊:“你能行!你必须要有决心!” 在一个感人的时刻,脚步又回来了,这是意志的胜利。事实并非如此,而是一路走来的小步。今天两步,明天四步,下周十八步,直到很久以后(对我来说是三个月),你才能正常行走而不会摔倒。一路走来,你必须时刻警惕自己和周围环境的细微变化,这些变化你以前从未考虑过:我能抓住哪里支撑?我能走多少步才会倒下?
But if you lose the ability to walk, as I did, you must think about it to do it again. Physical therapy is about learning to do consciously what you spent your life doing unconsciously. Movie and TV depiction of physical therapy is often misleading or wrong. A common trope is a cop or soldier learning to walk again after being wounded, on parallel bars, giving up hope while a friend, lover, or stern boss-type yells “you can do it! You have to want it!” And in a touching moment, steps return, a triumph of the will. It’s not like that, but is baby steps all the way. Two today, four tomorrow, 18 next week, until after a long time (for me, three months) you can walk normally without falling over. Along the way, you must be alert to nuances of yourself and your surroundings you never computed before: Where can I grab for support? How many steps can I take before I might collapse?
另一个误解发生在坐轮椅的角色突然恢复行走的场景中。例如,在《骗徒大亨》中,史蒂夫·马丁假装自己是一位坐轮椅的老兵,(出于剧情原因)必须站起来行走。就像其他电影中的描述一样,他直接从轮椅上跳起来,然后一步一步地、僵硬地、机械地行走。事实上,行走是容易的部分,站起来才是难的。在正常情况下,我们会不假思索地在椅子上向前倾,双手轻轻地扶住椅子的扶手、沙发的座位或床沿,以此来准备站立。这样做可以让我们的重心集中在双脚上,这样双腿就只需要向上推即可。然而,如果我们身体虚弱或感到疼痛,我们往往会忽略这些动作,即使它们比健康时更有必要,因为我们需要将身体的重心恰好而不是大致地放在双脚上。物理治疗师会教我们一句格言:“鼻子比脚趾重!”站起来之前,你需要在椅子上向前倾,直到鼻子和脚趾在地面上对齐,然后再尝试站起来。一开始,鼻子和脚趾的距离不能差一毫米,否则你就站不起来。一旦站起来,膝盖可以锁紧,就可以走路了。虽然仍然很难,但还是有可能的。
Another misconception occurs in scenes where a wheelchair-bound character suddenly walks again. For example, in Dirty Rotten Scoundrels, Steve Martin is faking being a wheelchair-bound veteran who (for plot reasons) has to get up and walk. As in other cinema depictions, he bolts straight out of his wheelchair and then walks badly, and robotically, rigid step by rigid step. In fact, walking is the easy part; getting up is the hard part. Without thinking about it, in our normal state we prepare to get standing by leaning forward in our chair and bracing, if lightly, our hands on the arms of the chair or the seat of a sofa or the edge of our bed. Doing so gets our center of gravity over our feet, so our legs just have to push up. However, if we are weak and/or in pain, we tend to neglect these moves, even though they are more necessary than when we were healthy because we need our weight to be exactly rather than approximately over our feet. Physical therapists teach a motto: “Nose over toes!” Before standing up, you lean forward in your chair until you visually align your nose with your toes on the floor, and then work on standing up. Initially, your nose can’t be short of your toes by even a millimeter, or you’ll fail to stand. Once up and your knees can lock, walking is possible. Still hard, but possible.
通过物理治疗,我对我的大象产生了极大的敬意,它在背后努力工作,让我能够继续前进,这样我的意识就可以做其他事情了。
Going through physical therapy gave me enormous respect for my elephant, working hard in the background to keep me going so my conscious mind could do other things.
关于人工智能的历史,可以参考M. Woolridge的《人工智能简史:它是什么,我们现在在哪里,以及我们要去哪里》(伦敦:Macmillan出版社,2021年),该书强调了失败,旨在展示科学家的思维方式。J. Shane的《你看起来像个东西,而我爱你:人工智能是如何运作的,以及它为何让世界变得更奇怪》(波士顿:Little, Brown出版社,2019年)则以幽默但严肃的视角审视了人工智能。Shane也关注那些有趣的失败,这些失败揭示了思维的复杂性,以及人工智能的难度。她运营着一个人工智能幽默博客:https://www.aiweirdness.com。
A history of AI is M. Woolridge, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence: What It Is, Where We Are, and Where We Are Going (London: Macmillan 2021), which emphasizes failures and aims to show how scientists think. A funny but ultimately serious look at AI is provided by J. Shane, You Look Like a Thing and I Love You: How Artificial Intelligence Works and Why It’s Making the World a Weirder Place (Boston: Little, Brown, 2019). Shane, too, focuses on failures—amusing ones—that reveal how complicated the mind is and thus how hard AI is. She runs an AI humor blog: https://www.aiweirdness.com.
M. Lewis 的《毁灭计划:改变我们思想的友谊》(纽约:诺顿,2016 年)是丹尼尔·卡尼曼和他的长期学术伙伴阿莫斯·特沃斯基共同撰写的传记,作者是著名作家(《点球成金》、《大空头》)。
M. Lewis, The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds (New York: Norton, 2016) is a joint biography of Daniel Kahnemann and his long-time academic partner, Amos Tversky, by a well-known writer (Moneyball, The Big Short).
《科学》杂志邀请了一些人工智能科学家挑选出最佳的人工智能电影,并对其科学准确性进行评分。以下是名单(现在看来有些过时了):https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/07/which-movies-get-artificial-intelligence-right。
The journal Science asked some AI scientists to pick the best AI films and rate them for scientific accuracy. Here’s the list (a bit dated now): https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/07/which-movies-get-artificial-intelligence-right.
我选《2001太空漫游》最好,因为HAL就是在我所在的伊利诺伊大学研究生院发明的。9 作为一个科幻迷,我读过艾萨克·阿西莫夫(《机器人总动员》)和阿瑟·C·克拉克(《2001太空漫游》)的作品。我从小就以为《2001太空漫游》里的世界至少会像库布里克电影里展现的一样先进。正如库布里克在《卡萨布兰卡》里谈到那里缺水时所说,“我被误导了。” 10
I’ll go with 2001 as the best, if only because HAL was created at my graduate school, University of Illinois.9 A sci-fi fan reading Isaac (I Robot) Asimov and Arthur C. (2001) Clarke, I grew up thinking that the world in 2001 would be at least as advanced into space as shown in Kubrick’s film. As Rick says in Casablanca about the lack of waters there, “I was misinformed.”10
本章没有特别的魔术,所以我推荐一部关于20世纪伟大魔术师之一的电影:《欺骗之道:瑞奇·杰伊的秘密与导师》(2012);以及《惊天魔盗团》(2013)。这些魔术都是真实存在的。
There’s no special magic for this chapter, so I’ll recommend a movie about one of the great 20th-century magicians: Deceptive Practice: The Mysteries and Mentors of Ricky Jay (2012); and Now You See Me (2013). The tricks are real.
内容
Contents
Computational Architectures of Cognition
Architecture I: Symbol-Systems
Essential Claim: Mind Is a Symbol System
Limits to the Symbol System Hypothesis: Computational Tractability
Dealing with Computational Tractability: Modularity
Architecture II: Connectionism and Predictive Processing
Types of Computational Processing
Essential Claim: Mental Processes Are Calculations of Association Strengths
Self-Organization of Mind and Behavior
The Predictive Processing Paradigm
Hybrid Architectures in One Mind/Brain
Noncomputational Architectures of Cognition
Architecture III: Radical Behaviorism
Architecture IV: Embodied Cognition
The Body Is Part of Intelligence, Not Just Its Implementation
Essential Claim: Cognition Is Behavior
Varieties of Embodied Cognition
我们现在准备开发认知科学中的认知架构。我们将它们分为两类:计算架构和非计算架构。计算架构源于第二次世界大战期间及之后计算机的发展,并催生了两种形式的人工智能。非计算架构有两个起源。一个来自两位行为理论家,EC 托尔曼和 BF 斯金纳,他们受到现实主义的影响。斯金纳和早期的托尔曼拒绝了“理念之路”,提出了摒弃表征和心理机制的学习理论。非计算理论的第二个来源来自社会科学:社会学、政治学,以及对我们来说最重要的经济学,理性选择理论忽略了心理和生理过程,转而支持易于处理的决策数学模型。行为生态学(研究动物行为的学科)也发展出了类似的观点,它用进化适应的行为策略来解释行为,而不假设内部过程。
We are now prepared to develop the architectures of cognition in cognitive science. We will divide them into two groups, computational architectures and noncomputational architectures. Computational architectures grew out of the development of computers during World War II and after and gave rise to two forms of artificial intelligence. Noncomputational architectures have two origins. One is from two behavioral theorists, E. C. Tolman and B. F. Skinner, who were influenced by realism. Skinner and the early Tolman rejected the Way of Ideas and proposed theories of learning that did away with representations and mental mechanisms. The second source of noncomputational theories came from the social sciences: sociology, political science, and, for us most importantly, economics, in the theory of rational choice, which ignored mental and physiological processes in favor of tractable mathematical models of decision making. A similar perspective developed in behavioral ecology—the study of animal behavior—that explained behavior in terms of evolutionarily adaptive behavioral strategies without positing internal processes.
笛卡尔说,语言是内在和私人灵魂的外在可见的符号。图灵摒弃了灵魂,但在他的模仿游戏中,他保留了语言。用作精神的标志。本质上,对于图灵及其随后的符号系统架构而言,思考是内心的对话,而智力是思考的语言(Fodor,1975)。
Descartes said that language was the outward and visible sign of the inward and private soul. Turing dispensed with the soul, but, in his imitation game, he retained language use as the mark of the mental. In essence, for Turing and the symbol system architecture that followed, thinking was inner talking, and intelligence is the language of thought (Fodor, 1975).
让我们以思维语言在工作中的作用为例,并用它来形式化符号系统假说。一个夏日的傍晚,你和一位朋友聊天,对方建议你如果明天天气好的话,就去公园烧烤。第二天,你醒来,图 3.1显示了你大脑中发生的事情,这符合认知的符号系统假说,并观察到与表 2.1 的相似之处。
Let’s take an example of the language of thought at work and use it to formalize the symbol system hypothesis. You’ve spoken to a friend one summer evening, and it’s suggested that if the weather stays pleasant tomorrow, you’ll go barbequing in the park. Next day, you wake up, and Figure 3.1 shows what happens in your mind, according to the symbol system hypothesis of cognition, observing the similarity to Table 2.1.
任何认知系统,无论是进化而来的还是人工的,面临的最重要问题是计算可处理性,其两个方面是实时性问题和框架性问题。我将以国际象棋为例进行简要说明,但它们在现实生活中是棘手的问题。
The most important problem facing any cognitive system, whether evolved or artificial, is computational tractability, whose two aspects are the real-time problem and the frame problem. I will briefly illustrate with chess as my example, but they are stubborn problems in real life.
在竞技象棋比赛中,你的走法会受到时间的限制。例如,大师级象棋锦标赛允许前40步棋在90分钟内完成。但象棋是一种爆炸性组合的游戏。合法的棋局数量可能与宇宙中的分子数量相当。你不可能永远寻找完美的走法。蛮力型象棋程序通过提高速度,在规定时间内处理数十亿步棋,从而缓解了象棋的实时性问题。
In competitive chess, your movements are constrained by time. For example, grandmaster chess tournaments allow 90 minutes for the first 40 moves. But chess is a game of explosive combinatoriality. The number of legal chess positions may be equal to the number of molecules in the universe. You can’t spend eternity looking for the perfect move. Brute-force chess programs have mitigated the real-time problem for chess by getting fast enough to process billions of moves in the allotted time.
然而,人类大师级棋手用缓慢的生物大脑下棋的事实表明,在没有万亿次浮点运算速度的情况下解决实时问题一定是可能的。实时问题——对经济学家来说就是停止问题——无处不在。决策不能无限期地推迟;在某个时候,你必须停止思考并采取行动。如果你是一位正在寻找首席财务官的首席执行官,你不可能在联邦贸易委员会下周需要签署表格的时候浪费数年时间。如果你正在寻找配偶,你必须在其他人都配对成功之前采取行动。如果你在树林里,一只熊向你咆哮,你不能花时间去判断它的种类以及可能的威胁程度;你应该马上行动。但如果它是一只霸王龙,你应该站着不动吗?
However, the fact that human grandmasters play chess with slow biological brains shows that it must be possible to solve the real-time problem without teraflops of speed. Real-time problems—stopping problems to economists—are ubiquitous. Decisions can’t be put off indefinitely; at some point, you must stop thinking and act. If you are a CEO looking for a Chief Financial Officer you can’t take years when the Federal Trade Commission needs a form signed next week. If you are looking for a spouse, you must act before everyone else is paired off. If you are in the woods and a bear roars at you, you can’t take time to work out its species and hence probable threat level; you should get going right away. But should you stand still if it’s a T-Rex?
最后一个例子引出了框架问题,它使实时问题变得更加糟糕,因为在脑海中构建一个框架问题使其变得可解可能非常困难。它是霸王龙还是异特龙?它们感知猎物的方式可能截然不同,需要不同的逃脱策略。人类非常善于判断问题的哪些特征与解决问题相关,哪些无关。例如,在国际象棋中,棋手知道棋子的形状、颜色和大小与找到最佳走法无关,无论棋子是由廉价塑料、精雕细琢的红木制成,还是仅仅以像素的形式存在于屏幕上。但重要的是,即使是研究了数千小时棋艺的国际象棋大师,也无法总是清晰地表达出引导他们选择某种进攻路线而非另一种进攻路线的直觉。专家思维的这种缺陷是人工智能国际象棋程序从基于与大师对话的计算机模拟转向暴力破解方法的主要原因之一。
This last example takes us to the frame problem, which makes the real-time problem worse because mentally framing the problem in such a way as to make it soluble can be hard. Is it a T-Rex or an Allosaur? How they sense prey might be very different, calling for different escape strategies. Humans are very good at knowing what features of a problem are relevant to solving a problem and which are not. In chess, for example, players know that the shape, color, and size of the pieces are irrelevant to finding the best move, whether the piece is made of cheap plastic or fine-carved mahogany or exists only as pixels on a screen. But importantly, even master chess players who have studied their game for thousands of hours can’t always articulate the intuitions that lead them to favor one line of attack over another. This shortcoming of expert minds was one of the major reasons for the shift in AI chess programs from computer simulations based on talking to grandmasters to the brute force method.
福多尔 (1983) 提出了解决这两个问题的方法,即心智模块性,这一理论影响了感知神经科学和进化心理学(图 3.2)。
Fodor (1983) proposed a solution to both problems, modularity of mind, that has influenced perceptual neuroscience and evolutionary psychology (Figure 3.2).
福多尔的模块化理论适用于信息处理的早期阶段,类似于亚里士多德的特殊感官。福多尔的理论认为,大脑中专门的区域只处理呈现给每个感觉器官的信息。实际上,人脑中并非像个人电脑那样只有一个计算机芯片,而是有多个芯片,每个芯片负责处理每种感觉,再加上一个通用的中央处理器(CPU)来整合各种感觉流。模块化提高了处理速度,因为每个感觉模块只负责一种数据,并且每个模块都是封装的,这意味着其处理不会影响其他模块的处理,也不会受到其他模块处理的影响,这些模块也不受中央处理器的控制。
Fodorian modularity applied to the earliest stages of information processing and resembles Aristotle’s special senses. Fodor’s theory held that dedicated tracts of the brain process only the information presented to each sense organ. In effect, instead of there being a single computer chip in the human head as in a PC, there were several, one for each sense, plus a general-purpose Central Processing Unit that brought the sensory streams together. Modularity gained processing speed because each sensory module was responsible for only one kind of data, and each module was encapsulated, meaning that its processing did not affect and was not affected by the processing in other modules, nor were the modules under control of the central processor.
为了说明他的意思,福多尔指出了感官错觉,例如艾宾浩斯/铁钦纳视觉错觉(图 3.3)。
To illustrate what he meant, Fodor pointed to sensory illusions, such as the Ebbinghaus/Titchener visual illusion (Figure 3.3).
在这个错觉中,两个显示器的中心圆圈大小相同,但由于与周围较大或较小的圆圈形成对比,看起来有所不同。对福多尔来说,重要的是,即使你被告知错觉的原理并测量了圆圈,你也无法消除错觉。它是与生俱来的、不可避免的,它提供了封装视觉模块存在的证据。
In this illusion, the central circles in both displays are the same size but appear to differ due to the contrast with the larger or smaller circles surrounding them. What is important to Fodor was that even if you are told how the illusion works and you measure the circles, you can’t make the illusion go away. It’s innate and inescapable, providing evidence of the existence of an encapsulated visual module.
福多尔的观点巧妙地缓解了实时性问题。它也朝着将心智视为并行进行信息处理的理念迈出了一步,引领我们走向下一个认知架构——联结主义。
Fodor’s notion was a clever way of ameliorating the real-time problem. It was also a step toward thinking of the mind as performing information processing in parallel, taking us part of the way to the next architecture of cognition, connectionism.
在20世纪50年代认知科学的萌芽阶段,人们提出了两种机器智能的形式。一种是符号系统方法。另一种是通过所谓的“神经元网络”来探索的。其最重要的倡导者是心理学家兼工程师弗兰克·罗森布拉特(Frank Rosenblatt,1928-1971)。他构建了一种名为感知器(Perceptron)的电子神经网络(Rosenblatt,1958),能够学习识别字母等简单模式。直到美国国防高级研究计划局(DARPA,该局也创建了互联网,即阿帕网)认定美国未来的军事命运取决于信息处理技术的进步,并开始向新兴的人工智能领域投入资金,这两种方法之间的竞争才变得激烈起来。符号系统观点的支持者认为感知器无法处理某些基本的逻辑功能,因此注定会失败(Minsky & Papert,1969)。尽管事实证明他们错了,但对感知器的支持逐渐消失,直到 20 世纪 80 年代联结主义/神经网络复兴(Olazaran,1996)才重新出现,从而带来了当今的深度学习和大数据时代。
At the dawn of cognitive science in the 1950s, two forms of machine intelligence were proposed. One was the symbol system approach. The other was sought through what were called “neuron nets.” Its foremost advocate was psychologist and engineer, Frank Rosenblatt (1928–1971). He built an electronic neural network called the Perceptron (Rosenblatt, 1958) capable of learning to recognize simple patterns such as letters. Competition between the two approaches did not become serious until DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, which also started the Internet as ARPANET) decided that America’s future military fortunes depended on advances in information-processing technology and began to throw money at the budding field of AI. Advocates of the symbol-system view argued that Perceptrons could not handle certain basic logical functions and were thus doomed to failure (Minsky & Papert, 1969). Although it turned out they were wrong, support for Perceptrons withered away, only to return with the connectionist/neural net revival of the 1980s (Olazaran, 1996), leading to today’s eras of deep learning and Big Data.
符号系统方法和神经网络方法之间的部分差异与它们执行的信息处理类型有关。
Part of the difference between the symbol-system approach and the neural-network approaches has to do with the kinds of information processing they perform.
直到最近,标准计算机CPU都执行串行处理,一次执行一个程序步骤,就像我用来演示数字恒温器工作原理的小程序一样。串行处理的优点在于,有意识的思考本身就是串行的,这使得编程变得相对简单,只需一次记录一个想法,尽管是用一种非自然的语言。正如我们所见,它的缺点是速度,直到摩尔定律规定CPU速度每十年翻一番,才使得暴力计算技术变得有效,尽管不够优雅。
Until very recently, standard computer CPUs performed serial processing, carrying out one program step at a time, as in the little program I used to illustrate how a digital thermostat might work. A virtue of serial processing is that conscious thinking is itself serial, making programming a relatively straightforward matter of setting our thoughts down one at a time, albeit in an unnatural language. Its drawback, as we’ve seen, was speed, until Moore’s Law of doubling CPU speed every ten years made brute-force computing techniques effective if inelegant.
另一种选择是并行处理,即多个 CPU 串联运行,每个 CPU 负责计算更大程序中各自的部分。例如,在游戏中,可以将游戏的图形显示(GPU)处理与其内部操作(CPU)处理分离。在这种分离之前,游戏可能需要在两种情况下进行权衡:要么游戏看起来逼真,但运行速度却远不及真实速度;要么游戏运行速度很快,但画面模糊。更普遍地说,并行处理可以提高整体计算速度,而无需像模块化那样开发和构建昂贵的新处理器。
The alternative was parallel processing, running multiple CPUs in tandem, each computing its own part of a larger program. For example, in gaming it became possible to separate processing of the graphics display (GPU) of a game from processing its internal operations (CPU). Prior to this separation, there could be a massive trade-off between a game looking realistic but running at a fraction of the speed of real life or running quickly but looking foggy. More generally, parallel processing granted gains in overall computing speed without having to develop and build expensive new processors, as in modularity.
但感知器和联结主义背后的想法更为激进,其灵感源自大脑——智能存在的证据。大脑并非由每秒计算数百个程序步骤的高性能CPU组成;而是由数百万个被称为神经元的小型计算设备组成,它们使用非常缓慢的化学过程来计算最简单的数学函数:开启时触发轴突脉冲,关闭时不触发轴突脉冲。神经元是数字化的,但它们缓慢且不复杂。然而,它们以某种方式赋予了我们智能,并且它们能够轻松地完成程序化符号系统无法完成的事情:它们能够自主学习。
But the idea behind Perceptrons and connectionism was more radical and was inspired by the brain, the existence proof of intelligence. The brain is not made up of high-powered CPUs computing hundreds of program steps a second; rather it is made up of millions of small computing devices called neurons using very slow chemical processes to compute the simplest of mathematical functions, being ON, and firing an axon spike, or being OFF and not firing an axon spike. Neurons are digital, but they are slow and unsophisticated. Nevertheless, they somehow make us intelligent, and they readily do something that programmed symbols systems didn’t: They learn by themselves.
1986年,感知器/神经网络方法在认知科学领域再次出现,并在《并行分布式处理》一书中引起轰动。该理论的领导者、心理学家大卫·鲁梅尔哈特在众多科学会议上宣称,他的目标是用人脑式信息处理取代计算机式信息处理,从而宣告了一场反对符号系统假说的革命。1他们提出,动物和人类的智能并非源于两三个模块化CPU的并行处理,而是源于在整个大脑中同时进行的大规模分布式处理,每个神经元都是一个小型、微弱的处理器,其整体性能堪比超级计算机。
In 1986, the perceptron/neural network approach to cognitive science reappeared with a huge splash in the publication of Parallel Distributed Processing. Their leader, psychologist David Rumelhart, went to scientific meetings saying his goal was to replace computer-style information processing with brain-style processing, declaring a revolution against the symbol-system hypothesis.1 They proposed that animal and human intelligence resulted not from parallel processing by two or three modularized CPUs, but from massively distributed processing taking place simultaneously across the whole brain with each neuron a small, weak processor whose collective strength rivaled supercomputers.
联结主义者的核心论点是,符号系统体系结构对 Marr 的第三个逆向工程层次——实现——关注太少。在常规工程中,人们最终会构建设备来执行所提出的算法。然而,在认知科学中,我们必须能够证明我们的算法可以在已经存在的物理系统——人脑中实现。显然,人脑太慢,无法实现思维的串行处理,但它比任何计算机都好。此外,它还具有串行计算机所不具备的优点,例如优雅降级。通常,如果标准数字计算机中一个部件出现问题,整个系统都会崩溃。然而,人脑可以承受一定程度的损伤并继续运作,尽管功能会减弱或受限。
Connectionists’ central argument was that the symbol-system architecture had paid too little attention to Marr’s third level of reverse engineering, implementation. In regular engineering, one ends by building the device to carry out proposed algorithms. However, in cognitive science we must be able to show that our algorithms can be implemented in an already existing physical system, the human brain. It is obvious that the human brain is too slow to implement serial processing of its thoughts, yet it works better than any computer. Moreover, it has virtues that serial computers do not, such as graceful degradation. Generally, if one thing goes wrong in a standard digital computer, the whole system fails. However, the human brain can take degrees of damage and still operate, albeit in weakened or limited forms.
有趣的是,联结主义也回顾了一种更古老的智力模型——联想主义,如今这种模型可以用神经中心主义的语言来表达。智力是由网络中自适应变化的连接构成的,这些连接由简单的处理单元组成,这些单元是生物神经元的数学模型。
Interestingly, connectionism also looked backward to an older model of intelligence, associationism, expressed now in neurocentric language. Intelligence consists of adaptively changing connections in a network consisting of simple processing units that are mathematical models of biological neurons.
图 3.4展示了一个利用声纳区分水雷和水下岩石的简单网络,图 3.5展示了联结网络中一个典型的“神经元”。在神经系统中,突触连接有两种类型:兴奋性连接和抑制性连接。兴奋性连接是指突触前神经元(图中未显示)的放电倾向于引起目标神经元的放电;抑制性连接是指突触前神经元的放电倾向于阻止目标神经元的放电。图中,兴奋性连接用箭头表示,抑制性连接用小圆圈表示。每个连接都关联一个权重,其值从 0(无影响)到 1(最大影响);因此,兴奋性连接的值从 0 到 1,抑制性连接的值从 0 到 -1。处理单元(或“神经元”)只需将其输入值相加,并计算一个指定的函数。在图 3.5中,我输入了一个简单的阈值阶跃函数,就像实际神经元通常计算的那样。如果总输入等于或大于设定的阈值,该单元就会触发,向其突触后神经元(未显示在目标神经元上方)发送兴奋性和/或抑制性冲动。如果未达到阈值,该单元将保持沉默。
Figure 3.4 shows a simple network for using sonar to distinguish mines from underwater rocks, and Figure 3.5 shows a typical “neuron” in a connectionist network. In the nervous system, synaptic connections are of two types, excitatory, in which the firing of the presynaptic neuron (not shown in the Figure) tends to cause the target neuron to fire, and inhibitory, in which firing of the presynaptic neuron tends to prevent the target neuron from firing. In the Figure, excitatory connections are indicated by arrows, inhibitory connections by small circles. Each connection has a weight associated with it, whose value runs from 0 (no effect) to 1 (maximum effect); thus, excitatory values run from 0 to 1 and inhibitory from 0 to -1. The processing unit, or “neuron,” simply sums the values of its inputs and computes an assigned function. In Figure 3.5, I have put in a simple threshold step function such as actual neurons typically compute. If the total input is equal to or greater than the set threshold, the unit fires, sending excitatory and/or inhibitory impulses to its postsynaptic neurons (not shown above the target neuron). If the threshold is not met, the unit remains silent.
在图 3.4中,数量不定的单元被组装成一个典型的多层前馈网络。该网络由三层组成:输入层,由神经元组成,这些神经元的响应由每个神经元接收到的感觉刺激强度决定;隐藏层,将输入单元连接到输出单元;输出层,其触发反映了网络的总体活动。虽然为了清晰起见没有显示出来,但每个输入单元都与每个隐藏单元都有连接,每个隐藏单元都与每个输出单元都有连接。它被称为前馈网络,因为连接的方向仅从输入到输出。没有连接同一层级的单元之间缺乏连接,后级单元与前级单元之间缺乏刺激连接。每个单元都完全相同,没有中央处理的空间。
In Figure 3.4, an unspecified number of units has been assembled into a typical multilevel feed-forward network. This one is made up of three layers, an input layer, consisting of neurons whose responses are determined by the strength of sensory stimulation each one receives, a hidden layer that connects input units to output units, and an output layer whose firing reflects the aggregate activity of the network. Although it’s not shown for clarity, every input unit has a connection to every hidden unit, and every hidden unit has a connection to every output unit. It is called a feedforward network because the direction of connections proceeds from input to output only. There are no connections between units at the same level, and there are no stimulating connections from later units to earlier ones. Each unit is identical, and there is no place for central processing.
与编程的符号系统不同,神经网络能够学习或被训练。虽然技术上存在多种不同的训练/学习机制,但它们基本遵循以下模式:首先,将所有连接的类型(抑制性或兴奋性)和权重(-1 到 0 或 0 到 1)随机化。然后,创建并部署一个已知案例的训练集;对于该网络,它将由已知反射声纳信号的水雷和水下岩石组成。对于我们的探雷网络,输入层代表每个物体的声频谱图样本。
Unlike symbol systems that are programmed, neural nets learn or are trained. Although there are technically several different training/learning regimes, they basically follow this pattern. You begin by simply randomizing all connections with regard to type (inhibitory or excitatory) and weight (-1 to 0 or 0 to 1). Then you create and deploy a training set of known cases; for this network, it will consist of mines and underwater rocks whose reflective sonar signals are known. For our mine detector network, the input layer represents a sample of the sound frequency spectrogram of each object.
由于其随机连接,网络在训练集的几乎所有成员上都会表现不佳。学习通过一种称为反向传播的方法进行,该方法使用输出端的误差来调整网络中单元之间的连接值。因此,你每次遍历网络的一个连接,将每个连接的权重改变一些预先选择的值。例如,在给定的训练运行中,每个权重可能会改变 0.1,从初始随机值 4.3 变为 4.4,或从 -6.6 变为 -6.5。如果给定的更改使网络的选择朝着正确的方向移动(假设声纳剖面是地雷),则保留调整。如果网络朝着错误的方向移动,则撤消调整,连接强度保留其先前的值。在继续进行下一个项目之前,对网络中的每个连接都执行此操作训练集。重复该过程,直到网络学会区分已知矿山和岩石,或者直到它未能满足成功标准。在这种情况下,您需要修改网络,例如添加更多输入单元或隐藏层单元,或者添加额外的隐藏层。
Because of its random connections, the network will do badly on almost all members of the training set. Learning proceeds via a method called backpropagation, by which error at the output end is used to tweak the values of the connections between the units in the network. Thus, you go through the network one connection at a time, altering each connection weight by some pre-chosen value. For example, on a given training run, each weight might be altered by 0.1, going from an initial random 4.3 to 4.4, or from -6.6 to -6.5. If a given change moves the network’s choice in the correct direction (let’s assume the sonar profile is of a mine), the tweak is retained. If the network moves toward an error, the tweak is undone, and the connection strength is left at its prior value. You do this for every connection in the network before proceeding to the next item in the training set. You repeat the process until the network has learned to distinguish known mines from rocks, or until it fails to meet your criteria for success, in which case you need to alter the network perhaps by adding more input units or units in the hidden layer, or perhaps by adding additional hidden layers.
联结主义有时被称为认知科学中的亚符号范式。神经网络不包含诸如Fonebone或barbeque之类的符号,也不包含用于形式计算的抽象符号。然而,个体单元或单元组在与世界互动时,仍有可能自发地获得表征能力。
Connectionism is sometimes referred to as the subsymbolic paradigm in cognitive science. Neural networks don’t contain symbols, such as Fonebone or barbeque, nor abstract tokens of them for the purposes of formal computation. However, there remains the possibility that individual units or groups of units may spontaneously acquire representational capacities as they interact with the world.
网络过程仅发生在大脑和神经系统中,就像符号系统架构一样。认知的符号系统架构提出了这样一种可能性:如果你的个性计算机程序能够被编译,它就可以被下载并在云端实现永生。联结主义者提出了一种云端永生的“神经”变体,即构建一个完整的大脑模拟网络并将其上传(Koene & Deca,2013)。
Network processes occur only in the brain and nervous system, as in the symbol-system architecture. The symbol-system architecture of cognition holds out the possibility that if the computer program of your personality could be compiled, it could be downloaded and achieve immortality in the cloud. Connectionists propose a “neural” variation of immortality in the cloud via building a whole brain emulation network and uploading it (Koene & Deca, 2013).
类似地,消除主义者应该相信,将大脑从身体中移除,如果大脑的感觉输入和运动输出被适当地连接起来,模拟你所感知的世界和你在其中采取的行动,你的生命似乎就能继续下去,从而实现永生 (Leahey, 2017)。各种俗气的科幻电影都呈现了这种场景(例如,“三曲腿图的游戏者”,2 这是原版《星际迷航》第二季中的一集,1968 年 1 月 5 日。在那一集中,缸中之脑——一个失落已久的种族的最后幸存者——用一种叫做 Quatloos 的货币,押注人类和类人战士之间角斗士比赛的结果。)最近,《黑客帝国3》系列电影探索了类似的领域,只不过不仅大脑,而且身体也被储存在缸中,但实际上生活在一个计算机生成的世界中,即同名的矩阵中。
In a similar vein, eliminativists should believe in achieving immortality by your brain being removed from your body and your life seemingly continued if your brain’s sensory inputs and motor outputs were suitably hooked up to simulate the world you sense and the actions you take in it (Leahey, 2017). Various cheesy sci-fi films have presented this scenario (e.g., “The Gamesters of Triskelion,”2 an episode from the second season of the original Star Trek, January 5, 1968. In that episode, brains in vats—the last survivors of a long-lost race—placed bets among themselves in a currency called Quatloos on the outcomes of gladiatorial fights among human and humanoid combatants.) More recently, The Matrix3 movies explored similar territory, except that not just brains, but also bodies were stored in vats but lived virtually in a computer-generated world, the eponymous matrix.
在此,有必要回顾鲁梅尔哈特的联结主义目标,即实现“大脑式”的处理,以及我们自身对隐喻和模型局限性的警告。联结主义的“神经”网络与真正的神经网络非常相似,只是表面上看,它们是由许多连接的简单计算单元构成的。人工智能与生物网络之间存在着重要的差异。
Here is it is important to recall Rumelhart’s goal for connectionism, achieving “brain style” processing, and our own warnings about the limits of metaphors and models. Connectionist “neural” networks are only very superficially like real neural networks in being made of many connected simple computing units. There are important differences between AI and biological nets.
尽管如此,联结主义系统具有巨大的学习优势,7或者更普遍地说,它展示了看似由主智能集中策划的大规模组织行为,是如何从仅对局部条件作出反应的有限智能的行为中涌现出来的(Mayor、Gomez、Chang & Lupyan,2014)。8
Nevertheless, connectionist systems have the tremendous virtue of learning,7 or, more generally, showing how large-scale organized behavior that seems centrally planned by a master intelligence can emerge out the behavior of limited intelligences responding only to local conditions (Mayor, Gomez, Chang, & Lupyan, 2014).8
请注意,尽管每只企鹅只受自身需求驱动(这是自私的),并且只对其周围环境做出反应,但个体企鹅的选择却构成了整个企鹅群的结构,所有企鹅都能从中受益,即使是无助的幼崽。这就像一个神经网络,其中每个单元只对其输入扇区做出反应,但最终网络会呈现出更大的自适应全局结构,以解决更大的问题,例如探测地雷。
Note that although each penguin is motivated only by its own needs (it’s selfish) and responds only to its immediate environment, the individual penguin’s choices structure the whole flock, and everyone benefits, even the helpless young. This is like a neural net, in which each unit responds only to its input fan, but eventually the net takes on a larger adaptive, global structure to solve larger problems, such as detecting mines.
古典认识论未能解决的问题是,在追求真理的过程中,如何修正信念。这并非柏拉图等理性主义者所关注的问题。对他们而言,真理与谬误之间的界限十分清晰:一个断言当且仅当其能够被正式证明时,才为真。然而,对于经验主义者而言,真理建立在证据之上,将观察结果与真理的候选者联系起来是一个鲜活而关键的问题,它既包含规范认识论的层面,也包含描述心理学的层面。在认识论中,问题在于我们应该如何根据证据修正信念;在心理学中,问题在于我们如何根据证据修正信念。休谟对这两个问题都进行了探讨,他认为,我们学习真理的方式是逐渐联想观念,而这一过程是动物心智运作的基础。然而,休谟的答案并未令其他思想家满意,他们认为这并不能很好地回答规范性问题。经验和联想观念提供了有用的信念,但他们担心,这些信念并非真正的信念。
Unaddressed by classical epistemologies was how to revise beliefs as we pursue Truth. This was not an issue for rationalists such as Plato. For them, the boundary between truth and error was sharp: An assertion was true if and only if it was formally provable. For empiricists, however, for whom truth rested on evidence, connecting observations to candidates for truth was a live and critical issue, having both normative epistemological and descriptive psychological aspects. In epistemology, the question was how we ought to revise beliefs in light of evidence; in psychology, the question was how we do revise beliefs in light of evidence. Hume addressed both questions, proposing that gradual association of ideas is how we learn truths and that this process was basic to the operation of animal minds. However, Hume’s answer was unsatisfactory to other thinkers, who found it a poor answer to the normative question. Experience and association of ideas provided useful beliefs, but not, they feared, True ones.
与休谟同时代的英国牧师托马斯·贝叶斯(1701-1761)曾探讨过这个规范性问题,但他的解决方案——贝叶斯定理——是在他死后发表的(Bayes,1763),并且被搁置了数十年。贝叶斯定理描述了如何在给定证据的情况下修正对某个信念的信心。A 表示信念本身;“先验”A 表示在收集证据之前对信念 A 的信心;后验 A 表示在给定证据的情况下对信念 A 的修正信心。新证据;B 是证据;p(B) 是证据的概率;p(X|Y) 是条件概率:在 Y 为真的情况下 X 为真的概率。9
A contemporary of Hume’s, the English minister Thomas Bayes (1701–1761) tackled the normative problem, but his solution, Bayes’ theorem, was published posthumously (Bayes, 1763), and it lay fallow for decades. Bayes’ theorem describes how to revise confidence in a belief given evidence for it. A is the belief; “Prior” A is confidence in belief A before collecting evidence; Posterior A is the revised confidence in belief A given the new evidence; B is the evidence; p(B) is probability of the evidence; p(X|Y) is conditional probability: the probability that X is true given that Y is true.9
休谟(1777年,第87页)在论述奇迹的存在时写道:“智者会根据证据调整自己的信念。”贝叶斯定理规定了如何进行调整。休谟和志同道合的怀疑论者认为人类是轻信的,而本书的关键教训是,他们是正确的。我们过度相信自己的感官(第五章),过度相信自己的记忆(第六章),过度相信自己的推理(第七章),因为我们的大脑进化出了神经计算技巧(第八章),用来解决生存问题(第九章),而不是为了探寻真相。
In addressing the existence of miracles, Hume (1777, p. 87) wrote, “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.” Bayes’ theorem prescribes how to do the proportioning. Hume and like-minded skeptics think that humans are credulous, and the key takeaway lesson of this book is that they are right. We trust our senses more than we should (Chapter 5), our memory more than we should (Chapter 6), and our reasoning more than we should (Chapter 7) because our brains evolved neural computing tricks (Chapter 8) to solve problems of survival (Chapter 9), not to Know the Truth.
休谟的怀疑论针对的是宗教奇迹,他提出了欺骗的可能性。自然法则被违反的可能性更大,还是人们欺骗的可能性更大?p (B) 的值应该较低。魔术师会欺骗——这就是魔术的定义——并且他们知道这很容易。令人惊讶的是,科学家本应是批判性思考者,但魔术师却发现他们很容易被观众会嗤之以鼻的戏法所愚弄。10贝叶斯定理告诉你如何利用你先前的信念值和证据的可能性来修正你对奇迹或任何真理主张的信念。
Hume’s skepticism was directed at religious miracles, and he raised the possibility of deception. Is it more probable that the laws of nature be violated or that people might deceive? The value of p(B) should be low. Magicians deceive—it’s the definition of conjuring—and are aware how easy it is. Surprisingly, scientists are supposed to be critical thinkers, but magicians find that they are easily fooled by tricks at which our audiences would hoot.10 Bayes’ theorem then tells you how to use the values of your prior belief and the likelihood of the evidence to revise your belief in miracles or any claim to truth.
随着贝叶斯定理在 21 世纪变得越来越有影响力(部分原因是作为对复制危机的解决方案),它在神经科学中催生了贝叶斯大脑的概念(Knil & Pouget,2004;Hutchinson & Barrett,2019),并成为预测处理范式 (PPP)。
As Bayes’ theorem became more influential in the 21st century—partly as a solution to the replication crisis—it gave rise in neuroscience to the concept of the Bayesian brain (Knil & Pouget, 2004; Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019), which became the predictive processing paradigm (PPP).
预测处理范式提供了一个神经科学解释,解释了大脑如何以及为何自组织(Friston,2018,2019;Rao & Ballard,1999),并且与联结主义兼容。尽管神经系统不使用反向传播进行学习,但最近的研究表明,神经学习机制在数学上等同于反向传播(Millidge、Tschantz & Buckley,2020;Sacramento、Costa、Bengio & Senn,2018;Whittington & Bogacz,2017,2019)。预测处理(在人工智能中称为预测编码)的总体思路是,我们的大脑构建一个不断更新的世界模型。实时地,并且模型就是意识本身(Clark,2008、2013、2016)。从某种意义上说,PPP 声称意识是一种受控的幻觉。在传统观点中,意识反映现实,要么直接(现实主义),要么通过表征间接(经验主义)。根据 PPP 的说法,意识反映了我们对世界的期望,只有当从感知中接收到错误信息时,这种“幻觉”才会得到纠正。PPP 将某些精神障碍(Adams、Brown 和 Friston,2013)和某些药物的影响(Carhart-Harris 和 Friston,2019)解释为错误纠正出错的场合,从而为它们提供了有趣的启示(图 3.6)。
The predictive processing paradigm provides a neuroscience account of how and why brains self-organize (Friston, 2018, 2019; Rao & Ballard, 1999) that is compatible with connectionism. Although nervous systems don’t use back-propagation to learn, recent work has shown that neural learning mechanisms are mathematically equivalent to back-prop (Millidge, Tschantz, & Buckley, 2020; Sacramento, Costa, Bengio, & Senn, 2018; Whittington & Bogacz, 2017, 2019). The general idea of predictive processing (called predictive coding in AI) is our brain builds a model of the world that is fluidly updated in real time and that the model is consciousness itself (Clark, 2008, 2013, 2016). In a sense, consciousness, PPP claims, is a controlled hallucination. In conventional views, consciousness reflects reality, either directly (realism) or indirectly via representations (empiricism). According to PPP, consciousness reflects our expectations about the world, and this “hallucination” is corrected only when error messages are received from perception. PPP throws interesting light on some mental disorders (Adams, Brown, & Friston, 2013) and the effects of some drugs (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019) by explaining them as occasions when error correction goes awry (Figure 3.6).
行为不仅被视为(甚至主要被视为)获取资源的一种手段,也被视为改变世界和/或自身在其中的位置的一种方式,以便提取用于更新模型的信息。强调行动作为信息收集,将 PPP 与我们稍后将讨论的具身认知范式联系起来(Badcock 等人,2019)。
Behavior is seen not only, or even primarily, as a means of obtaining resources, but also as a way of changing the world and/or one’s position in it in order to extract information used to update the model. Emphasis on action as information gathering ties PPP to the embodied cognition paradigm we’ll discuss later (Badcock et al., 2019).
从20世纪50年代到21世纪初,联结主义被认为是心理学和纯人工智能领域中符号系统认知架构的替代方案。然而,在心理学领域,人类心智的双系统观应运而生,并吸收了这两种架构(Marcus,2019),人工智能领域也出现了类似的融合(Laird、Lebiere & Rosenbloom,2017;Garnelo & Shanahan,2019)。纯人工智能中混合系统的一个实际案例是IBM的“辩论者计划”(Project Debater)(Slonim et al.,2021),它在某种程度上是一个符号系统,其参数由神经网络解析。联结主义解释了系统1中发生的不透明的、哺乳动物的、无意识的信息处理,而符号系统架构则解释了系统2中缓慢的串行处理和使用表征的操作。
From the 1950s into the 2000s, connectionism was presented as an alternative to the symbol-system architecture of cognition in both psychology and pure AI. However, in psychology, the two-system view of the human mind emerged and absorbed both architectures (Marcus, 2019), and a similar rapprochement took place in AI (Laird, Lebiere, & Rosenbloom, 2017; Garnelo & Shanahan, 2019). A practical example of a hybrid system in pure AI is IBM’s Project Debater (Slonim et al., 2021), which is, in part, a symbol system whose arguments are parsed by neural nets. Connectionism provides an account of the opaque, mammalian, unconscious information processing taking place in System 1, and the symbol-system architecture explains the operations of the slow serial processing, representation-using System 2.
激进行为主义的创始人是伯勒斯·弗雷德里克·斯金纳(1904-1990)。他的心理学体系包含三个部分:首先,一种哲学,即激进行为主义,尽管其形成早于激进行为主义,但它是具身认知的一种认知架构(Barrett,2016;Morgan,2018);其次,一套关于行为的理论和研究体系,主要以动物实验为主,即对行为的实验分析;第三,一个在实验室之外审视人类行为的视角,即对人类行为的解读。
The creator of radical behaviorism was Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904–1990). His scheme of psychology comprised three parts: First, a philosophy, radical behaviorism, which although formulated before it, is a version of embodied cognition’s architecture of cognition (Barrett, 2016; Morgan, 2018); second, a body of theory and research on behavior, primarily with animals, the experimental analysis of behavior, and third, a lens through which to examine human behavior outside the laboratory, the interpretation of human behavior.
尽管斯金纳对其思想发展受到的外界影响保持沉默,但他受到了哲学现实主义复兴 (Smith, 1986) 的影响,并得出了一个真正激进的结论:根本就不存在精神生活。我们可以用斯金纳对精神分析的批判 (Skinner, 1954) 来说明这一观点。弗洛伊德的吸引力很大程度上在于他对人类心灵的华丽描绘,以及其深邃的无意识过程 (Crews, 2017)。斯金纳认为,弗洛伊德做出了一个伟大的发现,但随后犯了一个大错误。这个伟大的发现是,意识不知道行为的原因,因此也不是行为的原因之一;这个大错误是用无意识的(不是错误)、不必要的(才是错误)心理机制填补了原因和结果之间的时间空白。
Although he was silent about outside influences11 on the development of his thought, Skinner was affected by a revival of philosophical realism (Smith, 1986), taking it to a genuinely radical conclusion: There is no such thing as mental life. We can illustrate this idea with Skinner’s critique of psychoanalysis (Skinner, 1954). Much of Freud’s appeal was his lush picture of the human mind, with its vast depths of unconscious processes (Crews, 2017). Skinner argued that Freud made one great discovery but then committed one great blunder. The great discovery was that consciousness was ignorant of, and therefore was not one of, the causes of behavior; the great blunder was filling in the temporal gaps between causes and effects with unconscious (not the blunder), unnecessary (that’s the blunder) mental mechanisms.
想象一下,你因参加学业考试而感到极度焦虑,这导致你的成绩下降。精神分析师可能会对你的问题做出如图3.7所示的解释。
Imagine that you are suffering from acute anxiety about taking academic tests that is causing your grades to suffer. A psychoanalyst might give an account of your problem as visualised in Figure 3.7.
随着治疗的进行,我们会发现,你考试焦虑的根源在于童年早期,可能与如厕训练有关。如厕训练至关重要,因为它是孩子行为满足道德权威要求的时刻。具体来说,孩子必须学会按照父母设定的时间表,而不是孩子自己设定的时间表,从自身释放一些东西。考试就是这样!当你不知道答案时,你会怎么做?你个混蛋!你没有意识到这种联系,因为你压抑了如厕训练的经历。然而,这些记忆仍然存在于你的超我中,即人类人格的道德部分。它吸收了你父母过高的标准,并将他们童年时期强加于你的羞耻感和内疚感强加于你的自我,但由于压抑,你体验到的是对考试的焦虑。一旦我们揭示了你的童年与现在之间的联系,你的自我就会变得更加强大,应该能够应对超我的要求。
We will find as we work through therapy that the cause of your test anxiety is in early childhood, probably having to do with toilet training, an important event because it’s when a child’s behavior meets the demands of moral authorities. Specifically, the child must learn to yield up something from within itself on a schedule set by parents, not the child. And that is what a test is! What do you do when you don’t know the answer: You bullshit! You are not aware of this connection because you have repressed the experience of toilet training. Nevertheless, the memories still live in your superego, the moral part of human personality. It has assimilated your parents’ excessively high standards, and it inflicts on your ego the feelings of shame and guilt they inflicted on you as a child, but because of the repression, you experience them as anxiety about tests. Once we reveal the connections between your childhood and today, your ego will become stronger and should be able to cope with the demands of the superego.
行为分析治疗师的故事更简单(参见图 3.8):
A behavior analytic therapist has a simpler story (see also Figure 3.8):
你现在的行为,即考试焦虑,是童年时期严格的如厕训练造成的。句号。引入“压抑”(没人能看到)、“超我”(没人能看到)或“自我”(没人能看到)都无法解释或纠正你的考试焦虑。你的父母可能在如厕训练期间错误地使用了负强化和惩罚——疼痛控制方法。疼痛控制会导致恐惧和攻击等不良情绪副产品,而这些副产品现在会在类似情况下再次出现,我们称之为刺激泛化。我们将使用行为方法逐渐消除不愉快的情绪,并强化备考和成功通过考试的替代策略。
Your current behavior, test anxiety, was caused by severe toilet training in childhood. Full Stop. Throwing in “repression” (which no one can see), the “superego” (which no one can see), or the “ego” (which no one can see) adds nothing to an explanation of, or a method of remediation for, your test anxiety. Your parents probably wrongly used negative reinforcement and punishment—pain control methods—during toilet training. Pain control causes unfortunate emotional by-products such as fear and aggression, and these now recur in similar situations, by what we call stimulus generalization. We will use behavioral methods to gradually extinguish unpleasant emotions and reinforce alternative strategies for preparing for and taking tests successfully.
斯金纳的批判不仅适用于精神分析,也适用于那些带有操作性术语的理论,例如赫尔的行为主义(Skinner,1950,1987)。赫尔的核心行为假设(参见第四章)是:有效反应潜能=习惯强度x驱动力,并且每个术语都是操作性定义的。然而,如果我们用操作性定义代替概念,我们就可以消除对理论术语的引用:潜伏期反应是强化反应次数和食物匮乏小时数的函数(l = nxh)。句号。同样,符号系统认知科学认为,生物体计算规则是因为它们的行为与规则一致。然而,物理学家不会说空间中运动的物体计算牛顿运动定律,因为它们的行为与这些定律一致。物体的运动受牛顿定律支配,但它们并不遵循(计算)牛顿定律。同样,生物体受各种行为定律支配,例如泛化,但它们并不遵循,即计算这些定律(Skinner,1966 年、1985 年;另见 Smolensky,1988 年)。
Skinner’s critique applies not only to psychoanalysis, but also to theories with operationally defined terms, such as Hull’s behaviorism (Skinner, 1950, 1987). Hull’s central behavior postulate (see Chapter 4) was: Effective reaction potential = Habit strength x Drive, and each term was operationally defined. However, if we substitute the operational definitions for the constructs, we can eliminate references to theoretical terms: latency of response is a function of number of reinforced responses and number of hours of food privation (l = n x h). Full Stop. Similarly, symbol-system cognitive science says that organisms compute rules because their behavior is consistent with them. However, physicists do not say that objects moving in space compute Newton’s laws of motion because their behavior is consistent with those laws. Objects’ movements are governed by Newton’s laws, but they do not follow (compute) Newton’s laws. Similarly, organisms are governed by various laws of behavior, such as generalization, but they do not follow, i.e., compute them (Skinner, 1966, 1985; see also Smolensky, 1988).
激进行为主义的一个不寻常之处是它对控制环境的定义。直觉上,“我”和“环境”之间的界限是皮肤,心理学家们也默认了同样的观点。但激进行为主义者认为,皮肤并不是一个特殊的屏障:皮肤里面的东西是导致你行为的环境的一部分。例如,牙痛和噪音一样,都是物理刺激;它源于身体,这使得它成为控制环境的一部分。对激进行为主义者来说,“我”就是我所做的,而不是位于身体或大脑中导致行为的内在事物。你的身份就是你的行为,句号。
An unusual aspect of radical behaviorism is its definition of the controlling environment. Intuitively the boundary between “me” and “the environment” is the skin, and psychologists have tacitly adopted the same view. But radical behaviorists say that the skin is not a privileged barrier: what’s inside it is part of the environment that causes your behavior. A toothache, for example, is just as much a physical stimulus as is a noise; its origin in the body makes it part of the controlling environment. For radical behaviorists, “me” is what I do, not an inner thing located in the body or brain that causes behavior. Your identity is your behavior, Full Stop.
由于具身认知和激进行为主义都植根于感知实在论,斯金纳堪称具身认知运动的先驱。“人们被自身经历所改变;他们不会将经验的副本储存为表征或规则。”(斯金纳,1985,第300页)
Because both embodied cognition and radical behaviorism are rooted in perceptual realism, Skinner was a forerunner of the embodied cognition movement. “People are changed by their experiences; they do not store copies of them as representations or rules” (Skinner, 1985, p. 300).
蓄电池比信息处理更能体现行为生物体。我们把电放进电池里,需要的时候再取出来,但电池里并没有电。当我们“放电”的时候,其实是在更换电池,而当它被打开时,“放出电”的其实是一块更换过的电池。
(Skinner,1985,第 294-295 页)
A storage battery would be a better model of a behaving organism [than information processing]. We put electricity into a battery and take it out when needed, but there is no electricity in the battery. When we ‘put electricity in’ we change the battery, and it is a changed battery that ‘puts out electricity’ when tapped.
(Skinner, 1985, pp. 294–295)
斯金纳(1977,第6页)在他最后一篇论文《为什么我不是认知心理学家》中写道:“身体在接触点对世界做出反应;复制是浪费时间。” 他拒绝接受生理学解释,而强调身体活动。“心智是身体所做的事情。它是人所做的事情。……专注于[大脑]就像重拾荷马史诗中的希腊人”(斯金纳,1987,第784页)。“观察一个物体……不仅仅是被动感知;它是一种行为”(斯金纳,1954/1972,第190页)。
Skinner (1977, p. 6) wrote in his last paper, “Why I Am Not a Cognitive Psychologist,” “The body responds to the world, at the point of contact; making copies would be a waste of time.” He rejected physiological explanation for emphasis on bodily activity. “The mind is what the body does. It is what the person does. … To focus on [the brain] is to rejoin the Homeric Greeks” (Skinner, 1987, p. 784). “To see an object … is not mere passive sensing; it is an act” (Skinner, 1954/1972, p. 190).
从 19 世纪末认知科学和现象学的早期(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990; Ratcliffe, 2007)到当代机器人技术(Brooks, 1991),这是一种另类架构,直到最近才被认定为符号系统或联结主义架构的替代方案。并非所有拥护者都认同其最常用的名称——具身认知,或坚持其所有论点——其中既有激进派(Chemero,2009),也有温和派(Clark,2008)——但他们提出了一些值得思考的重要观点(Roth & Jornet,2013)。
From the early days of cognitive science and phenomenology in the late 19th century (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990; Ratcliffe, 2007) to contemporary robotics (Brooks, 1991), there was an alternative architecture that, until recently, never jelled as an alternative to the symbol-system or connectionist architectures. Not all its adherents sign on to its most-used name, embodied cognition, or adhere to all its theses—there are radicals (Chemero, 2009) and moderates (Clark, 2008)—but they make important points worth considering (Roth & Jornet, 2013).
想象一下,你被困在一家着火的酒店房间里。你无法从门口离开,因为火势已经蔓延到大厅。这就带来了一个实时问题——如何在火势吞噬你的房间之前逃生——以及框架问题——你和你所处环境的哪些特征与你的逃生相关?
Imagine that you are trapped in a room of a hotel on fire. You can’t leave by the door because the fire has reached the hall. This poses a real-time problem—escaping before the fire consumes your room—and frame problem—what features of you and your environment are relevant to effecting your escape?
你注意到你的房间有一扇窗户(虽然打不开),并想既然你在三楼,或许可以打破窗户,跳到地面后还能活下来。怎么打破窗户呢?需要注意的是,你并没有被编程(符号系统或许会被这样编程)或训练(联结网络或许会被这样训练)来完成打破一大块牢牢固定住的玻璃的任务。
You observe that your room has a window (though it can’t be opened), and figure that since you are on the third floor, you might be able to break the window and survive a jump to the ground. How to break the window? It’s important to note that you have not been programmed (as a symbol system might have been) or trained (as a connectionist network might have been) for the task of breaking a large rigidly held pane of glass.
你环顾四周,想找点东西砸碎窗户。像免费洗漱用品这样的东西显然是错的,所以你从来没想过。这个“结论”看起来很傻,但从具身视角来看,它很有启发性,因为它根本不是一个“结论”。你不会考虑每件洗漱用品的重量,计算 F = M × A,就得出结论说它打不破窗户。同样,其他物品由于不同的原因也没有浮现在脑海中。梳妆台抽屉太重了;钢制床架也许可以当撞锤,但是没有时间拆开床,折叠床架,然后冲向窗户。排除了这么多选择后,一些选择进入了你的脑海,比如椅子或木脚凳:不要太重,不要太轻,而且可以扔。你的身体状况也可能会影响你的选择。 30岁的人可能会选择结实的办公椅,而像我这样75岁的人,可能会选择脚凳——我可以抬起脚凳,但抬不起椅子。假设你我都能做出明智的选择,并且安然度过。
You look around for something to smash the window. Things like the complimentary toiletries are so obviously wrong they never enter your mind. This “conclusion” looks silly, but from the embodied perspective it’s instructive because it is not a “conclusion” at all. You don’t think about each toiletry’s weight, compute F = M × A, and conclude that it can’t break the window. Similarly, other items don’t rise to mind for different reasons. The dresser drawer set is too heavy; the steel bedframe might make a viable ram, but there’s no time to disassemble the bed, fold the frame up, and make a run at the window. With so many choices ruled out, a few enter thought, such as a chair or a wooden footstool: not too heavy, not too light, and throwable. The condition of your body may sway your choice, too. A 30-year-old might go for the solid desk chair, while the same person at age 75, like me, might settle for the footstool—I can lift it, but not the chair. Let’s assume you and I choose wisely and survive.
具身认知运动的目标是笛卡尔式的“侏儒”(homunculus),该理论认为,每个行为生物体内都存在一个智能设备或场所,负责执行智能行为所需的计算。然而,该运动的成员对此观点可能存在分歧,他们认为智能是生物体与其环境之间的关系。智能并非存在于身体中(例如侏儒),而是存在于身体在其所处情境中的行为中。具身认知的另一个名称是“情境认知”。
The target of the embodied cognition movement is the Cartesian homunculus, the thesis that somewhere within every behaving organism there’s an intelligent device or place that performs computations responsible for intelligent behavior. Instead, a point on which members of the movement may differ, intelligence is a relationship between an organism and its environment. Intelligence is not in the body—a homunculus—it is of the body acting in the situation it’s in. One alternative name for embodied cognition is situated cognition.
在心理学中,具身认知研究人体在产生智能行为中的作用。笛卡尔认知科学提出了一种非具身认知的版本,其中输入被提供给中央处理器或神经网络,在那里进行转换、操控和使用。经验和行动被视为大脑做出的智能决策的边缘因素。
In psychology, embodied cognition studies the role of the human body in producing intelligent behavior. Cartesian cognitive science presents a disembodied version of cognition, in which input is provided to the central processer or the neural network, where it is transformed and manipulated and used. Experience and action are seen as peripheral to the intelligent decisions made in or by the brain.
Aglioti、Cesari、Romani 和 Urgesi (2008) 的一项研究阐述了具身认知的研究。研究人员向参与者播放了顶尖篮球运动员罚球的视频;视频在篮球入篮前的不同时间点暂停,参与者被要求预测这次罚球是否成功。参与者分为三组:技术娴熟的篮球运动员、篮球教练和体育记者,以及没有篮球经验的人员。如果要完成这项任务,需要计算篮球的轨迹,那么经验丰富的罚球观察员——包括球员、教练和记者——都应该比新手表现更好,因为他们见证过许多成功和失败的罚球尝试。然而,只有技术娴熟的球员才能做出准确的预测。最重要的是,如果视频在篮球离开投篮者手部之前暂停,在有轨迹可计算之前,球员就能预测这次罚球是否成功。经验丰富的球员能够感同身受地感受到投篮者的动作,因为他们自己已经多次完成投篮动作,并且能够根据投篮者的身体位置判断投篮是否命中。如果没有罚球命中和罚球不中的身体经验,也没有身体能够模仿其他球员的动作,计算就无法解决这个简单的问题。就像酒店房间起火事件一样,身体依靠直觉,而不是计算。
A study by Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, and Urgesi (2008) illustrates research in embodied cognition. Participants were shown videos of elite basketball players shooting free throws; the videos were paused at different points before the ball got to the basket, and the participants were asked to predict whether the shot would be good. The participants comprised three groups: skilled basketball players, basketball coaches and sports journalists, and people with no special experience of basketball. If computing the trajectory of the ball was needed to succeed at this task, then experienced observers of free throws—players, coaches, and journalists alike—should all do well compared to novices, as they had seen many successful and many failed free throw attempts. However, only the skilled players were able to make accurate predictions. Most importantly, the players could predict whether a shot would be good if the video was stopped just before the ball left the shooter’s hand, before there was a trajectory to compute. Skilled players could empathetically feel the movement of the shooter because they had carried out his action many times themselves and knew from his bodily position whether the throw would go in or not. Without the bodily experience of making and missing free throws, and without a body to mirror the movements of another player, computation cannot solve this simple problem. As in the hotel room fire, the body intuits, it does not compute.
心智不会形成表征,因为它们并非必需。因此,无需规则来操纵它们。这在具身机器人技术中清晰可见。在符号系统架构的影响下,第一批机器人被设计用来构建其环境的内部模型,然后它们参考这些模型四处移动,并定期停下来更新表征,以包含新的或移动的障碍物,并从新的位置重新计算它们对世界的视角。然而,这些机器人速度缓慢且效率低下,因为“咨询→形成表征→移动→重建表征→咨询新的表征→移动”的循环耗时过长,无法实时生成有效的行为。12机器人专家罗德尼·布鲁克斯(iRobot 创始人)认为,构建世界的表征是愚蠢的,因为他呼应了斯金纳的观点:“世界本身就是它最好的模型”(布鲁克斯,1991,第 417 页)。既然可以直接观察世界本身,为什么还要费力构建表征呢?如果没有符号,就不需要像侏儒那样的 CPU。布鲁克斯的机器人是由环境引导的,而不是环境的表现。
The mind does not form representations because they are unnecessary. Therefore, rules are not needed to manipulate them. This can be seen clearly in embodied robotics. Under the influence of the symbol-system architecture, the first robots were built to construct internal models of their environment, which they then consulted to move around, stopping periodically to update the representation to include new or moved obstacles and to recompute their view of the world from their new position. However, these robots were slow and ineffective, as the cycle of consult → form representation → move → reconstruct representation → consult new representation → move took too long to generate effective behavior in real time.12 Roboticist Rodney Brooks (founder of iRobot) concluded that building representations of the world was stupid because, echoing Skinner, “the world is its own best model” (Brooks, 1991, p. 417). Why go to the trouble of building a representation when you can just look at the world itself? And if there are no symbols, there need be no homunculus-like CPU. Brooks’s robots were guided by the environment, not the environment’s representation.
英国哲学家吉尔伯特·赖尔(Gilbert Ryle,1900-1976)认为笛卡尔二元论犯了他所谓的范畴错误(Ryle,1949)。笛卡尔主义者用“智能”、“充满希望”、“真诚”、“虚伪”等“精神”谓词来描述行为,然后假设在这些行为背后一定潜伏着一个精神实体,一个侏儒,它因为具有智能而使这些行为具有智能、充满希望、真诚或虚伪等特征。赖尔认为,错误就在这里,因为这些行为本身就是智能、充满希望、真诚或虚伪的;并不需要内在的幽灵来使它们如此。此外,发明侏儒“机器里的幽灵”在科学上毫无意义,因为即使存在内在的幽灵,我们仍然需要解释为什么它的运作是智能的、充满希望的、真诚的或虚伪的。幽灵里有幽灵吗?幽灵里还有幽灵吗?机器中的幽灵不仅不能解释精神生活,反而大大增加了我们理解精神生活的难度。
British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) said that Cartesian dualism committed what he called a category mistake (Ryle, 1949). Cartesians describe behaviors with “mental” predicates such as “intelligent,” “hopeful,” “sincere,” “disingenuous,” and then assumed that there must be a mental thing, a homunculus, lurking behind the behaviors and making them intelligent, hopeful, sincere, or disingenuous because it is intelligent, etc. Here, says Ryle, lies the mistake because the behaviors themselves are intelligent, hopeful, sincere, or disingenuous; no inner ghost is needed to make them so. Moreover, inventing the homuncular “ghost in the machine” accomplishes nothing scientifically because if there were an inner ghost, we would still have to explain why its operations are intelligent, hopeful, sincere, or disingenuous. Is there a ghost in the ghost? And a ghost in the ghost in the ghost? The ghost in the machine,13 far from explaining mental life, vastly complicates our efforts to understand it.
赖尔认为,心理谓词的意义远不止简单的行为描述。例如,当我们说鸟儿“迁徙”时,我们看到它们向南飞行,而一个头脑简单的方法论行为主义者(第四章)可能会说“迁徙”仅仅是“向南飞行的行为”。然而,正如赖尔指出的那样,说鸟儿“迁徙”远不止说它们向南飞行,因为“迁徙”一词隐含着关于它们为何向南飞行、它们之后将如何返回、每年如何返回以及它们如何导航的理论。说鸟儿“迁徙”超越了说它们向南飞行,但它并不超越说它们向南飞行的范围,因为它是复杂群体行为自发自组织的一个例子。同样,说某种行为是“智能的”不仅仅是描述某种行为,因为它引入了我们判断某种行动方案是否智能的标准——例如,它适合当时的情况并且很可能成功。但说一个人的行为是智能的,并不意味着其背后存在某种幽灵般的内在计算者,其智能会渗透到行动中。我们既不是脱离肉体的灵魂,也不是可下载的程序,更不是缸中之脑。生物的身体并非受内在计算智能操控的载体,而是与智能本身密不可分。不同物种拥有不同的智能。
Ryle held that there is indeed more to mental predicates than simple descriptions of behavior. For example, when we say birds are “migrating,” we see them flying south, and a simple-minded methodological behaviorist (Chapter 4) might say that “migration” is just “flying-south behavior.” However, as Ryle pointed out, to say that birds are “migrating” is to say much more than that they are flying south, for the term migration implies a story about why they are flying south, how they will return later, how it happens every year, and theories about how they navigate. To say birds are “migrating” goes beyond saying that they are flying south, but it does not go behind saying that they are flying south because it’s an example of the spontaneous self-organization of complex group behavior. Similarly, to say a behavior is “intelligent” does more than simply describe some behavior, for it brings in the criteria we have for saying a course of action is intelligent—for example, that it is appropriate to the situation and is likely to be successful. But saying a person is acting intelligently does not go behind the behavior to some ghostly inner calculator whose intelligence bleeds into action. We are neither disembodied souls, downloadable programs, nor brains in vats. A creature’s body is not a vehicle manipulated by an inner calculating intelligence but is inseparable from intelligence itself. Different species will have different intelligences.
布鲁克斯制造的机器人不使用符号系统或联结主义方法,因为他拒绝表征,而倾向于感知现实主义。他从模仿昆虫的简单机器人——动物机器人开始。昆虫是进化过程中的持久幸存者,因此它们堪称自然界的杰作。它们没有中央计算大脑,只有遍布全身的简单神经系统。同样,布鲁克斯的动物也没有中央处理器,只有简单的反射执行器,独立控制着它们的肢体。有序的运动源于每个肢体与环境的独立接触。动物直接适应自身处境,而非适应环境的表象。14
Brooks builds working robots that don’t use symbol-system or connectionist methods because he rejects representations in favor of perceptual realism. He began with animats, simple robots that imitate insects. Insects are durable survivors of evolution, so they count among nature’s successes. They have no central computing brain, but rather a simple nervous system spread out through their bodies. Likewise, Brooks’ animats don’t have CPUs, but simple reflexive actuators independently controlling their limbs. Organized locomotion emerges out of each limb’s separate contacts with the environment. Animats adapt directly to their situation, not to a representation of the situation.14
具身认知在心理学中根深蒂固,源于詹姆斯·J·吉布森(1904-1979)的生态现实主义(Gibson,1950、1972、1977、1979)。感知表征理论的动机之一是,人们显然需要利用二维感官线索构建三维世界的内在精神图景,就像文艺复兴时期艺术家使用暗箱一样。一位名叫阿德尔伯特·埃姆斯的验光师建造了一个扭曲的房间——一种扭曲的暗箱,它能使人产生错觉,让人看到生动逼真的深度感知幻象。15
Embodied cognition has a strong root in psychology, in the ecological realism of James J. Gibson (1904–1979) (Gibson, 1950, 1972, 1977, 1979). One motive for the representational theory of perception was the apparent need to build an inner mental picture of the 3-D world out of 2-D sensory cues, as did Renaissance artists using a camera obscura. An optician named Adelbert Ames built a distorted room—a sort of distorted camera obscura, which fools people into seeing vivid, living illusions of depth perception.15
但吉布森的实在论者指出,艾姆斯房间并不能代表现实生活中的感知,因为它人为地禁止了身体运动,迫使我们进入暗箱。图3.9展示了艾姆斯房间的设置;它本质上是一个魔术。
But Gibsonian realists point out that the Ames room is not representative of perception in real life because it artificially forbids bodily movement, forcing us into a camera obscura. Figure 3.9 shows the setup of the Ames room; it is basically a magic trick.
艾姆斯错觉之所以有效,是因为观察者必须透过一个小小的窥视孔才能看到。只要观察者稍稍移动一下,错觉就会消失。由于身体无法活动,我们被迫进入笛卡尔剧场的暗箱,并被迫得出这样的结论:三维意识世界是用户构建的错觉(丹尼特,1991)。拥有实体的生物可以自由探索自己的世界,直接体验深度。
The Ames illusion works only because the viewer must look through a little peephole. If the viewer can move even a little, the illusion vanishes. Denied the mobility of our bodies, we are forced into the camera obscura of the Cartesian Theater and pushed toward the conclusion that the world of 3-D consciousness is a constructed user illusion (Dennett, 1991). Free to explore their world, embodied creatures experience depth directly.
吉布森为具身认知贡献了可供性的概念。传统的感知观点强调我们如何处理和理解物体的感知品质,例如颜色、大小和形状。吉布森拒绝了这种绘画式的、观察性的智力表征,坚持认为感知是为了行动而不是表征。吉布森认为,我们直接感知的不仅仅是物体的感官属性,还有我们可以用物体做什么——它能给我们带来什么动作——并且这些可供性对于不同身体类型的生物来说会有所不同。例如,一块石头可以为老鼠提供藏身或攀爬的地方,为猫提供寻找小猎物藏身的地方,而一个人可以提供一个可以扔出或用作锤子的工具。
Gibson contributed to embodied cognition the concept of affordance. Traditional views of perception emphasize how we process and understand an object’s perceptual qualities, such as color, size, and shape. Gibson rejected this painterly, spectatorial characterization of intelligence, insisting that perception is for action rather than representation. Gibson argued that we directly perceive not just an object’s sensory properties, but also what we can do with an object—what actions it affords us—and that these affordances will be different for creatures with different bodies. For example, a rock will afford a mouse a place to hide or climb on, a cat a place to find small prey hiding, and a person a tool to throw as a projectile or use as a hammer.
范盖尔德 (Van Gelder, 1995, p.345) 问道:“如果不是计算,认知会是什么?”通过对比詹姆斯·瓦特 (James Watt, 1736–1819) 为控制他的新蒸汽机而设计的调速器的计算性和非计算性描述,他给出了答案。
Van Gelder (1995, p. 345) asks, “What might cognition be, if not computation?” He provides an answer by contrasting computational and noncomputational accounts of the governor that James Watt (1736–1819) designed to control his new steam engine.
如果说科学革命建立在世界格局的机械化之上,那么工业革命则建立在劳动的机械化之上,即用机器代替动物或人类从事纯粹的体力劳动。机器工作比动物或人类劳动更高效、更廉价,让人们能够用脑力从事体力要求更低但效率更高的工作。然而,让机器产生能量面临着控制方面的挑战。蒸汽机可以产生巨大的能量,但有效地控制其输出对于平稳运行至关重要。1788年,企业家兼工程师詹姆斯·瓦特解决了这个问题,为蓬勃发展的工业革命做出了重要贡献。他发明了离心式调速器,即瓦特调速器。
If the Scientific Revolution rested upon the mechanization of the world picture, the Industrial Revolution rested upon the mechanization of work, using machines in place of animals or people to do sheer physical labor. Machine work can be done more efficiently and cheaply than animal or human labor, freeing people to do less physically demanding but more productive work with their minds. However, getting machines to produce energy poses challenges of control. A steam engine can make prodigious amounts of energy, but effectively controlling its output is necessary to smooth working. In 1788 entrepreneur and engineer James Watt solved the problem, making an essential contribution to the burgeoning Industrial Revolution. He invented the centrifugal, or Watt, governor.
一根轴连接着两个沉重的球。锅炉内的蒸汽推动轴旋转,蒸汽压力越高,轴旋转得越快,球也旋转得越快。球安装在枢轴上,因此当它们旋转时,离心力会将它们向上推离轴。旋转球的位置控制着进入锅炉的燃料量。快速旋转的球会降低锅炉的温度。随着锅炉温度下降,轴旋转得更慢,球旋转得更少,从而增加了进入锅炉的燃料量,因此温度上升,蒸汽压力上升,轴的转速也随之增加,最终温度降低,如此循环往复。循环,将锅炉的输出维持在稳定的可用水平(van Gelder,1995)(图 3.10)。
There is a shaft attached to two heavy balls. The shaft is spun by the steam in the boiler, and the higher the steam pressure, the faster the shaft rotates, and the faster the balls spin. They are mounted on a pivot, so as they spin centrifugal force pushes them out and up away from the shaft. The position of the spinning balls controls the amount of fuel allowed into the fire heating the boiler. Fast-spinning balls reduce the temperature of the boiler. As the boiler temperature goes down, the shaft rotates more slowly, the balls spin less, increasing the input of fuel into the boiler, so the temperature rises, raising the steam pressure and increasing the speed of the shaft, which lowers the temperature, in a continuous dynamic cycle that maintains the output of the boiler to a steady usable level (van Gelder, 1995) (Figure 3.10).
这件工程学作品与心理学有什么关系?关系很大。需要注意的是,瓦特的新型蒸汽机是一种有目的、目标导向的机器,类似于恒温器。调速器的目标是维持蒸汽机锅炉内安全稳定的压力,它以灵活的方式实现这一目标,根据锅炉温度的变化调节燃料流量。瓦特早在控制论出现一个多世纪前就提出了反馈的概念。
What does this piece of engineering have to do with psychology? Quite a lot. Note that Watt’s new steam engine was a purposive, goal-directed machine, akin to a thermostat. The goal of the governor was to maintain safe and steady pressure in the engine’s boiler, and it pursued this goal in a flexible fashion, adjusting fuel flow as the temperature in the boiler changed. Watt hit on the notion of feedback over a century before cybernetics.
我们可以从人工智能逆向工程的角度来解答瓦特的问题,以此来阐明笛卡尔认知科学与具身认知科学之间的基本区别。让我们运用马尔提出的认知分析层次。
We can illustrate the basic differences between Cartesian cognitive science and embodied cognitive science by addressing Watt’s problem from the reverse engineering point of view of AI. Let’s apply Marr’s levels of cognitive analysis.
接下来,我们进行如下操作。在锅炉上安装一个传感器,每十秒采样一次锅炉内部压力。然后,该传感器将输入提供给以下计算程序(BASIC 语言):
We then proceed as follows. Put a sensor on the boiler that samples the boiler’s internal pressure every ten seconds. This sensor then provides input to the following computational program (in BASIC):
然后我们将该程序输入计算机,将计算机连接到锅炉的传感器和燃料控制阀,计算机将执行瓦特调节器的工作,通过调节火的燃料输入来升高或降低温度,从而响应锅炉内的压力。
We then enter this program into a computer, hook the computer up to the sensor and the fuel-control valve for the boiler, and the computer would do the work of the Watt governor, responding to the pressure inside the boiler by regulating the fuel input to the fire to raise or lower the temperature.
在这种情况下,一个通用的信息处理设备将承担瓦特那台不利用信息的专用设备的工作。传统人工智能的假设是,人类是通用的信息处理器,通过学习适当的信息处理步骤来执行任务。
In this scenario, a general-purpose information-processing device would be doing the work of Watt’s non-information-using dedicated device. The assumption of traditional AI is that human beings are general-purpose information processors who carry out tasks by learning the appropriate information-processing steps.
具身认知的倡导者认为,人类更像瓦特的调速器,其智力根植于我们与世界的身体互动。单凭大脑过程——无论是符号系统还是神经网络——不足以解释动物的智力。动物需要一个与世界互动的身体。马尔型系统完全由思维构成,除了提供输入的传感器和服从程序指令的燃油控制阀外,没有其他相关的身体。瓦特的调速器完全由身体构成,没有思维;其控制发动机的行为可以用耦合动态系统的物理定律来解释(van Gelder, 1995)。它不需要表征、规则和计算。生物体可以被视为在动态宇宙中相互作用的连续动力系统。
Advocates of embodied cognition believe that human beings are more like the Watt governor, intelligence being rooted in our bodily interactions with the world. Brain processes alone—whether conceived as symbol systems or as neural nets—do not alone explain animal intelligence. A body that interacts with the world is required. A Marr-type system is all thought with no relevant body except the sensor that provides input and the fuel-control valve that obeys the program’s commands. Watt’s governor is all body and no mind; its behavior in controlling the engine is explained by the physical laws of coupled dynamic systems (van Gelder, 1995). There need be no representations, no rules, and no computations. Organisms may be regarded as continuous dynamical systems interacting with each other in a dynamical universe.
具身认知的另一种形式是延展心智论。它认同符号系统假说,认为思维是符号操控,但认为人类的认知系统延伸到大脑之外,进入更广阔的环境中(Clark,2008)。例如,记忆的认知过程通常位于大脑中,但在现代社会,我们的大部分记忆已被转移到智能手机和谷歌等互联网服务中。我们不必记住挚友的电话号码,因为它就在我们手机的数据库中;我们不需要知道《大宪章》是什么,我们可以用谷歌搜索。此外,这种认知过程的转移自人类进化以来就一直在进行:在骨刻、泥板、笔记、操作手册上记录,以及依靠同事了解……关键信息(Hutchins, 1995)。这种记忆卸载解释了为什么现代人类的大脑比第一批智人更小,却仍然能够繁荣发展(Bednarik, 2014)。
Another flavor of embodied cognition is the thesis of the extended mind. It agrees with the symbol-system hypothesis that thinking is symbol manipulation, but it holds that the human cognitive systems extend outside the brain into the larger environment (Clark, 2008). For example, the cognitive process of memory is usually located in the head, but, in the modern world, much of our memory has been offloaded into smartphones and Internet services such as Google. We don’t have to remember our best friend’s phone number because it’s in our phone’s database; we don’t need to know what the Magna Carta was, we can Google it. Moreover, such offloading of cognitive processes has been going on since human beings first evolved: making records on incised bones, clay tablets, notes to oneself, procedural manuals, and relying on coworkers to know critical information (Hutchins, 1995). Such memory offloading explains why modern humans have managed to thrive despite having smaller brains than the first Homo sapiens (Bednarik, 2014).
心理学通常被称为社会科学,但由于它关注的是个体心智,因此经常被排除在社会科学书籍之外(例如,Manicas,2006;Leahey,2007)。然而,我们必须纳入主流的社会科学理论——理性选择理论(RCT),因为它在经济决策和行为生态学中可以作为心理学解释的替代(第七章和第九章)。
Psychology is often called a social science, but because it focuses on the individual mind, it is often excluded from books on social science (e.g., Manicas, 2006; Leahey, 2007). However, we must include the dominant social science theory of human behavior, rational choice theory (RCT), because it is an alternative to psychological explanation in economic decision making and behavioral ecology (Chapters 7 and 9).
面对各种各样的选择,从早上穿什么鞋到约谁约会,再到投资什么,人们都会考虑一系列方案,最终选择对自己最有利、效用最大的那个 (Friedman, 1953; Levin & Milgrom, 2004; Lovett, 2006; Gintis, 2018)。该理论的优点在于,它能够构建涵盖人类所有行为的精确数学模型。行为生态学将其应用于动物行为,用适应度(后代数量)代替效用。随机控制理论 (RCT) 与心理学解释(尤其是计算解释)的区别在于,它完全不考虑导致行为的内部过程,无论是心理的还是生理的。16然而,它与激进行为主义非常相似,都强调量化规律 (Herrnstein, 1990),甚至与具身认知也一样,这三者都回避了内在机制。
Given a choice between options of any type, from what shoes to wear in the morning to whom to ask for a date to what to invest in, people consider a range of alternatives and choose the one that is best—has the most utility—for them (Friedman, 1953; Levin & Milgrom, 2004; Lovett, 2006; Gintis, 2018). A virtue of the theory is that it allows the construction of precise mathematical models of behavior ranging across all human life. Behavioral ecology applies it to animal behavior, substituting fitness (number of offspring produced) for utility. What sets RCT apart from psychological explanation, especially computational ones, is that it is entirely agnostic about internal processes, mental or physiological,16 that cause behavior. However, it is much like radical behaviorism, with which it shares an emphasis on quantitative laws (Herrnstein, 1990), and even to embodied cognition, in that all three eschew inner mechanisms.
非计算架构让我们想起认知科学中最根本的问题——心智本身的本质。心智是像原子一样的自然类型,等待着科学的发现;还是像燃素一样的虚构,在科学中暂时有用,但并非真实存在,可以被更好的概念取代?具身认知与激进行为主义非常相似。两者都对感知持实在论观点,并都强调生物体与世界之间的物理相互作用作为适应性行为基础的重要性。两者之间的主要区别在于,具身认知的倡导者假设心智是自然类型,真实存在于自然界中。他们认为笛卡尔对心智的描述是错误的,需要被取代,就像早期关于原子是物质最小单位的观念需要被更复杂的亚原子粒子理论取代一样。另一方面,激进行为主义者认为,笛卡尔受到先前存在的宗教思想的误导,发明了一个虚构的概念——心智,与宙斯或燃素并列。 “心智”这个概念不应该被修改,而应该被抛弃。
Noncomputational architectures remind us of the most fundamental issue in cognitive science, the nature of mind itself. Are minds natural kinds like the atom, awaiting discovery by science, or are minds fictions like phlogiston, useful for a time in science but not real, replaceable by better concepts? Embodied cognition looks a lot like radical behaviorism. Both take a realist view of perception and both stress the importance of physical interaction between the organism and the world as the basis of adaptive behavior. The difference between them is mostly that advocates of embodied cognition assume that minds are natural kinds, really existing in nature. They say that Descartes’s description of mind was wrong and needs replacing, the way that early ideas about atoms as the smallest units of matter needed to be replaced by more sophisticated theories about subatomic particles. Radical behaviorists, on the other hand, think that Descartes, misled by preexisting religious thought, invented a fictitious concept, mind, on a par with Zeus or phlogiston. The concept of “mind” should not be revised but dropped.
我们现在准备探索人类认知,从其行为的基本构成要素到更高级的心理过程。除了人类思维的双系统图谱之外,我们还将在一个我称之为认知科学理论非还原层级的框架内开展工作。我并没有采用那种每个层级都被降低到(或被消除到)较低层级的层级结构,而是结合了马尔的层级结构,并根据相邻层级理论所回答的解释性问题的类型来定义它们之间的关系。每个层级都回答其上一层级提出的“如何”问题,并向其下一层级提出“为什么”问题(图 3.11)。
We are now prepared to explore human cognition from its basic building blocks of behavior to the higher mental processes. In addition to the two-system map of the human mind, we will work within a framework I call the non-reductive hierarchy of theories in cognitive science. Instead of being a hierarchy in which each level is reduced to (or eliminated by) a lower one, I incorporate Marr’s levels and define the relationship between theories at neighboring levels in terms of the kinds of explanatory questions they answer. Each level answers how questions posed by the level above it and poses why questions to the level below (Figure 3.11).
古希腊人说“认识你自己”,苏格拉底说真正的知识需要理性的论证。笛卡尔审视内心,在私人理性中找到了真理。第七章将探讨理性在社会中扮演的重要角色。然而,一些研究表明,理性可能会被过度推崇,以至于干扰良好的判断,尤其是在涉及情感的情况下(Wilson,2002)。
The classical Greeks said know thyself, and Socrates said real knowledge required rational justification. Descartes looked inward and found Truth in private reason. In Chapter 7 we will look at the important role being rational plays in our society. However, some research suggests that it’s possible to push rationality too far, to the point that it interferes with good judgment, especially when emotions are involved (Wilson, 2002).
例如,Wilson 等人(1993)进行了一项实验,让参与者根据自己对艺术海报的喜爱程度对其进行评分,或者在对照组中,简单地填写一份信息表。评分参与者被要求解释他们为何对海报进行如此评分。这些海报分为两类:在预测试中,印象派绘画获得了较高的评价;以及评分较低的简单波普艺术海报。两组的参与者都被告知,他们参与者可以带任何喜欢的海报回家,作为参与的小奖励。实验组成员倾向于选择波普艺术海报,并选择其中一张;而对照组成员则更喜欢印象派海报,并带走了这些海报。之后,研究人员对参与者进行了跟踪调查,询问他们对奖励海报的满意度以及是否还保留着这些海报。实验组的参与者对奖励海报的满意度较低,也不太可能保留这些海报。这里有一个例子,欧比旺建议卢克关闭他的目标计算机(系统2),并相信他的直觉(系统1)是正确的。
For example, Wilson et al. (1993) performed an experiment in which participants rated art posters for how much they liked them, or, in the control, simply filled out an information form. The rating participants were asked to give reasons why they rated the posters as they had, which were of two types, highly rated (in pre-testing) Impressionist paintings or less highly rated simple pop-art type posters. Both groups’ participants were told they could take any poster they liked home as a small reward for participating. Experimental group members tended to report preferring the pop-art posters and chose one of them, but control group members preferred and took the Impressionists. Later, participants were followed up and asked how happy they were with their reward posters and if they still had them. Experimental group participants were less happy with and less likely to have kept their choices than controls. Here we have a case where Obi-Wan’s advice to Luke to turn off his targeting computer (System 2) and trust his intuition17 (System 1) is right.
符号系统假说最重要的创始人是赫伯特·西蒙,他的自传是《我人生的模型》(1991)。我曾评论过这本书(Leahey,1993);https://cdm15960.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p15960coll21/id/72873/rec/2。我还写了一篇关于他获得诺贝尔奖的文章(Leahey,2003),doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.753。
The most important creator of the symbol-system hypothesis was Herbert Simon, whose autobiography is Models of My Life (1991). I reviewed it (Leahey, 1993); https://cdm15960.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p15960coll21/id/72873/rec/2. I also wrote an article about his Nobel Prize (Leahey, 2003), doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.753.
斯金纳写了三卷本自传,分别是《我的生平》(1976年)、《一个行为主义者的塑造》(1979年)和《后果的问题》(1983年),均由克诺夫出版社出版。他本人也曾表示,这三卷书秉承着他的哲学,最终讲述的是一个非人。有一个基金会(https://www.bfskinner.org/)致力于维护他的记忆,并推广激进行为主义,主要作为一种疗法。想了解行为主义,请阅读《关于行为主义》(纽约:克诺夫出版社,1974年)。
Skinner wrote a three-volume autobiography, Particulars of My Life (1976), The Shaping of a Behaviorist (1979), and A Matter of Consequences (1983), all published by Knopf. True to his philosophy, in the end, the three volumes were, he said, about a non-person. There is a foundation, https://www.bfskinner.org/, that tends his memory and advances radical behaviorism, primarily as a therapy. To learn about behaviorism, read About Behaviorism (New York: Knopf, 1974).
上一章的人工智能阅读材料包含神经网络的背景知识。目前还没有关于具身认知的非技术性书籍,最接近的是安迪·克拉克的《冲浪不确定性》(纽约:牛津大学出版社,2016年),该书也讨论了PPP。
The AI readings from the previous chapter include background on neural nets. There is yet no non-technical book on embodied cognition, the closest being Andy Clark’s Surfing Uncertainty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), which also discusses PPP.
PPP 的领导者之一是阿尼尔·塞斯 (Anil Seth),他的著作《做你自己:意识的新科学》 (纽约:企鹅出版社,2021 年) 是对 PPP 的非技术性解读。他曾在 TED 上发表演讲,网址:https: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyu7v7nWzfo 。
One of the leaders of PPP is Anil Seth whose Being You: A New Science of Consciousness (New York: Penguin, 2021) is a non-technical treatment of PPP. He gave a TED talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyu7v7nWzfo.
关于揭穿通灵术和其他神秘事件,请参阅詹姆斯·兰迪 (James Randi) 的《Flim-Flam》(纽约:普罗米修斯出版社,1980 年)以及佩恩和泰勒的《胡说八道》 (Penn & Teller's Bullshit ) 的各个片段。
On debunking psychics and other mysteries, see James Randi, Flim-Flam (New York: Prometheus, 1980) and various episodes of Penn & Teller’s Bullshit.
显然,《18 录像带谋杀案》是一部适合观看以培养具体/扩展认知的电影。
Apparently18 Videodrome is the movie to see for embodied/extended cognition.
值得一看的两部纪录片分别是:第一部是关于詹姆斯·兰迪的《诚实的骗子》 (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2246565/);第二部是关于人工智能的《人工智能的乐趣》 (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt9053472/)。这部纪录片的结尾展示了人工智能物体感知能力的一个严重缺陷。对图片进行细微的改动,即使人眼无法识别,也可能使人工智能无法识别。这种情况也延伸到了停车标志之类的地方,因此恐怖分子或犯罪分子可以对交通标志进行细微改动,从而对自动驾驶汽车造成干扰,包括目前那些只需极少驾驶员干预即可行驶的自动驾驶汽车。
Two relevant documentaries to watch are, first, on James Randi, An Honest Liar https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2246565/ and, second, on AI, The Joy of AI https://www.imdb.com/title/tt9053472/. This one closes with demonstrations of a serious glitch in AI object perception abilities. Tiny changes to a picture that don’t change it to human eyes can make it unrecognizable to AI. This extends to things like stop signs, so a terrorist or crook could make tiny changes to traffic signs and cause chaos for self-driving cars, including in models now available that drive with minimal driver input.
探水术是一种看似奇迹的现象,指用所谓的超感官方法找到看不见的东西。最常见的版本是探水术(或“巫术”),但所谓的通灵者也会探水寻找油和丢失的物品,并通过探水寻找线索来“帮助”警方。魔术师利用人们对探水术的信仰,通常使用新时代风格的“水晶摆”。例如,在一个魔术中,五张扑克牌、超感官知觉卡或“新时代”卡片放在桌子上。趁魔术师不注意,观众选择一张牌:在演示19中,他通过探水找到它。魔术师回来并展示一个摆锤,将其稳稳地放在每张牌上方。尽管如此,摆锤仍在四张牌上方来回摆动,并在所选牌上方上下摆动。也可以让观众使用摆锤来找到牌。20一个看似奇迹的现象发生了。
Dowsing is an apparent miracle, identifying something unseen by supposed extra-sensory methods. The most common version is water dowsing (or “witching”), but alleged psychics also dowse for oil and lost objects, and “help” police by dowsing for clues. Magicians exploit belief in dowsing, usually using New Agey “crystal pendulums.” For example, in one trick, five playing cards, ESP cards, or “New Age” cards are laid on a table. While the magician is not looking, a spectator chooses one card: in the demo19 he then locates it by dowsing. The magician returns and shows a pendulum, which he holds steady over each card. Nevertheless, the pendulum swings back and forth over four cards and up and down over the chosen card. It’s also possible to get the spectator to use the pendulum to find the card.20 An apparent miracle has occurred.
钟摆戏法是预测、行动以及基于感知的纠错反馈紧密结合的一个例子。它依赖于一种被James称为“意念运动”的现象(Wiese & Metzinger,2017;Lawson & Crane,2014)。仅仅想到一个动作,就会自动启动神经系统来执行它。用PPP(感知-行动)的术语来说,你的大脑“预测”某个动作会发生——或者更准确地说,你的世界模型会发生某种变化——然后运动系统就会采取行动,使预测成真。当魔术师将钟摆悬在选定的牌上方时,他只需想象垂直运动——预测它会发生——运动系统就会毫不费力地让它发生。观众也可以这样做。即使他们试图保持钟摆静止,以掩盖钟摆悬在他们牌上方的事实,魔术师的暗示——预测——也会促使运动系统推动钟摆移动。许多所谓的催眠控制都是以同样的方式起作用的。
The pendulum trick is an example of the intimate coupling of prediction, action, and error-correcting feedback from perception of the act. It depends on a phenomenon James called ideo-motor action (Wiese & Metzinger, 2017; Lawson & Crane, 2014). Simply thinking of an action automatically sets in motion the nervous processes to carry it out. In PPP terms, your brain “predicts” that an action will happen—or, more precisely, that your world-model will change in a certain way—and then the motor system acts to make the prediction true. As the magician holds the pendulum over the selected card, he merely thinks about vertical motion—predicts that it will happen—and the motor system makes it happen with minimal effort. Audience members can be made to do the same thing. Even though they try to hold the pendulum still to hide that it’s over their card, the suggestion—the prediction—from the magician causes the motor system to make the pendulum move. Much of so-called hypnotic control works the same way.
内容
Contents
Evolution and Comparative Cognition: What Is Consciousness For?
Learning Stands In for Consciousness
Computational Architectures as Methodological Behaviorism
Experimental Analysis of Behavior
Modern Associative Theory of Pavlovian Learning
Trap of the Diagram: Stimulus Substitution Theory
在认知科学发展的早期,其方法论——内省法——曾引发一个令人不安的问题,即重要的研究无法重复。大多数实验采用的方法类似于斯腾伯格的记忆扫描调查,要求参与者报告简单的视觉体验,并且这些方法重复性良好。然而,那些试图更深入地探究心智的研究——要求参与者报告思维过程——却得出了令人困惑、模糊且相互矛盾的结果(Beenfeldt,2013;Leahey,2014,2018)。因此,一些心理学家开始质疑内省法的科学有效性,并寻找替代方法(Angell,1911a,b;Ogden,1911b),例如新的心理测试方法。最终,心理学家得出结论,内省意识的私人主观方法应该被观察人类(以及动物)行为的公开客观方法所取代(Angell,1913;Ogden,1911a;Watson,1913)。与此同时,进化论开始挑战笛卡尔范式,而内省正是其中的一部分。
Early in the history of cognitive science, a troubling issue arose regarding its methodology, introspection, concerning failure to replicate important studies. Most experiments used methods similar to Sternberg’s memory scanning investigations, which required participants to report simple visual experiences, and these replicated well. However, studies that attempted to probe the mind more deeply—asking participants to report thought processes—got confusing, vague, and contradictory results (Beenfeldt, 2013; Leahey, 2014, 2018). As a result, some psychologists began to question the scientific validity of introspection, looking for alternative methodologies (Angell, 1911a, b; Ogden, 1911b) such as the new methods of mental testing. Eventually, psychologists concluded that the private and subjective method of introspecting consciousness should be replaced by the public and objective method of observing human—and animal—behaviors (Angell, 1913; Ogden, 1911a; Watson, 1913). At the same time, evolution began to challenge the Cartesian paradigm of which introspection was a part.
进化创造了比较认知领域,旨在研究人类与动物心智之间的相似与差异、连续与不连续性。笛卡尔范式的一个假设是,心智和意识是共存的;不存在无意识的心理过程,因为不属于灵魂的东西就属于机械的躯体。因此,主导比较认知的首要问题是:意识(心智)是一种适应吗?以及什么样的外在行为体现了内在的心智?笛卡尔自然没有回答第一个问题,但他对第二个问题——语言的使用——给出了答案。
Evolution created the field of comparative cognition, investigating similarities and differences, continuities and discontinuities, between the minds of humans and animals. An assumption of the Cartesian paradigm was that mind and consciousness were co-extensive; there were no unconscious mental processes because what did not belong to the soul belonged to the mechanical body. Hence, the first questions to dominate comparative cognition were: Was consciousness (mind) an adaptation? and What outward behavior manifested a mind within? Descartes had naturally not addressed the first question, but he did have an answer to the second question, use of language.
在达尔文之后,笛卡尔的语言标准显得过于绝对,造成了一条巨大的鸿沟,一边是动物,另一边是人,这种鸿沟与达尔文关于进化是渐进过程的观点不一致。如果人类心智以达尔文的方式进化,那么它必然有更简单的东西进化而来。人们可以调和笛卡尔和达尔文的理论,但代价是不能回答关于心智的第一个问题——意识是一种适应吗?——意识可能只是繁忙的神经系统中电化学活动的副产品,就像电源线中的热量是电流从电源传输到工作电机的副产品一样。我们将在第 8 章更详细地讨论这一主张。
After Darwin, Descartes’s criterion of language seemed too absolute, creating a yawning chasm with animals on one side and people on the other, a gap inconsistent with Darwin’s view of evolution as a gradual process. If human mind evolved in a Darwinian way, it had to have something simpler to evolve from. One could reconcile Descartes and Darwin at the cost of answering the first question about mind—is consciousness an adaptation?—in the negative. It might be the case that consciousness is nothing but a by-product of electro-chemical activity in a busy nervous system, the way heat in a power cord is a by-product of moving electricity from its source to a working motor. We’ll take up this claim in more detail in chapter 8.
然而,詹姆斯(1890)提出了强有力的论据,支持意识(心智)是一种适应性而非进化偶然的观点。他指出,没有意识的生物不会在意自己的生死。相反,詹姆斯他认为意识是为了生存而积极奋斗的斗士,这增加了其拥有者获得达尔文式成功的机会。詹姆斯的观点赢得了众多追随者,并促使心理学家们开始研究:如果不是语言,意识的行为表达可能是什么。
However, James (1890) marshalled powerful arguments in favor of the view that consciousness (mind) is an adaptation rather than an evolutionary accident. He pointed out that a creature without consciousness would not care if it lived or died. Instead, James argued that consciousness is an active fighter for the goal of survival, increasing its bearer’s chances of Darwinian success. James’s view won adherents, moving psychologists to work on the question of what might be the behavioral expression of consciousness if it wasn’t language.
最终,人们达成了共识。在达尔文进化论中,物种世世代代地适应着不断变化的环境。个体生物通过改变其行为,即在其一生中不断学习,来适应不断变化的环境。意识——心智——是一种适应性行为,体现在生物体的学习能力中。此外,如果学习是私人心智在公众领域所做的事情,那么基于主观内省的研究就可以被基于客观学习观察的研究所取代。认知科学家可以在实验室中研究学习是如何进行的,应用心理学家可以运用关于学习的科学发现来帮助人们适应工业现代主义的新世界(杜威,1900/1978)。
Eventually a consensus was reached. In Darwinian evolution, species adapted to their changing environments over generations. Individual organisms adapted to their changing environments by changing their behavior, that is, by learning in the course of their lifetimes. Consciousness—mind—was an adaption that manifested itself in organisms’ capacities to learn. Furthermore, if learning was what private mind publicly does, then research using subjective introspection could be replaced by research using objective observations of learning. Cognitive scientists could study how learning worked in the laboratory, and applied psychologists could apply scientific findings about learning to help people adapt to the new world of industrial modernism (Dewey, 1900/1978).
行为主义运动由比较心理学家约翰·B·沃森(John B. Watson,1878-1958)于1913年发起。然而,与其说它是对心理学新框架的深思熟虑的阐述,不如说是一份宣言,宣扬着一位愤怒的年轻人对20世纪前思想局限性的不满(Leahey,2018)。
The behaviorist movement was launched in 1913 by John B. Watson (1878–1958), a comparative psychologist. It was, however, not so much a thoughtful exposition of a new framework for psychology as a manifesto for the attitudes of an angry young man chafing at the limitations of pre-20th-century ideas (Leahey, 2018).
在沃森宣言之后,提出了两种用行为取代心灵的方法。一种是卡尔·拉什利 (1890-1958) 的严格行为主义(Lashley, 1923)。拉什利是沃森的学生。他们一起复制了巴甫洛夫的动物实验并发明了人类巴甫洛夫条件反射的方法 (Watson, 1916)。拉什利受到俄罗斯客观心理学还原学派的影响,并将成为美国生理心理学的先驱 (第 8 章)。拉什利的严格行为主义(或更描述性地称生理行为主义)的目标是通过表明它们实际上是大脑过程来消除对心灵(包括意识)的提及,但这一目标超出了拉什利的方法论理解范围。
In the wake of Watson’s manifesto, two ways of replacing mind with behavior were proposed. One was Karl Lashley’s (1890–1958) strict behaviorism (Lashley, 1923). Lashley was a student of Watson’s. Together they replicated Pavlov’s animal experiments and invented methods for Pavlovian conditioning in humans (Watson, 1916). Lashley became influenced by the reductive Russian school of Objective Psychology and would go on to be the American pioneer of physiological psychology (Chapter 8). The goal of Lashley’s strict, or more descriptively, physiological, behaviorism was to eliminate references to mind, including consciousness, by showing that they were really brain processes, but this ambition was beyond Lashley’s methodological grasp.
行为主义的另一种表述,方法论行为主义(例如,托尔曼,1935,1936),成为了主流心理学和认知科学。它并不承诺解释意识,因为它用一个简单的论证就将意识排除在科学范围之外。科学要求事实是公开的,每个聚集在实验台周围的人都可以获得。然而,内省的“事实”是私密的,锁在每个人的头脑中。方法论行为主义者并没有断言意识是一种幻觉,甚至没有说它不重要,只是它的私密性使它不适合成为科学研究的对象。意识可以留给诗人、画家、小说家以及一般的艺术。科学心理学只有通过研究客观可定义的条件如何规律地改变客观可定义的行为才能作为一门科学发展。方法论行为主义者愿意将未观察到的理论术语纳入他们的理论,只要这些术语能够通过与客观程序或测量联系起来进行精确定义。
The other formulation of behaviorism, methodological behaviorism (e.g., Tolman, 1935, 1936), became mainstream psychology and cognitive science. It did not promise to explain consciousness because it ruled consciousness out of scientific bounds with a simple argument. Science demands facts that are public, available to everyone gathered around a lab bench. The “facts” of introspection, however, were private, locked up in each person’s head. Methodological behaviorists did not assert that consciousness is an illusion, or even that it was unimportant, only that its privacy made it an unsuitable object of scientific study. Consciousness could be left to poets, painters, novelists, and the arts in general. Scientific psychology could only advance as a science by investigating how objectively definable conditions lawfully change objectively definable behaviors. Methodological behaviorists were willing to admit unobserved theoretical terms into their theories provided they could be precisely defined by connecting them to objective procedures or measurements.
将心理学定义为行为科学,可以回避关于意识存在及其本质的棘手争论。计算心理学也是如此。图灵机是通用计算机,神经网络可以进行高性能数学运算,未来机器人或许可以驾驶汽车,但我们不必将意识归因于它们的运作。主流认知科学是方法论行为主义的一种版本(Dennett,1991;Leahey,1994)。
Difficult arguments about the existence and nature of consciousness could be evaded by defining psychology as the science of behavior. So does computational psychology. Turing machines are universal computers, neural nets do high-powered math, and one day robots may drive cars, but we don’t have to attribute consciousness to their operations. Mainstream cognitive science is a version of methodological behaviorism (Dennett, 1991; Leahey, 1994).
行为主义对认知科学的贡献在于,它对学习过程的细致研究主要基于动物模型,而这受到学习过程相关理论的驱动。当然,使用动物模型是为了方便研究,但受联想主义的影响,行为主义者认为学习规律,即联想规律,至少在所有哺乳动物身上都是相同的。
Behaviorism contributed to cognitive science the careful study of learning, primarily in animal models, driven by rival theories of the learning process. Animal models were used, of course, for convenience, but, influenced by associationism, behaviorists believed that the laws of learning, i.e., of association, would be the same across at least all mammals.
人们提出了各种各样的学习类别。其中一种区别是联想学习和非联想学习。在非联想学习中,反复接触刺激会改变生物体对刺激的反应。在兴奋状态下,反复接触会增强反应;在抑制状态下,反复接触会减弱反应。在联想学习中,我们会在不同条件下向生物体呈现多种刺激,并观察由此导致的行为变化。
Various categories of learning have been proposed. One distinction is between associative and nonassociative learning. In nonassociative learning, repeated exposure to a stimulus changes an organism’s response to the stimulus. In excitation, repeated exposure strengthens the response; in inhibition, repeated exposure weakens the response. In associative learning, multiple stimuli are presented to an organism under various conditions, and we look for changes in behavior that result.
更本质的区别通常体现在试错法(其原名)、工具性学习或操作性学习(斯金纳的术语)与经典学习(其原名)、巴甫洛夫学习(当今的主流术语)或反应性学习(斯金纳的术语)之间。后者是指对某一刺激的特定先天反应(例如恐惧)受到另一个通常不会引发该刺激的刺激的控制。反应(例如,铃声)。前者发生在自由情境中的行为(例如,按下杠杆)以及行为后的后果(例如,允许动物获得食物)会改变该行为的频率。
A more substantial distinction is typically made between trial-and-error (its original name), instrumental, or operant learning (Skinner’s term), on the one hand, and classical (its original name), Pavlovian (the mainstream term today), or respondent (Skinner) learning, on the other. The latter occurs when a given innate response (e.g., fear) to a stimulus is brought under control of another stimulus that does not normally evoke the response (e.g., the sound of a bell). The former occurs when a behavior (e.g., pressing a lever) occurs in a free situation and the consequences (such as allowing the animal access to food), following the behavior change the frequency of that behavior.
美国心理学家爱德华·李·桑代克(Edward Lee Thorndike,1874-1949)发现了试错学习。桑代克致力于研究儿童学习——他的职业生涯都致力于教育心理学——但哈佛大学不允许他这样做,于是桑代克转而研究动物。
American psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949) discovered trial-and-error learning. Thorndike wanted to study learning in children—he spent his career in educational psychology—but Harvard would not permit it, and Thorndike turned to animals.
当时的比较心理学家希望确定不同动物物种的相对智力,始于乔治·罗马尼斯 (1848-1894) 和《动物智力》。罗马尼斯采用了后来被称为轶事法的方法。他收集关于动物行为的故事(轶事),并筛选这些故事,试图重建所涉及动物的心理过程并评估每个物种的智力。在这样做的过程中,罗马尼斯和其他人面临着严重的笛卡尔绊脚石。尽管有局限性,但人们可以报告他们的有意识的想法,而动物不能。轶事法被认为是比较认知中内省法的替代品,但桑代克 (1911) 严厉批评了它。
Comparative psychologists of the time wanted to establish the relative intelligence of different animal species, beginning with George Romanes (1848–1894) and Animal Intelligence. Romanes employed what came to be called the anecdotal method. He collected stories (anecdotes) about the behavior of animals and sifted through the stories attempting to reconstruct the mental processes of the animals involved and assess the intelligence of each species. In doing so, Romanes and others faced a serious Cartesian stumbling block. People can report their conscious thoughts, albeit with limitations, while animals can’t. The anecdotal method was supposed to be the replacement for introspection in comparative cognition, but Thorndike (1911) harshly criticized it.
首先,它高估了动物的心智能力。人们倾向于认为动物很聪明,而不是平凡或愚蠢。1更糟糕的是,轶事研究法及其对动物思维过程的重构很容易被拟人化。看着动物解决问题,我们很容易设身处地为之,把自己在同样情况下的想法投射到动物身上。最后,因为每个轶事都与一个独特且不受控制的情况有关,所以很难弄清楚哪些环境特征决定了特定动物的行为。桑代克认为实验应该取代轶事。在他的研究方法中,迄今为止最重要的是他所谓的“谜题盒”,因为它们的形式决定了他的学习理论,并将教会我们很多关于方法和理论之间关系的知识。
First, it overestimated animals’ mental powers. People tended to report animals being clever, not being ordinary or stupid.1 Worse, the anecdotal method, with its attendant reconstruction of the animal’s thought processes, was easily given to anthropomorphism. Watching an animal solve a problem, we easily put ourselves in its place and project onto the animal the thoughts we would have in the same circumstances. Finally, because each anecdote is about a unique and uncontrolled situation, it’s hard to figure out which features of the environment determined a given animal’s behavior. Thorndike argued that experiments should replace anecdotes. Of his methods, by far the most important were his so-called puzzle-boxes, because their form dictated his theory of learning, and will teach us much about the relationship between method and theory.
桑代克制作了几个谜盒(如图 4.1所示),并将一位参与者(通常是一只小猫)放入其中。谜盒是一种笼子,猫可以通过学习操作操纵器从里面打开门。之后,猫逃走了,吃了一些鱼,然后被放回盒子里。2
Thorndike constructed several puzzle boxes (as shown in Figure 4.1) in which he placed one of his participants, typically a young cat. The puzzle box is a kind of cage constructed so the cat can open the door from the inside by learning to work a manipulandum. The cat then escaped and ate some fish before being placed back in the box.2
桑代克想探究参与者是如何学习正确反应的。他描述了实验过程:在一个盒子里,猫必须拉动绳子末端的环或按钮:
Thorndike wanted to discover how the participant learns the correct response. He described what happens in a box in which the cat must pull a loop or button on the end of the string:
猫咪在盒子里到处乱抓,很可能会抓住绳子、绳圈或纽扣来打开门。渐渐地,所有其他不成功的冲动都会被消除,而导致成功行为的特定冲动则会被由此产生的快感所强化,直到经过多次尝试,猫咪被放进盒子里后,会立即抓住纽扣或绳圈。
Thorndike,1911 年,第 36 页
The cat that is clawing all over the box will probably claw the string or loop or button so as to open the door. And gradually all the other nonsuccessful impulses will be stamped out and the particular impulse leading to the successful act will be stamped in by the resulting pleasure, until, after many trials, the cat will, when put in the box, immediately claw the button or loop.
Thorndike, 1911, p. 36
桑代克将他的研究视为联想形成的研究之一:
Thorndike conceived his study as one of association formation:
然后,猫开始凭借其储存的本能冲动,找到成功的动作,并逐渐将其与盒子内部的感觉印象联系起来,直到完美地联系起来,以便它一遇到感觉印象就会做出动作。
Thorndike,1911年,第38页
Starting, then, with its store of instinctive impulses, the cat hits upon the successful movement, and gradually associates it with the sense-impression of the interior of the box until the connection is perfect, so that it performs the act as soon as confronted with the sense-impression.
Thorndike, 1911, p. 38
“反复尝试”,或者更确切地说是“尝试成功”——学习——恰如其分地描述了这些动物的行为。它们被放入培养皿中,尝试了各种熟悉的行为。猫可能会尝试挤过栅栏,抓挠笼子,或者把爪子伸进栅栏之间。最终,一只猫会用爪子抓住绳圈,然后拉动它,并发现自己的努力得到了回报。随着这些事件的重复,无用的行为逐渐消失,或者说消失,正确的行为在进入笼子后不久就会出现。
The phrase trial-and-error, or perhaps more exactly trial-and-success, learning aptly describes what these animals did. Placed inside, they tried out a variety of familiar behaviors. Cats were likely to try squeezing through the bars, clawing at the cage, or sticking their paws between the bars. Eventually, a cat pawed at the loop of string and so pulled on it, finding its efforts rewarded. As these events are repeated, useless behaviors die away, or extinguish, and the correct behavior is done soon after entering the cage.
大约在同一时期,俄罗斯生理学家伊万·彼得罗维奇·巴甫洛夫(1849-1936)发现了巴甫洛夫条件反射,他此前已因其在唾液腺方面的研究而获得诺贝尔奖(1904 年)。在消化研究中,巴甫洛夫注意到一个奇怪的现象。在被用作参与者后,狗不仅会在食物出现时分泌唾液,还会对先前的中性刺激分泌唾液,例如看到喂食者的实验者。巴甫洛夫发现,不仅存在先天的刺激反应反射(将食物放入狗嘴中,狗会分泌唾液),还存在后天习得的反射(看到实验者时分泌唾液)。巴甫洛夫最初将这些称为心理反射(与生物反射相对)。巴甫洛夫并非心理学家,而是生理学家,他将学习研究视为研究大脑而非心智的窗口(Pavlov,1957 年)。3
About the same time, Russian physiologist Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849–1936), who already had a Nobel Prize (1904) for his research on the salivary gland, discovered Pavlovian conditioning. During his digestion research, Pavlov noticed a curious phenomenon. After being used as a participant, a dog would not only salivate when food was presented but would also salivate to previously neutral stimuli—the sight of the experimenter who fed it, for example. Pavlov saw that not only are there innate stimulus-response reflexes (put food in a dog’s mouth and it salivates), but there are also learned reflexes (salivating at the sight of the experimenter). Pavlov originally called these psychical (as opposed to biological) reflexes. Pavlov was not a psychologist but a physiologist, and he viewed his studies of learning as windows on the brain, not the mind (Pavlov, 1957).3
巴甫洛夫将联想理论运用到他的实验环境中。他把“心理分泌”视为习得的联想;食物本身就会引起唾液分泌,并与实验者联系起来,实验者随后又引发唾液分泌。作为一名实验生理学家,巴甫洛夫深谙如何严密控制偶然发现,从而创建了一套严谨的实验范式。俄国革命期间,他勤奋工作。革命胜利后,新的苏维埃政权为巴甫洛夫建造了一个特殊的实验室,被称为“寂静之塔”。为了排除不受控制的刺激,实验室配备了厚厚的玻璃窗、专门隔开的房间、嵌入沙子的地基以及一条充满稻草的护城河。实验期间,一只狗被拴在挽具上,实验者可以从另一个房间控制刺激呈现,并计算狗口中产生的唾液滴数(图4.2)。巴甫洛夫的实验装置可以完全控制动物的环境,并对学习情况进行客观的量化测量,他辉煌的研究计划由此开启。
Pavlov harnessed associationism to his experimental setting. Pavlov viewed “psychical secretions” as learned associations; the food, which already elicited salivation, became associated with the experimenter, who then elicited salivation. As an experimental physiologist, Pavlov knew how to put careful controls on his happenstance discovery, creating a rigorous experimental paradigm. He worked diligently through the Russian Revolution, and, after its victory, the new Soviet regime built Pavlov a special laboratory,4 known as the Towers of Silence, which, to ensure exclusion of uncontrolled stimuli, had thick glass windows, specially separated rooms, a foundation embedded in sand, and a straw-filled moat. During experiments, a dog was held in a harness, and from another room the experimenter could control stimulus presentations and count the drops of saliva produced in the dog’s mouth (Figure 4.2). Pavlov’s experimental setup allowed complete control of the animal’s environment and produced an objective quantitative measure of learning, and his brilliant research program began.
能够引发生物反射的刺激(将食物放入口中、向眼睛吹一口气)是无条件刺激(US)。因此,生物引发的反射是无条件反应(UR)。通过与 US 配对而引发通常与 UR 几乎相同的反应的刺激称为条件刺激(CS),因为它引发 UR 的能力取决于与 US 的配对。由 CS 引发的反射是条件反应(CR)。最后,US 通常被称为强化物,因为它与 CS 的配对会加强(强化)CS 引发 CR 的能力。
A stimulus that biologically elicits a reflex (food placed in the mouth, a puff of air at the eye) is an unconditional stimulus (US). The biologically elicited reflex is, therefore, an unconditional response (UR). A stimulus that through pairing with a US comes to elicit a response usually almost identical with the UR is called a conditional stimulus (CS) for its ability to elicit the UR is conditional on pairing with the US. The reflex elicited by a CS is a conditional response (CR). Finally, the US is often called a reinforcer, since its pairing with the CS strengthens (reinforces) the power of the CS to elicit the CR.
巴甫洛夫在他的实验中系统地研究了古老的哲学联想定律(图 4.3)。
Pavlov systematically worked through the old philosophical laws of association in his experiments (Figure 4.3).
以下是他的大部分基本发现,尽管它们绝不是巴甫洛夫研究的全部范围(Pavlov,1927;Todes,2014)。
Here are most his basic findings, though they by no means exhaust the range of Pavlov’s investigations (Pavlov, 1927; Todes, 2014).
休谟的邻近定律认为,如果两个想法同时出现,它们就会产生关联。在巴甫洛夫的实验范式中,我们可以通过控制呈现认知(CS)和感知(US)的时机来研究邻近定律。巴甫洛夫使用了两种认知(US)——食物(在消化过程中引起唾液分泌)和弱酸(在防御反射过程中引起唾液分泌)。他使用了许多认知(CS)——节拍器的咔哒声、音乐的音调、气味、沸腾的水声——尽管他没有使用著名的铃铛。我们在此假设 US 是食物,而 CS 是音符或音调。图 4.4显示了 US 和 CS 之间各种可能的时间关系。
Hume’s law of contiguity says that two ideas get associated if they occur at the same time. Within Pavlov’s experimental paradigm, the law of contiguity may be investigated by controlling when we present CS and US in relation to each other. Pavlov employed two USs— food, which elicited salivation as part of digestion, and mild acid, which elicited salivation as a defensive reflex. He used many CSs—the clicking of a metronome, musical tones, odors, the sound of bubbling water—though he did not use the famous bell. We will here assume the US is food and the CS is a musical note or tone. Figure 4.4 shows the various possible temporal relationships between the US and the CS.
根据邻近定律,我们可能认为同时呈现 US 和 CS 会最有效。然而,这样的配对并没有产生最快的条件反射。逆向条件反射(US 在 CS 开始之前呈现和移除)很难建立。相反,最佳条件反射发生在 CS 略早于 US 开始并与之重叠时。如果 CS 开始和结束都早于 US,则称为踪迹条件反射,这也很难建立。CS 和 US 必须重叠才能产生 CR 这一事实支持了邻近定律,但 CS 的开始必须先于 US 这一发现表明,CS 只有作为向生物体发出的信号时才会有效(Pavlov,1927)。
From the law of contiguity, we might expect simultaneous presentation of US and CS to be most effective. However, such pairings did not produce the fastest conditioning. Backward conditioning, in which the US is presented and removed before the CS begins, is hard to establish. Instead, best conditioning occurs when the CS begins slightly before the US and overlaps with it. If the CS begins and ends before the US, it is called trace conditioning, which is also difficult to establish. The fact that CS and US must overlap to create a CR supports the law of contiguity, but the finding that the onset of the CS must precede the US suggests that CSs become effective only if they act as signals to the organism (Pavlov, 1927).
假设 CS 在 US 出现之前就开始了,也许早 30 秒,并且与 US 开始重叠。这被称为延迟条件反射;它类似于标准程序,只是 CS 开始的时间远早于 US。在这种情况下,CR 会建立,但会随着 CS-US 配对的进行而发生变化。起初,狗在 CS 开始时就开始流口水,但随着试验的继续,流口水直到 US 预计到达之前才开始。这一发现向巴甫洛夫 (1927) 表明时间本身可以充当 CS。引起流口水 CR 的控制 CS 不再仅仅是音调,而是音调加上一定时间的复合刺激。当两个刺激以这种方式控制反应时,这被称为复合条件反射。
Suppose the CS starts well before the US is presented, perhaps 30 seconds before, and overlaps US onset. This is called delay conditioning; it is like the standard procedure except that the CS begins far before the US. In this case a CR gets established, but it changes as CS-US pairings proceed. At first, the dog begins to salivate as soon as the CS begins, but as trials continue, the salivation does not commence until a little before the US is scheduled to arrive. This finding suggested to Pavlov (1927) that time itself could act as a CS. The controlling CS eliciting the salivation CR was no longer just the tone, but it was the compound stimulus of tone plus a certain passage of time. When two stimuli control a response in this way it is called compound conditioning.
巴甫洛夫发现,人们可以同时对两种或多种CS进行条件反射,例如,将光和声音与食物配对。另一个联想定律是生动性:一个给定的想法最容易与同时出现的生动想法联系起来,而不是与较弱的想法联系起来。巴甫洛夫的研究证实了这一点。如果两个CS的强度大致相等,并且单独呈现,经过条件反射后,每个CS都会引发CR。但如果其中一个比另一个强,例如明亮的光和昏暗的声音,那么只有更生动的刺激才会成为CS。当一种化合物的一个CS比其他CS强得多时,这种现象被称为遮蔽。
Pavlov found one could condition two or more CSs at the same time, for example, pairing a light and a tone with food. Another law of association was vividness: A given idea will get mostly associated with concurrent vivid ideas, rather than with weak ones. Pavlov’s work bore this out. If the two CSs were about equal in intensity, and if they were presented alone, after conditioning, each would elicit the CR. But if one were stronger than the other, a bright light and a dim tone, for instance, only the more vivid stimulus became a CS. This phenomenon, when one CS of a compound is much more powerful than the others, is called overshadowing.
巴甫洛夫(1927)将对特定正向反应(例如唾液分泌)的条件反射称为兴奋性条件反射。US(刺激)自然会刺激 UR(刺激上皮层),经过几次配对后,CS(刺激后皮层)也会兴奋。巴甫洛夫还认为,CR(刺激后皮层)的活动既可以被抑制,也可以被激发。
The conditioning of a distinct positive response, such as salivation, Pavlov (1927) called conditioning of excitation. The US naturally excites the UR, and, after several pairings, so does the CS. Pavlov also believed that the action of CRs could be inhibited as well as excited.
回到延迟条件反射,我们看到了抑制的作用。在多次 CS-US 配对之后,CR 仅发生在 CS 间隔接近尾声时,即 US 的预期时间。那么,为什么 CS 开始前的早期 CR 会消失呢?音调的第一部分是否只是断开连接,与 CR 分离了?巴甫洛夫认为不是。他认为,音调的早期部分主动抑制了 CR 的发生。作为证据,巴甫洛夫指出了脱抑制:如果在 CS 的早期阶段,在任何 CR 发生之前,引入一个全新的刺激,例如光的闪光,CR 就会发生。现在,如果 CR 只是与早期 CS 断开连接,光不会引起唾液分泌,就像在实验室外一样。但是,在 CS 期间光闪烁时意外出现唾液分泌,这向巴甫洛夫表明,光干扰了皮质的抑制过程,释放了被抑制的对音调的 CR。
Returning to delay conditioning, we see inhibition in action. After many CS-US pairings, the CR occurred only near the end of the CS interval, at the anticipated time of the US. Why then did the earlier CRs to the start of the CS disappear? Was the first part of the tone simply disconnected, disassociated from the CR? Pavlov thought not. He believed that the early part of the tone actively inhibited the CR from taking place. As evidence, Pavlov pointed to disinhibition: If, during the early stages of the CS, before any CR would occur, a wholly new stimulus is introduced, such as a light flash, the CR would occur. Now if the CR had simply been disconnected from the early CS, the light would not cause salivation, any more than it would outside the laboratory. But the unexpected appearance of salivation when the light flashed during the CS indicated to Pavlov that the light interfered with the cortical process of inhibition, releasing the suppressed CR to the tone.
最重要的抑制形式是消退。如果我们只呈现一个既定的CS,而不进行进一步的强化,会发生什么?CR会持续一段时间,然后慢慢减弱,最终降至零。在这里,似乎可以这样说:CS已经与 CR 分离,甚至 CS 不再是 CS 而是中性刺激——反射实际上已经消失。
The most important form of inhibition is extinction. What happens if we present an established CS alone, without further reinforcement? The CR occurs for a while, slowly weakens, and finally falls to zero. It seems plausible to say here that the CS has been disassociated from the CR, even that the CS is no longer a CS but a neutral stimulus—the reflex has literally extinguished.
但进一步的研究表明,CS-CR关联仍然存在,只是被消退程序抑制了。如果我们只是将动物放置一段时间,然后再次呈现CS,唾液分泌就会重新出现。条件反射已经自发恢复。这表明该反射并非因消退而习得,而是被主动抑制了;这也表明抑制是暂时的。
But further investigation reveals that the CS-CR association is still present, only inhibited by the extinction procedure. If we simply put the animal aside for some time and present the CS again, salivation reappears. The conditional reflex has spontaneously recovered. This indicates that the reflex was not unlearned by extinction but was actively inhibited; it also indicates that inhibition is temporary.
另一种证据支持巴甫洛夫的论点。假设我们在唾液分泌量为零之后继续进行消退,并反复呈现条件反射。如果消退仅仅是对条件反射的遗忘,那么额外的非强化配对就不会产生任何效果:一旦条件反射变成了中性刺激,就无法再说它变得更加中性了。相反,巴甫洛夫发现,消退持续的时间越长,条件反射自发恢复所需的时间就越长,这表明额外的非强化配对会加深条件反射,从而延长对条件反射的抑制。
Another kind of evidence supports Pavlov’s argument. Suppose we continue extinction well beyond the point at which zero salivation occurs, presenting the CS over and over. If extinction were simply unlearning the conditional reflex, additional unreinforced pairings would have no effect: Once a CS has become a neutral stimulus, it makes no sense to say it has become more neutral still. Instead, Pavlov found that the longer extinction continued past zero, the longer it took for the CR to spontaneously recover, indicating that additional unreinforced pairings deepened and so prolonged the inhibition of the CR.
休谟的另一条联想定律是相似性:相似的想法很容易联系起来。巴甫洛夫发现 CR 不仅发生在训练过的 CS 上,也发生在类似的刺激上。假设我们训练一条狗对每秒 1,000 个周期的音调分泌唾液,然后呈现接近或远离 1,000 个周期的音调(或高或低)。我们发现 CR 发生在相关音调上,并且新音调越接近原始 CS,CR 越大;越远,CR 越小。CR 扩展到像 CS 这样的刺激称为泛化,而随着测试刺激与 CS 越来越不同,CR 的逐渐减弱称为泛化梯度。
Hume’s other law of association is similarity: Similar ideas are easily associated. Pavlov found that CRs occur not just to the trained CS, but to similar stimuli, too. Suppose we have trained a dog to salivate to a tone of 1,000 cycles per second, and then present tones near or far from 1,000 cycles, either above or below. We find that the CR occurs to the related tones, and that the closer the new tone is to the original CS, the greater the CR; the farther away, the less the CR. The extension of a CR to stimuli like the CS is called generalization, and the gradual weakening of the CR as the test stimuli increasingly differ from the CS is called the generalization gradient.
我们可以将兴奋和抑制相互抵消,从而产生刺激辨别。假设我们调节唾液分泌,使其适应屏幕上呈现的发光圆圈的刺激刺激(CS+)(Pavlov,1927)。如果我们随后呈现从近圆形到极椭圆形的椭圆,就会发现一个泛化梯度。然而,在呈现 CS+ 之后,我们立即反复呈现一个极椭圆形,并且从不强化它(CS-)。抑制会逐渐增强,直到椭圆形(CS-)。这样,我们就创造了刺激辨别。动物对 CS+ 有反应,而对 CS- 没有反应。
We can set excitation and inhibition against one another to produce stimulus discrimination. Suppose we condition salivation to a CS (CS+) of a luminous circle presented on a screen (Pavlov, 1927). If we then present ellipses varying from near-circular to extremely elliptical, we find a generalization gradient. However, right after presenting the CS+, we repeatedly present an extreme ellipse alone and never reinforce it (CS-). Inhibition will build up to the ellipse (CS-). We have created stimulus discrimination. The animal responds to CS+ and does not respond to CS-.
了解了泛化之后,我们现在可以提出以下问题:如果我们继续进行辨别过程,同时使连续的CS-越来越接近圆形,会发生什么?兴奋和抑制的泛化梯度将开始发生冲突:CS-像圆形,会在一定程度上引发唾液分泌,而作为椭圆形则会引发抑制;CS+类似于椭圆,会在一定程度上引发抑制,而作为圆形则会引发唾液分泌。随着CS-越来越像CS+,这两种对抗趋势将会发生冲突。如果进一步深入,巴甫洛夫的狗“会呈现所有”“它会尖叫、扭动、撕扯仪器并狂吠不止(Pavlov,1927,第291页)。”巴甫洛夫预见了行为疗法,他提出,由于精神病理学是通过条件反射习得的,因此它应该可以通过重新条件反射“消除”。
Knowing about generalization, we can now ask the following question: What happens if we continue the discrimination procedure while making successive CS-s more and more circular? The generalization gradients of excitation and inhibition will begin to clash: CS-, being like a circle, will to some degree elicit salivation, while as an ellipse it will elicit inhibition; CS+, being similar to an ellipse, will to some degree elicit inhibition, while as a circle it will elicit salivation. As CS- increasingly resembles CS+, the antagonistic tendencies will clash. Pushed far enough, Pavlov’s dog “presented all the symptoms of acute neurosis.” It squealed, it wiggled, it tore at the apparatus and barked violently (Pavlov, 1927, p. 291). Pavlov anticipated behavior therapy by proposing that because psychopathology is learned by conditioning it should be “undoable” by reconditioning.
历史学家将两次世界大战之间的时期称为理论的黄金时代,因为与当今的许多心理学领域不同,今天的科学家将他们的职业生涯都花在用一些他们喜欢的研究工具来照料微小的理论花园上(Newell,1973a),而黄金时代的心理学家旨在用一个理论来解释所有动物(包括人类)的所有行为。
Historians call the interwar period the Golden Age of Theory because unlike so much of psychology today, in which scientists spend their careers tending tiny theoretical gardens with a few favorite research tools (Newell, 1973a), Golden Age psychologists aimed to explain all behavior in all animals, including people, with a single theory.
两位理论家分别是爱德华·切斯·托尔曼(Edward Chace Tolman,1886-1959)和克拉克·伦纳德·赫尔(Clark Leonard Hull,1884-1952)。有趣的是,两人在研究生院之前都没有心理学背景。托尔曼拥有化学学士学位(他的哥哥是一位重要的化学物理学家,曾与爱因斯坦合作出版过著作),在阅读了威廉·詹姆斯的著作后,他决定成为一名心理学家。赫尔原本想成为一名机械工程师,但一场小儿麻痹症让他放弃了机械工程师的职业,转而选择心理学。他开始寻找一个让有抱负的人能够迅速成名的领域。
The leading theorists were Edward Chace Tolman (1886–1959) and Clark Leonard Hull (1884–1952). Interestingly, neither had a background in psychology prior to graduate school. Tolman had a bachelor’s in chemistry (his older brother was an important chemical physicist who published with Einstein), and he decided to become a psychologist after reading William James. Hull wanted to be a mechanical engineer but gave it up for psychology when a bout of polio caused him to look for a field in which an ambitious person could quickly make a reputation.
赫尔的抱负是牛顿式的,他的目标是能够将动物的运动预测到毫秒级。他的核心行为公设(Hull, 1943)让人想起牛顿的F = M × A,即S E R = S H R × D,换句话说,有效反应势等于习惯强度乘以驱动力。每个术语都有一个操作定义:E由学习到的反应的物理表达来定义,例如其延迟时间;H是学习到的反应强度,具体来说是在它之后获得奖励的次数;D是食物(奖励)剥夺的小时数。赫尔还预见了人工智能,制造能够学习的机器(Hull & Baernstein, 1929),尽管这更多地成为了他的私人爱好,而不是研究项目。
Hull’s ambition was Newtonian, no less than being able to predict the movements of animals down to the millisecond. His central behavior postulate (Hull, 1943), which recalls Newton’s F = M × A, was SE R =SH R × D, or, in words, Effective reaction potential equals Habit strength times Drive. Each term had an operational definition: E was defined by the physical expression of a learned response, such as its latency; H was the learned strength of the response, specifically how many times it had been followed by reward; and D was the number of hours of food (the reward) deprivation. Hull also anticipated artificial intelligence, building machines capable of learning (Hull & Baernstein, 1929) though these became more a private hobby than a research program.
托尔曼(Tolman)的一项实验(1932;托尔曼和洪齐克(Honzik)的实验,1930)采用了黄金时代研究学习的主流方法——迷宫。实验的问题是,在学习了迷宫之后,当实验者改变路线时,老鼠是否能够运用它们的知识找到通往目标的最短路线。更深层次的问题在于,如何将托尔曼的詹姆斯式观点与赫尔的数学版本进行对比,前者认为生物体能够智能地适应环境,后者认为动物是连接刺激和反应的机械连接器。
One experiment (Tolman, 1932; Tolman & Honzik, 1930) used the dominant methodology for studying learning during the Golden Age, the maze. At issue was whether having learned a maze, rats could use their knowledge to figure out the shortest route to their goal when the experimenter altered the routes. The deeper issue was contrasting Tolman’s Jamesian view of organisms as adapting intelligently to their environments versus Hull’s mathematical version of Thorndike’s view of animals as mechanical connectors of stimuli to responses.
桑代克曾用他的效果定律提出了一种对目标导向行为的机械解释,该定律“印证了”某些刺激→反应之间的联系,赫尔对其进行了改进。常识会认为桑代克的一只猫找到了获得自由和获得所需食物的方法,而刺激→反应学习理论则认为,获取食物的快感只是将谜盒内的刺激与拉动盒顶悬挂的绳子的行为粘合在一起,这样拉绳子就成为了一种自动反应,会自动消失。赫尔说,实际上,桑代克的学习与巴甫洛夫的学习没有什么不同。巴甫洛夫的狗并不是为了获取食物而流口水,因为流口水并不能使食物变得可得。同样,桑代克的猫也不是为了逃脱和获取食物而拉绳子,它们只是重复了受谜盒中刺激控制的动作。赫尔 (1937) 表示,根本不存在有目的的行为。
Thorndike had proposed a mechanistic explanation of goal-directed behavior with his Law of Effect that “stamped in” certain Stimulus → Response connections, and Hull refined it. Where common sense would say that one of Thorndike’s cats had figured out a way to freedom and a desired bit of food, S → R learning theory said that the pleasure of getting food had simply glued together the stimuli inside the puzzle box to the pulling of the string dangling from the box’s top, so that the string-pulling became an automatic response that simply ran itself off. In effect, said Hull, Thorndikian learning was no different from Pavlovian learning. Pavlov’s dogs did not salivate in order to get food, because salivating did not cause the food to become available. Similarly, Thorndike’s cats did not pull the string in order to escape and get food, they simply repeated a movement that had come under control of the stimuli in the puzzle box. There was no such thing as purposive behavior, said Hull (1937).
托尔曼赞同詹姆斯关于意识是“目的的斗士”的观点,但他不同意这种观点,他认为目的是生命的基本事实,而非需要解释或消除的谜团(托尔曼,1925、1932、1959)。他遵循感知实在论,进一步指出目的并非我们从行为中推断出的神秘内在心理状态,而是行为中可观察到的特征。托尔曼的许多实验,包括“老鼠的‘顿悟’实验”,都是为了证实这些论断。
Tolman, agreeing with James that consciousness is a “fighter for ends,” disagreed, argued that purpose is a basic fact of life, not a mystery in need of explanation or elimination (Tolman, 1925, 1932, 1959). Following perceptual realism, he further claimed that purpose is not a mysterious inner state of mind that we infer from behavior, but an observable feature of behavior. Many of Tolman’s experiments, including “‘Insight’ in rats,” were designed to establish these claims.
图 4.5展示了迷宫。迷宫路径是一块狭窄的木板,老鼠沿着它从起始平台跑到目标平台,在那里它们可以找到食物。其中两个迷宫的木板有侧面,所以老鼠看不到它们所在的房间;第三个迷宫的木板没有墙。
Figure 4.5 shows the maze. The paths were narrow boards along which the rats ran from the starting platform to the goal platform where they found food. In two of the mazes, the boards had sides, so the rats could not see the room they were in; in the third, there were no alley walls.
首先,受试者被迫跑完所有三条路径。决定性时刻到来时,实验人员在路径2的返回点与路径1的返回点以及路径3的返回点与路径1的返回点之间设置了一个障碍物。遇到这个障碍物时,老鼠会回到选择点。它会选择哪条路线?(图4.6)
First, the participants were forced to run all three paths. The decisive moment came when the experimenters placed a barrier halfway between where the return of Path 2 met Path 1 and the return of Path 3 met Path 1. Meeting this barrier, a rat would return to the choice point. What route would it choose? (Figure 4.6).
Hull 表示,老鼠已经学会了一种习惯家族层级结构(Hull, 1934),即一组由控制刺激以不同强度引发的反应。在这种情况下,每个 R 实际上都是老鼠沿着小巷一步一步移动时产生的一系列反应。在这个层级结构中,反应的整体强度由反应链的长度决定,因此走路径 1 的强度最强,走路径 3 的强度最弱,走路径 2 的强度居中。因此,当老鼠在路径 1 的末端附近遇到障碍物时,它会退回到选择点,该点的刺激会引发下一个最强的反应链,老鼠会走路径 2,再次遇到障碍物,再次退回到选择点,这将触发走路径 3,最后参与者会到达目标箱并进食。
Hull said that the rat had learned a habit family hierarchy (Hull, 1934), that is, a set of responses provoked with varying strength by a controlling stimulus. In this case, each R is actually a chain of responses as the rat moves paw step by paw step down an alley. In this hierarchy, overall strength of response was determined by the length of the response chain, so that taking Path 1 was strongest and taking Path 3 was the weakest, with taking Path 2 having a middling value. Therefore, when the rat met the barrier near the end of Path 1, it would back up to the choice point, whose stimuli would evoke the next strongest response chain, and the rat would take Path 2, meet the barrier again, retreat again to the choice point, which would trigger taking Path 3, and finally the participant would reach the goal box and eat.
另一方面,托尔曼认为,动物并非反射性机器;相反,它们始终是目标导向的斗士,为最终目标而战。因此,在迷宫中,在某个地点找到食物,使该地点成为需要记住和追寻的目标。生物体学习迷宫的空间布局——一张认知地图(托尔曼,1948),而不仅仅是一组有序的反射。拥有了这张学习地图后,老鼠会展现出洞察力,能够看到障碍物阻挡了通过路径1和路径2到达目标的通道,并立即选择路径3。这种洞察力在托尔曼和洪齐克的第三个迷宫中被发现。
Tolman, on the other hand, believed that animals are not reflexive machines; rather, they are always goal-directed fighters for ends. Thus, in a maze, finding food in a certain spot made that spot a goal to be remembered and sought. Organisms learn the spatial layout—a cognitive map (Tolman, 1948)—of the maze, not simply a set of ordered reflexes. In possession of its learned map, a rat would show insight, able to see that the barrier blocked access to the goal via both Path 1 and Path 2 and would right away take Path 3. Such insight was found in the third of Tolman’s and Honzik’s mazes.
空间学习的进一步证据来自潜在学习的研究(Thistlethwaite,1951)。在这些实验中,老鼠穿过没有食物作为诱饵的迷宫,因此没有强化S→R链。然而,当食物被放置在迷宫中的某个位置时,经验丰富的老鼠可以立即找到食物,这表明它们在没有奖励的情况下获得了认知地图(Tolman,1948)。在人类中,Tolman、Hall和Bretnall(1932)表明,如果疼痛在迷宫中标记了通往目标的道路,它就可以像奖励一样发挥作用。Tolman几乎区分了事件的信息价值(告诉生物体它是否在做正确的事情)和情感价值(它的感受)。
Further evidence for spatial learning came in studies of latent learning (Thistlethwaite, 1951). In these experiments, rats ran through mazes that were not baited with food, so that no S → R chains were reinforced. Nevertheless, when food was placed in a location in the maze, experienced rats could immediately find their ways to it, showing that they had acquired a cognitive map in the absence of reward (Tolman, 1948). In humans, Tolman, Hall, and Bretnall (1932) showed that pain could operate like a reward if it marked the way toward a goal in a maze. Tolman came close to distinguishing the information value of an event—telling the organism whether it’s doing the right thing—from its affective value—how it feels.
“大鼠的‘洞察力’”的最后一个方面指向学习的神经科学。回想一下,实验中使用了三个迷宫。其中两个迷宫的爪子路径是迷宫被围起来,所以参与者看不到迷宫外面,也没有表现出顿悟的迹象,但行为符合 S → R 理论。只有在第三个迷宫中才表现出顿悟,老鼠可以看到迷宫所在的实验室。如果没有迷宫外的线索,前两个迷宫就无法绘制出有用的地图,所以老鼠必然会回忆起它们到达目标的步骤。有了线索,参与者就能绘制地图,并能进行顿悟。老鼠在两种情况下都成功找到了食物,这表明学习肯定不止一种,至少有 S → R 学习和空间位置学习。现代认知神经科学的一项里程碑式发现5表明,皮层下的一种叫做海马体的结构负责制作认知地图(O'Keefe & Nadel,1978,1979)。
A final aspect of “‘Insight’ in rats” points to neuroscience of learning. Recall that there were three mazes used in the experiment. In two of them, the paw paths were walled, so the participants could not see outside the maze, and they showed no signs of insight, but behaved in accord with S → R theory. Insight was shown only in the third maze, in which the rats could see the laboratory in which the maze stood. Without the extra-maze cues, in the first two mazes no useful map could be built up and so the rats were necessarily thrown back on recalling their steps to the goal. With the cues, the participants constructed maps and could consult them insightfully. That the rats succeeded under both conditions in finding the food shows that there must be more than one kind of learning, at least S → R learning and spatial location learning. One of the landmark findings in modern cognitive neuroscience5 showed that a subcortical structure called the hippocampus is responsible for making cognitive maps (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978, 1979).
在最后一节中,我们将探讨当今两种学习理论。第一种是BF·斯金纳的行为实验分析。第二种是比较心理学家发展的认知理论。
In this final section we will look at two forms of learning theory today. The first will be B. F. Skinner’s experimental analysis of behavior. The second will be cognitive theories developed by comparative psychologists.
斯金纳坚持认为实验控制是检验科学真理性的终极标准,体现在两个方面。首先,能够调整自变量并观察到行为的变化,表明你的理论主张是正确的。其次,斯金纳始终认为科学应该为社会带来实际回报,即控制人们的行为以造福人类(Skinner,1971,1986)。他批评认知科学未能做到这一点(Skinner,1985)。“分析”一词使他的研究体系秉承了将复杂事物和行为分解为各个组成部分的传统,例如物理学和化学。这使他反对将复杂现象视为其各部分之和以外的其他传统,例如格式塔心理学。“行为”一词宣誓效忠激进行为主义:不涉及有机体的内部状态。
Skinner maintained that experimental control was the ultimate test of truth in science in two ways. First, being able to tweak independent variables and see changes in behavior showed that your theoretical claims were correct. Second, Skinner always believed that science should pay off in practical returns to society, i.e., controlling peoples’ behavior for their own good (Skinner, 1971, 1986). He criticized cognitive science for not being able to do so (Skinner, 1985). The word “analysis” sets his program in the tradition of breaking complex things and behaviors into their component parts, as in physics and chemistry. It set him against traditions that see complex phenomena as more than the sum of their parts, as in Gestalt psychology. The word “behavior” pledges allegiance to radical behaviorism: There will be no reference to inner states of the organism.
斯金纳批判现有的心理学,并试图用自己的观点取而代之。他在研究生院发明的方法论——斯金纳箱(他称之为实验空间)——很快取代了大多数其他研究动物行为的方法。他对现有方法的批判至今仍具有重要意义,因为他指出了实验方法一个重要但经常被忽视的特征:你的方法的特征看似直觉的东西,实际上可能比你想象的更能控制参与者的行为。我称之为方法陷阱;格式塔心理学家也有类似的担忧。
Skinner was critical of existing psychology and sought to replace it with his own ideas. The methodology he invented in grad school, the Skinner box (he called it an experimental space), soon replaced most other way of investigating animal behavior. His critique of existing methods remains important because he pointed out an important but often overlooked feature of experimental methods, that features of your method that seem intuitive to you may control more of your participant’s behavior than you think. I call this the trap of the method; Gestalt psychologists had similar concerns.
斯金纳最初的担忧与生物学有关,主要集中在巴甫洛夫条件反射上。巴甫洛夫研究了一种固定的反射——唾液分泌,它属于一组预先存在的、进化而来的功能,这些功能专注于消化这一单一功能。斯金纳担心,巴甫洛夫的条件反射定律可能只适用于唾液分泌反射,而无法提供适用于所有物种的学习原则。斯金纳的担忧并非空穴来风,因为物种在学习方面存在差异是很常见的。例如,托尔曼和赫尔研究了老鼠学习迷宫,但它们天生就适应学习迷宫,因为它们生活在分支隧道中,因此必然擅长于穿越这些隧道。
Skinner’s first worry concerned biology and focused on Pavlovian conditioning. Pavlov studied a fixed reflex, salivation, that was part of a preexisting evolved set of functions devoted to one function, digestion. Skinner feared it was possible that Pavlov’s laws of conditioning might be true only for the salivary reflex and would not provide learning principles valid across species. Skinner’s worry was well placed, as species differences in learning are common. For example, Tolman and Hull studied rats learning mazes, but learning mazes is something they are preadapted for, because they live in, and thus must be good at, navigating branching tunnels.
另一个担忧与定义行为有关。在本例中,斯金纳的目标主要在于迷宫学习,他提出了一些在其他方面被忽视的担忧。迷宫学习中最常用的因变量是每次运行的错误次数,就像桑代克的试错学习一样。问题在于,错误是我们强加于动物的人类道德观念。什么算作“错误”?在某个特定的选择点,老鼠可能会完全走进死胡同。或者它可能会走进死胡同一小段距离。或者它可能会走进死胡同但又折了回来。或者它可能会先在入口处停顿一下再继续前进。或者它可能会放慢速度,看看小巷,但继续前进。这些都是错误吗?还是其中一些?我们如何知道?通常的答案是操作性定义,将错误定义为,例如,老鼠将50%或更多的身体(不包括尾巴)走进死胡同。但这是心理学家对自然行为而非科学观察的武断判断。最好从实验本身中消除“错误”,并排除人为判断。
Another concern had to do with defining behaviors. In this case, Skinner’s target was primarily maze learning, and he raised otherwise ignored concerns. The most frequently used dependent variable in maze learning was the number of errors made on each run, as in Thorndike’s trial and error learning. The problem is that error is a human moral concept that we impose on the animal. What counts as an “error?” At a given choice point a rat might go all the way down a blind alley. Or it might go some partial distance down the blind alley. Or it might start down the blind alley but back out. Or it might pause at the entrance before continuing. Or it might slow down, look down the alley, but keep going. Are all of these errors? Some of them? How could we know? The usual answer was operational definition, defining an error as, for example, the rat getting 50% or more of its body (not counting the tail) down a blind alley. But this is an arbitrary judgment a psychologist passes on natural behavior, not a scientific observation. It would be better to eliminate “error” from the experiment itself and leave human judgment out.
其他方法则显得人为,因为它们将连续的行为流程切割成任意的试验,从而打断了连续的行为流。我们选择何时呈现US和CS;我们决定何时完成老鼠的迷宫测试并将其放回起始盒;我们打断猫的进食并将其放回谜题盒。这样一来,我们的数据就变成了一系列离散数字,用于测量试验中的唾液滴、运行中的错误或谜题盒中的解答时间。最好在整个实验过程中对某个行为进行连续记录。
Other methods were artificial in that they interrupted the continuous flow of behavior by chopping it up into arbitrary trials. We choose when to present US and CS; we decide when a rat’s maze run is done and drop it back in the start box; we interrupt the cat’s eating and put it back in the puzzle box. Our data are then a series of discrete numbers measuring saliva drops on a trial, errors on a run, or time-to-solution in a puzzle box. It would be better to have a continuous record of a behavior during the whole course of an experiment.
综合这些要求,斯金纳希望研究不属于既存生物系统的行为学习,并在一个行为被持续记录而非评判的环境中开展研究。经过大量的反复试验(Skinner, 1959; Lattal, 2004),他提出了斯金纳箱。
Putting these requirements together, Skinner wanted to study the learning of behavior not part of a preexisting biological system, in a setting in which that behavior was recorded, not judged, continuously. After a lot of trial and error on his part (Skinner, 1959; Lattal, 2004), he came up with the Skinner box.
斯金纳箱主要有两种,一种用于大鼠,一种用于鸽子(图4.7)。这两种箱通常都由透明塑料制成,有些箱底配有电击网格,箱体大小刚好能让实验对象舒适地躺下并四处走动。箱体一侧墙上有一个可以向喂食杯中分配食物或水的弹匣、一个扬声器、一盏或多盏用于辨别刺激的灯,以及动物必须操作才能获取食物或水的操作器。用于大鼠的操作器是一个水平伸出的杠杆对鸽子来说,它是一个嵌在墙上的发光圆盘或钥匙。操作操纵器可以激活食物或水匣。对于研究人员来说,斯金纳箱的一个额外好处是无需监督。实验开始后,计算机可以记录数据并操纵刺激和奖励变量。
There are two main kinds of Skinner boxes, for rats and for pigeons (Figure 4.7). Both boxes are usually made of clear plastic, some with a shock grid on the floor, and are just large enough to hold the subject comfortably and allow it to move around. One wall contains a magazine that can dispense food or water to a feeding cup, a speaker, a light or lights for discriminative stimuli, and the manipulandum that the animal must operate to get food or water. The manipulandum for the rat is a horizontal lever sticking out of the wall; for pigeons it is a lighted disc or key set into the wall. Operation of the manipulandum activates the food or water magazine. For researchers, a side benefit of Skinner boxes is that they need no supervision. Once the experiment is underway, computers can record data and manipulate stimulus and reward variables.
除了一个例外,这些盒子都符合斯金纳的要求。动物一旦被放入盒子中,就可以自由活动,直到实验结束前都无需处理,因此无需进行单独试验。对于大鼠来说,按压杆是一种在野外不太可能发生的随意行为。对于鸽子来说,啄食发光的钥匙似乎是一种随意行为,但实际上并非如此,因为啄食是鸽子的进食方式。事实证明,啄钥匙行为中存在巴甫洛夫式的成分。即使啄食和食物递送之间没有后验关系,仅仅点亮钥匙并呈现食物也能引发啄食行为,这种现象被称为自我塑造(Rescorla, 1984)。
With one exception, these boxes met Skinner’s requirements. Once placed in the box, animals move about freely and need not be handled until an experiment is over, so that separate trials are not imposed. For the rat, bar-pressing is an arbitrary behavior unlikely to occur in the wild. In the case of the pigeon, pecking a lighted key appears to be an arbitrary behavior, but it really is not because pecking is how pigeons feed. It turns out that there is a Pavlovian component to key pecking. Simply lighting the key and presenting food recruits pecking even without a contingency between the peck and food delivery, a phenomenon known as autoshaping (Rescorla, 1984).
可以简单地将老鼠放入斯金纳箱并等待它压杆,但在实践中,实验者会逐渐将行为塑造成最终形式。塑造对于激进行为主义、行为分析的专业实践方面至关重要。实验者有一个操作食物漏斗的按钮。当老鼠探索盒子时,实验者在老鼠位于盒子饲料盒末端时将食物放入喂食盒中,然后仅当老鼠面向饲料盒时,然后仅当老鼠靠近杆时,然后将自己抬到杆上方时,老鼠自己很可能在此时第一次压杆。此时,可由计算机控制强化,而累积记录器(笔下展开的连续纸卷)会实时记录每次压杆的情况。
It’s possible to simply put a rat in a Skinner box and wait for it to press the bar, but in practice experimenters gradually shape the behavior into its terminal form. Shaping is vital to the professional practice side of radical behaviorism, behavior analysis. The experimenter has a button that operates the food hopper. As the rat explores the box, the experimenter drops food in the feeding magazine when the rat is in the magazine’s end of the box, then only when the rat is facing the magazine, then only when it gets closer to the bar, then raises itself above the bar, when the rat’s own first bar press will probably occur. At this point, reinforcements can be computer-controlled while the cumulative recorder—a continuous roll of paper unfurling under a pen—notes each bar press as it occurs in real time.
斯金纳箱也消除了迷宫中谜题盒残留的拟人化。桑代克认为,他的猫和他一样,把盒子看作一个需要逃脱的迷宫陷阱,因此,未能达到这一目的的行为是令人遗憾的错误。迷宫,同样,也提出了一个挑战,即老鼠像运动员一样“努力”缩短达到目标的时间。另一方面,在斯金纳箱中,参与者只是发现自己身处一个新环境,行为举止与平常无异,没有固定目标,因此不会犯任何“错误”。当杠铃推举后出现强化结果时,杠铃推举的频率会发生变化。理论上可以避免提及目标和努力(Skinner, 1984)。
The Skinner box also eliminates the residual anthropomorphism of puzzle boxes in mazes. Thorndike assumed that his cats saw the box as he did, a puzzling trap to escape, and thus that behaviors failing to accomplish this end were regrettable errors. Mazes, too, suggest a challenge as rats “strive” like athletes to decrease their time to goal. In the Skinner box, on the other hand, the participant simply finds itself in a new environment and behaves as it usually would with no fixed goal and thus no “errors” to commit. When the consequence of reinforcement follows a bar press, the frequency of bar pressing changes. Theoretical references to goals and striving can be avoided (Skinner, 1984).
斯金纳对学习争议的分析颇具创新性。与赫尔一样,他坚持不参考心理状态来定义行为,但与托尔曼一样,他认为反射层面或分子层面的定义并不适用。相反,他定义操作行为时,不是根据动作本身,而是根据其结果。在这种情况下,作者对语言的熟悉为他提供了很大的帮助。
Skinner’s analysis of learning controversies was innovative. Like Hull, he wanted to stick to behaviors defined without reference to mental states, but, like Tolman, he saw that reflex level, or molecular, definitions would not do. Instead, he defined operant behaviors not in terms of movements made, but in terms of what they accomplish. In this case, his writer’s familiarity with language served him well.
考虑以下行为:说出“乔治·华盛顿”、“美国第一任总统”、“约克镇战役的胜利者”;或者像我刚才那样打字;或者像以前上课那样把它们写在黑板上;或者举起一张一美元钞票,指着肖像说“他!”。这些行为涉及身体不同部位的不同肌肉运动,但显然应该将它们归为一类,因为按照传统说法,它们都指代乔治·华盛顿这个人。但斯金纳箱中的老鼠也存在类似情况。老鼠可能会用左爪按压横杆;用双爪按压;用头部侧面按压;如果绑住前爪,则用后爪按压。作为动作,这些行为各不相同,但它们是相同的,因为它们得到的是同一种东西。此外,老鼠可能会做出同样的动作来按压横杆获取食物和水,但它们不应被视为同一种反应,因为它们会受到不同后果的强化。
Consider the following behaviors: Saying “George Washington,” “The first president of the United States,” “The victor at Yorktown”; or typing these words as I just did; or writing them on a blackboard as I used to in class; or holding up a dollar bill and pointing at the portrait while saying “Him!” These behaviors involve different muscle movements of different parts of the body, but clearly they should be grouped together because they all refer, in traditional parlance, to the person George Washington. But something similar is true about a rat in a Skinner box, too. A rat might press the bar with its left paw; with both paws; with the side of its head; with its rear paw(s) should we tie up its front paws. As movements, these behaviors are different, yet they are the same because they get the same thing. In addition, a rat might make the same movement to bar press for food and to bar press for water, but they should not be counted as the same response because they are reinforced by different consequences.
斯金纳提出,任何给定的操作不应定义为一种运动或反射,而应定义为由相同辨别刺激控制并由相同结果强化的一类行为。因此,所有对华盛顿的提及尽管它们的运动地形不同,但都是同一操作,因为它们的控制刺激是相同的。老鼠为了食物而做出的所有运动地形不同的按杆动作都是同一操作,因为强化物是相同的。最后,为了食物和水而做出的运动地形相同的按杆动作属于两个不同的操作,因为它们的强化物不同。事实上,操作可以在没有任何运动的情况下发生。瘫痪的人可以学习使用连接到他们脑电波的计算机界面来操作他们环境中的设备,例如电视或炉灶(Birnbauer,2006;Ruf&Birnbauer,2012;Willett,2021 6)。
Skinner proposed that any given operant should be defined not as a movement or a reflex, but as a class of behaviors controlled by the same discriminative stimuli and reinforced by the same consequence. Thus, all the references to Washington are the same operant despite their different movement topographies because their controlling stimulus is the same. All the topographically distinct bar presses of the rat for food are the same operant because the reinforcer is the same. Finally, the topographically identical bar presses for food and water belong to two different operants because their reinforcers are different. Indeed, an operant can occur without any movements at all. Paralyzed people can learn to use computer interfaces linked to their brain waves to operate devices in their environments, such as televisions or stovetops (Birnbauer, 2006; Ruf & Birnbauer, 2012; Willett, 20216).
斯金纳方法论的最后一个方面涉及研究个体还是群体。心理学从一开始就以研究个体为特色,无论是早期实验心理学家的内省报告,还是临床心理学家的测试结果。其他新兴的社会科学,例如社会学心理学家通过收集和分析统计数据来研究群体。在理论方面,心理学家撰写了关于个体生物体实体和过程的文章,例如注意力、记忆力或学习能力。然而,随着时间的推移,尽管心理学继续对个体进行理论研究,但它收集了群体数据,并使用统计数据来比较群体结果。
A final aspect of Skinner’s methodology concerns whether to study individuals or groups. From its beginning, psychology distinguished itself by studying individual human beings, whether in introspective reports from the first experimental psychologists or the test results of clinical psychologists. Other nascent social sciences, such as sociology and economics, studied groups of people through collecting and analyzing statistics. On the theoretical side, psychologists wrote about entities and processes belonging to individual organisms, such as attention, memory, or learning. However, over time, although psychology continued to theorize about individuals, it collected group data and used statistics to compare group results.
然而,将众多参与者的行为汇总成群体平均值可能会掩盖个体行为的实际情况。例如,Voeks (1954) 研究了人类的眨眼条件反射,这通常被视为巴甫洛夫条件反射的一种形式。在这种装置中,参与者的头部被固定在一个类似眼科医生使用的框架中。US 指的是一股气流,引发参与者眨眼的 UR(重复性反应)。US 与 CS 配对,例如闪光或音调。最终,CR 会被习得。Voeks 问道,它是如何习得的,是逐渐习得的还是在一次试验中习得的?Hull 的理论认为,学习总是循序渐进的,习惯强度会随着强化次数的增加而增强。然而,其他理论认为,在习得联想的场合,联想的强度会在瞬间达到最大强度。当 Hullians 让受试者分组并绘制不同试验中 CR 的数量时,他们得到了平滑的学习曲线,该曲线逐渐增加,直到每个人都对 CS 眨眼。
However, there is a danger that aggregating the behavior of many participants into group averages may obscure what’s going on in individuals. For example, Voeks (1954) studied human eyeblink conditioning, usually treated as a form of Pavlovian conditioning. In this setup, the participant’s head is held in a framework like those used by eye doctors. The US is a puff of air that elicits a blink UR from the participant. The US is paired with a CS, such as a light flash or a tone. Eventually, a CR will be learned. Voeks asked how it’s learned, gradually or on a single trial? Hull’s theory says learning is always gradual, as habit strength builds up with number of reinforcements. However, other theories held that on occasions when associations were learned, the strength of association reached full strength in a single instant. When Hullians ran groups of subjects and plotted the number of CRs across trials, they got smooth learning curves that increased gradually until everybody was blinking to the CS.
Voeks 认为,这些学习曲线是将个体行为聚合到群体数据中造成的人为现象。在任何给定的试验中,参与者都有可能将 CS 和 US 联系起来,在试验前不给出 CR,试验后也始终给出 CR。换句话说,个体会表现出“全有或全无”的学习,而不是习得曲线。由于个体会在不同的试验中从未学习状态过渡到已学习状态,因此群体中 CR 的累积数量会缓慢上升,直到每个人都处于已学习状态。进行实验并查看每个人的数据非常简单,Voeks 发现她的分析是正确的。参与者从不给出 CR 过渡到在单次试验中每次都给出 CR。这符合 Brewer (1974) 后来提出的学习认知图景,即受试者对学习过程表现出洞察力,有意识地理解 CS 可以预测 UR,然后产生适当的行为 (Leahey, 1979)。
Voeks argued that these learning curves were artifacts caused by aggregating individual behaviors into group data. It was possible that on any given trial, there was some probability that a participant would associate CS and US, not giving the CR before that trial and never failing to give it after that trial. In other words, individuals would show all-or-nothing learning rather than a curve of acquisition. Because individuals would go from the unlearned state to the learned state on different trials, the cumulative number of CRs in the group would rise slowly until everyone was in the learned state. It was a simple matter to run an experiment and look at each person’s data, Voeks finding that her analysis was right. Participants transitioned from not giving CRs to giving them every time on a single trial. This would fit the cognitive picture of learning set out later by Brewer (1974) that subjects show insight into the procedure, consciously figuring out that CS predicts UR, and then producing the appropriate behavior (Leahey, 1979).
激进行为主义者认同沃克斯的总体结论。将个体行为归结为群体行为,可能会忽视心理学,无意中将其与其他社会科学融合。他们通常对一位或最多几位参与者进行实验,并发表个体行为的累积记录。斯金纳在其博士论文《有机体行为》(1938 年)中建立了这一模型。尽管标题暗示着对多种物种行为的调查,但该论文报告的是他用一只白鼠进行的广泛实验。在当今大数据时代,沃克斯和斯金纳的观点值得铭记。应对心理学(以及其他科学)重复性危机的一种策略是通过大幅增加研究参与者的数量来增强统计分析的有效性,但这只会让我们的注意力进一步偏离心理学的独特性:它不是一门社会科学,而是一门个人科学(Leahey,2007)。
Radical behaviorists agree with Voeks’ general conclusion. Aggregating individual behavior into group behavior risks losing sight of psychology, unwittingly melding it with the other social sciences. They typically perform their experiments on one or at most a few participants and publish individual cumulative records of individual behavior. Skinner established the model in his dissertation, Behavior of Organisms (1938). Despite the title suggesting a survey of behavior in many species, it reports his extensive experiments with one white rat. Voeks’ and Skinner’s point is important to remember in today’s era of Big Data. One strategy for dealing with the replication crisis in psychology (and other sciences) is to make statistical analysis more powerful by drastically increasing the number of participants studied, but this just draws our attention further away from psychology’s distinctiveness: It’s not a social science, but a personal science (Leahey, 2007.)
像大多数心理学家一样,斯金纳希望利用心理学来改善人类生活,激进行为主义有一个专业组织,即国际行为分析协会。7尽管斯金纳是一位实验心理学家,但他仍然致力于影响人类生活,尤其是在第二次世界大战之后。8他建造、宣传和分享了一种高科技婴儿床的计划,旨在减少母亲花在照顾婴儿上的时间(Skinner,1945 年)。他写了一本小说《瓦尔登湖 II》 ,描述了一个由受过科学训练的行为控制者管理的乌托邦(Skinner,1948 年;参见 Rutherford,2009 年)。他在《超越自由和尊严》(Skinner,1971 年)和《关于行为主义》 (Skinner,1974 年)等书中普及了行为主义,并发表了关于现代社会缺点的演讲(例如,Skinner,1986 年)。
Like most psychologists, Skinner wanted to use psychology to improve human lives, and radical behaviorism has a professional organization, the Association for Behavior Analysis International.7 Although Skinner was an experimental psychologist, he nevertheless worked to influence human life, especially after World War II.8 He built, publicized, and shared plans for a sort of high-tech crib meant to reduce the amount of time mothers had to devote to infant care (Skinner, 1945). He wrote a novel, Walden II, describing a utopia run by scientifically trained behavior controllers (Skinner, 1948; see Rutherford, 2009). He popularized behaviorism in books such as Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner, 1971) and About Behaviorism (Skinner, 1974), and he gave talks about the shortcomings of modern society (e.g., Skinner, 1986).
然而,斯金纳触及了其他科学心理学家回避的一个问题。哲学家威尔弗雷德·塞拉斯(Wilfred Sellars,1962)对人类的显性形象(即我们在日常生活中自我呈现的样子以及我们如何谈论自己)与人类的科学形象(即科学如何在科学研究的视角下构想人类)进行了颇具影响力的区分。现在应该清楚的是,这两种形象之间存在着巨大的张力,许多哲学家对此都进行了论述。一些人期待科学战胜民间心理学(例如,Dennett,1991,1996;但参见Leahey,1994;Stich,1983),他们认为民间心理学极其不准确,注定要失败。而其他人,包括塞拉斯本人,则认为这两种观点可以调和或融合(例如,Stich,1996)。少数人,尤其是塞尔(1994、1995、1997),认为科学的简化或消除是矫揉造作,且威胁甚微。不出所料,斯金纳属于第一阵营,他只承认日常常识性语言过于便捷,行为主义的语言无法将其消除。
Skinner, however, tackled one issue that other scientific psychologists avoid. Philosopher Wilfred Sellars (1962) has drawn an influential distinction between the manifest image of human beings—how we seem to ourselves and how we talk about ourselves in everyday life—and the scientific image of human beings—how science conceives of human beings under the lens of scientific research. It should be clear by now that there is enormous tension between these images, and many philosophers have written about it. Some look to a triumph of science over folk psychology (e.g., Dennett, 1991, 1996; but see Leahey, 1994; Stich, 1983), which they see as wildly inaccurate and hopelessly doomed. Others, including Sellars himself, believe the views can be reconciled or added together (e.g., Stich, 1996). A few, especially Searle (1994, 1995, 1997) view scientific reduction or elimination as pretentious and of little threat. Unsurprisingly, Skinner is in the first camp, conceding only that everyday common-sense language is too convenient to be eliminated by behaviorist speak.
斯金纳提出了一个令人震惊的论断:精神生活根本不存在。这引发了一个问题:为什么人们认为自己拥有精神生活,而实际上却没有?答案在于语言。他写道:“所有行为,无论是人类还是非人类,都是无意识的;当言语环境提供了自我观察所必需的偶然事件时,它就变成了‘有意识的’。”(斯金纳,1987,第782页)
Skinner makes the astonishing claim that there is no such thing as mental life, provoking the question why people think they have mental lives when they don’t. The answer lies in language. He writes, “All behavior, human or nonhuman is unconscious; it becomes ‘conscious’ when verbal environments provide the contingencies necessary for self-observation” (Skinner, 1987, p. 782).
斯金纳将《言语行为》(1957)视为他的杰作,书中他阐述了旨在论证上述主张的语言分析,特别是他的“语言技巧” (linguistic tact)概念。技巧旨在解决的首要问题是普遍指称,例如“猫”,而不是具体指称,例如“弗雷亚”(一只具体的猫)。指称行为主义通过刺激控制可以轻松处理细节问题。“弗雷亚”是一个由猫弗雷亚的正向辨别刺激控制的刺激。
Skinner regarded Verbal Behavior (1957) as his masterpiece, where he laid out the analysis of language meant to justify the claim above, specifically in his concept of the linguistic tact. The first problem the tact was meant to solve was the referent of universals, such as “cat,” as opposed to particulars, such as “Freya,” a particular cat. The referent of particulars could be handled easily in behaviorism with stimulus control. “Freya” is a stimulus controlled by the positive discriminative stimulus of the cat Freya.
普遍性更令人费解,因为不存在单一的物理CS+。根据源自亚里士多德的表征理论,普遍性是一种心理建构,普遍性术语可应用于此。然而,斯金纳运用了刺激控制理论,并根据个体的言语社群或文化对言语表达的塑造进行了修正。因此,孩子在猫面前说“猫”会得到差异化的强化,而在非猫面前说“猫”则不会得到强化,而是会因说“狗”或“牛”等其他操作词而得到强化。最终,“猫”会受到一类CS+的控制;我们不必说孩子已经获得了内在的“心理”概念。
Universals were more puzzling, because there is no single physical CS+. On the representational account descending from Aristotle, a universal is a mental construct to which universal terms apply. Nevertheless, Skinner applied stimulus control theory, modified by shaping of verbal utterances by a person’s verbal community, or culture. Thus, a child would be differentially reinforced for saying “cat” in the presence of cats, and not reinforced for saying “cat” in the presence of non-cats, but instead reinforced for other operants, such as “dog” or “cow.” Eventually “cat” comes under the control of a class of CS+s; we do not need to say the child has acquired an inner “mental” concept.
斯金纳运用“触觉”来解释我们对精神生活的信念。我们可以触觉——即谈论,或者用行为语言来表达——我们自己的行为和私人刺激。在触觉私人刺激的情况下,感觉它们在我们体内,加上他人无法感知它们,这创造了一种内省私人精神世界的假象,而实际上,我们只是在接触我们身体的私人内部环境。在触觉自身行为的情况下,我们实际上与外部观察者处于相同的位置,但我们被自己的民间心理学误导了。想象一下,在一个寒冷的除夕夜,你参加了一个聚会,你在主人的衣橱里戴帽子、外套和手套。主人走过来问你在做什么,你回答说:“很晚了,我要走了。”现在,主人可以从之前的事件和你的行为推断出这一点。斯金纳认为,事实上,你也在做同样的事情。你的行为是由先前的刺激(球落地)和当前刺激(你在壁橱旁)引起的,现在,在这种刺激的提示下,你触碰了自己穿上冬装的行为,并像你的主人一样发现你现在要离开了,因为过去做过这些事之后,必然会出现离开的行为。按照斯金纳的说法,只有当你触碰了这些行为的原因时,你才会意识到这些原因,但触碰本身并没有引发你的行为,它只是描述了行为的先例。
Skinner deployed the tact to explain our belief in mental life. We can tact—i.e., talk about, or in behavior-speak make verbal responses to—our own behavior and private stimuli. In the case of tacting private stimuli, the feeling that they are inside us plus the fact that others don’t sense them creates the illusion of introspection of a private mental world when, in fact, we are merely accessing the private inner environment of our body. In the case of tacting our behavior, we are really in the same position as outside observers, but we have been misled by our folk psychology. Imagine you’ve been at a party on a cold New Year’s Eve, and you are at your host’s closet putting on your hat, coat, and gloves. Your host comes by and asks what you are doing, and you reply, “It’s late and I’m leaving now.” Now your host can infer this from previous events and your behavior. Skinner argues that you, in fact, do the same thing. Your behavior has been caused by previous (the ball has dropped) and current (you are at the closet) stimuli, and now, prompted to do so, you tact your own behavior of putting on your winter gear and discover, as your host has, that you are leaving now, because doing these things in the past has been reliably followed by leaving behavior. You become conscious, in Skinner’s sense, of the causes of your behavior only when you tact them, but the tacting did not cause the behavior, it simply described its antecedents.
拥有精神生活是一种错觉,它源于我们能够用言语表达公共和私人刺激以及我们自身观察到的行为,而古代哲学家传承下来的错误民间心理学则助长了这种错觉。“有谁解释过心灵如何作用于身体,或身体如何作用于心灵?这类问题根本不应该问。”(Skinner,1987,第785页)
Having a mental life is a delusion brought about by our ability to verbalize public and private stimuli and our own observed behavior, abetted by an erroneous folk psychology descended to us from ancient philosophers. “[H]as anyone ever explained how the mind works on the body or the body on the mind? Questions of that sort should never have been asked” (Skinner, 1987, p. 785).
尽管已经提出了一些超强符号系统条件反射理论(例如,Holyoak、Koh 和 Nisbett,1989;Boddez 等人,2014),但大多数现代理论都是联想性的,经常与神经科学(Honey、Iordanova 和 Good,2014;Houwer,2011)或神经网络(Mondragón、Alonso 和 Kokkola,2017)相融合。
Although some overpowered symbol system theories of conditioning have been proposed (e.g., Holyoak, Koh, & Nisbett, 1989; Boddez et al., 2014), the majority of modern theories are associative, often blending with neuroscience (Honey, Iordanova, & Good, 2014; Houwer, 2011) or neural nets (Mondragón, Alonso, & Kokkola, 2017).
请重新查看图 4.3。
Please revisit Figure 4.3.
这张图是教科书中描述巴甫洛夫实验步骤的标准方式。然而,乍一看似乎只是视觉辅助工具的东西,却悄悄地编码了巴甫洛夫条件反射的一种特殊理论,称为刺激替代理论或反射转移理论(Holland,1984)。该理论在沃森向心理学家介绍巴甫洛夫条件反射时被应用于学习理论(Evans & Rilling,2000)。其基本思想是,通过将“刺激替代”和“反射”配对,反射会对生物体产生与“刺激”完全相同的作用:人们可以用反射替代“刺激”,而不会出现明显的行为差异,或者换句话说,反射的控制权已从“刺激替代”转移到“反射”。
This diagram is the standard way that textbooks depict Pavlov’s experimental procedure. However, what at first glance appears to be merely a visual aid quietly encodes a particular theory of Pavlovian conditioning called the stimulus substitution, or reflex transfer, theory (Holland, 1984), deployed in learning theory with Watson’s introduction of Pavlovian conditioning to psychologists (Evans & Rilling, 2000). The basic idea is that by pairing US and CS, the CS comes to act on the organism exactly as the US did: One can substitute the CS for the US with no apparent behavioral difference, or, put differently, control of the reflex has transferred from US to CS.
刺激替代理论蕴含着五个具体的经验主张。在这里,我们将讨论前四个主张,并在第九章回顾第五个主张。
Five specific empirical claims are implied by stimulus substitution. Here, we will consider the first four claims, returning to the fifth in Chapter 9.
尽管人们早就认识到刺激替代理论的问题(例如,Woodworth & Schlosberg,1954),但最重要的挑战来自认知心理学的回归。
Although problems with the stimulus substitution theory were long recognized (e.g., Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954), the most important challenges came with the return of cognitive psychology.
在生活和心理实验中,我们看到想法之间会产生联想,但它们为什么会这样呢?大卫·休谟说,联想是一种将想法联系在一起的引力,他暗示,联想之所以如此,仅仅是因为两个想法在空间和时间上彼此接近(即邻近律)。这一论断被悄悄地融入了巴甫洛夫学习的刺激替代理论。
In life and psychological experiments, we see that ideas get associated, but why do they do so? When David Hume said that association was a sort of gravity that binds ideas together, he implied that it does so simply because two ideas are close together in space and time (law of contiguity), and this claim was quietly incorporated into the stimulus substitution theory of Pavlovian learning.
一种名为“阻断” (Kamin,1968,1969)的现象引发了质疑。在阻断实验中,我们首先以常规方式制造巴甫洛夫恐惧反应,例如在大鼠身上将音调(CS)与电击(US)配对。现在假设我们回到巴甫洛夫条件反射,进一步将音调CS与电击配对,只是现在我们添加了另一个与音调一起呈现的CS,例如闪光。观察到闪光和电击连续性,就像音调和电击一直以来都是连续的一样。如果连续性理论正确,那么闪光与电击同时出现应该会使闪光产生恐惧的CS。但事实并非如此:先前和持续的第一个CS的配对会阻止与闪光形成任何关联。
A phenomenon called blocking (Kamin, 1968, 1969) raised doubts. In a blocking experiment, we first create a Pavlovian fear response in the usual way, say by pairing a tone (CS) with footshock (US) in rats. Suppose now we return to Pavlovian conditioning and further pair the tone CS with shock, only now we add another CS presented with the tone, for example, a light flash. Observe that the light flash and the shock are contiguous, just as the tone and the shock always have been. If contiguity theory is correct, presentation of the light flash with the shock should make the light flash a fear-producing CS. But it does not: Previous and continued pairing of the first CS blocks the formation of any association with the light-flash.
研究解除阻塞实验有助于我们了解究竟发生了什么。解除阻塞实验的进行方式与阻塞实验相同,直到引入第二个CS,此时US发生变化。继续我们的例子,在大鼠完成对音调的恐惧条件反射后,我们开始将音调与闪光配对,并同时进行两次电击。在这种情况下,阻塞不会发生,而闪光会产生恐惧。在一个相关实验中,大鼠首先接受对音调和电击配对的条件反射,然后引入第二个CS,对两只大鼠都进行一次电击配对。在这种情况下,阻塞同样没有发生。
Examination of unblocking experiments will help us see what is going on. An unblocking experiment proceeds just as a blocking experiment until the introduction of the second CS, when the US is changed. To continue our example, after the fear conditioning of the rat to the tone is complete, we begin to pair the tone with a light flash and with two shocks at a time. In this case blocking does not occur, and the light flash becomes fear producing. In a related experiment, rats were first conditioned with the tone to pairs of shocks, and then when the second CS was introduced, both were paired with just one shock. In this case, too, blocking did not occur.
简而言之,刺激只有在能够预测US的情况下才会成为CS。更普遍地说,生物体会根据实验的大背景来计算每个刺激相对于刺激的预测值 (Urcelaya & Miller, 2014)。在阻断实验中,闪光没有形成条件反射并成为CS,因为尽管闪光与US之间完全贴近,但它并不能帮助动物预测US,因为原始音调CS已经完美地预测了闪光。换句话说,动物学会忽略闪光,因为它对动物应对休克没有任何帮助。一个刺激要成为CS,它与US之间必须存在独特的预测性偶然性;仅有贴近性是不够的。解除阻断实验强调了偶然性的重要性。在这些实验中,第二个CS确实预测了一些新的东西,即US性质的变化。新的CS与US变化之间的偶然性有助于动物做好应对休克的准备,因此动物注意到了这种偶然性,并进行了解除阻断。巴甫洛夫条件反射并非像联想主义所认为的那样,是机械自动的过程,而是一个更为复杂的过程,涉及动物计算环境事件之间的偶然性,并学习相应的行为。关于动物学习偶然性的过程,存在许多理论,但偶然性——预测——的存在是确定无疑的(Rescorla,1988;Miller & Matzel,1989;Maes et al.,2016;Stout & Miller,2007;Urcelay & Miller,2014)。
In short, stimuli became CSs only to the extent that they predicted the US. More generally, organisms calculate the predictive value of each stimulus measured against stimuli in the larger context of the experiment (Urcelaya & Miller, 2014). In the blocking experiment, the light flash does not condition and become a CS because despite perfect contiguity between it and the US, it does not help the animal predict the US, because it is perfectly predicted already by the original tone CS. Another way to state this is to say the animal learns to ignore the light flash because it does nothing to help the animal cope with shock. For a stimulus to become a CS, there must be a unique predictive contingency between it and the US; contiguity alone is insufficient. The importance of contingency is underscored by the unblocking experiments. In them, the second CS does predict something new, a change in the nature of the US. The contingency between the new CS and the change in the US is helpful to the animal in preparing for shock, so the contingency is noted, and unblocking occurs. Pavlovian conditioning is not the mechanically automatic process associationism suggests it should be, but it is a more complex process involving the animal computing contingencies between environmental events and learning to behave accordingly. There are a number of theories about the process by which animals learn how animals learn contingencies, but the fact of contingency—prediction—is certain (Rescorla, 1988; Miller & Matzel, 1989; Maes et al., 2016; Stout & Miller, 2007; Urcelay & Miller, 2014).
我将以 Siegel 关于药物成瘾的研究(例如 Siegel,2005;2016;Siegel & Ramos,2002)为例,讨论预测观点的一般版本。
I will discuss a general version of the predictive view using as an example Siegel’s work (e.g., Siegel, 2005; 2016; Siegel & Ramos, 2002) on drug addiction.
西格尔(2016)描述了一个真实的案例:KJ,一天早上在公共卫生间被发现死亡,疑似因过量服用海洛因而亡。他是一位长期吸毒者,曾向妻子承诺戒毒。然而,KJ并未停止吸毒,为了掩盖吸毒行为,他在前一天晚上又在一个新的地方——公共卫生间注射了毒品。海洛因会代谢成吗啡,对受害者血液的检测显示,其体内的药物浓度远低于正常吸毒者通常导致过量服用的水平。此外,还排除了与其他药物和疾病的相互作用。
Siegel (2016) describes the real case of K. J., found dead one morning in a public washroom, apparently from an overdose of heroin. He was known to be a long-term user who had promised his wife to stop. However, K. J. did not, and in order to conceal his drug use, he had the previous evening shot up in a new place, the washroom. Heroin metabolizes into morphine, and assays of the victim’s blood showed that drug levels were well below those that would ordinarily cause an overdose in a regular user. Interactions with other drugs and medical conditions were also ruled out.
西格尔认为,像KJ这样的死亡可以通过将吸毒视为一种巴甫洛夫条件反射来解释。“刺激反应”(US)指的是毒品,而最初的、先天的“刺激反应”(UR)指的是由此产生的兴奋感。然而,吸毒者倾向于在熟悉的地方注射毒品,并且某些程序(例如,在手臂上绑止血带)通常会先于吸毒。这些程序会成为预测“刺激反应”(US)释放的“刺激反应”(CS)。然而,随着刺激配对的发生,身体会利用这些“刺激反应”(CS)来预测药物的释放,并启动稳态预期反应,让身体做好接受药物的准备。例如,如果一种药物会降低心率,那么当预测性刺激反应(CS)发生时,身体就会加快心率。与刺激替代理论的主张2.2相反,药物条件反射中的“刺激反应”(CR)与“刺激反应”(UR)并不相同,而是相反的。“刺激反应”为生物体提供了关于即将发生什么的预测线索,而条件反射的结果是生物体为“刺激反应”(US)的到来做好准备。在食物条件反射的情况下,CS会通过分泌唾液来告知身体为食物做好准备。巴甫洛夫本人也指出,狗会根据它们习得的预期US(美国)分泌不同形式的唾液。在药物条件反射的情况下,生物体会通过让自己进入相反的身体状态来为US产生的即将出现的异常UR(求助反应)做好准备,这样当药物到达时,UR(求助反应)和预期CR(求助反应)就会相互抵消,从而最大限度地降低药物的效果。补偿性CR解释了成瘾的累积效应:成瘾者需要增加药物摄入量——增加UR输入——来克服习得的补偿性CR。
Siegel argues that deaths such as K. J.’s can be explained by treating drug use as a form of Pavlovian conditioning. The US is the drug and the initial, innate UR is the resulting high. However, drug addicts tend to shoot up in familiar places and certain procedures (e.g., putting a tourniquet on the arm) regularly precede drug administration. These become CSs that predict delivery of the US. However, as pairings occur, the body uses the CSs to predict delivery of the drug, and homeostatic anticipatory responses kick in to prepare the body for the drug. So, for example, if a drug depresses heart rate, the body will increase the heart rate when predictive CS occurs. In contrast to claim 2.2 of the stimulus substitution theory, the CR in drug conditioning is not the same as the UR, but its opposite. CSs provide predictive cues to an organism about what will happen, and the result of conditioning is that the organism prepares for the arrival of the US. In the case of food conditioning, the CS tells the body to prepare for food by salivating. Pavlov himself noted that dogs would produce different forms of saliva depending on what US they had learned to anticipate. In the case of drug conditioning, the organism prepares for the looming abnormal URs produced by the US by throwing itself into the opposite bodily state so when the drug arrives the UR and the anticipatory CR cancel out, minimizing the effect of the drug. The compensatory CR explains the cumulative effect of addiction: The addict needs increased drug consumption—increased UR input—to overcome the learned compensatory CR.
KJ 为何会死?西格尔写道:“KJ 在 1 月 29 日注射的药物或剂量本身并没有什么不寻常之处。不寻常的是当时的环境很新奇。”(第 377 页)KJ 那天晚上不是在家里注射,而是在公共厕所注射。因此,药物(US)注射之前没有出现通常的 CS,因此没有发生预期的 CR。KJ 的身体当时变成了一个对海洛因毫无准备的新手吸毒者的身体,他死于在通常情况下不会致命的 US 剂量。与刺激替代理论的主张 2.1(CS 是 CR 的唯一决定因素)相反,决定 CR 的是整体刺激环境。他肯定戴上了止血带并进行了其他海洛因使用者行为,这些行为也属于 CS,但发生在其通常环境之外,预期的 CR 没有发生。同样,即使是像消退这样看似简单的现象也会受到环境的影响。如果我们在一个房间里对动物进行条件反射训练,在另一个房间里消除该反应,然后立即返回第一个房间并呈现 CS,则 CR 会再次出现,就好像从未消失过一样(Bouton,1991)。
Why did K. J. die? Siegel writes, “There was nothing unusual about the drug or the dose that K.J. administered on January 29. What was unusual was the novelty of the setting” (p. 377). Instead of shooting up at home, K. J. shot up that night in the public washroom. Drug (US) delivery was thus not preceded by the usual CSs, and so no preparatory CR occurred. K. J.’s body was thus at that time turned into that of a novice drug user unprepared for heroin, and he died of a US dose that would not, in his usual context, be fatal. Contrary to claim 2.1 of stimulus substitution theory, that the CS is the sole determiner of the CR, it is overall stimulus context that determines the CR. He must have put on the tourniquet and done other heroin user behaviors, and these were CSs, but occurring outside their usual context, the anticipatory CR did not occur. Similarly, even a seemingly simple phenomenon such as extinction can be affected by context. If we condition an animal in one room, extinguish the response in a different one, and immediately return to the first room and present the CS the CR comes back as if never extinguished (Bouton, 1991).
这里我们又举了一个例子来说明程序陷阱。在巴甫洛夫条件反射中,我们实验者知道CS是什么,因为我们选择了它,并且操纵了它。然而,让我们从巴甫洛夫实验室里的狗的角度来看待这个问题。你刚刚进入一个陌生的房间,里面充满了新的景象、声音和气味。获取食物等生物学上重要的事件偶尔会发生,知道它们何时发生会很有用。有些刺激,比如墙壁的颜色和灯光的位置,不会改变,不会预测你何时会得到食物。最终你会发现,只要你听到某个音调,你就会得到食物。就是这样!用信息处理术语来说,你会弄清楚哪些刺激不会改变你预测我们的行为,哪些行为确实会做出反应,而你学会了独自应对这些行为。但心理学家可能很难理解这一点,因为我们对自己的行为有着完整而常规的认知,而这些认知会逐渐淡出,变成内隐的。
We have here another example of the trap of the procedure. In Pavlovian conditioning, we experimenters know what the CS is because we have chosen it and we manipulate it. However, take the dog’s perspective in Pavlov’s lab. You’ve just entered a strange room full of new sights and sounds and smells. Biologically important events such as getting food occur occasionally, and it would be useful to know when they might happen. Some stimuli, such as the color of the walls and the placement of lights, don’t change, don’t predict when you’ll get fed. Eventually you figure out that just after you hear a certain tone, you get food. That’s it! In information processing terms you figure out what stimuli don’t predict USs and which do, and you learn to respond to them alone. But it can be hard for psychologists to appreciate this because we have complete and routine knowledge of what we’re doing, and this knowledge fades into the background and becomes implicit.
从学习过程的角度思考成瘾,可以提出一种简单的成瘾治疗方法:行为矫正。西格尔从巴甫洛夫的角度出发,建议通过呈现不带 UR 的信号 CS 来消除成瘾的 CR。例如,要治疗酒精成瘾,可以带患者去附近的酒吧喝苏打水。操作性技术也可用于应急管理,经过数十年的研究,这些技术已被证明非常有效(NIDA,2020 年;Roll、McPherson 和 McDonell,2021 年)。参加使用该技术的戒毒康复计划的成瘾者,在提供干净尿液样本后将获得有条件的报酬。不幸的是,在美国,此类计划违反了禁止患者从治疗计划中获得“回扣”的联邦法律。加利福尼亚州于 2021 年成为第一个批准应急管理的州。9
Thinking of addiction in terms of learning processes suggests a straightforward approach to treating addiction: Behavior modification. Taking a Pavlovian perspective, Siegel recommends extinguishing the addictive CRs by presenting the signaling CSs without the UR. For example, to treat alcohol addiction, take the patient to the neighborhood bar and drink club soda. Operant techniques can also be used, in contingency management, which have proved to be highly effective (NIDA, 2020; Roll, McPherson, & McDonell, 2021) after decades of research. Addicts enrolled in drug rehabilitation programs using it are paid contingently on producing clean urine samples. Unfortunately, such programs in the United States run up against federal laws against patients getting “kickbacks” from treatment programs. California became the first state to approve contingency management in 2021.9
在心智的双系统信息处理模型中,基本学习过程处于什么位置?由于动物会进行条件反射,而条件反射又可以用联想过程(系统1功能的主要动力)来解释,因此人们可能会认为,动物或人类的条件反射必然(或许完全)由该系统完成。自桑代克时代起,大多数行为主义者就相信强化刺激的自动作用。正如桑代克所说,奖励和惩罚只是促使或抑制其后的反应。参与者无需意识到自身行为与其后果之间的联系,也无需意识到“我们”和“我们”的规律配对,条件反射便会发生。强化刺激对行为的影响被认为是直接、自动的,无需经过思考,即使在人类中也是如此(Postman & Sassenrath,1961)。因此,在行为主义者看来,一个人的心理状态与行为完全无关。参与者可能已经或可能没有弄清楚强化的后效性,但这并不重要。
What is the place of basic learning processes in the two-system information-processing model of the mind? Because animals condition, and because conditioning may be explained by associative processes—the mainspring of System 1 functioning—one might think that conditioning in animals or humans must be carried out, perhaps exclusively, by that system. From the time of Thorndike, most behaviorists believed in the automatic action of reinforcers. As Thorndike put it, reward and punishment simply stamp in or stamp out the responses they follow. A participant does not have to be aware of the connection between one’s behavior and its consequences, or of the regular pairing of US and CS, for conditioning to occur. The effect of reinforcers on behavior held to be direct and automatic, unmediated by thought, even in humans (Postman & Sassenrath, 1961). In the behaviorist view, then, the mental state of a person is simply irrelevant to behavior. A participant may or may not have worked out the contingencies of reinforcement, but it does not matter.
然而,Brewer (1974) 认为,强化刺激的自动作用应用于人类过于简单。如果我们对人们的某些活动进行奖励,或者将“自发性行为”(USs)和“自发性行为”(CSs)配对,他们的行为就会改变。Brewer 认为,当参与者学习到某些东西或“条件”时,实际上发生的是参与者弄清楚了实验中发生了什么,然后采取了适当的行动。因此,从认知的角度来看,在一个人的“条件”过程中发生变化的是参与者的意识心理状态,而行为的改变是因为参与者“解决”了实验难题。因此,应该可以通过直接操纵参与者的心理状态来创造和消除CR和工具性反应,而无需实际进行任何条件反射。或者,应该可以通过欺骗人们,让他们对实验的真实情况一无所知,从而避免条件反射。一般而言,认知假说认为,在调节行为方面,对环境的信念比实际环境更为重要。
Brewer (1974), however, argued that the automatic action of reinforcers was simplistic applied to humans. If we reward people for some activity, or pair USs and CSs, their behavior changes. Brewer contended that when a participant learns something, or “conditions,” what really happens is that the participant figures out what’s going on in the experiment and then acts appropriately. In a cognitive view, then, what changes during a person’s “conditioning” is the participants’ conscious mental states, with behavior changing because the participant has “solved” the experimental puzzle. Therefore, it should be possible to create and extinguish CRs and instrumental responses by directly manipulating participants’ mental states, without actually doing any conditioning. Or it should be possible to fool people about what’s really going on in an experiment so that they do not condition. In general, the cognitive hypothesis maintains that beliefs about the environment are more important in regulating behavior than the actual environment.
为了支持他的论点,Brewer(1974)回顾了200多项研究,这些研究分别检验了强化物观点与认知观点的自动作用,结果普遍发现,行为主义理论从未得到支持,尽管几乎所有被审查的研究都发生在行为主义时代!他的论文引发了一场关于人类意识在学习中作用的持续争论(例如,Greenwald & Houwer,2017;McLaren 等人,2019;Weidemann、Satkunarajah & Lovibond,2016)。为了阐明关于这场争论的发现,我们将举两个例子。
To support his argument, Brewer (1974) reviewed over 200 studies testing the automatic action of the reinforcers view against the cognitive view, universally finding that the behaviorist theory was never supported, even though almost all the reviewed studies took place during the behaviorist era! His paper set off a continuing debate about the role of human consciousness in learning (e.g., Greenwald & Houwer, 2017; McLaren et al., 2019; Weidemann, Satkunarajah, & Lovibond, 2016). To illustrate the findings on this dispute we will take two examples.
作为巴甫洛夫条件反射的一个例子,我们将考虑条件反射,即皮肤电反应 (EDR),以前称为皮肤电反应 (GSR)。当你受到惊吓或兴奋时,你会出汗,从而改变皮肤导电的能力;测谎仪利用这一事实,据称可以检测到伴随说谎压力而来的身体兴奋。电击会产生 EDR 反应,我们可以将音调 (CS) 与电击 (US) 配对,以形成条件性 EDR。如果我们只是告诉参与者,当他们听到音调时会受到电击,而他们根本不会这样做,会怎么样?结果是参与者获得了条件性 EDR。另一方面,已经形成条件反射的参与者在被告知电击不会再遵循 CS 时表现出立即的消退,至少在那些相信我们的参与者中是这样;然而,许多参与者并不相信。遵循通常的条件反射程序,然后询问参与者是否弄清楚了 CS-US 连接的研究发现,只有那些弄清楚了连接的人才表现出任何条件反射(Davey,1987)。
As an example of Pavlovian conditioning, we will consider conditioning the electrodermal response (EDR), formerly called the galvanic skin response (GSR). When you are frightened or aroused, you sweat, changing the ability of your skin to conduct electricity; lie detectors use this fact to allegedly detect the bodily arousal that should accompany the stress of lying. Electric shock produces the EDR response, and we can pair a tone (CS) with the shock (US) to condition a conditional EDR. What if we simply tell participants that when they hear the tone, they will be shocked, without ever doing it? The result is that participants acquire a conditional EDR. On the other hand, already conditioned participants who are told the shocks will no longer follow the CS show immediate extinction, at least in those participants who believe us; however, many don’t. Studies that follow the usual conditioning procedures and then ask the participants if they figured out the CS-US connection found that only those who had figured out the connection displayed any conditioning (Davey, 1987).
作为运动学习的一个例子,我们将选择手指收回条件反射。在这种实验中,参与者将手指掌心朝下放在电极上。发出一个音调,参与者受到电击,他们很快就会学会避开电击。手指收回条件反射的参与者被指令愚弄了。在我们用常规方法对他们进行条件反射之后,假设我们将他们的手翻过来并呈现音调?他们会收回手指,做出与他们所学动作相反的运动反应,还是会像之前一样移动手指,将手指压入电极?大约75%的参与者会做出新的屈曲反应,将手指从电极上移开,5%的参与者会将手指压入电极,而20%的参与者则不会做出任何反应。
As an example of motor learning, we will select finger-withdrawal conditioning. In this kind of experiment, participants rest their fingers, palm down, on an electrode. A tone is sounded, and participants are shocked, and they soon learn to avoid it. Participants in finger-withdrawal conditioning have been fooled by instructions. After we condition them by ordinary means, suppose we turn their hand over and present the tone? Will they withdraw their finger, making the opposite motor response from what they had learned, or will they move their finger in the same way as before, pressing their finger into the electrode? About 75 percent make the new flexion response that gets their finger off the electrode, 5 percent press their fingers into the electrode, and 20 percent make no response.
基于这一既定结论,让我们设想一个实验,其中参与者的信念被操纵。一组人接受上述程序。另一组人接受同样的条件反射,但被告知他们应该学习一种特定的肌肉运动——将手指向上收回,手掌向下。最后,最后一组人也接受了条件反射,但在实验的后半段,他们被欺骗了。关于电极的位置,这样在试图避免电击时,他们实际上会用手指按压电极。第一组,也就是标准组,得到了通常的结果。在被告知学习简单肌肉反射的组中,只有大约三分之一的人在实验的第二部分中做出了远离电极的反应。第三组将所有反应都放在电极上。参与者认为实验者希望他们做的事情通常比实际受到电击更有力。
With this established finding in mind, let us consider an experiment in which participants’ beliefs are manipulated. One group is put through the above procedure. Another group receives the same conditioning but is told that what they are expected to learn is a particular muscle movement—withdrawing the finger up, with palm down. Finally, the last group is conditioned, but in the second half of the experiment they are lied to about the location of the electrode, so that in trying to avoid the shock they will actually be pressing their finger into the electrode. The first, or standard, group produced the usual results. In the group told they were learning a simple muscle reflex, only about one-third gave responses away from the electrode in the second part of the experiment. The third group gave all their responses into the electrode. What participants think the experimenter wants them to do is generally more powerful than actually getting shocked.
这项研究中常见的发现模式——即意识对CS和CR之间或操作与结果之间的偶然性认知——是人类条件反射的必要条件(Mertens & Engelhard, 2020; Skora, Yeomans, Crombag & Scott, 2021),从双系统视角来看(McLaren et al., 2019),这令人费解。人们通常认为条件反射可以像动物一样自动发生,并且必要时或许可以被意识思维所取代。例如,Hanley & Garland (2019) 发现正念训练可以改变巴甫洛夫学习的进程和结果,为克服恐惧症等疾病提供了一种临床工具。正如科学家们常说的那样,还需要更多研究。
The usual pattern of findings in this research—that consciousness awareness of the contingency between CS and CR or between operant and consequence—is required for human conditioning (Mertens & Engelhard, 2020; Skora, Yeomans, Crombag & Scott, 2021) is puzzling from the two-system picture (McLaren et al., 2019). One would expect that conditioning can take place automatically, as in animals, and that perhaps it can be overridden by conscious thought if necessary. For example, Hanley & Garland (2019) found that mindfulness training could alter the course and outcome of Pavlovian learning, offering a clinical tool for overcoming disorders such as phobias. As scientists always say, more research is needed.
我们追踪了行为理论的发展,以及它为认知科学提出的至今仍活跃的理论问题,尽管早期的理论家主要研究的是动物行为。现在我们来谈谈信息处理认知科学的研究。尽管信息处理理论是新兴的——它用计算机来比喻人类——但我们会发现,随着新问题的出现,相同的理论问题依然存在。
We have tracked the development of behavioral theory and the still active theoretical issues it raises for cognitive science, even though the older theorists primarily investigated animal behavior. Now we turn to the study of information processing cognitive science. Although information processing theory is new—its metaphor for the human is the computer—we will find the same theoretical problems remain as new ones are added.
虽然激进行为主义作为认知科学理论并不令人满意,但应用行为分析为改变行为提供了有效的工具包。我们已经了解了两个重要的观点,即有机体总是对的,以及你必须从有机体的行为开始。第三个是强化相对论,非正式地称为普雷马克原理(Premack,1965)。它是强化思维重要转变的一部分。在 SR 学习理论中,强化物被认为是与身体需求相关的东西,例如食物——饥饿或水——口渴。然而,在新的概念中,强化物是活动:吃是强化物,而不是食物;喝是强化物,而不是水。此外,强化行为不一定与生物驱动力有关。这种变化具有重要的理论和实践意义(Baum,2012)。
While radical behaviorism is unsatisfactory as a theory in cognitive science, applied behavior analysis provides an effective toolkit for changing behavior. We’ve already met two important ideas, that the organism is always right and that you must begin with the behaviors the organism has. A third is the relativity of reinforcers, known informally as the Premack Principle (Premack, 1965). It is part of an important shift in thinking about reinforcement. In S-R theories of learning, reinforcers were thought of as things tied to physical needs, such as food – hunger or water – thirst. However, in the new conception, reinforcers are activities: eating is the reinforcer, not food; drinking is the reinforcer, not water. Moreover, reinforcing behaviors are not necessarily tied to biological drives. This change has important theoretical and practical implications (Baum, 2012).
如果我们仅仅观察动物或人在其自然环境中的自发行为,我们就会发现某些活动比其他活动进行得更频繁。如果我们将这些活动绘制成图表,我们就可以为任何生物体建立一个从最多做到最少做的活动的层次结构。经济学家在 RCT 中将这些称为偏好层次结构,但斯金纳主义者不喜欢心理主义术语。普雷马克原理认为,对于任何两项活动,我们可以通过让更受欢迎行为的执行取决于其表现来增加较不受欢迎行为的频率。例如,在斯金纳箱实验开始时,我们让进食取决于按压杆。或者,我们可以让进食取决于向左转圈。
If we simply observe an animal or person spontaneously behaving in its natural environment, we will see that some activities are performed more frequently than others. If we chart these, for any individual organism we can establish a hierarchy of activities from most done to least done. Economists call these preference hierarchies in RCT, but Skinnerians don’t like mentalistic terms. The Premack Principle says that for any two activities, we can increase the frequency of a less preferred behavior by making access to a more preferred behavior contingent on its performance. For example, at the beginning of an experiment in a Skinner box, we make eating contingent on bar-pressing. Or we could make eating contingent on turning circles to the left.
这一修正观点的第一个重要含义是扩展了强化刺激的种类。老鼠在活动轮中会自发奔跑,因此我们可以将进入活动轮的条件设定为按下杆子打开轮子的门。第二个含义是,个体的偏好层次存在差异,因此没有放之四海而皆准的强化模式。例如,老师会发现有些学生喜欢安静地阅读而不是参加体育运动,而有些学生则相反。我们可以将阅读时间设定为玩耍时间,从而提高阅读者的积极性,而对于运动爱好者则相反(例如,参见 Geiger,1996)。
The first important implication of this revised view is expanding the kit of reinforcers. Rats run spontaneously in their activity wheels, so we could make access to the wheel contingent on bar-pressing to open a door to the wheel. The second implication is that there are individual differences in preference hierarchies, so there is no one-size-fits-all template of reinforcement. For example, teachers will find students who prefer reading quietly to participating in sports, and others for whom the opposite is true. One can get the reader more active by making reading time contingent on play, and the reverse for the sports enthusiast (see e.g., Geiger, 1996).
我在物理康复期间对自己进行了行为分析。正如我之前提到的,站立比行走更难(对我来说,也更痛苦)。然而,我的治疗师希望按照逻辑顺序教授技能,先站立,再行走。所以,我和治疗师达成了一项协议(并试图传达行为方面的见解):如果我尝试(塑形)站立,他们就会把我拉起来,让我走几步(强化),随着站立能力的提高,我会走更多路。现在我又能站起来了,我仍然把散步作为强化物。
I applied behavior analysis to myself during physical rehab. As I mentioned before, standing up is harder (and for me then, much more painful) than walking. However, my therapists wanted to teach skills in the logical sequence, standing before walking. So, I made a deal (and tried to pass along behavioral insights): If I tried a bit (shaping) to stand, they’d then haul me up and let me walk some steps (reinforcement), with more walking as standing improved. Now that I’m on my feet again, I still use taking a walk as a reinforcer.
关于应用行为方法的书籍有很多,但最有趣的是艾米·萨瑟兰的《沙姆教给我的人生、爱情和婚姻:动物及其训练师给人类的启示》(纽约:兰登书屋,2006年)。最初,她只是在《纽约时报》上发表一篇关于海洋世界动物训练的文章,并将它应用到丈夫身上,这让她一夜成名,并签下了书籍合同和电影合约(据我所知,这份合约从未兑现)。
There are lots of books on applied behavior methods, but the most fun is Amy Sutherland’s What Shamu Taught Me about Life, Love, and Marriage: Lessons for People from Animals and Their Trainers. (New York: Random House, 2006). What started out as a New York Times piece on Sea World animal training that she applied to her husband led to media stardom, a book deal, and a movie contract (never fulfilled as far as I can tell).
《心理学史的进展》中有一个关于巴甫洛夫条件反射的俄罗斯汇编电影的链接:https://ahp.apps01.yorku.ca/2010/02/pavlovian-conditioning-on-film-2/。
Advances in the History of Psychology has a link to a Russian-assembled film on Pavlovian conditioning: https://ahp.apps01.yorku.ca/2010/02/pavlovian-conditioning-on-film-2/.
行为分析师推荐了一些电影:https://www.appliedbehavioranalysisprograms.com/lists/5-great-movies-for-applied-behavior-analysts/。
Behavior analysts have a short list of recommended movies: https://www.appliedbehavioranalysisprograms.com/lists/5-great-movies-for-applied-behavior-analysts/.
《办公室》第三季第15集(https://www.nbc.com/the-office/video/jims-pavlovian-prank-on-dwight-the-office/4141507 )中有一幕,将自己描述为巴甫洛夫条件反射练习,但其呈现方式具有误导性。尝试识别US、CS、UR和CR,但要小心!同时,还有未言明的操作性学习在进行。操作性学习总是存在的:经过几天的条件反射训练后,当巴甫洛夫的狗早上从睡笼中被释放出来时,它们会急切地跑到走廊尽头的实验室,跳上设备,准备接受强化。识别《办公室》场景中操作性学习的元素。
A sequence in season 3, episode 15 of The Office (https://www.nbc.com/the-office/video/jims-pavlovian-prank-on-dwight-the-office/4141507) presents itself as an exercise in Pavlovian conditioning, but its presentation is misleading. Try to identify the US, CS, UR, and CR, but be careful! There’s also—unspoken—operant learning going on at the same time. There always is: After a few days of conditioning, when Pavlov’s dogs were released from their sleeping cages in the morning, they eagerly ran down the hall to the lab and jumped onto the equipment, ready to be reinforced. Identify the elements of operant learning in The Office scenario.
内容
Contents
The Idea of Information Processing
The Modal Model of the Human Information Processing System
Types of Information Processing
Automatic vs. Controlled Processing
Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Processing
Sensory Memory: Meeting the World
Characteristics of Sensory Memory
Pattern Recognition: What Are We Looking at and Why Are We Looking at It?
Investigating Pattern Recognition
Neural Networks and Neuroscience
“Deep Learning” in Neural Networks
Attention: Deciding What’s Important
Cognitive Blindness: Perils of Focus
Predictive Processing: The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
Where Do Priors Come from? I. Evolution
Where Do Priors Come from? II. Concepts
The Bottleneck of Consciousness: Short-Term Memory
Characteristics of Short-Term Memory
From STM to WM: Working Memory as Gateway to LTM and as Mahout
信息处理认知心理学实际上始于乌尔里克·奈瑟(Ulric Neisser)的《认知心理学》(1967)。他采用了一种松散的计算机思维比喻,并用它来组织和解释现有的研究,主要是在视觉感知领域。他对记忆或更高级的心理过程几乎没有论述。本章将涵盖类似的内容。我们将追溯认知处理的最初阶段,从感觉到现在被称为工作记忆(以前称为短期记忆)的记忆。下一章将从工作记忆开始,然后探讨长期记忆的形式。我们的主题是感官体验如何转化为意识。
Information-processing cognitive psychology effectively began with Ulric Neisser’s Cognitive Psychology (1967). He adopted a loose computer metaphor of the mind and used it to organize and explain existing research, mostly in the domain of visual perception. He had little to nothing to say about memory or the higher mental processes. This chapter will cover similar ground. We will trace the first stages of cognitive processing from sensation through what’s now called working (formerly, short-term) memory. The next chapter will begin with working memory and then explore forms of long-term memory. Our theme will be how sensory experience becomes conscious.
第二章区分了串行和并行信息处理。长期以来,正如奈瑟尔的观点,串行处理主导了认知心理学和人工智能,直到联结主义的复兴。串行处理认知模型占据主导地位的一个重要原因是,意识是一个串行处理器,每次计算一步,我们很容易像亚里士多德那样,将感知视为一个串行过程,从受体对刺激的感知、早期感知(特殊感官)到意识中对物体的识别(常识),再到直接的想象存储和记忆。图5.1展示了最常被引用的“模态模型”的示意图。(Baddeley、Hitch & Allen,2019)信息处理理论(Atkinson and Shiffrin,1968、1971)在许多方面与亚里士多德的理论相似。
Chapter 2 distinguished between serial and parallel information processing. For a long time, as in Neisser, serial processing dominated both cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence until the revival of connectionism. An important reason for the dominance of serial processing models of cognition is that consciousness is a serial processor, computing one step at a time, and it’s easy to think of perception as a serial process, as Aristotle did, moving from sensation of stimuli by receptors, early perception (the special senses), and recognition of objects in consciousness (common sense) to immediate imaginal storage to memory. Figure 5.1 shows a diagram from the most cited, “modal model” (Baddeley, Hitch, & Allen, 2019), of information processing (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968, 1971), which in many ways resembles Aristotle’s.
虽然这个模型如今已过时,但它仍然提供了一个有用的起点。它直观易懂,而且写作和教学必然是连续进行的。因此,我们将以此图的结构来指导我们的讨论,尽管最终我们会发现,并行处理是人类思维的常态,而非例外。
Although this model is now dated, it nevertheless provides a useful place to start. It’s intuitive, and, moreover, writing and teaching are necessarily serial enterprises. Thus, we will use this figure’s structure to guide our discussion, although by the end we will see that parallel processing is the rule in the human mind, not the exception.
在我们继续之前,您应该观看以下视频,其中演示了一种称为“注意力盲视”的现象:
Before we proceed, you should watch the following videos demonstrating a phenomenon called inattentional blindness:
让我们首先来看看 Marr 提出的两个用于研究早期信息处理的认知层面框架。这些框架并非关于心智如何从刺激到意识处理信息的实际理论,而是用于构建理论的框架:心智需要解决哪些适应性问题?哪些方法可以算作解决这些问题的充分和/或最佳方法?人类或人工智能心智需要哪些认知资源?这些框架还具有其他优势,可以应用于认知科学的其他领域,例如思维和决策。
Let’s begin by looking at two Marr cognitive-level frameworks for studying early information processing. These are not theories about how the mind actually processes information from stimulus to consciousness, but frameworks for building theories: What adaptive problem does the mind have to solve? What might count as adequate and/or optimal ways of solving these problems? What cognitive resources does the human or AI mind need? These frameworks have the additional virtue of applying in other areas of cognitive science, such as thinking and decision making.
感知的透镜模型由匈牙利心理学家埃贡·布伦斯维克(Egon Brunswik,1903-1955)提出,他曾与托尔曼(Tolman)合作(Leary,1987)。他的模型概括了感知的表征理论。布伦斯维克(Brunswick,1952)提出,感知涉及根据环境中物体(感知的远端物体)提供的近端线索构建内部表征(感知的近端物体)。感知的成功取决于近端物体与远端物体的匹配程度(图5.2)。
The lens model of perception was developed by Egon Brunswik (1903–1955), a Hungarian psychologist who worked with Tolman (Leary, 1987). His model adumbrates the representational theory of perception. Brunswick (1952) proposed that perception involved constructing an internal representation (the proximate object of perception) from proximal cues supplied by the object in the environment (the distal object of perception). Perception succeeds to the extent that the proximate object matches the distal object (Figure 5.2).
在透镜模型中,感知是信息整合这一更广泛的认知过程的一个实例。就像凶杀案调查中的侦探一样,我们掌握着一组离散的事实,必须判断哪些相关、哪些不相关、哪些最重要,并解析模棱两可的线索,等等,直到它们指向凶手。
In the lens model, perception is an instance of a broader set of cognitive processes called information integration. Like a detective in a murder investigation, we find ourselves in possession of a discrete set of facts and must decide which are relevant and which are not, which are most important, resolve ambiguous clues, and so on until they point to the killer.
我们的另一个框架,信号检测理论(SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Wickens, 2002),则持不同观点。它既不涉及表征哲学,也不涉及实在论哲学,而是将感知视为基于经验的判断,而非构建世界图景的过程。就我们的目的而言,信号检测理论最重要的一点在于它将行动融入了感知图景。感知并不会随着近端对象的创建而结束,而是在我们根据已得出的结论采取行动时继续进行。根据线索,我们得出结论,是罗科杀死了弗内博恩。说出他的名字会有什么后果?如果他有罪呢?如果他无辜呢?我们或许确信他有罪,但我们应该审判他吗?
Our other framework, signal detection theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Wickens, 2002), takes a different view. It doesn’t implicate either representational or realist philosophies of perception, seeing perception as a judgment passed on experience rather than a process of building up a picture of the world. For our purposes what’s most important about signal detection theory is that it incorporates action into its picture of perception. Perception does not end with the creation of the proximal object but continues as we act on the conclusion we have reached. From clues we conclude that Rocco killed Fonebone. What are the consequences of naming him? What if he is guilty? What if he is innocent? We may be convinced he is guilty, but should we put him on trial?
声纳探测(SDT)的典型案例是声纳操作员,就像电影《猎杀红色十月》中描述的那样。声纳操作员通过拖曳式麦克风阵列聆听海面的声音,听到各种各样的声音,但其中只有一种可能很重要:敌方潜艇的声音。操作员的工作是在海洋背景噪音中判断是否存在潜艇信号(图5.3)。
The paradigm case of SDT is a sonar operator, as depicted in movies such as Hunt for Red October. The sonar operator listens to the sounds of the sea transmitted to him by a towed array of microphones, hearing a myriad of noises, only one of which might be important: The sound of an enemy submarine. The operator’s job is to determine if there is the presence of a submarine signal against the background noise of the ocean (Figure 5.3).
与感知的哲学理论不同,SDT 是由工程师开发的,它考虑了得出有信号或没有信号的结论的后果。有四种可能的结果:有信号时检测到信号;没有信号时“检测到”信号;有信号时未检测到信号;没有信号时未“检测到”信号。图 5.4总结了这些情况,并为我们假设的潜艇狩猎场景做了注释。图中单元格中的垂直线表示条件概率,例如 P(Y|N) 表示当只有噪声存在时说“是”的概率,而 P(Y|SN) 表示在信号和噪声同时存在的情况下说“是”的概率。完美的声纳操作员将具有以下接收器操作特性(ROC):P(Y|N) = 0(误报);P(Y|S) = 1(命中); P(N|N) = 1(正确拒绝),P(N|SN) = 0(未通过)。
Unlike philosophical theories of perception, SDT was developed by engineers, and it considers the consequences of concluding there is a signal or there isn’t a signal. There are four possible outcomes: Detecting a signal when there is one; “detecting” a signal when there isn’t one; failing to detect a signal when there is one; and not “detecting” a signal when there isn’t one. These cases are summarized in Figure 5.4, glossed for our hypothetical submarine-hunting scenario. The vertical lines in the cells of the figure indicate conditional probabilities, e.g., P(Y|N) means the probability of saying yes when only noise is present, and P(Y|SN) means the probability of saying yes given that signal and noise are both present. A perfect sonar operator would have the following receiver-operating characteristics (ROC): P(Y|N) = 0 (false alarm); P(Y|S) = 1 (hit); P(N|N) = 1 (correct rejection), and P(N|SN) = 0 (miss).
在SDT的框架下,有两个因素决定了感知过程的结果。第一个因素是d',即敏感度,它与确定刺激是否存在的难度有关;第二个因素是标准设定,它与感知者给出正确答案的重要性有关。
Given the framework of SDT, two considerations determine the outcome of perceptual processes. The first, d’ or sensitivity, concerns the difficulty of determining whether or not a stimulus is present, and the second, criterion setting, concerns how important it is that the perceiver give the right answer.
在某些情况下,信号在背景噪声中并不突出(图 5.5)。
In some cases, a signal does not stand out well against background noise (Figure 5.5).
想象一下,你有个朋友跑马拉松,他请你为他加油,让他参加一场金刚主题的马拉松。你应该为谁加油,或者给谁倒水?在一群穿着大猩猩服的跑步者(噪音)中找出你的朋友(信号)可不是件容易的事。
Imagine that you have a friend who runs marathons, and he asks you to root for him in a King Kong–themed marathon. Who should you root for or give water to? Picking out your friend (signal) among all the gorilla-suited runners (noise) is difficult.
另一天,另一场比赛可能会更容易(图 5.6)。
Another day, a different race might be easier (Figure 5.6).
其次,你所看到的,或者你认为自己看到的,不仅取决于环境带来的挑战,还取决于你如何根据情境的重要性进行感知。例如,在《隐形大猩猩》中实验中,你的任务是计算传球次数,因此你设定自己将这些次数视为对抗视频视觉噪声的信号。传球检测比大猩猩检测更重要(图 5.7)。
Second, what you see, or think you see, is determined not just by the challenges posed by the environment, but also by how you have disposed yourself to perceive in accord with the importance of the situation. For example, in the invisible gorilla experiment, your job is to count the number of ball passes, and so you set yourself to see them as the signal against the visual noise of the video. Ball pass detection is more important than gorilla detection (Figure 5.7).
如果你接受了计数传球的任务,那么传球就是需要检测的信号,而场景的其余部分则是噪音,所以你很可能看不到也检测不到大猩猩,即使它的图像出现在你的视网膜上。另一方面,如果你被要求计数动物传球给球员,那么大猩猩就是信号,球员就是噪音,你会看到大猩猩,但不知道传球了多少次。
If you have accepted the assigned task of pass-counting, the passes are the signals to detect and the rest of the scene is noise, and so you may very well fail to see and detect the gorilla, even though its image crosses your retina. On the other hand, should you be told to count animals passing the players, the gorilla would be the signal and the players the noise, and you would see the gorilla but have no clue how many ball passes were made.
重要的是要理解,SDT 并不声称刚才描述的过程是有意识的。SDT 认为感知包含推理,但这些推理是无意识的,正如赫尔曼·冯·亥姆霍兹(1821-1894)在 19 世纪首次提出的那样(Helmholtz, 1867; Hatfield, 2002)。因为这并不重要,所以你实际上并没有看到大猩猩。
It is important to understand that SDT does not claim that the process just described is conscious. SDT says that perception involves inferences, but that these inferences are unconscious, as proposed first by Herman von Helmholtz (1821–1894) in the 19th century (Helmholtz, 1867; Hatfield, 2002). Because it’s not important, you genuinely do not see the gorilla.
Drew、Vo 和 Wolf (2013) 强调了这一结论。他们研究了放射科医生在肺部 CAT 扫描中识别跳舞大猩猩照片的能力。他们要求放射科医生和非专业参与者检查一系列 CAT 扫描图像,寻找并计数被称为结节的异常。其中一张扫描图像包含一张黑白图像,其中一只跳舞的大猩猩大约有火柴盒大小;它清晰可见;实验结束时,当参与者被特别询问目标图像是否有任何异常时,每个人都指出了大猩猩。然而,在寻找结节的过程中,没有一位天真的参与者报告了大猩猩,24 位放射科医生中只有 4 位报告了大猩猩。Drew、Vo 和 Wolf 还使用眼动追踪设备记录了每位参与者视网膜扫描的区域,发现即使直视大猩猩,也很少报告。这进一步证实了他们的结论:大猩猩并非被体验到,而是被看到但被忽略了。在《血字的研究》中,夏洛克·福尔摩斯责备华生:“你只看不观察。”
This conclusion is underscored by Drew, Vo, and Wolf (2013), who looked at radiologists’ ability to see photos of a dancing gorilla in CAT scans of lungs. They asked radiologists and lay participants to examine a series of CAT scans looking for and counting abnormalities called nodules. One of the scans included a black-and-white image of a dancing gorilla about the size of a matchbox; it was easily visible; when at the end of the experiment, participants were specifically asked if there was anything odd about the target image, everyone pointed out the gorilla. However, while hunting for nodules, none of the naive participants and only four of 24 radiologists reported the gorilla. Drew, Vo, and Wolf also used an eye-tracking device to record the areas each participant’s retina scanned, finding that the gorilla was rarely reported even when directly looked at, reinforcing the conclusion that it was not experienced, rather than seen but ignored. In A Study in Scarlet, Sherlock Holmes upbraids Watson: “You see but you do not observe.”
信息处理有多种类型。本章重点在于理解两对不同的处理方式。这两种认知过程不应被视为非此即彼,即一个过程在没有另一个过程的情况下发生。两者都始终在进行。弄清楚它们的相对贡献是一个实证问题,正如第一个对比所展示的那样。
There are various types of information processing. For this chapter, understanding two pairs of distinct processing is important. Neither of these cognitive processes should be thought of as either/or, one occurring in the absence of the other. Both go on all the time. Figuring out their relative contributions is an empirical question, as the demonstration of the first contrast shows.
系统1中的进程快速、操作成本低且自动化,除了知晓结果(如果有的话)之外,几乎无需任何意识参与。系统2中的进程则受到意识控制,并消耗认知资源。通过实验,可以发现相互竞争的自动进程和受控进程,从而引发令人不快的心理能量竞争。斯特鲁普效应(Stroop,1935)就是一个突出的例子。
Processes in System 1 are fast, cheap to operate, and automatic, running themselves off with little if any conscious involvement beyond knowledge of the outcome, if that. Processes in System 2 are consciously controlled and drain cognitive resources. It’s possible experimentally to engage competing automatic and controlled processes, resulting in an unpleasant competition for mental energy. An outstanding example is the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjesfzWozo4。
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjesfzWozo4.
虽然关于斯特鲁普效应(MacCleod,2015)有各种详细的理论,但其基本原理却很简单。孩童时期学习阅读时,这是一个受控的系统2任务,我们会读出单词,并将它们与心理词典中的想法进行匹配。然而,随着我们成为阅读专家,阅读的认知过程会被整合到系统1中,并变得自动化。因此,当我们看到用另一种颜色的墨水写成的颜色名称,而我们需要说出它的名字时,系统2必须抑制系统1的阅读习惯,并有意识地说出墨水的颜色。然而,系统2速度慢,资源消耗大,它经常在争夺我们发声器官的控制权时败给系统1,导致反应时间过长和错误百出。
While there are a variety of detailed theories about the Stroop effect (MacCleod, 2015), the basic idea is straightforward. When we learn to read as children, it’s a controlled System 2 task as we sound out words and match them to ideas in our mental lexicon. However, as we become expert readers, the cognitive processes of reading are incorporated into System 1 and become automatic. Thus, when we see a color name printed in ink of another color that we are supposed to name, System 2 has to suppress System 1’s reading habit and consciously say the ink color. However, System 2 is slow and a resource hog, and it often loses its battle for control of our vocal apparatus to System 1, causing long response times and numerous errors.
自上而下处理和自下而上处理之间的区别很重要,但很容易被误解,尤其是在将思维视为一个串行处理器,先处理一个过程,然后再处理另一个过程的情况下。此外,认知科学中沿用至今的标签不如最初提出的其他标签那样具有描述性,这些标签最初是为了捕捉这种区别而提出的。我更喜欢用更具描述性的术语“数据驱动处理”来描述自下而上的处理,用“概念驱动处理”来描述自上而下的处理。总而言之,其理念是:经验(以及我们的记忆)是经验形成过程中获得的实际事实(数据驱动/自下而上)与我们在经验形成过程中对世界的期望、信念、价值观和积累的认知(概念驱动/自上而下)的混合体。隐形大猩猩实验已经让我们初步领略了这一理念,它是本章其余部分的基础。
The distinction between top-down processing and bottom-up processing is important but easy to misunderstand, especially if one thinks of the mind as a serial processor that first does one and then the other. Moreover, the labels that have stuck in cognitive science are not as descriptive as other ones originally proposed to capture the distinction. I prefer the more descriptive terms data-driven processing for bottom-up processing and conceptually-driven processing for top-down processing. Put together, the idea is that experience (and our memories) are mixtures of the actual facts (data-driven/bottom-up) obtaining in the world during the formation of an experience and the expectations, beliefs, values, and accumulated acquaintance (conceptually driven/top-down) with the world that we bring to the formation of an experience. The invisible gorilla experiments already give us a taste of this idea, and it’s fundamental to the rest of the chapter.
这两种类型的处理方式以一种非此即彼的方式构成了早期感知哲学的基础。复制理论和实在论认为,经验强加于心灵,因此,我们看到的是世界事实的本来面目。唯心论认为感知存在不可挽回的缺陷,坚持认为我们已经拥有了真理,这些真理是与生俱来的或可以通过理性证明的概念。亚里士多德的经验主义与实在论相符,直到特殊感官记录的事实被常识所判断。然而,亚里士多德的图景假设了我们现在知道是错误的东西,即在概念应用于数据时存在一个判断的时刻,在那个时刻,我们对世界的感官图景,无论准确与否,都会结晶成一个有意义的感知。正如我们将看到的,自下而上和数据驱动的过程从感知的最初几毫秒开始,一直持续到数年乃至数十年的记忆存储和检索。对于每一种经验和每一段记忆,研究人员的诀窍在于解开它们(图5.8)。
In an either/or way, these two types of processing underlie earlier philosophies of perception. Copy theory and realism say that experience imposes itself on the mind and, therefore, we see the facts of the world as they are. Idealism dismisses perception as irretrievably flawed, insisting that we already possess the truth as innately given or rationally provable concepts. Aristotle’s empiricism agrees with realism until the facts recorded by the special senses are judged by common sense. However, Aristotle’s picture assumes something we now know is wrong, that there is a single moment of judgment when concepts are applied to data, a single moment when our sensory picture of the world, accurate or not, crystallizes into a meaningful perception. As we will see, bottom-up and data-driven processes operate from the first milliseconds of sensation through years and decades of memory storage and retrieval. For every experience and every memory, the trick for researchers is untangling them (Figure 5.8).
在直觉模型中,信息处理的第一阶段是感觉,即构建我们所接触的刺激的想象表征,但这些刺激尚未被加工成意义(模式识别)或重要性(注意力)。对感觉第一阶段的研究可以追溯到19世纪60年代冯特第一个实验室中认知科学的开端。
In the intuitive model, the first stage in information processing is sensation, building an imaginal representation of stimuli to which we are exposed but which has not yet been processed for meaning (pattern recognition) or for importance (attention). Investigating the first stage of sensation goes back to the beginnings of cognitive science in Wundt’s first laboratory in the 1860s.
冯特受到直觉模型的联想版本的影响。在联想主义中,诸如CAT之类的有意义的复杂概念是由更简单、意义更不明晰的元素构成的,类似于视频像素(参见模式识别部分)。在《观念之路》中,提出了一个问题:在任何给定的时间点,意识可以容纳多少个元素。在冯特之前,哲学家们就此争论了数十年,但他们未能得出结论,因为他们的空想内省并非实验性的。控制。冯特构建了一个标准化的情况,参与者可以对他们所看到的内容做出简单、直接的回答。
Wundt was influenced by an associative version of the intuitive model. In associationism, meaningful complex ideas, such as CAT, were made up of simpler, less meaningful elements similar to video pixels (see section on pattern recognition). In the Way of Ideas the question arose as to how many elements consciousness could hold in any given moment in time. Philosophers argued about this for decades before Wundt, but they had not reached a conclusion because their armchair introspections were not experimentally controlled. Wundt constructed a standardized situation to which participants could respond with simple, immediate answers about what they saw.
冯特使用一种名为速视仪的装置,在极短的时间内(不到一秒)向受试者呈现简单的视觉刺激。如今,计算机显示器已用于此目的,但早期的研究人员使用了各种机械和机电设备。以下是冯特刺激阵列的示例(图 5.9)。
Wundt used a device called a tachistoscope to present simple visual stimuli to participants for very brief—less than a second—exposures. Today, computer displays are used for this purpose, but earlier researchers used a variety of mechanical and electro-mechanical devices. Here’s an example of one of Wundt’s stimulus arrays (Figure 5.9).
在最初的空白屏幕中央有一个小点,这是参与者关注的注视点。然后字母闪烁一小会儿,参与者报告尽可能多的字母。因为他要求参与者从整个 16 个字母阵列中报告尽可能多的字母,所以冯特的方法被称为整体报告程序。冯特发现,天真的参与者可以报告大约三到四个字母,这是一个至今仍然可靠的发现。在冯特的时代,参与者不是心理学入门学生(当时没有),而是成为熟练的内省者的教授和研究生。在这个实验中,熟练的参与者可以报告多达六个字母。最后,所有参与者都认识到字母数超过三到六个,但是他们看得不清楚和不清楚,所以无法报告。
At the center of an initial blank screen was a small dot, the fixation point the participant focused on. Then the letter display was flashed for a fraction of a second, and the participant reported as many letters as possible. Because he asked for participants to report as many letters as possible from the whole array of 16, Wundt’s method is called the whole report procedure. Wundt found that naïve participants could report about three to four letters, a robust finding to today. In Wundt’s day, participants were not intro psych students (there being none), but fellow professors and grad students who became practiced introspectors. In this experiment, practiced participants could report up to six letters. Finally, all participants recognized that there were more than three to six letters, but these were not seen clearly and distinctly, and so they could not be reported.
从现代视角来看,冯特“发现”了感觉记忆,但他用注意力而非记忆来解释他的发现。冯特预见了后来注意力的“聚光灯”理论(Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980),他将视觉意识视为一个领域,其中存在一个中心的、被关注的焦点区域,周围环绕着一个更大、甚至难以界定的边缘区域(图5.10)。
From a modern perspective, Wundt had “discovered” sensory memory, but he explained his findings in terms of attention rather than memory. Anticipating later “spotlight” theories of attention (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), Wundt regarded visual consciousness as a field in which there was a central, attended focal area surrounded by a larger, indeed undefinably large, fringe area (Figure 5.10).
冯特的结论受到了斯珀林(1960)的质疑。斯珀林同意冯特的结果,修改了他的方法,并提出了一种非常早期、语义原始的记忆形式,称为“图像”。他认为,整个报告过程不能排除这样一种可能性,即即使字母阵列消失后,参与者仍可以暂时看到整个阵列,因为报告看到了多少个字母需要时间,在此期间图像衰减为虚无。为了支持他的主张,斯珀林发明了部分报告程序,其中提示参与者只回忆显示屏上的一行。斯珀林实验中的显示屏是 3 x 4 的字母显示屏,随后是随机选择的高、中或低音调。如果他们听到高音,参与者要报告最上面一行;如果是中音,则报告中间一行;如果是低音,则报告最下面一行。阵列偏移和提示音呈现之间的间隔从立即到大约一秒不等。2
Wundt’s conclusions were challenged by Sperling (1960), who agreed with Wundt’s results, modified his method, and proposed the existence of a very early, semantically primitive, form of memory called the icon. He argued that the whole report procedure could not rule out the possibility that the entire letter array was temporarily available to participants even after it disappeared because it took time to report how many letters were seen, during which period the image decayed to nothingness. To support his claim, Sperling invented the partial report procedure in which the participant was cued to recall just one row of the display. The display in Sperling’s experiment was a 3 x 4 display of letters followed by a randomly chosen high, medium, or low-pitched tone. If they heard the high tone, participants were to report the top row; if the medium tone, the middle row; and if the low tone, the bottom row. The interval between the offset of the array and the presentation of the cuing tone was varied from immediate to about a second.2
斯珀林发现,如果在阵列之后立即或几乎立即呈现音调,参与者可以报告提示行,但不能报告其他行。随着阵列偏移和音调之间的时间变长,性能下降,直到大约四分之三秒时,部分报告和完整报告相同。斯珀林的结论是,在那短暂的时间内,参与者拥有一个图像,即字母阵列的图标,他们可以看到并用它来报告提示行。然而,正如他在批评冯特的整体报告程序中所暗示的那样,图标会自发衰减到没有。他还表明,在阵列偏移后立即呈现刺激物可以擦除或掩盖图标,甚至是图标的碎片。例如,如果在字母刚刚出现的位置呈现一个比字母稍大的环,参与者报告只看到了环,而不是被环包围的字母。如果在整个阵列所在的位置呈现视觉白噪声,参与者根本不会报告字母。掩蔽对于研究无意识感知的心理学家来说很有用,因为他们可以呈现刺激但掩盖它们,并观察它们是否仍然影响行为。
Sperling found that if the tone was presented immediately or nearly immediately after the array, participants could report the cued row, but not the other rows. As the time between array offset and tone got longer, performance declined until at about three-quarters of a second, partial reports and whole reports were the same. Sperling concluded that for that brief time participants possessed an image, an icon of the letter array, that they could look at and use to report the cued row. However, as suggested in his criticism of Wundt’s whole report procedure, the icon spontaneously decayed to nothing. He also showed that the icon, or even pieces of the icon, could be erased, or masked, by the presentation of stimuli just after the array offset. For example, if a ring slightly bigger than a letter was presented where a letter had just been, participants reported seeing the ring alone rather than the letter surrounded by the ring. If visual white noise was presented where the whole array had been, participants never reported letters at all. Masking would prove useful to psychologists interested in unconscious perception, because they could present stimuli but mask them, and see if they nevertheless affected behavior.
感觉记忆容量巨大,能够短暂地容纳远超意识所能掌握的信息。它容易发生两种形式的遗忘:衰减,以及新信息的干扰,例如掩蔽效应。
Sensory memory has a large capacity, being able to briefly hold much more information than can be grasped by consciousness. It is subject to two forms of forgetting, decay, and interference by the arrival of new information, as seen in masking.
关于感觉记忆,最具争议的在于它包含什么信息以及这些信息是如何构成的。当它在信息处理的串行处理模型中首次被提出时,它被认为是一种前分类存储。也就是说,这些字母还没有被归类为字母——它们只是白底黑字的图案。分类被认为发生在模式识别的处理流的后期。然而,这种假设已被证明是错误的。例如,Merikle(1980)展示了随机混合字母和数字的数组,并提示参与者在某些情况下按行报告,或者在其他情况下按字母或数字报告,结果发现两种情况下的表现都一样好。如果图标是一种真正的前分类存储,参与者就不应该能够按语义类别对他们的报告进行排序。
What became most controversial about sensory memory is what information it contains and how that information is structured. When it was first proposed in the context of the serial processing model of information processing, it was thought to be a pre-categorical store. That is, the letters had not yet become, i.e., categorized as, letters—they were just patterns of black on white. Categorization was thought to take place later in the stream of processing during pattern recognition. This assumption, however, has proved wrong. For example, Merikle (1980) presented arrays that randomly mixed letters and numbers, and cued participants to report by rows in some cases or by letter versus number in others, finding that performance was equally good in both cases. If the icon was a true pre-categorical store, participants should not have been able to sort their reports by semantic category.
除了感觉记忆并非斯珀林所想的那么简单之外,其确切性质仍存在争议(Jolicoeur、Lefebvre & Martinez-Trujillo,2016)。一个有趣的假设与预测处理相关,即图像由多层构成,每一层由不同的神经过程创建,并包含不同类型的信息(Rensink,2014;类似模型参见Capiello & Zhang,2016)。例如,最先创建的、最简单的层实际上是未经处理的物理刺激表征,它会迅速衰减。另一层是在经过一些概念处理后创建的,由神经回路从大脑高级区域反馈到视网膜的输入回路,正是这一层使得梅里克尔(Merikle)发现的感觉阵列能够进行概念处理。另一方面,Treisman & Lages(2013)认为,图像和感觉记忆根本不存在于信息处理的某个阶段。他们利用 SDT 提出,生物体会调整其决策标准以最佳地适应其感官世界,并且随着决策标准的调整,可以观察到感官输入的不同方面,无论是物理的还是语义的。
Beyond the fact that sensory memory is not as simple as Sperling thought, its exact nature is still disputed (Jolicoeur, Lefebvre, & Martinez-Trujillo, 2016). One interesting proposal ties in with predictive processing, that the icon consists of multiple layers, each of which is created by different neural processes and contains different sorts of information (Rensink, 2014; for a similar model, see Capiello & Zhang, 2016). For example, the first created and simplest layer is indeed an unprocessed representation of the physical stimulus that decays rapidly. Another layer is created after some conceptual processing, by neural circuits that feedback from higher areas of the brain to the input circuits of the retina, and it’s this layer that enables conceptual processing of sensory arrays as found by Merikle. On the other hand, Treisman & Lages (2013) argue that the icon and sensory memory simply do not exist as a stage of information processing. Using SDT, they propose that organisms adjust their decision criteria to optimally adapt to their sensory world and that, as decision criteria are adjusted, different aspects of sensory input, physical or semantic are observed.
亚里士多德、阿特金森和希弗林对早期信息处理的描述表明,模式识别——识别和分类刺激——是感觉寄存器之后的下一个连续步骤。亚里士多德明确指出,世界是由特殊感官感知的,并由常识进行判断(分类)。阿特金森和希弗林则含蓄地将模式识别归因于他们提出的短期存储的决策。注意力是信息处理过程中的一个阶段,这就是为什么我在直觉模型中没有明确其顺序。我们稍后会再讨论这个问题,因为当我们试图将模式识别和注意力结合成序列信息处理中的不同步骤时,序列模型会严重失效。
Aristotle’s and Atkinson and Shiffrin’s pictures of early information processing suggest that pattern recognition—recognizing and categorizing stimuli—is the next serial step after the sensory register. Aristotle is explicit, saying that the world is sensed by the special senses and judged—categorized—by common sense. Atkinson and Shiffrin implicitly assign pattern recognition to the decisions of their proposed short-term store. Neither has attention as a stage in processing, which is why I left the ordering ambiguous in the intuitive model. We will return to this later, as the serial model breaks down badly when we try to combine pattern recognition and attention as distinct steps in serial information processing.
无论如何,当对刺激的感知描述与人类语义记忆的概念结构相遇时,模式识别就会发生,因为我们试图将前者与后者中的某个项目进行匹配。因此,模式识别几乎与记忆和感知同等重要(DeCarlo & Cox,2007;Rey、Riou & Versace,2014;Rey 等人,2015)。在本章中,虽然必然会提及记忆,但我们将重点关注感知和感知结构,并在下一章中回到意义和语义结构。
In any event, pattern recognition occurs when a perceptual description of the stimulus meets the conceptual structure of human semantic memory, as we try to match the former to an item in the latter. Thus, pattern recognition is almost as much about memory as it is about perception (DeCarlo & Cox, 2007; Rey, Riou, & Versace, 2014; Rey et al., 2015). In this chapter, although necessarily alluding to memory, we will focus on perception and perceptual structure, returning to meaning and semantic structure in the next chapter.
将感官输入与储存的概念相匹配的难度可以用模棱两可的图形来说明,例如图 5.11所示。在每种情况下,都有不止一种方法可以将刺激在认知上解析为有意义的单元。在 Archimbaldo 的画作 (5.11a) 中,有一张脸和一个头,但它是由水果和蔬菜组成的。如果人们关注图画的组成部分,他们可能会看到水果和蔬菜,而如果人们关注整幅画,他们可能会辨认出脸和头。有两种方法可以解释 5.11b 中的显示,兔子的头或鸭子的头。它是哪一个?刺激本身并不会强加特定的感知;你如何根据先前的学习来解释它们才会。然而,在本章结束时,我们将要探讨的关键问题是,我们是在解释感觉赋予我们的世界图景,还是根据先天和后天习得的期望来创造世界图景。
The difficulty of matching sensory input to stored concepts is illustrated by ambiguous figures, such as in Figure 5.11. In each case, there is more than one way to cognitively parse the stimuli into meaningful units. In the painting by Archimbaldo (5.11a) there is a face and head, but it is made up of fruit and vegetables. If one focuses on component parts of the picture, one is likely to see the fruit and vegetables, whereas if one focuses on the painting as a whole, one is likely to make out the face and head. There are two ways to interpret the display of 5.11b, as the head of a rabbit or as the head of a duck. Which is it? The stimuli by themselves do not impose a particular perception; how you interpret them in light of your prior learning does. However, the key question we will reach by the end of this chapter is whether we interpret a picture of the world given to us by sensation or whether we create a picture of the world out of innate and learned expectations.
毫无疑问,模式识别是动物和人类智能行为的核心,从简单的反射到更高级的心理过程。例如,高效、实时的模式识别处理是打造自动驾驶汽车的最大技术挑战。在之前的章节中,我曾指出,最重要的技术之一人工智能对认知科学的贡献在于,它发现,虽然我们认为需要智力挑战的任务(例如下棋)对人工智能来说很容易,但一些我们无需费力就能完成的任务(例如在现实世界中移动)却很难。为了让自动驾驶汽车上路,人们已经投入了数百万美元,但它们仍然无法应对突发情况(Boudette,2019)。
There is no question that pattern recognition is central to intelligent behavior by animals and humans from simple reflexes to the higher mental processes. For example, effective, real-time pattern recognition processing is the top technical challenge to building self-driving cars. In an earlier chapter, I remarked that one of the most important contributions of AI to cognitive science has been discovering that although tasks we find mentally challenging, such as chess, turn out to be easy for AIs, what we do without effort, such as moving about in the world, turns out to be hard. Millions have been spent to get autonomous vehicles on the road, but they still can’t deal with unexpected situations (Boudette, 2019).
在智能行为的另一端,专业知识和模式识别仍然发挥着关键作用。国际象棋有时被称为人工智能界的果蝇(McCarthy,1989;Ensmenger,2012),也被称为认知心理学界的果蝇。它难度较高,需要更高级的心理过程,但它的棋盘很小,只有32个棋子,并遵循正式规则。它是一种完全信息游戏——双方都能随时看到所有棋子。它与现实生活大相径庭,因此其他游戏中常见的社交策略,例如扑克中的虚张声势,在国际象棋中基本不存在。几个世纪以来,国际象棋的实践者一直在研究它,因此有大量的专家知识可供利用。简而言之,从计算的角度来看,尤其是从符号系统方法的角度来看,它是研究和理论的理想选择。
At the other end of the spectrum of intelligent behavior, expertise, pattern recognition still plays a key role. Chess has sometimes been called the Drosophila of artificial intelligence (McCarthy, 1989; Ensmenger, 2012) and cognitive psychology in general. It’s hard, so it engages the higher mental processes, yet it is played on a small board with only 32 pieces following formal rules. It’s a game of perfect information—both players see all the pieces all the time. It’s largely separated from real life, so that social tactics found in other games, such as bluffing in poker, are largely absent. It’s been studied by its practitioners for centuries, so there’s a large body of expert lore to exploit. In short, from a computational point of view, especially the symbol-system approach, it’s an ideal candidate for research and theory.
国际象棋的先驱研究是由国际象棋大师兼心理学家阿德里安·德·格鲁特(Adriaan de Groot,1914-2006)在纳粹占领荷兰期间进行的(de Groot,1946,1978)。他向特级大师、大师级选手和新手棋手简要展示了先前比赛中场的局面,或棋盘上随机摆放的相同棋子,然后给参与者一个空棋盘,让他们重现他们所看到的局面。3
The pioneering studies of chess were performed by chess master and psychologist Adriaan de Groot (1914–2006) during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands (de Groot, 1946, 1978). He briefly showed grandmaster, master, and novice players game situations from mid-points of previous games or the same pieces randomly placed on a chessboard, and then he gave the participants an empty board and asked them to re-create what they had seen.3
德·格鲁特发现,大师级棋手和新手在重建随机局面方面同样优秀——实际上,同样糟糕——但大师级棋手在重建真实局面方面远胜于新手。4专家级棋手在真实对局中发现了新手级棋手根本无法察觉的模式,这些模式是由最初的棋手在发展棋子、建立防御和发动攻击时创造的。随机棋盘没有历史,因此几乎没有任何有意义的模式能够被专家级棋手识别并在回忆中运用。后来采用更复杂方法的研究证实并扩展了德·格鲁特最初的发现(Bilalic、Langner、Erb 和 Grod,2010 年;Connors、Burns 和 Campitelli,2011 年;Leone、Slezak、Cecchi 和 Sigman,2014 年;Sheridan 和 Reingold,2017 年)。
De Groot found that master players and novices were equally good—really, were equally bad—at reconstructing the random positions, but that masters were vastly superior to novices at reconstructing the real positions.4 The experts saw patterns in the real games that were simply not present for the novices, patterns created by the original contestants as they developed their pieces, built up defenses, and launched attacks. The random boards had no history and so had few, if any, meaningful patterns to be detected by the expert mind and called on during recall. Later studies using more sophisticated methodologies confirmed but amplified de Groot’s original findings (Bilalic, Langner, Erb, & Grod, 2010; Connors, Burns, & Campitelli, 2011; Leone, Slezak, Cecchi, & Sigman, 2014; Sheridan & Reingold, 2017).
总结专家领域内模式识别专业知识成果的一个有效方法是引用将禅宗传入美国的禅宗大师铃木俊良(1904-1971)的话。他说:“在初学者的头脑中,可能性很多,而在专家的头脑中,可能性却很少”(1971,第1页)。无论是观察真实的棋盘位置还是随机的棋盘位置,新手棋手看到的模式很少,但如此多的可能走法,全是混乱,既开放又令人担忧。有太多可能性需要考虑,棋局就会很糟糕。专家也同样困惑于随机的棋局,这根本说不通。然而,观察真实的棋局,规律就会显现,进攻和防守的可能性也会随之展开。对于专家来说,能做的事情有限——可能性很少——但这些可能性是可以应对的,既有希望的,也有威胁的,而不是令人困惑的随机噪音。
A useful way of summarizing such results of expertise on pattern recognition within the expert’s domain is a quotation from Shunryo Suzuki (1904–1971), the Zen master who brought Zen Buddhism to the USA. He said, “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, in the expert’s mind there are few” (1971, p. 1). Whether viewing a real board position or a random one, the novice chess player sees few patterns but many possible moves, all is confusion, equally open and equally foreboding. There are too many possibilities to think about, and play will be poor. The expert is on similarly confusing ground with the random displays, which simply make no sense. However, viewing the real game situations, patterns emerge, and possibilities of attack and defense open up. For the expert, what can be done is constrained—there are few possibilities—but they are promising or threatening possibilities that can be coped with, not confusing random noise.
简而言之,从图标到更高级的心理过程,有效的模式识别是大脑的必备技能。有效的模式识别是超级预测者的关键技能,他们擅长预测未来事件,例如从新电影的票房收入到政治革命(Tetlock & Gardner,2015)。
In short, from the icon to the higher mental processes, effective pattern recognition is the brain’s essential skill. Effective pattern recognition is the key skill of super-forecasters, people who are good at predicting future events, such as a new movie’s box-office receipts to political revolutions (Tetlock & Gardner, 2015).
因此,模式识别自认知科学诞生之初就受到广泛研究也就不足为奇了。同时,在认知科学的所有主要课题中,它始终处于理论边缘,一方面是心理学,另一方面是神经生理学的还原或消除。我们进行模式识别是如此无意识,以至于很难构建一个直观的、第一人称的描述。事实上,只有一种纯粹的心理学模式识别理论,而且它一开始就失败了。
It should not be surprising then that pattern recognition has been intensely studied from the first days of cognitive science. At the same time, of all the major topics in cognitive science, it has always been at the theoretical edge between psychology, on one side, and neurophysiological reduction or elimination, on the other. We do pattern recognition so unconsciously that it’s hard to formulate an intuitive, first-person account of it. Indeed, there’s only been one purely psychological theory of pattern recognition, and it failed out of the gate.
联想主义的乐高意识理论在整个早期心理学中都具有影响力,但对其最执着的是一位在康奈尔大学度过职业生涯的英国心理学家——爱德华·布拉德福德·铁钦纳(Edward Bradford Titchener,1867-1927;铁钦纳,1897,1898;本费尔特,2013)。该理论也可以被称为意识的马赛克理论,认为诸如“狗”或“树”之类的复杂概念是由一些纯粹感觉的小片段构成的,但它们可以重新排列成“狗”或“树”或其他任何概念。
The associationist Lego theory of consciousness was influential in all early psychology, but it was pursued most tenaciously by an English psychologist who spent his career at Cornell, Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927; Titchener, 1897, 1898; Beenfeldt, 2013). It can also be called the mosaic theory of consciousness, holding that complex ideas, such as “dog” or “tree,” are made up of small bits of pure sensations, but they could be rearranged to be the ideas of “dog” or “tree,” or anything else.
在训练观察者时,铁钦纳(1912)严厉批评了未经训练的内省者和在竞争对手实验室接受训练的内省者所犯的“刺激错误”(铁钦纳,1912;博林,1921;哈特菲尔德,2015;奇里穆塔,2016)。如果我问你在图5.12中体验到了什么,你可能会说“一只狗”,犯了刺激错误,即说出了世界上的物理刺激,而不是构成你对它的心理体验的感觉。正如铁钦纳最重要的学生E.G.博林(1912)所说,你需要报告给定的,即模式识别随后运作的感官输入。随着内省分析在心理学中的进展,感官原子的列表将被汇编起来,就像物理学家和化学家汇编原子和亚原子的列表一样。元素。然后,联想连接将元素组合成诸如狗、猫、树、云等配置。
In training observers, Titchener (1912) railed against “the stimulus error” made by untrained introspectors and introspectors trained in rival laboratories (Titchener, 1912; Boring, 1921; Hatfield, 2015; Chirimuuta, 2016). If I ask you what you experience in Figure 5.12, you will probably say, “a dog,” committing the stimulus error, i.e., naming the physical stimulus in the world rather than the sensations comprising your mental experience of it. As Titchener’s most important student, E. G. Boring (1912) put it, you are to report the given, the sensory input upon which pattern recognition then operates. As introspective analysis proceeded in psychology, a list of sensory atoms would be compiled, just as physicists and chemists were compiling a list of atomic and sub-atomic elements. Associative connections then combined the elements into configurations such as dog, cat, tree, cloud, etc.
然而,对其他人来说,铁钦纳的贡献并非显而易见。威廉·詹姆斯在《心理学原理》中写道:
However, to others, it wasn’t obvious that Titchener’s given was theirs. In Principles of Psychology, William James wrote:
意识……本身并非被分割成碎片。“链条”或“火车”之类的词语并不能恰当地描述它,因为它最初呈现的样子(即,它是既定的)。它并非连接在一起的,而是流动的。“河流”或“溪流”是最自然的比喻。以后再谈论它时,我们不妨称之为思想之流、意识之流或主观生命之流。
James,1890 年,第 1 卷,第 239 页
Consciousness...… does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as “chain” or “train” do not describe it fitly, as it presents itself in the first instance [i.e., it’s the given]. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A “river” or a “stream” are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.
James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 239
在德国,克里斯蒂安·冯·埃伦费尔斯(Christian von Ehrenfels,1859-1932)用音乐实例来推翻联想原子论。乍一看,一段旋律似乎由片段、单个音符组成,正如马赛克理论所言。然而,一段曲调可以调换成不同的调,其中所有音符都与之前的音符不同,但曲调依然存在。从某种意义上说,一段旋律是由一组音符加上埃伦费尔斯所谓的“形式品质”(Gestaltqualität)构成的,即一组音符之间的关系,这些关系无法被简化为一个感知原子。
In Germany, Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) used musical examples to undermine the associative-atomistic theory of the given. At first glance, a melody appears to be made up of pieces, individual notes, just as mosaic theory says. However, a tune can be transposed into a different key in which none of the notes is the same as before, yet the tune remains. In some way, a melody is comprised of a set of notes plus what Ehrenfels called a form-quality (Gestaltqualität), a set of relations between the notes that cannot be reduced to a sensory atom.
格式塔心理学家给心理学中的原子论带来了致命一击,他们也开创了用生理学来解释模式识别的先河。格式塔心理学的主要代表人物是马克斯·韦特海默 (1880-1943)、沃尔夫冈·科勒 (1887-1967) 和库尔特·科夫卡 (1886-1941)。他们像艾伦费尔斯一样——他们的运动借用了艾伦费尔斯的名字——格式塔心理学——属于一个新的心理学哲学流派,即弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 (1838-1917) 的现实主义行为心理学,该流派成为具身认知的源泉之一。布伦塔诺认为,感知是一种将物体作为一个整体来把握的心理行为,而不是像原子论所教导的那样,将感觉原子记录下来,然后在心理上组装成更大的物体。
The death-blow to atomism in psychology was dealt by the Gestalt psychologists, who also inaugurated the turn to physiology in explaining pattern recognition. The leading Gestalt psychologists were Max Wertheimer (1880–1943), Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), and Kurt Koffka (1886–1941). Like Ehrenfels, from whom they borrowed the name of their movement, Gestalt psychology, they were members of a new philosophical school of psychology, the realist act psychology of Franz Brentano (1838–1917), which became one of the wellsprings of embodied cognition. Brentano contended that perception was a mental act of grasping an object as a whole, rather than the registration of sensory atoms that were then mentally assembled into larger objects, as atomism taught.
格式塔心理学家继承了布伦塔诺的观点,并将其发展成对“理念之路”的猛烈批判。他们的批判很好地展现了关于心灵的假设如何不假思索地从哲学转移到心理学,以及图表和程序的陷阱。回过头来看看笛卡尔的大脑感知箭的过程。它悄然体现了格式塔心理学家认为导致其科学研究脱轨的两个关于感知的假设。第一个是束假说(Wertheimer,1922),另一个是恒常性假说(Köhler,1947)。后者假设松果体上的每个感觉点都是由箭上特定点的刺激引起的。前者认为,我们对箭的最初感知——即给定——只是这些感觉点的束。换句话说,铁钦纳所谓的给定根本不是给定的,而是一个关于感知如何运作的哲学假设。铁钦纳心理学是为了寻找数据而寻找解释,而不是为了寻找解释而寻找数据。后来,科勒(1925)将同样的推理应用于桑代克未能在其谜题盒中找到推理的现象。被囚禁的猫无法看到盒子的运作方式,因此它们无法思考逃脱的方法。相反,它们将反复试验作为应对困境的唯一可能策略。实验装置,而非猫缺乏认知能力,导致了它们的行为。格式塔心理学家始终认为,科学必须从尽可能少的先入之见出发。科学的首要任务是描述自然,而不是将其强加于人类的概念框架中。从经验上讲,格式塔心理学始于一项实验,其中我们所体验到的事物没有刺激性的物理原因,这违反了捆绑假设和恒常性假设。韦特海默称之为phi现象。5
The Gestalt psychologists took Brentano’s standpoint and developed it into a devastating critique of the Way of Ideas. Their criticisms are good examples of how assumptions about the mind can be unthinkingly carried over from philosophy to psychology, and of the traps of diagram and procedure. Go back and look at Descartes’s brain perceiving an arrow. It quietly embodied two assumptions about perception the Gestalt psychologists said had derailed its scientific study. The first was the bundle hypothesis (Wertheimer, 1922) and the other was the constancy hypothesis (Köhler, 1947). The latter assumes that every sensory point on the pineal gland was caused by stimulation from a particular point on the arrow. The former was that our initial perception of the arrow—the given—was just a bundle of these sensory points. In other words, Titchener’s so-called given was not given at all, but a philosophical assumption about how perception must work. Titchenerian psychology was explanation in search of data, not data in search of explanation. Later, Köhler (1925) applied the same line of reasoning to Thorndike’s failure to find reasoning in his puzzle boxes. The imprisoned cats could not see the workings of the box, and so they could not think their way to solutions for escape. Instead, they resorted to trial and error as the only possible strategy for dealing with their situation. The experimental setup, not cats’ lack of cognitive abilities, caused their behavior. Science, Gestalt psychologists always believed, had to start with as few preconceptions as possible. Science’s job is first to describe nature, not force it into human conceptual boxes. Empirically, Gestalt psychology began with an experiment in which what we experience has no stimulating physical cause, violating the assumptions of bundle and constancy. Wertheimer called it the phi phenomenon.5
客观上,只有两个球会亮起,然后随着另一个球的亮起而熄灭。然而,大多数观看者(存在个体差异)会感觉到左右和左右交替的运动。在理想情况下,观看者只会看到一个球在平滑连续地运动。我们在观看电影或视频时都会体验到phi现象,这些视频由一系列以每秒约24帧的速度播放的静止图像组成。如果你玩电子游戏时遇到过视频处理器变慢的情况,你就会发现 phi 现象的魔力正在令人沮丧地消失。因为你看到的是根本不存在的东西——一个与运动相对应的物理刺激点——所以 phi 现象现在被称为视运动。Wertheimer 武断地将其命名为phi,正是因为他不想让一个所谓的描述性标签误导他的参与者(Köhler 和 Koffka)的观察,或者他自己的理论。
Objectively, there are just two balls that light up and then turn off as the other ball is lit. However, most viewers (there are individual differences) sense motion alternating left-right and right-left. Under ideal conditions, viewers see only one ball in smooth, continuous motion. We all experience the phi phenomenon when we watch a movie or video, which are made of a series of still images shown at about 24 frames per second. If you play video games and ever have a slowdown in your video processor, you’ve seen the magic of the phi phenomenon frustratingly disappear. Because you see something that isn’t there—a point of physical stimulation to which the motion corresponds—the phi phenomenon is now called apparent motion. Wertheimer arbitrarily dubbed it phi precisely because he didn’t want an allegedly descriptive label to lead his participants’ (Köhler and Koffka) observations, or his own theorizing, astray.
我们无需运动就能看到感知如何违背原子论假设的另一个例子。图5.13展示了1955年发明的卡尼萨三角形,它显示了明显的轮廓。
We don’t need motion to see another example of how perception violates atomistic assumptions. Figure 5.13 shows the Kanizsa triangle, invented in 1955, showing apparent contours.
在这个图形中,大多数人看到的是一个倒置的等腰三角形,严格来说,它并不存在,只是一种暗示。此外,这个“幽灵三角形”往往看起来比背景更亮一些,在三角形拐角处,类似吃豆人图案的人物附近产生了虚幻的轮廓。与phi现象一样,这些轮廓的形成并不存在任何物理刺激点,这违反了粒子束和恒常性假说中的原子论假设。
In this figure, most people see an inverted isosceles triangle that, strictly speaking, is not there but only suggested. Moreover, this ghost triangle tends to look somewhat brighter than the background, generating illusory contours near the Pac-Man–type figures at the triangle’s corners. As with the phi phenomenon, there are no points of physical stimulation to cause the contours, violating the atomistic assumptions of the bundle and constancy hypotheses.
最后,格式塔心理学家可以指出,与马赛克石头不同,视觉显示的各个元素可以动态地相互作用,创造出超越其本身的体验。例如,图5.14是一个备受研究的错觉,它是由记忆实验研究的先驱赫尔曼·艾宾浩斯发现的。
Finally, Gestalt psychologists could point out that, unlike mosaic stones, the elements of a visual display may dynamically interact, creating experiences that go beyond them. In Figure 5.14, for example, is a much-studied illusion discovered by Hermann Ebbinghaus, the pioneer of the experimental study of memory.
圆圈中心的两个圆盘实际上是等大的。如果感知仅仅涉及看到感觉原子,那么就不会产生幻觉。
The two disks at the center of the circles are really the same size. If perception simply involved seeing sensory atoms, there would be no illusion.
总体而言,韦特海默(Wertheimer,1923/1938,第78页)与原子论相反,他指出:“当我们面对大量刺激时,我们通常不会体验到‘大量’个体事物,这一个,那一个……相反,经验中呈现出的是彼此分离又相互关联的更大整体……这种排列和划分是否遵循明确的原则?” 他的答案是肯定的。格式塔心理学家提出,大脑中存在一套与生俱来的感知法则,将感知组织成有意义的整体。例如,其中一条法则是闭合律,即我们倾向于在脑海中完成一个完整的图形。卡尼萨三角形就是闭合律发挥作用的一个例子:我们用明显的轮廓线填充缺失三角形的线条。后来,科夫卡(Koffka,1935/1963)将闭合律阐述为更普遍的格式塔原理,即普朗格纳兹法则(Prägnanz Law) ,即简单性法则。我们自然而然地将经验分组为可用的最少数量的简单图形。
In general, Wertheimer (1923/1938, p. 78) said, contrary to atomism, “When we are presented with a number of stimuli we do not as a rule experience ‘a number’ of individual things, this one and that…. Instead larger wholes separated from and related to one another are given in experience… Do such arrangements and divisions follow definite principles?” He answered yes, and the Gestalt psychologists proposed that there was a small set of innate principles of laws of perception built into the brain that organize percepts into meaningful wholes. For example, one of the principles, is the law of closure, our tendency to mentally complete a good figure. The Kanizsa triangle is an example of closure at work: we fill in the lines of the missing triangle with apparent contours. Later, Koffka (1935/1963) elaborated the law of closure into a more general Gestalt principle, the Law of Prägnanz, or simplicity. We naturally group experiences into the smallest number of simple figures available.
格式塔原则的有效性已在平面设计中得到广泛应用。6例如,这里有一个你见过很多次的著名商业标志,但你可能没有注意到我所说的“蹲伏格式塔,隐藏的箭头”:
That Gestalt principles work is testified to their extensive use in graphic design.6 For example, here’s a famous commercial logo you’ve seen many times, but you might not have noticed what I call Crouching Gestalt, Hidden Arrow:
直到我读到一篇关于这个标志如何诞生的文章时,我才注意到(当第一次看到这个标志时,大多数联邦快递董事会成员都没有注意到)Ex 中的箭头;当然,现在我无法忽视它了。
Until I read an article about how the logo came to be I did not notice (as most of the FedEx board didn’t when they were first shown it) the arrow in the Ex; now, of course, I can’t unsee it.
格式塔心理学家有效地推翻了乐高模式识别理论。然而,他们取而代之的理论并非心理学理论。他们与巴甫洛夫共享脑场理论,并提出脑电场相互作用能够反映或映射物理宇宙的结构。正如科勒(Köhler,1967/1971,第115页)所写:“格式塔心理学自此成为场物理学在心理学和脑生理学重要领域的一种应用。” 即使认知科学进入计算时代,这种转向神经科学的趋势依然存在。
The Gestalt psychologists effectively destroyed the Lego theory of pattern recognition. However, the theory they put in its place was not psychological. They shared with Pavlov the field theory of the brain and proposed that the electric field interactions of the brain came to reflect, or map, the structure of the physical universe. As Köhler (1967/1971, p. 115) wrote, “Gestalt psychology has since become a kind of application of field physics to essential parts of psychology and brain physiology.” The turn to neuroscience remained even when cognitive science entered the computational era.
由于各种原因(Leahey,2018),格式塔心理学对原子论的批判影响了后来的认知心理学,但他们的实证理论却没有。7就模式识别而言,他们的原则被认为依赖于过时的神经生理学理论,更重要的是,它们只是描述性的,而非解释性的。也就是说,格式塔原则优雅地捕捉了经验在我们看来的样子,但并没有真正一旦人们不再将大脑视为一组电磁场的观点,就可以解释它们的工作原理。
For a variety of reasons (Leahey, 2018), Gestalt psychology’s critique of atomism influenced subsequent cognitive psychology, but their positive theories did not.7 In the case of pattern recognition their principles were seen as depending on an outmoded theory of neurophysiology, and more importantly as being descriptive but not explanatory. That is, Gestalt principles elegantly captured how experience seems to us, but did not really give an account of how they worked, once one discarded the view of the brain as a set of electromagnetic fields.
第一个模式识别的计算理论是由 Oliver Selfridge (1959; Selfridge & Neisser, 1960) 提出的。它被称为Pandemonium,和联结主义一样,它由多层简单计算单元组成,这些计算单元可以通过改变它们之间的链接权重来学习。在弥尔顿的《失乐园》中,上帝打败了撒旦和他的反叛天使后,他们被投入地狱,在那里他们建造了一个他们共同居住的地方——Pan ( all) demonium。塞尔福里奇的理论是认知科学和人工智能中一般策略的一个很好的例子,它将一个复杂的任务(在本例中为模式识别)分解为一组更简单的任务,这些任务似乎需要复杂的智能,而这些任务可以由没有思想的机器人或神经元来完成。在 Pandemonium 中,机器人是恶魔,每个机器人都有一项简单的、无需思考的工作要做。尽管如此,只要积累足够多的没有思想的恶魔,智慧就会出现(Dennett, 1983)。
The first computational theory of pattern recognition was proposed by Oliver Selfridge (1959; Selfridge & Neisser, 1960). It was called Pandemonium, and, as in connectionism, it consisted of multiple layers of simple computing units that could learn by changing the weights of the links between them. In Milton’s Paradise Lost, after God defeats Satan and his rebel angels, they are cast into Hell where they build a place where they all live—Pan (all) demonium. Selfridge’s theory is an excellent example of a general strategy in cognitive science and AI, breaking a complex task, in this case pattern recognition, that appears to demand sophisticated intelligence into a set of much simpler tasks that can be carried out by thoughtless bots or neurons. In Pandemonium the bots are demons each of which has one, simple, mindless job to do. Nevertheless, add up enough thoughtless demons and intelligence emerges (Dennett, 1983).
Pandemonium 的总体策略是特征分析。正如我们之前所讨论的,在模式识别中,对世界的呈现必须与存储在记忆中的概念相匹配。理解概念的一种方法是,它们包含一系列定义特征,就像字典一样。例如,“单身汉”指的是未婚男性。如果我们遇到拥有这些属性或特征的人,那么这个人就是单身汉。所以,所有模式识别的工作原理可能都是一样的。Pandemonium 最常见的例子是识别字母,这是人工智能的首要目标之一。考虑到当今先进的文本扫描和翻译技术,这似乎并非难题,但计算机花了几十年的时间才能够扫描书籍并创建文本文件。
The general strategy of Pandemonium is feature analysis. In pattern recognition, as we’ve discussed, a presentation of the world must be matched up with a concept stored in memory. One way to think about concepts is that they comprise a list of defining features, as in a dictionary. So, for example, a bachelor is an unmarried male. If we meet someone possessing these attributes, or features, that person is a bachelor. So it could be that all pattern recognition works the same way. The most common example of Pandemonium at work was recognizing letters, one of the first goals of AI. Given today’s sophisticated technology for scanning and translating text, it doesn’t seem like a hard problem, but it took decades for computers to be able to scan books and create text files.
最早的程序使用一种叫做模板匹配的方法。计算机内存中存储着字母的小图像(模板)。A,a;A,a;A,a;等等。然后,扫描仪扫描文本,模板匹配程序会确定哪个字母(如果有的话)与扫描字母的物理形状匹配。然而,正如我在上文中部署的几种字体所示,即使是字体大小、形状、扫描平台的角度、墨水渗入廉价纸张等方面的细微偏差,都可能使程序崩溃,导致输出乱码。Pandemonium 提供了一种更强大的替代方案,而如今它的深度学习后代只是使用了更复杂的策略版本(图 5.15)。
The earliest programs used a method called template matching. In computer memory were stored little images, templates, of letters. A, a; A, a; A, a; and so on. A scanner then scanned text, and the template matching program determined what, if any, letter matched the physical shape of the scanned letter. However, as the few fonts I deployed in the sentence above show, even small deviations of font size, shape, angle on the scanning platform, ink bleeding through cheap paper, etc. could defeat the program, resulting in gibberish. Pandemonium offered a more robust alternative, and its deep learning descendants today simply use more sophisticated versions of its strategy (Figure 5.15).
我们从图像恶魔开始,它基本上就是斯珀林的图标,它手持输入字母的呈现,等待第二层恶魔——特征恶魔——的处理。它们会检查图标上指定的图形特征,例如垂直线、水平线或曲线,并根据图标上显示的特征数量(塞尔福里奇语)发出尖叫声。第三层由认知恶魔组成,每个认知恶魔代表一个由其关键特征定义的字母表字母,它们尖叫的程度取决于它的许多定义特征都已存在。因此,R 被定义为一条垂直线、两条水平线、一条斜线、三个直角和一条不连续的曲线。但这些特征也出现在其他字母(例如 P)的定义中,因此多个恶魔同时尖叫。因此,需要再加一层来完成模式识别的过程。最后一层只有一个恶魔,即决策恶魔,但它的工作与其他恶魔一样简单,就是从之前的尖叫声中挑选出最响亮的那个。恶魔层。在这种情况下,虽然 P 恶魔和 R 恶魔都在大声尖叫,但声音最大的是 R 恶魔,而决策恶魔将输入模式识别为R。
We begin with the image demon, basically Sperling’s icon, who holds a presentation of the input letter for processing by the second layer of demons, the feature demons. They inspect the icon for their assigned graphic feature, such as a vertical line, horizontal line, or curve, shrieking (Selfridge’s word) in proportion to the number of its features the icon displays. The third layer consists of the cognitive demons, each of whom represents a letter of the alphabet defined by its critical features, and it shrieks as a function of how many of its defining features are present. So, an R is defined as one vertical line, two horizontal lines, an oblique line, three right angles, and one discontinuous curve. But these features also figure in the definition of other letters, such as P, and multiple demons are therefore shrieking in parallel. One more layer is therefore needed to complete the process of pattern recognition. This final layer has just one demon, the decision demon, but its job is just as simple as the others’ jobs, to pick the loudest shrieker from the earlier layer of demons. In this case, while the P and R demons are shrieking loudly, the loudest is the R demon, and the decision demon identifies the input pattern as an R.
在许多方面,Pandemonium 堪称多层前馈人工神经网络(ANN)联结主义架构的先驱。然而,它面临两个重要的局限性。首先,误差信号反向传播的技术尚未开发。从概念上讲,Pandemonium 仍然依赖于符号系统架构,在这种架构中,系统启动时必须将一定程度的知识编程到系统中。特征和认知“恶魔”已为过程分配了符号,特征“恶魔”为直线、曲线和角度,认知“恶魔”为有意义的字母。因此,Pandemonium 与其说是发现了世界中的模式,自己学习了什么是垂直线或什么是R,不如说是学会了将预先编程的知识应用于具体案例。
In many respects, Pandemonium was a pioneer of connectionist architectures of multilayered feedforward ANNs. However, it faced two important limitations. First, the technique of backpropagation of error signals had not yet been developed. More conceptually, Pandemonium was still tied to the symbol system architecture in which some degree of knowledge had to be programmed into the system at the beginning. The feature and cognitive demons had assigned symbols to process, lines, curves, and angles in the case of the feature demons, and meaningful letters in the case of the cognitive demons. Thus, Pandemonium did not so much discover patterns in the world, learning on its own what a vertical line is or what an R is, as it learned to apply its pre-programmed knowledge to specific cases.
凭借更复杂的数学和无比强大的计算机,当今的“深度学习”网络可以实现 Selfridge 梦寐以求的真正模式识别。一个关键的突破是卷积神经网络(O'Shea & Nash, 2015) 的发展。人工神经网络在视频屏幕上显示图像,必须通过标准训练集学习将其识别为猫、狗、汽车、裙子、树木等等。每个图像都可以定义为亮度不同的像素阵列。在典型的网络中,例如第三章中的岩石/矿山示例,每个输入单元的激活由一个像素的亮度决定。
Armed with more sophisticated mathematics and incomparably more powerful computers, today’s “deep learning” networks can achieve that of which Selfridge only dreamed, true pattern recognition. A key breakthrough was the development of convolutional neural networks (O’Shea & Nash, 2015). Artificial neural networks are shown images on video screens and must learn, through standard training sets, to recognize them as cats, dogs, cars, dresses, trees, and so on. Every image can be defined as an array of pixels of varying illuminance. In a typical network, such as the rock/mine example from Chapter 3, each input unit’s activation is determined by the luminance of one pixel.
在卷积网络中,每个单元都由其目标像素周围的一组像素激活,例如,每个像素右边两个像素、左边两个像素、上面两个像素和下面两个像素,总共 5 × 5 = 25 个像素。设计人员可以设置各种参数来确定每个像素的权重如何影响输入单元的总输出。例如,它可以简单地将所有亮度均等平均,或者可以赋予目标(中心)像素最高权重,而外部像素的权重较低。或者,如果遵循哺乳动物大脑的工作方式,可以抑制最外面的像素;结果是加强中心关注像素的轮廓对比度,使图片中物体的形状在背景中脱颖而出。
In a convolutional network, each unit is activated by a group of pixels surrounding its target pixel, for example, every pixel two pixels to the right, two pixels to the left, two pixels above, and two pixels below, for a total of 5 × 5 = 25 pixels. The designer can set various parameters to determine how each pixel’s weight affects the total output of the input unit. It might, for example, simply average all the luminances equally, or it might give the highest weight to the target, central, pixel, with the outer pixels having weaker weights. Or, if it follows how mammalian brains work, the outermost pixels might be made inhibitory; the result would be to strengthen the contrast of contours at central, attended pixels, making the shape of the pictured object stand out against the background.
卷积网络效果良好,如今已成为模式识别人工智能的标准做法。然而,它们也存在一些严重的局限性,尤其是在作为人类模式识别的模型时,因为它们采用的是一种蛮力式的认知计算方法,与人类模拟相去甚远。
Convolutional networks work well and are now standard practice in the AI of pattern recognition. However, they are subject to important limitations, especially as models of human pattern recognition, as their brute force approach to cognitive computation takes them further from human simulation.
我的经历就是我同意关注的事情。只有那些我注意到的事物才能塑造我的思维——如果没有选择性的兴趣,经历将一片混乱。唯有兴趣才能带来强调和强调、光与影、背景与前景——总之,带来清晰的视角。……每个人都知道什么是注意力。它是心灵以清晰生动的形式,从看似同时存在的多个对象或思路中,抓住一个。意识的聚焦、专注是它的本质。它意味着从某些事物中抽离出来,以便有效地处理其他事物。
威廉·詹姆斯,1890 年,第 1 卷,第 402、404 页
My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. … Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.
William James, 1890, Vol. 1, pp. 402, 404
由于我们无需思考或努力,模式识别是一个自动的信息处理过程。但正如威廉·詹姆斯那句著名且雄辩的描述所表明的那样,注意力是一个需要努力、受控的信息处理过程,通过它,我们可以选择最令我们感兴趣的体验。然而,注意力并非总是完全受控,因为有时它会被外部某种栩栩如生、令人无法忽视的事物所引导,例如警笛声,或者巧妙地被魔术师所引导。事实上,在魔术师用来愚弄我们的所有手段中,误导是最强大的。8
Because we do it without thinking or effort, pattern recognition is an automatic information process. But as William James’s famous and eloquent description indicates, attention is an effortful, controlled information process by which we choose what item of experience are of most interest to us. However, attention is not always entirely controlled because sometimes it can be directed from outside by something so vivid it can’t be ignored, like a siren or, subtly, by a magician. In fact, of all the powers magicians use to fool us, misdirection is the strongest.8
在本章中,我们一直使用序列处理模型来佐证注意力,该模型认为注意力是信息处理过程中一个独特的阶段或时刻,詹姆斯正是在这个阶段“掌控”了一系列的思路。如果我们假设这一点,就会出现两个经验问题。首先,注意力选择发生在哪个阶段?是早期,接近图像,还是晚期,就在意识之门之前?第二个问题与第一个问题相关,选择的依据是什么?如果选择发生在早期,在图像和模式识别之间,那么选择似乎取决于刺激的物理特征,例如它在我们的右侧还是左侧,是音乐而不是对话,是视觉刺激而不是听觉刺激。如果选择发生在晚期,发生在模式识别之后——刺激变得有意义的时候——但在意识形成之前,那么我们可以根据所见所闻的意义来选择,同意关注我们会接受令我们高兴的事情,并拒绝接受令我们不悦的事情。然而,图5.16中漫画的幽默暗示着情况并非如此简单。两个塞尔福里奇式的恶魔正在监听一位体育迷的音频输入。请注意,我们是在球迷的耳朵里,所以处理过程还处于早期阶段。然而,左边的恶魔正在根据配偶的话语内容“占据”球迷的大脑,这表明模式识别已经发生。
In the serial processing model of attention we have been using as our foil in this chapter, attention is thought to be a distinct stage, or moment, in information processing at which James “taking possession” of a train of thought takes place. If we assume this, then two empirical questions arise. First, at what point does attentional selection take place? Is it early, near the icon, or late, just before the doorway to consciousness? The second question is related to the first, on what basis is selection made? If the choice is early, between the icon and pattern recognition, the choice would seem to have to depend on the physical features of the stimulus, such as its being to our right or left or being music rather than talk or visual rather than auditory. If the choice is late, occurring after pattern recognition—when stimuli become meaningful—but before consciousness, then we could choose on the basis of the meaning of what we see or hear, agreeing to attend to things that please us and refusing to agree to things that displease us. The humor in a cartoon such as that in Figure 5.16 suggests, however, that the picture is not so simple. Two Selfridge-like demons monitor a sports fan’s audio input. Notice that we’re in the fan’s ear, so processing is early. Nevertheless, the demon on the left is “taking possession” of stimuli for the fan’s mind on the basis of the content of what the spouse says, suggesting pattern recognition has already happened.
有趣的是,最早的现代注意力实验研究是针对听觉而非视觉注意力进行的,就像动画片中的设定一样。这在一定程度上是商业对认知科学的影响,就像今天的人工智能一样,因为电话公司(没错,曾经只有一家电话公司,而且他们拥有电话)对优化通过简单的铜线和廉价电话进行的语音传输非常感兴趣。像E·科林·切里(E. Colin Cherry,1953)这样的工程师开发了双耳分听程序,以模拟现实生活中一种被称为鸡尾酒会效应的选择性注意案例。
Interestingly, the first modern experimental studies of attention were carried out for auditory rather than visual attention, like the setting in the cartoon. In part this was an influence of commerce on cognitive science, as in AI today, because the telephone company (yes, there was just one once, and they owned the phones) had great interest in optimizing voice transmission over simple copper wires and cheap telephones. Engineers such as E. Colin Cherry (1953) developed the dichotic listening procedure to mimic a real-life case of selective attention called the cocktail party effect.
如果你身处一个热闹的鸡尾酒会,你必须在周围嘈杂的谈话声和噪音中,用心聆听朋友的谈话。你听到朋友说了什么,其他人的谈话则沦为背景中舞台演员的“喋喋不休,喋喋不休;咕噜咕噜”,毫无意义的声音。在双耳分听,参与者佩戴耳机,注意力集中在一只耳朵的输入上。通常情况下,参与者会被要求在被关注的耳朵里跟读材料,尽可能准确地重复听到的内容。所以,如果你关注左耳并听到“在人类事件的过程中……”,你必须重复你听到的每个单词。这是一项要求很高的任务,通常大约 20% 的参与者会因为无法跟读而退出实验。要求较低的注意力任务包括从提供的列表中数出名词、押韵词或同义词。其他类型的输入可以在未被关注的耳朵中播放,最后,我们可以测试参与者对双耳所听内容的记忆。
If you are at a busy cocktail party, you must mentally take possession of a friend’s conversation among the cacophony of conversations and noises going on around you. You hear what your friend says, other talk being reduced to what stage actors in the background say, “natter, natter; grommish, grommish,” vocal sounds sans meanings. In dichotic listening, the participant wears headphones, and attention is directed to one ear’s input. Typically, the participant is asked to shadow the material in the attended ear, repeating it as closely as possible as it’s heard. So, if you attend the left ear and hear “When in the course of human events…,” you must repeat each word as you hear it. This is a demanding task, and often about 20% of participants wash out of the experiment for not being able to shadow. Less demanding attention tasks include counting nouns or rhymes or synonyms from a presented list. Input of various other types can be played in the unattended ear, and, at the end, we can test the participant on what they remember about what they heard in both ears.
双耳分听研究的基本发现(除了一个我们将要讨论的异常现象)与我们根据鸡尾酒会的亲身经历以及直觉序列信息处理模型所预期的结果相符。参与者可以概括被关注通道的要点,但无法概括未被关注通道的要点,但他们可以回忆起未被关注通道的物理特征,例如男性和女性的声音,或者无关刺激(例如音调)的介入。最早的注意力信息处理模型就是围绕这一范式及其结果建立的。
The basic findings (with one anomaly we’ll come to) from dichotic listening studies replicated what we would expect from our personal experience of cocktail parties and with the intuitive serial information processing model. Participants could summarize the gist of the attended, but not the unattended, channel, but they could recall physical characteristics of the unattended channel, such as male vs. female voice, or the intrusion of an irrelevant stimulus, such as a tone. The first information processing models of attention were built around this paradigm and its results.
除了他对注意力的著名描述之外,詹姆斯还对两类注意力理论——因果理论和因果理论——进行了有益的区分。因果理论认为,存在一个心理处理阶段,或者说,将注意力资源分配给一个输入流,以便(正如詹姆斯所说)有效地处理体验的某一方面。在上面的漫画中,操作风扇耳朵的恶魔体现了因果理论,因为它选择进入风扇意识的内容。另一方面,在意识的因果理论中,进入大脑的内容是由注意力以外的心理过程决定的。例如,在一部恐怖电影中,一个角色经常独自置身于可怕的环境中,哪怕是最轻微的声音都会让他惊慌失措。角色的广泛性焦虑导致原本微弱的刺激被放大并进入大脑。让詹姆斯感到苦恼的是,所有注意力,即使是看似自愿的注意力,都可能是心理原因而非选择的结果。詹姆斯的担心得到了证实,因为随着时间的推移,效果理论取代了原因理论,直到一些认知科学家声称注意力根本不存在(Anderson,2011)。
In addition to his famous description of attention, James made a useful distinction between two classes of theories of attention, cause theories and effect theories. Cause theories of attention posit the existence of a mental stage of processing or of allocation of attentional resources to one stream of input in order, as James put it, to deal effectively with just one aspect of experience. In the cartoon above, the demon operating the fan’s ear embodies a cause theory of attention because it chooses what passes into the fan’s consciousness. In an effect theory of consciousness, on the other hand, what enters the mind is determined by a mental process other than attention. For example, in a horror movie a character is often alone in frightening surroundings, and startles at the least little sound. The character’s generalized anxiety caused an otherwise weak stimulus to be magnified and admitted to the mind. What came to vex James was the possibility that all attention, even seemingly voluntary attention, was the outcome of mental causes rather than choice. James’s fear was borne out, as over time effect theories replaced cause theories until it was possible for some cognitive scientists to claim that there’s no such thing as attention (Anderson, 2011).
现代第一个注意力理论是 Broadbent (1958) 的过滤理论,它也很好地说明了现有技术如何为注意力提供隐喻。大脑。布罗德本特提出,注意力的作用类似于收音机或电视上的频道选择器。许多广播到达设备的天线,但调谐器只选择其中一个进行处理(图5.17)。
The first theory of attention in the modern era was Broadbent’s (1958) filter theory, which also provides a nice example of how existing technology has provided metaphors for the mind. Broadbent proposed that attention work liked the channel selector on a radio or TV. Many broadcasts reach the device’s antenna, but your tuner selects just one to process (Figure 5.17).
注意是信息处理中一个独特的阶段,位于图标之后,因此它会根据图标上可用的输入刺激的物理特性进行选择,例如空间位置(例如,在聚会上你会面向朋友),或者与周围其他声音相比,被关注的声音的音调,并且你可以注意到新声音的进入。你可以总结被关注的耳朵听到的内容,因为它在语义上被处理并进入记忆,但你无法描述未被关注通道的内容,因为它没有被处理。简而言之,过滤理论解释了早期双耳分听实验的基本结果。
Attention is a distinct stage in information processing located just after the icon, and thus making its selection based on physical characteristics of the input stimulus available on the icon, such as location in space (you orient toward your friend at a party) or pitch of the attended voice compared to other voices near you, and you can note the intrusion of novel sounds. You can summarize what the attended ear heard, because it was semantically processed through to memory, but you can’t say anything about the content of the unattended channel because it wasn’t. In short, filter theory explains the basic results of early dichotic listening experiments.
然而,后来的研究表明,Broadbent 的过滤机制过于强大。Moray(1959)将参与者的名字放入无人注意的频道,发现它经常被注意到。在过滤账户中,这种情况不应该发生,因为名字不应该在图标之后被处理。Broadbent 的学生 Anne Treisman(1964、2004、2012;Treisman & Gelade,1980)发展了一种改进的过滤理论,以适应 Moray 和其他类似研究的结果(图 5.18)。
However, later findings showed that Broadbent’s filter was too strong. Moray (1959) dropped participants’ names into the unattended channel, discovering that frequently it was noticed. On the filter account this should not happen, because the name should have not been processed past the icon. Broadbent’s student Anne Treisman (1964, 2004, 2012; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) developed a modified filter theory to accommodate Moray’s results and others like them (Figure 5.18).
注意力在信息处理中仍是一个独特的阶段,但它不再是我们选择进一步处理内容的唯一决定因素。它不再选择一个思路并阻止其他思路,而是削弱未选择的输入强度。长期记忆现在在将思想纳入意识方面发挥着作用。特雷斯曼提出,存储在长期记忆中的想法,例如金丝雀、联结主义或你的名字,具有不同的激活阈值,需要一定量的输入能量才能被激活。因此,被关注通道中的想法往往会被激活并成为意识,因为它们的输入能量被允许以最大强度通过。大多数无人注意通道中的想法不会被激活,因为无人注意流的强度会降低到阈值以下。然而,与此同时,那些阈值较低的想法,比如你喜欢听到的“你的名字”,即使在输入强度较低的情况下也会被激活。所以,你会听到“喋喋不休,喋喋不休,咕噜咕噜,你的名字,咕噜咕噜,喋喋不休。”
Attention is still a distinct stage in information processing, but it is no longer the sole determiner of what we select for further processing. Instead of choosing one stream of thought and blocking others, it now weakens the input strength of unselected inputs. Long-term memory now plays a role in admitting thoughts to consciousness. Treisman proposed that ideas stored in long-term memory, such as canary, or connectionism, or your name, have different thresholds of activation, requiring a certain amount of input energy to become activated. Thus, ideas in the attended channel will tend to activate and become conscious because their input energy is allowed through at full strength. Most ideas in the unattended channel will not activate because the strength of the unattended stream is reduced to below their threshold values. At the same time, however, ideas that have low threshold values, such as your name, which is something you like to hear, will activate even at low input strengths. So, you hear, “Natter, natter, grommish, YOUR NAME, grommish, natter.”
特雷斯曼的理论摒弃了串行处理。由于无人参与的信息流仍然会被处理,尽管强度有所减弱,但它们最终会进入长期记忆,并可能对意识体验产生影响。特雷斯曼的理论是并行处理概念被发明之前的先驱模型。在特雷斯曼的模型中,注意力仍然是你体验的原因之一,但并非唯一原因。在哲学和科学领域,奥卡姆剃刀原则告诉我们,要用尽可能少的理论实体来解释事物。或许,注意力是一个我们可以省略的原因或处理阶段,这解释了直觉和詹姆斯所说的注意力是其他信息处理的结果。
Treisman’s theory abandoned serial processing. Because unattended streams are still processed, albeit at attenuated strength, they reach long-term memory, where they may have an effect on conscious experience. Hers was a pioneering model of parallel processing before the concept had quite been invented. In Treisman’s model, attention is still a cause of what you experience, but not the sole cause. In philosophy and science, Ockham’s razor tells us to explain things with as few theoretical entities as possible. Perhaps attention is a cause or stage of processing we can do without, explaining what intuition and James call attention as the result of other information processes.
第一个沿着这一思路提出的观点来自 Deutsch & Deutsch (1963, p.83):“无论是否关注,信息都会到达相同的感知和辨别机制”(图 5.19)。
The first proposal along these lines came from Deutsch & Deutsch (1963, p. 83), “a message will reach the same perceptual and discriminatory mechanisms whether attention is payed to it or not” (Figure 5.19).
在这个理论中,信息处理中不存在注意力选择阶段。相反,所有输入都会被完全处理以产生意义,而你所听到内容的意义决定了其是否能够进入意识。Deutsch 和 Deutsch 对其运作方式含糊其辞。但他们确实提出了一个在认知科学中日益重要的问题,尤其是在新的预测处理框架中,即所谓的感知的认知渗透性。传统上,我们认为感知是一个自下而上的过程,通过我们的感官感知世界并对其进行表征——世界强加于我们——然后我们必须掌控我们所见所闻。然而,如果感知能够被我们已知的、希望的和恐惧的事物所渗透,那么世界就不是以经验的形式强加于我们,而是我们强加于自身。接下来的问题是如何以及在何种程度上强加于我们。
In this theory, there is no stage of attentional selection in information processing. Instead, all inputs are fully processed for meaning and it’s the meaning of what you hear that determines access to consciousness. Deutsch and Deutsch were carefully vague on how it works. But they did raise an issue of increasing importance in cognitive science, especially in the new predictive processing framework of what’s called the cognitive penetrability of perception. Traditionally, we think of perception as a bottom-up process by which our senses detect the world and represent it—the world forces itself upon us—and then we must take possession of what we see and hear. If, however, perception can be penetrated by what we already know, and hope, and fear, then the world does not force itself upon us as experience, we force ourselves on it. The question then becomes how and to what degree.
研究方法从听觉转向视觉,推动了后来的注意力理论朝着多伊奇和多伊奇的方向发展。乌尔里克·奈瑟(Ulric Neisser)的原著《认知心理学》(1967)为该领域的建立做出了巨大贡献,如今却成了该领域的批评者(Neisser,1976)。他的主要抱怨是认知科学过于退缩到实验室,脱离了现实世界。就注意力而言,他认为二分式的聆听范式尤其人为,围绕它建立的理论过于依赖听觉注意力,而视觉对人类更为重要,这使得过滤式理论显得荒谬。奈瑟发明了“隐形大猩猩”实验(Neisser & Becklen,1975)。
A shift in research methods from audition to vision pushed later theories of attention in Deutsch and Deutsch’s direction. Ulric Neisser, whose ur-text Cognitive Psychology (1967) had done so much to establish the field, now became its critic (Neisser, 1976). His main gripe was that cognitive science had retreated too much into the lab, getting out of touch with the real world. In the case of attention, he thought the dichotomous listening paradigm was especially artificial, and theories built around it were too tied to auditory attention, when vision was more important to humans and made filter-type theories absurd. Neisser invented the invisible gorilla experiment (Neisser & Becklen, 1975).
Neisser (1976) 非正式地表达了他的观点。想象一下,你在剧院观看芭蕾舞演出。你对一位即将表演特别高难度曲目的新任首席芭蕾舞女演员的才华很感兴趣。演出结束后,我问发生了什么事,你告诉我这位新任芭蕾舞女演员的情况和她的技巧,以及她是如何完成首秀的。我问舞台设计怎么样?芭蕾舞团(背景舞者)怎么样?你几乎无法告诉我什么,因为你关注的是这位新星的表演,而不是舞台布景或其他舞者。但是,舞台布景和芭蕾舞团并没有像过滤理论那样被遮挡在视野之外,也没有像特雷斯曼的理论那样变成被削弱的幽灵。你兴趣之外的信息并没有被拒绝;只是没有被捕捉到而已。如果你对舞台布景感兴趣(你最好的朋友,帮你买到票的人,是剧院的首席设计师),你就会捕捉到关于舞台布景的信息。如果你的孩子首次参加芭蕾舞团演出,你就会获得这些信息。滤波器和滤波器衰减理论只有在基于电话或无线电传输的双耳分听范式中才有意义。
Informally, Neisser (1976) put his message this way. Imagine you’re at a theater, watching a ballet. You are interested in the talents of a new prima ballerina who will be dancing an especially difficult piece. After the show, I ask what happened, and you tell me about the new ballerina and her skills, and how she pulled off her first appearance. I ask what the set design was like? How was the corps de ballet (background dancers)? You’ll be able to tell me very little because you attended to the new star’s performance, not the sets or the other dancers. But the sets and corps did not get blocked from view, as in filter theory, nor did they become attenuated ghosts, as in Treisman’s theory. Information outside your interests was not rejected; it simply did not get picked up. Had you been interested in the sets (your best friend, who got you the tickets, is the theater’s lead designer), you’d have picked up information about them. Had your child been making its debut in the corps de ballet, you’d have picked up that information. The filter and filter-attenuation theories only made sense in the dichotic listening paradigm, based on telephone or radio transmission.
奈瑟的观点很有吸引力,因为它尊重我们(以及詹姆斯)对注意力的直觉——注意力关乎我们选择处理什么——但它放弃了这样一种观念:在一系列允许某些输入、阻止其他输入的时刻中,存在一个单一的选择时刻。相反,信息处理沿着多条平行的轨道进行,因此,我们的兴趣可以在许多地方和时间塑造体验(Stigchel,2016)。
Neisser’s view is attractive because it respects our (and James’s) intuitions about attention—that it’s about what we choose to process—but it gives up the notion that’s there’s a singular moment of choice in a series of moments where some input is allowed in and the rest is blocked. Instead, information processing takes place along multiple parallel tracks, and, thus, there are many places and times our interests can shape experience (Stigchel, 2016).
在本章中,我们阐述了自上而下、概念驱动的感知和模式识别的影响。一旦认识到这一点,我们就有可能发现自上而下的期望和注意力集中可能导致我们错过周围发生的事件,从而造成所谓的认知盲区(因为这种盲区是由自上而下的信息处理引起的)。
In this chapter we have been demonstrating top-down, conceptually driven influences on perception and pattern recognition. Once recognized, it becomes possible to discover instances in which top-down expectations and attentional focus can cause us to miss events occurring around us, creating what can be called cognitive—because caused by top-down information processes—blindness.
我们已经了解了一种认知盲视的形式——非注意盲视,即无法感知我们注意力范围之外的事件。隐形大猩猩是非注意盲视的典型案例,我们将在讨论预测处理框架时对此进行进一步讨论,该框架为大猩猩为何隐形提供了强有力的解释。
We have already met one form of cognitive blindness, inattentional blindness, failing to perceive events outside the scope of our attention. The invisible gorilla is the paradigm case of inattentional blindness, and we will discuss it more when we get to the predictive processing framework, which offers a powerful explanation of why the gorilla is invisible.
视盲症是指我们自认为已经形成了对某个事件的表象,但却未能注意到最初看到的景象与之后看到的景象之间的变化。9这一概念源于 Rensink (2005) 提出的闪烁范式。在这种方法中,参与者观看一张“闪烁”的简单照片。闪烁之后,会显示略微修改的照片版本,随后再次闪烁,并重复播放第一幅图像。参与者持续观看闪烁的图像,直到察觉到变化或放弃。10
Change blindness occurs when we think we have formed a representation of an event but fail to notice changes between our first view and later ones.9 The concept was broached via the development of Rensink’s (2005) flicker paradigm. In this method, participants view a simple photograph that “flickers.” After the flicker, a slightly altered version of the photo is shown, flowed by another flicker and the first image is repeated. The participant views the flickering images until the change is detected or the participant gives up.10
大脑预测处理架构的一个基本主张是,我们所体验的世界几乎是一种幻觉,是一种自上而下构建的模型我们先前存在的对世界的预期——贝叶斯先验——会不断更新这个模型,而这种模型会因感觉偶尔自下而上的错误信息(尤其是由我们身体行为引起的信息)而更新。传统的意识理解,体现在笛卡尔的“大脑注视箭头”中,认为经验由感觉构成,然后由内部认知系统进行解读。即使是格式塔心理学对信息处理的描述也采用了这种解读方案,因为格式塔感知定律将输入的感觉分组为更有意义的整体。
A foundational claim of the predictive processing architecture of the mind is that the world as we experience it is nearly a hallucination, a top-down model constructed out of our preexisting expectations—Bayesian priors—about the world, and that this model is updated by occasional bottom-up error messages from sensation, especially those caused by our bodily actions. Traditional understanding of consciousness, embodied in Descartes’ brain looking at an arrow, says that experience is constituted by sensation and then interpreted by inner cognitive systems. Even Gestalt psychology’s picture of information processing adopted the interpretive scheme, as the Gestalt Laws of Perception grouped input sensations into meaningful larger wholes.
福多尔(Fodor,1975)提出的颇具影响力的模块化理论认为,每种输入感觉都由一个专门的处理器处理。该理论假设感知无法被认知渗透,包括任何发生在模块之外的信息处理,因为模块本身并不相互影响。同样,模块化处理的结果会在模块的下游阶段进行解读。在本节中,我们将讨论感知具有认知渗透性的证据,并结合预测架构提出的一个相关问题:我们的先验知识从何而来?
Fodor’s (1975) influential modularity thesis, that each type of input sensation is processed by a dedicated processor, assumes that perception is not penetrable by cognition, including any information process taking place outside the modules, which themselves do not influence one another. Again, the results of modular processing are interpreted during stages downstream from the modules. In this section we will discuss evidence for the cognitive penetrability of perception in combination with a related issue raised by the predictive architecture, where do our priors come from?
本书以认知科学的哲学和认识论视角开篇。人类心智的目标是认识真理,或者更心理学意义上的认识论,即获得可证实的真实信念。自苏格拉底以来,整个认识论体系,除了偶尔受到怀疑论者的抨击外,都致力于揭示心智如何能够并且确实认识真理。福多尔(2000)坚持这条道路,甚至拒绝了进化论和进化心理学。然而,预测处理架构接受进化论,因此,它将人类心智的最终目标是实现对世界的有效行为适应。真理固然美好,但生存更重要,而福多尔的坚持实际上是一种狂热(Frankenhuis & Ploeger,2007;Pinker,2005)。
We began this book with the philosophical, epistemological perspective on cognitive science. The goal of the human mind is to know Truth or, more psychologically, to acquire justifiable true beliefs. The entire enterprise of epistemology from Socrates onward, with the exception of occasional sniping by skeptics, was devoted to showing how the mind could, and did, know the truth. Fodor (2000) tenaciously kept to this path to the point of rejecting evolution and evolutionary psychology. However, the predictive processing architecture accepts evolution, and, therefore, it sees the human mind’s ultimate goal as achieving effective behavioral adaptation to the world. Truth is nice, but survival is more important, and Fodor’s tenacity is really fanaticism (Frankenhuis & Ploeger, 2007; Pinker, 2005).
因此,进化很可能塑造了感知,使其能够最佳地应对——拥有有效的贝叶斯先验——心智将要置身于的特定世界。我们天生就具备随时可用且可靠适应的意识。例如,请考虑一下Kleffner和Ramachandran(1992)的弹出点(图5.20)。
Therefore, it is likely that evolution has shaped perception to be optimally prepared for—have effective Bayesian priors for—the particular world in which the mind will find itself. We come equipped with a consciousness ready to hand and reliably adaptive. Consider, for example, Kleffner and Ramachandran’s (1992) pop-out dots (Figure 5.20).
这种错觉以及其他错觉的产生都是因为,包括人类在内的动物都是在一个由上方单一光点(太阳)照亮的世界中进化而来的(Stone, Kerrigan, & Porrill, 2009; Gigerenzer, 2008; Clark, 2013, 2016)。
This illusion and others are caused by the fact that animals, including people, have evolved in a world illuminated by a single point of light (the sun) shining from above (Stone, Kerrigan, & Porrill, 2009; Gigerenzer, 2008; Clark, 2013, 2016).
这种先天先验的威力或许可以用一种名为“反遮蔽”的现象来最好地体现。这种现象被动物(Tinbergen,1957)和人类用作伪装,是由美国艺术家阿博特·塞耶(Abbot Thayer,1849-1941;Behrens,2014)发现的。当我们看到凸出的点时,我们的视觉系统会将中间两列看作是朝我们凸出的半球:假设这些点都是均匀的灰色,那么它们在光线照射到的顶部应该呈现较浅的灰色,而在阴影下的底部应该呈现较暗的灰色。当我们翻转圆点,两个半球现在会从我们眼前弹出,光线到达底部的地方颜色较浅,而顶部则较暗。塞耶推断,如果一个物体被涂成顶部比底部更暗(仿佛在阴影中),就像在光照下一样,我们的视觉就会被这种刻意的反阴影所欺骗(图5.21)。
The power of this innate prior is perhaps best illustrated by a phenomenon called countershading that is used as camouflage by both animals (Tinbergen, 1957) and humans, discovered by American artist Abbot Thayer (1849–1941; Behrens, 2014). In seeing the pop-out dots, our visual system sees the middle two columns as hemispheres popping out toward us: Assuming that the dots are uniformly grey, they should be lighter grey on top where light strikes them and darker below, where there is shade. When we flip the dots, the hemispheres now are taken to pop away from us, paler where the light reaches the bottom and darker on top. Thayer reasoned that if an object were painted such that its top was darker (as if it were in shade) than its bottom (as if it were lighted), our vision would be fooled by this deliberate counter-shading (Figure 5.21).
反遮光技术在进化过程中已经被使用,经过塞耶和他的儿子的长期努力,它成为了军事伪装的主要手段(图 5.22)。
Countershading was already used by evolution, and, after a long campaign by Thayer and his son, it became a staple of military camouflage (Figure 5.22).
我们大脑关于地球上物体如何被照亮的固有假设的最后一个例子是颜色恒常性现象。乔治·贝克莱指出了尺寸恒常性现象,即尽管物体在我们视网膜上的投射尺寸发生了变化,但我们对物体尺寸的感知保持不变。我们对颜色也有同样的感知,尽管物体的实际亮度随着从亮处移到暗处而发生变化,我们对物体颜色的感知保持不变(图5.23)。
A final example of our brain’s innate assumption about how objects on earth are lit is the phenomenon of color constancy. George Berkeley, recall, pointed out the phenomenon of size constancy, how we hold constant in perception an object’s size despite changes in its projected size on our retinas. We do the same with colors, holding constant in perception an object’s color despite changes in its actual illumination as it moves from light into shade11 (Figure 5.23).
总的来说,这些现象表明,刺激误差无需克服,因为在人类信息处理的任何环节,都不存在完美的感觉——未经解读的简单原子刺激。此外,我们的许多感知先验早在人类出现之前就已进化,至少存在于所有哺乳动物的大脑中。
Collectively, these phenomena suggest that there is no stimulus error to be overcome because there are no immaculate sensations—uninterpreted simple atomic stimuli—existing at any point in human information processing. Moreover, many of our perceptual priors evolved well before the appearance of humans, existing in at least all mammalian brains.
与动物不同,人类会学习概念,而这些概念也能渗透到感知中(Lupyan,2017)。像贾斯特罗的鸭子/兔子这样的模糊图形,通常一次只能被看作一种解读,要么是鸭子,要么是兔子,并在瞬间从一种解读转换为另一种解读(Lupyan,2017)。然而,在一个巧妙的实验中,詹森和马修森(2011)设计了一些言语提示,让受试者在两种解读下都能看到相同的模糊图形对。图 5.24展示了鸭子/兔子对。参与者最初看到这些图像时,通常都会以一种模棱两可的方式看待它们,他们的体验会从一种解读转换到另一种解读。然而,当听到“鸭子正在吃兔子”这个提示时,大多数人都能将右侧图像看作是捕食者鸭子,将左侧图像看作是被捕食者兔子。
Unlike animals, humans learn concepts, and these, too, can penetrate perception (Lupyan, 2017). Ambiguous figures such as Jastrow’s duck/rabbit can usually be seen under one interpretation at a time, as either a duck or a rabbit, flipping from one to the other in a moment (Lupyan, 2017). However, in a clever experiment, Jensen and Mathewson (2011) came up with verbal cues that allowed subjects to see identical pairs of ambiguous figures under both of their interpretations. Figure 5.24 shows the duck/rabbit pairs. Participants first saw these and saw them both in the usual ambiguous way, their experience flipping from one interpretation to the other. However, given the cue, “The duck is eating the rabbit,” most were able to see the right-hand image as the predatory duck and the left-hand image as the predated rabbit.
因此,一个全新的概念——食肉鸭!——能够渗透并改变这些刺激的通常感知处理(Lupyan & Clark,2015;Lupyan et al.,2020)。
Thus, a brand-new concept—carnivorous ducks!—was able to penetrate and change the usual perceptual processing of these stimuli (Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Lupyan et al., 2020).
詹姆斯说,注意力意味着“为了有效地处理其他事情而从某些事情中抽离出来”。但为什么我们必须这样做呢?为什么我们不能同时有效地处理所有事情?为什么同时进行多任务处理如此困难(Musslick & Cohen,2021)?答案可以追溯到启发冯特早期意识研究的哲学问题。在《发展理念之路》一书中,哲学家们曾探究,在某一特定时刻,有多少个理念或表象构成了人类意识。休谟等经验主义者认为,意识由许多简单的理念构成,它们捆绑在一起。通过联想。另一方面,以康德为首的唯心论者则强调我们主观体验到的意识的单一统一性。冯特并没有解决这场争论,但他确实发现了人们能够处理的信息量存在限制,这种限制取决于信息量的数量(在他自己的研究中)或时间(斯珀林发现)。
James said that attention involves “withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.” But why must we do this? Why can’t we deal effectively with everything at once? Why is it so hard to multitask (Musslick & Cohen, 2021)? The answer goes back to the philosophical question that inspired Wundt’s earliest research on consciousness. Developing the Way of Ideas, philosophers had asked how many ideas, or representations, constituted human consciousness at a single moment in time. Empiricists such as Hume said consciousness consisted of many simple ideas, a bundle bound together by association. Idealists, on the other hand, led by Kant, emphasized the singular unity of consciousness subjectively experienced as such by us. Wundt did not settle this debate, but he did find limits on how much information people can process as a function of number of items (in his own research) or as a function of time (as Sperling found).
我们有限的信息处理能力的经典证明——以及区分系统2和系统1的首要动机——来自于言语学习领域的研究——即记忆无意义的音节或单词列表。这项研究促使阿特金森和希弗林提出了两种记忆形式:短期记忆和长期记忆。
The classic demonstration of our limited capacity for information processing—and the first motive for distinguishing System 2 from System 1—comes from work in the field of verbal learning—the memorization of lists of nonsense syllables or words. This research led to Atkinson and Shiffrin’s positing of two forms of memory, the short-term store and the long-term store.
想象一下,听到并被要求记住一份以下列内容开头的列表
Imagine listening to and being asked to remember a list that starts as follows
依此类推,总共 24 项。人们通常采用的学习这种清单的策略是排练,即一边听到单词一边默念。然而,在某个时候,需要记住的项目比你能承受的要多,这时就必须有所作为,产生干扰。在某些情况下,已经排练过的项目会被你设法记住的新项目所取代(前摄干扰——新知识扰乱旧知识);在其他情况下,新项目无法进入排练集(后摄干扰——旧知识扰乱新知识)。当清单结束时,你会被要求记住尽可能多的项目,如果我们将回忆概率绘制为清单中位置的函数,我们会得到这条曲线,即序列位置效应(图 5.25)。
And so on for a total of 24 items. The strategy people usually adopt to learn this kind of list is rehearsal, saying the words silently to yourself as you hear them. However, at some point there are more items to be kept in mind than you can bear, and something’s got to give, creating interference. In some cases, items already being rehearsed get knocked out by new items you manage to latch on to (proactive interference—new learning disrupts old); in others, new items fail to enter the rehearsal set (retroactive interference—old learning disrupts new learning). When the list ends, you are asked to remember as many items as you can, and if we plot the probability of recall as a function of position in the list, we get this curve, the serial position effect (Figure 5.25).
前几项(首因效应)和后几项(近因效应)记忆良好,但中间项记忆较差。因此,在模态模型中,短期存储(STS)是信息处理的瓶颈,位于容量较大的感觉存储和长期存储之间。通过STS传递信息会导致遗忘,这要么是通过干扰(如序列位置效应所示),要么是通过衰变(Wa、Masud 和 Bays,2014),我们可以用魔术师的一种叫做时间误导的技巧来说明这一点。
The first few items (primacy effect) and the last few items (recency effect) are remembered well, but the middle items are remembered poorly. In the modal model, then, the short-term store (STS) is a bottleneck in information processing placed between the larger capacity sensory and long-term stores. Moving information through STS causes forgetting, either through interference, as demonstrated by the serial position effect, or through decay (Wa, Masud, & Bays, 2014), which we can illustrate with a magician’s technique called time misdirection.
大多数纸牌戏法都是从魔术师要求观众抽取一张牌开始的,任何一张都可以。然而,有时强制抽牌效果更好,让观众抽取一张我们选择的牌。所有强制抽牌中最简单的是交叉切牌强制抽牌12;它简单到你可能不相信它能起作用,但只要稍加时间误导,它就能起作用。一副牌被洗好后,魔术师会悄悄地记下底牌的牌型。参与者切牌,将牌堆的上半部分放在下半部分旁边,然后将下半部分交叉放在上半部分上,完成切牌。接下来是时间误导,魔术师描述发生了什么,指出参与者控制了牌并在任意位置切牌。然后,魔术师会通过多种可能性中的一种,揭晓被切牌选中的牌型。参与者翻开横放在牌堆另一侧的那半副牌,揭开它的身份,这与魔术师的预测相符!到现在为止,由于 STS 的容量有限以及信息衰减的趋势,参与者和观众已经忘记了“揭示”的牌只是洗牌后牌堆最底下的牌,魔术师可以轻易地知道。
Most card tricks start out with the magician asking someone to take a card, any card. However, sometimes it’s better to force a card, getting the audience member to pick a card of our choosing. The simplest of all forces is the cross-cut force12; it’s so simple you may not believe it works, but with a little time misdirection, it does. A deck is genuinely shuffled, and the magician quietly notes the identity of the bottom card. The participant cuts the cards, places the top half of the deck next to the lower half, and completes the cut by placing the lower half cross-wise on the upper half. Now comes the time misdirection, as the magician describes what has happened, pointing out that the participant controlled the cards and made the cut anywhere. Then, by one of many possibilities, the magician reveals the identity of the card chosen by the cut. The participant turns over the half-deck of cards resting crossways on the rest of the deck, revealing its identity, which matches the magician’s prediction! By now, because of the limited capacity and tendency for information to decay in STS, participant and audience have forgotten that the “revealed” card was just the bottom card of the deck after shuffling and could have been easily known by the magician.
在其最初的表述中,短期记忆(或存储)被认为只是一个容量有限的通道,信息必须通过该通道进行进一步处理并存储在长期记忆中。关于其容量究竟有多有限的争论随之而来,早期公式将“神奇数字”设定为七项(Miller,1956),后来下调至四项(Cowan,2001)。然而,从一开始,人们就认为STS的意义远不止于有限的规模,因为如果运用得当,短期记忆能够容纳的神奇数字可以通过米勒所谓的“组块”进行灵活调整。在米勒看来,这是一个格式塔的理念:一些项目集合形成自然的组群,可以作为单个组块编码到记忆中,而组块在STS中只占用一个位置。
In its original formulation, short-term memory, or store, was thought of as just a limited capacity channel through which information had to pass for further processing and for storage in long-term memory. Debate ensued about how limited its capacity was, an early formulation setting the “magical number” at seven items (Miller, 1956), later revised downward to four (Cowan, 2001). However, from the beginning, there was the thought that there was more to the STS than limited size because, used properly, the magical number of items that short-term memory could hold was flexible through the deployment of what Miller called chunks. In Miller’s hands, it was a Gestalt idea: Some collections of items formed natural groups that could be encoded into memory as a single chunk taking up just one slot in STS.
想象一下,学习一个字母列表,而不是部分属于 FBIDBQ 的单词列表。它包含六个项目,接近或超过了 STS 的容量。然而,FBI 形成了一个自然组或块,由于其超出列表的含义,可以将其视为单个项目。当列表包含可分块的项目(例如 FBI)时,STS 中可以保存的项目比其他情况下更多 (Thalmann, Souza, & Oberauer, 2019)。因此,即使将相同的九个字母打乱排列,超出了短期记忆的容量,由 FBI - C - I - A - N - S - A这三个块组成的列表也可以被完全回忆起来。魔术师表演的许多最神秘的纸牌戏法都依赖于使用魔术师记住的纸牌(有时是在观众面前即兴表演!),使用分块和其他助记技巧。
Imagine learning a list of letters rather than words that goes in part F-B-I-D-B-Q. It contains six items, near or above the capacity of STS. However, F-B-I forms a natural group, or chunk, and can be thought of as a single item because of its extra-list meaning. When lists contain chunkable items, such as FBI, more items can be kept in STS than otherwise (Thalmann, Souza, & Oberauer, 2019). So, a list consisting of F-B-I-C-I-A-N-S-A, three chunks, could be completely recalled, even though the same nine letters scrambled would exceed the capacity of short-term memory. Many of the most mystifying card tricks that magicians do depend on the use of stacked decks of cards that magicians memorize (sometimes on the fly in front of the audience!), using chunking and other mnemonic techniques.
我们已经追溯了信息处理的过程,并探讨了短期记忆,它是通往长期记忆的桥梁。然而,短期记忆的概念已经发展成为一个含义更为丰富的概念,称为工作记忆(Baddeley,2016)。工作记忆不仅仅是一个信息存储库;它也是智力的关键组成部分,也是系统2的核心。接下来,我们将讨论工作记忆和长期记忆。
We have followed information processing up to short-term memory, the bridge to long-term memory. However, the concept of short-term memory has become a much richer concept called working memory (Baddeley, 2016). Working memory is much more than an information store; it’s also a key component of intelligence and the heart of System 2. Next, we move to it and LTM.
我们能同时进行多任务处理吗?信息处理受认知负荷的影响:我们处理的信息越多,效率和准确性就越低。例如,如果在呈现的单词列表末尾,参与者从一个随机数(例如582)开始以3为单位倒数——这是一项具有挑战性的任务——那么近因效应就会消失,因为减法任务会阻碍复习。随着数字设备的兴起,据称出现了一代精通媒体的多任务处理者,他们能够同时发短信、上课专心听讲,还能调情。13大量研究已确凿地证明,这只是一个误区(Kirschner & De Bruyckere,2017;May & Elder,2018;Uncaphera & Wagner,2018;Lovell,2021)。这种误解之所以存在,原因之一是有些人自欺欺人地认为他们可以进行多任务处理,错误地认为他们正在进行多任务处理,而实际上他们只是在进行任务切换(Srna、Schrift 和 Zauberman,2018)。
Can we multitask? Information processing is subject to cognitive load: The more information we process the less efficiently and accurately we do it. For example, if at the end of a presented word list, participants count backward by threes from a random number (e.g., 582)—a challenging task—the recency effect disappears because the subtraction task blocks rehearsal. With the rise of digital devices, a generation of media-savvy multitaskers has allegedly arisen, adepts who can text, pay attention in class, and flirt all at the same time.13 A mass of research has shown conclusively that this is a myth (Kirschner & De Bruyckere, 2017; May & Elder, 2018; Uncaphera & Wagner, 2018; Lovell, 2021). One reason the myth survives is that some people fool themselves into thinking that they can multitask, falsely believing that they are multitasking when they are just task-switching (Srna, Schrift, & Zauberman, 2018).
计算和认知神经科学解释了为什么多任务处理是不可能的(Madore & Wagner, 2019; Musslick & Cohen, 2021; Rothbart & Posner, 2015),但根本问题是生物学问题。请记住,我们不可能一边做 27 × 13 的乘法一边走路。正如我们将看到的,人脑是能量消耗大户,向特别耗能的 2 号系统添加任务会导致认知崩溃。了解这些崩溃代价的绝佳资料是电视连续剧《空难调查》(2003 年以后),https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0386950/。尤其是在 1995 年左右发生的空难中,原因主要是心理因素而非机械因素,而且在几乎所有情况下,根本问题都是飞行员的信息处理能力超负荷。该剧还展示了应用认知心理学在安全工程中的应用。
There are computational and cognitive neuroscience explanations for why multitasking is impossible (Madore & Wagner, 2019; Musslick & Cohen, 2021; Rothbart & Posner, 2015), but the fundamental problem is biological. Remember that we can’t multiply 27 × 13 and walk at the same time. As we will see, the human brain is an energy hog, and adding tasks to the especially expensive System 2 results in cognitive breakdowns. An excellent source for seeing the costs of these breakdowns is the TV series Air Crash Investigation (2003+), https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0386950/. Especially in crashes occurring after about 1995, the causes are primarily psychological rather than mechanical, and, in almost every case, the root problem is overloading pilots’ information processing limits. The show also showcases jobs for applied cognitive psychology in safety engineering.
有时,让认知负荷发挥作用是可能的。在康复初期,我服用了一种可能产生幻觉副作用的药物。我开始“听到”妻子呼救,但这根本不可能。所以,当这种情况发生时,我会倒数三,幻觉就会消失。这就引出了——
Sometimes it’s possible to make cognitive load work for you. Early in rehab I was put on a medication that had a potential side effect of inducing hallucinations. I started “hearing” my wife calling out for help, which was impossible. So, when it happened, I’d count backward by threes, and the hallucination would vanish. This takes us to—
唐纳德·霍夫曼从预测加工的角度撰写了《反现实案例:进化为何将真相从我们眼前隐藏》(纽约:WW·诺顿出版社,2019年)。他反驳了福多尔所认可的“心智是为了寻找真理”的哲学论点,认为了解什么是适应性更为重要。
Donald Hoffmann makes The Case against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (New York: W. W. Norton, 2019) from the predictive processing perspective. He argues against the philosophical thesis (endorsed by Fodor) that the mind is for finding Truth, arguing that knowing what’s adaptive is more important.
理查德·格雷戈里是一位研究感知的领军人物,兴趣广泛,兼收并蓄。他写了两本引人入胜的书,分别是《奇异感知》和《更奇异感知》。 (纽约:劳特利奇出版社,1989年,1994年),运用感知的怪癖来阐释其心理学。他编辑了一部作品《巧妙的眼睛》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,1995年),书中介绍了顶尖心理学家如何将科学应用于艺术,包括维米尔对暗箱的运用。
Richard Gregory was a leading perception researcher of broad and eclectic interests. He wrote two fascinating books, Odd Perceptions and Even Odder Perceptions (New York: Routledge, 1989, 1994), using quirks of perception to illustrate its psychology. He edited a collection, The Artful Eye (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), in which leading psychologists applied science to art, including Vermeer’s use of the camera obscura.
蒂莫西·威尔逊 (Timothy Wilson) 的《陌生人》(2002 年)总结了关于我们对大象活动过程缺乏认识的研究,但他将这些研究结果用于实际目的,例如如何更快地入睡。
Timothy Wilson’s Strangers to Ourselves (2002) contains summaries of research on our poor awareness of the elephant’s processes, but he uses the findings for practical ends, such as how to go to sleep more quickly.
http://www.tasteofcinema.com/2015/10-great-movies-that-question-the-nature-of-human-perception/上列出了一些相关的电影。类似的网站还有https://www.filminquiry.com/6-movies-screw-sense-reality/,但它指的是罗森汉一项现已被否定的关于精神错乱的研究。
At http://www.tasteofcinema.com/2015/10-great-movies-that-question-the-nature-of-human-perception/ there’s a list of relevant films. Similar is https://www.filminquiry.com/6-movies-screw-sense-reality/, but it refers to a now-discredited study on insanity by Rosenhan.
认知心理学家研究电影体验(例如,电影中对phi现象的运用)。两篇总结性文章如下:ES Tan,“电影心理学”,Palgrave Communications 4 (2018): 第82篇。DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0111-y | www.nature.com/palcomms;以及EB Goldstein,“电影感知”,载于《感知百科全书》第一卷(洛杉矶:SAGE出版社,2010年),第459-461页。DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412972000.n146。
Cognitive psychologists study the movie experience (e.g., its use of the phi phenomenon). Two summary articles are: E. S. Tan, “A Psychology of the Film,” Palgrave Communications 4 (2018): Article 82. DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0111-y | www.nature.com/palcomms; and E. B. Goldstein, “Film (Cinema) Perception,” in Encyclopedia of Perception, Vol. 1 (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010), pp. 459–461. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412972000.n146.
最后,网站https://www.k-state.edu/psych/vcl/applied-research/film.html由一个广泛研究电影认知心理学的实验室维护,包括感知、注意力和记忆。
Finally, the website https://www.k-state.edu/psych/vcl/applied-research/film.html is maintained by a lab investigating the cognitive psychology of film broadly, including perception, attention, and memory.
在众多可能性中,本章给出了两个例子。
Out of many, many possibilities, here are two examples for this chapter.
图像的持久性被用来创造魔术师所谓的“视觉保留” ——手中的小物体(例如硬币或海绵球)消失。魔术师一只手拿着物体,假装把它放在另一只手上。由于视觉保留,观众会暂时“看到”物体在接球的手中,但当物体不在时,他们会感到惊讶。演示和教程可在https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdxWuLOHaJ8上观看。想要观看我见过的最好且价格实惠的教程,请访问https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8sPAu2o99A。
The persistence of the icon is exploited to create what magicians call retention of vision vanishes of small objects in the hand, such as coins or sponge balls. The magician holds the object in one hand and pretends to place it in the other. Because of retention of vision, the audience “sees” the object momentarily in the receiving hand and is surprised when it’s not there. Demonstrations and a tutorial are available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdxWuLOHaJ8. For the best I’ve ever seen and an inexpensive tutorial, visit https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8sPAu2o99A.
魔术师们毫不留情地利用了人们对于变化视盲的现象。公主牌戏法就是一个很好的例子。
Magicians mercilessly exploit change blindness. A case in point is the Princess Card Trick.
通常情况下,公主牌戏法是用一副五张牌的牌组为一位观众表演的,但我使用的是为团体表演而开发的改良版本。你将学习这个戏法的认知秘诀,但不会学习牌组操作的秘诀。在图5.26中,你会看到五张扑克牌的展示。快速地看一眼(不超过五秒钟左右),闭上眼睛,想出一张要从牌组中剔除的牌。值得注意的是,今天,也就是2019年7月29日,我已经预测了你会选哪张牌,并且安排了四张牌的展示,但少了你的牌。请翻到图5.27,看看我是否猜对了。你的牌在那儿吗?
Normally, the Princess Card Trick is performed with a packet of five cards for a single spectator, but I’m using a modified version developed for groups. You will learn the cognitive secret of the trick but not the card manipulation secret. In Figure 5.26 you will find a display of five playing cards. Look at it briefly (no more than five seconds or so), close your eyes, and think of one card to eliminate from the packet. Remarkably, today, July 29, 2019, I have predicted which card you will choose, and have arranged a display of four cards that’s missing yours. Turn to Figure 5.27 and see if I’m right. Is your card there?
我怎么会提前这么久知道你的选择?答案是视盲。请看图 5.28。最上面一排 5 张牌是最初展示的牌,最下面一排是我从中“移除”了一张牌的牌。但是,这些牌都不在第一个展示牌中,因此无论你从第一个展示牌中选择什么牌,它都不在四张牌的牌组中。但是,由于扑克牌看起来相当相似,你没有注意到从第一个五张牌展示牌到最后一个五张牌展示牌的变化,所以以为我以某种方式猜出了你的牌。你对从第一次展示牌到第二次展示牌阵的变化视盲。
How did I know your choice so far in advance? The answer is change blindness. Look at Figure 5.28. The top row of 5 cards was the initial display, and the bottom row is the display from which I had “removed” one card. However, none of these cards was in the first display, therefore no matter what card you chose from the first display, it was not in the four-card set. However, since playing cards look rather similar, you did not notice the change from the first five-card display to the last, and so thought I had somehow divined your card. You were blind to the change in the card array from the first presentation to the second.
下一章记忆演示。请阅读以下段落一两遍,但不要重复。下一章将要求你尽力回忆这段文字及其标题。
Memory Demonstration for Next Chapter. Please read the following passage once or twice, but do not return to it. In the next chapter you will be asked to recall the passage and its title as best you can.
一天晚上,两个来自埃古拉克的年轻人去河边猎捕海豹。他们到达那里时,雾气渐浓,风平浪静。这时,他们听到了战吼,心想:“也许是战队来了。”他们逃到岸边,躲在一根木头后面。这时,独木舟驶来,他们听到桨声,看到一艘独木舟正向他们驶来。独木舟上有五个人,他们说道:
“你觉得怎么样?我们想带你一起去。我们要逆流而上,去和那些人开战。”
其中一个年轻人说:“我没有箭。”
他们说:“箭在独木舟里。”
“我不去。我可能会被杀。我的亲戚们不知道我去了哪里。不过你,”他转身对另一个人说,“可以跟他们一起去。”
于是,一个年轻人去了,另一个却回家了。
战士们继续沿河而上,来到卡拉玛河对岸的一个小镇。人们来到河边,开始战斗,许多人阵亡。但不久,年轻人听到一个战士说:“快,我们回家吧:那个印第安人被击中了。”他心想:“哦,他们是鬼魂。”他没有感到恶心,但他们说他被枪击中了。
于是,独木舟回到了埃古拉克,年轻人上岸回家,生了一堆火。他告诉大家:“看哪,我和鬼魂们一起出去打仗了。我们许多同伴被杀了,许多袭击我们的人也被杀了。他们说我被击中了,但我没有感到不舒服。”
他把一切都说了出来,然后就沉默了。太阳升起时,他倒下了。嘴里吐出了一个黑色的东西。他的脸变得扭曲。人们跳起来,哭了起来。
他死了。
One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals and while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard war-cries, and they thought: “Maybe this is a war-party.” They escaped to the shore and hid behind a log. Now canoes came up, and they heard the noise of paddles, and saw one canoe coming up to them. There were five men in the canoe, and they said:
“What do you think? We wish to take you along. We are going up the river to make war on the people.”
One of the young men said, “I have no arrows.”
“Arrows are in the canoe,” they said.
“I will not go along. I might be killed. My relatives do not know where I have gone. But you,” he said, turning to the other, “may go with them.”
So one of the young men went, but the other returned home.
And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. The people came down to the water and they began to fight, and many were killed. But presently the young man heard one of the warriors say, “Quick, let us go home: that Indian has been hit.” Now he thought: “Oh, they are ghosts.” He did not feel sick, but they said he had been shot.
So the canoes went back to Egulac and the young man went ashore to his house and made a fire. And he told everybody and said: “Behold I accompanied the ghosts, and we went to fight. Many of our fellows were killed, and many of those who attacked us were killed. They said I was hit, and I did not feel sick.”
He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down. Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people jumped up and cried.
He was dead.
内容
Contents
Memory Is a Recording. No: Memory Is a Re/construction of the Past
It’s All in There. No: There Is Forgetting, Interference, and Mutability of Memories
Memories Are Stored Experiences. No: Memories Are Re-bound Experiences
Memory Is One Thing. No: “Memory” Can Be Decomposed into Types
Taxonomies of Long-Term Memory
Semantic vs. Episodic (Autobiographical) Memory
Declarative vs. Procedural Memory
Investigating Long-Term Memory
Capacity Is Infinite and Expands with Use
Content Addressability, Gist, and Inference
Memory as Imaginative Construction and Reconstruction: Schemas
Controversies about Long-Term Memory
Individual Differences in Memory
Flashbulb Memories: Does Vividness of Memory Indicate Accuracy?
The Memory Wars: Repression, False Memories, and Eyewitness Testimony
自传揭示了记忆在个人和心理层面的意义。其中最杰出的两部作品是圣奥古斯丁的《忏悔录》(公元410年)和马塞尔·普鲁斯特的《追忆似水年华》(1913年) 。
Autobiographies reveal the personal and psychological significance of memory. Two of the best are Saint Augustine’s Confessions (410 CE) and Marcel Proust’s (1913) In Search of Lost Time.
圣奥古斯丁(公元354-430年)受洗成为基督徒,但他失去了信仰。在青年时期和成年早期,他一直试图通过尝试知识动荡的希腊化时代(Leahey,2018)的多元哲学和宗教来寻找新的信仰。他的《忏悔录》讲述了他追寻上帝的一生,并在其中反思了记忆的本质,写道:“记忆的力量多么伟大,我的上帝啊,它是多么令人敬畏,它是多么深邃无边的多样性;而这便是心灵,而这便是我自己。” 奥古斯丁将记忆描述为一个储存过去的地方,我们可以通过它来探索:
St. Augustine (354–430 CE) was baptized a Christian, but he lost his faith, spending his youth and early adulthood hoping to find a new one by trying on the variegated philosophies and religions of the intellectually restless Hellenistic Age (Leahey, 2018). His Confessions recounts his life in search of God, and, at one point, he reflects on the nature of memory, writing, “Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself.” Augustine describes memory as a place that stores the past and through which we search:
看哪,在我记忆的平原、洞穴、深渊中,数不清数不清地充满了无数的事物……我该去哪里寻找祢?如果我在记忆之外找到了祢,那我岂不是没有将祢铭记于心?如果我不记得祢,我又如何能找到祢?
Behold in the plains, and caves, and caverns of my memory, innumerable and innumerably full of innumerable kinds of things.… And where shall I find Thee? If I find Thee without my memory, then do I not retain Thee in my memory. And how shall I find Thee, if I remember Thee not?
这种担忧使奥古斯丁发现了一个关于记忆的奇怪但重要的事实,我们可以称之为记忆悖论:
This worry leads Augustine to discover an odd but important fact about memory we can call the paradox of memory:
就像那个丢了钱币的女人,她点着灯去找它;除非她记得,否则她永远也找不到。因为即使找到了,她又怎么知道是不是同一个呢?除非她记得。我记得我曾经寻找过很多东西,也找到过很多东西;因此我知道,当我寻找其中任何一件时,有人问:“就是这个吗?”“就是那个吗?”我一直说“不”,直到有人把我想要的东西提供给我。即使有人提供给我,如果我不记得了,我也找不到,因为我认不出它。当我们寻找并找到任何丢失的东西时,情况总是如此。尽管如此,当任何东西偶然从眼前消失,而不是从记忆中消失时,它的形象仍然保留在心中,我们会一直寻找它,直到它重新回到眼前;当它找到时,我们是通过内心的形象来识别的:除非我们认出了丢失的东西,否则我们不会说我们找到了它;除非我们记住了它,否则我们也无法认出它。但这些东西虽然从眼前消失,却保留在记忆中。但是,当记忆本身丢失了任何东西时,比如当我们忘记并寻找以回忆起它时,它就会掉落下来,该怎么办呢?最终,我们除了在记忆中寻找,还会在哪里寻找呢?在那里,如果偶然出现了一样东西而不是另一样东西,我们就会拒绝它,直到我们寻找的东西找到我们;当它发生时,我们说,“就是它了”;除非我们认出了它,否则我们不会说出来;除非我们记得它,否则我们不会认出它。
For the woman that had lost her coin, and sought it with a light; unless she had remembered it, she had never found it. For when it was found, whence should she know whether it were the same, unless she remembered it? I remember to have sought and found many a thing; and this I thereby know, that when I was seeking any of them, and was asked, “Is this it?” “Is that it?” so long said I “No,” until that were offered me which I sought. Which had I not remembered though it were offered me, yet should I not find it, because I could not recognise it. And so it ever is, when we seek and find any lost thing. Notwithstanding, when any thing is by chance lost from the sight, not from the memory, yet its image is still retained within, and it is sought until it be restored to sight; and when it is found, it is recognised by the image which is within: nor do we say that we have found what was lost, unless we recognise it; nor can we recognise it, unless we remember it. But this was lost to the eyes, but retained in the memory. But what when the memory itself loses any thing, as falls out when we forget and seek that we may recollect? Where in the end do we search, but in the memory itself? and there, if one thing be perchance offered instead of another, we reject it, until what we seek meets us; and when it doth, we say, “This is it”; which we should not unless we recognised it, nor recognise it unless we remembered it.
当我们在阁楼里寻找东西时,我们知道要找什么,因此看到它时就能认出来。然而,当我们搜索记忆时,我们并没有找到它——如果有的话,我们就不会搜索了——但如果我们脑子里还没有找到它,我们又如何能认出它呢?
When we search for something in our attic, we know what we are looking for and will thus recognize it when we see it. However, when we search memory we don’t have it—if we did, we wouldn’t be searching—but if we don’t already have it in mind, how do we recognize when we find it?
奥古斯丁观察到记忆对于定义我们是谁(即“我就是我自己”)具有个人心理重要性,而普鲁斯特(1871-1922)对此进行了阐述。
Augustine observes the personal psychological importance of memory to defining who we are—”this I am myself”—amplified by Proust (1871–1922).
很长一段时间里,我习惯早睡。有时,蜡烛一灭,我的眼睛就合上得很快,甚至来不及说“我要睡觉了”。半小时后,我又突然想到该睡觉了;我试图把那本我以为还在手里的书收起来,然后吹灭蜡烛;睡着的时候,我一直在想着刚才读到的内容,但我的思绪却跑偏了,最终我似乎真的成了这本书的主题:一座教堂,一场四重奏,弗朗索瓦一世和查理五世之间的竞争。这种印象在我醒来后还会持续一段时间;它并没有扰乱我的思绪,但它像鳞片一样压在我的眼睛上,使我无法察觉蜡烛已经熄灭的事实。然后,它开始变得难以理解,就像是来自过去某个时刻的思绪。
For a long time, I used to go to bed early. Sometimes, when I had put out my candle, my eyes would close so quickly that I had not even time to say, “I’m going to sleep.” And half an hour later the thought that it was time to go to sleep would awaken me; I would try to put away the book which, I imagined, was still in my hands, and to blow out the light; I had been thinking all the time, while I was asleep, of what I had just been reading, but my thoughts had run into a channel of their own, until I myself seemed actually to have become the subject of my book: a church, a quartet, the rivalry between François I and Charles V. This impression would persist for some moments after I was awake; it did not disturb my mind, but it lay like scales upon my eyes and prevented them from registering the fact that the candle was no longer burning. Then it would begin to seem unintelligible, as the thoughts of a former existence.
每天清晨醒来,我们都必须回溯记忆,将清醒时的想法与睡前的想法联系起来。以普鲁斯特为例,他阅读时产生的想法和画面如此生动,以至于他一时之间将它们与清醒时的意识流联系起来,误以为自己是自己。普鲁斯特的短暂失误表明,我们的自我意识和我们在世界上的位置取决于记忆的正确运作(Nelson,2003)。
When we wake up each morning, we must reach back in memory to connect our awakening thoughts to those at bedtime. In Proust’s case, the thoughts and images caused by his reading were so vivid that for a moment he linked them to his waking stream of consciousness and mistook himself. Proust’s brief error shows that our sense of self and our place in the world depends on the right working of memory (Nelson, 2003).
由于我们对记忆的运用如此灵活,在每个意识时刻都发挥作用——每个模式识别行为都是一种记忆行为——我们自以为对记忆了如指掌。我们对记忆的天真信任反映在关于记忆的普遍信念中,而这些信念在认知科学看来不过是神话。Simons 和 Chabris(2011)向三组人群提出了关于记忆的问题:公众、记忆研究专家以及心理学会(一个由实验心理学家组成的精英协会)的成员(表 6.1)。
Because our use of memory is so fluid, working in the background of every conscious moment—every act of pattern recognition is an act of memory—we think we know it well. Our naïve trust in memory is reflected in commonplace beliefs about it that are myths according to cognitive science. Simons and Chabris (2011) posed questions about memory to three groups, the public, experts in memory research, and members of the Psychonomic Society, an elite association of experimental psychologists (Table 6.1).
陈述 Statement |
团体 Group |
非常同意 Strongly Agree |
基本同意 Mostly Agree |
大多不同意 Mostly Disagree |
强烈反对 Strongly Disagree |
不知道 Don't Know |
健忘症: 患有健忘症的人通常无法记起自己的名字或 Amnesia: People suffering from amnesia typically cannot recall their own name or |
民众 Public |
47.8 47.8 |
34.9 34.9 |
10.1 10.1 |
3.7 3.7 |
3.7 3.7 |
身份。 identity. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
12.5 12.5 |
87.5 87.5 |
0.0 0.0 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
0.0 0.0 |
1.4 1.4 |
31.5 31.5 |
57.5 57.5 |
9.6 9.6 |
自信的证词: 在我看来,一位自信的目击者的证词 Confident testimony: In my opinion, the testimony of one confident eyewitness |
民众 Public |
11.2 11.2 |
25.9 25.9 |
35.1 35.1 |
24.7 24.7 |
3.1 3.1 |
应该有足够的证据来判定被告有罪。 should be enough evidence to convict a defe ndant of a crime. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
6.2 6.2 |
93.8 93.8 |
0.0 0.0 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
11.0 11.0 |
87.7 87.7 |
1.4 1.4 |
视频记忆: 人类记忆的工作原理就像摄像机一样,准确地记录 Video memory: Human memory works like a video camera, accurately recording 我们看到和听到的事件,以便我们以后可以回顾和检查它们。 the events we see and hear so that we can review and inspect them later. |
民众 Public |
23.9 23.9 |
39.1 39.1 |
23.4 23.4 |
11.3 11.3 |
2.4 2.4 |
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
6.2 6.2 |
93.8 93.8 |
0.0 0.0 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
2.7 2.7 |
97.3 97.3 |
0.0 0.0 |
催眠: 催眠有助于帮助证人准确回忆犯罪细节。 Hypnosis: Hypnosis is useful in helping witnesses accurately recall details of crimes. |
民众 Public |
15.0 15.0 |
39.6 39.6 |
26.9 26.9 |
10.4 10.4 |
8.1 8.1 |
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
18.8 18.8 |
68.8 68.8 |
12.5 12.5 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
15.1 15.1 |
69.9 69.9 |
15.1 15.1 |
意外事件: 当意外事件发生时,人们通常会注意到 Unexpected events: People generally notice when something unexpected enters |
民众 Public |
27.2 27.2 |
50.3 50.3 |
18.3 18.3 |
2.1 2.1 |
2.1 2.1 |
他们的视野,即使他们正在关注其他事物。 their field of view, even when they're paying attention to something else. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
18.8 18.8 |
31.2 31.2 |
50.0 50.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
2.7 2.7 |
15.1 15.1 |
35.6 35.6 |
43.8 43.8 |
2.7 2.7 |
永久记忆: 一旦你经历了某个事件并形成了记忆 Permanent memory: Once you have experienced an event and formed a memory |
民众 Public |
16.5 16.5 |
31.1 31.1 |
34.7 34.7 |
14.1 14.1 |
3.6 3.6 |
但那段记忆不会改变。 of it, that memory does not change. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
专家 Experts |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
93.8 93.8 |
6.2 6.2 |
|
心理经济学 Psychonomics |
0.0 0.0 |
0.0 0.0 |
6.8 6.8 |
91.8 91.8 |
1.4 1.4 |
| 为了便于文中阐述,每个问题都标注了一个简短的标签(粗体)。公开样本中每个问题对应的数字代表了加权受访者给出每个答案的百分比。doi:l0.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t002。 | ||||||
对于这六个问题,公众和科学家给出了不同的答案。
The public and scientists gave different answers to all six questions.
奥古斯丁将记忆比作洞穴的比喻,在20世纪不可避免地被“记忆是记录”的理念所取代(Draisma,2000)。不幸的是,记录的比喻强化了人们对记忆的直觉性信任。尽管目前人们对深度伪造视频和Photoshop™的担忧引发了人们对记忆的质疑,但记忆就像一段可以倒带重放的录音的想法依然存在。录音机的比喻保留了奥古斯丁的空间特质,暗示记忆是一个被动的仓库(Roediger,1980),而正如我们将看到的,它更像是橡皮泥。
Augustine’s metaphor for memory as caves and caverns was inevitably replaced in the 20th century by the idea of memory as a recording (Draisma, 2000). Unfortunately, the recording metaphor reinforces intuitive faith in memory. Although at present skepticism about memory is provoked by worries about deep fake videos and Photoshop™, the idea that memory is like a recording that can be rewound and replayed persists. The recorder metaphor retains the spatial quality of Augustine’s, suggesting that memory is a passive storehouse (Roediger, 1980), when as we’ll see, it’s more like silly putty.
我们将了解到,记忆是对过去的重构。即使这种表述也过于薄弱,因为正如我们刚刚了解到的,我们对世界的持续体验是一种即时构建,将我们预测的世界模型构建与来自感官的纠错信号融合在一起。因此,即使记忆是完美的记录,它也是对所发生事件的解读的完美记录,而不是对已发生事件的记录。此外,每一次记忆行为都会使用相同的构建过程来创造新的体验,但却没有纠错信号的可能性。普鲁斯特曾说过:“对过去事物的回忆不一定是对事物本来面目的回忆。”
Memory, we will learn, is a reconstruction of the past. Even this formulation is too weak because, as we just learned, our ongoing experience of the world is an on-the-fly construction merging our predictive world model-building with error correction signals from the senses. Therefore, even if memory were a perfect recording, it would be a perfect recording of an interpretation of what happened, not a recording of what did happen. In addition, every act of remembering creates a new experience using the same constructive processes but without the possibility of error correction signals. Proust remarked, “Remembrance of things past is not necessarily remembrance of things as they were.”
关于记忆最有害的迷思之一是:如果记忆是一种记录,那么我们所经历的一切都会被储存在某个地方。弗洛伊德相信这一点,这导致他犯下了灾难性的诱惑错误,并由此创立了精神分析学(Leahey,2018)。一些现代治疗师坚持相信这一点,导致了道德恐慌和对虐童的诬告。催眠师也相信这一点,这导致他们通过暗示性探寻谋杀和外星人绑架的记忆。
One of the most pernicious myths about memory is that if memory is a recording, then everything we’ve ever experienced is stored away somewhere. Freud believed it, leading him to make the disastrous seduction mistake that created psychoanalysis (Leahey, 2018). Some modern therapists persisted in believing it, leading to moral panics and false accusations of child abuse. Hypnotists believe it, leading to suggestive probing for memories of murders and alien abductions.
然而,正如我们在感觉记忆和短期记忆(STM)研究中发现的那样,并非所有记忆都包含在内。有些体验由于回溯性干扰而无法编码,而另一些体验则由于前摄性干扰而丢失。未被注意到的体验部分,例如意外遇到的大猩猩,根本就不会被编码。
However, as we have already found from research on sensory and short-term memory (STM), it’s not all in there. Some experiences are blocked from encoding because of retroactive interference, and others are lost because of proactive interference. Unattended parts of experience, such as unexpected gorillas, never get encoded at all.
无论是奥古斯丁的洞穴,还是如今的计算机文件,存储的隐喻都意味着每段记忆都存储在心理或神经空间的某个特定区域。例如,大脑中某个文件夹里保存着你昨晚晚餐的记忆,或者你第一只宠物的神经痕迹。正如奥古斯丁所说:“它的形象仍然保留在大脑中,人们不断寻找它,直到它重回视野。” 然而,事实并非如此。感知的绑定问题也适用于记忆。过去经验原本绑定的感官表征必须重新绑定到过去的某个事件中。
The storage metaphor, whether Augustine’s caverns or today’s computer files, implies that each memory is stored in a single part of psychological or neural space. So, for example, there’s a folder holding your memory of last night’s dinner or a neural trace of your first pet somewhere in the brain. As Augustine said, “its image is still retained within, and it is sought until it be restored to sight.” However, this is not true. The binding problem of perception applies to memory, too. The originally bound sensory representations of past experience must be re-bound into a single event from the past.
我们已经根据记忆存储于信息处理中的位置将其分为不同的类型。长期记忆(LTM)本身也可以进行类似的划分。
We have already divided memory stores into types based on their position in information processing. Long-term memory (LTM) itself can likewise be divided.
认知科学家如何定义和分类长期记忆的形式引发了一些重要的概念问题,因为分类的基础因分类法而异。有时是心理结构,有时是可报告性,有时仅仅是方法论,而在背后隐藏着可能的神经生理学方法,通过位置、神经连通性、神经元类型,甚至所涉及的神经递质来表征记忆储存。最后,一旦做出区分,我们就可以探究它们之间的关系。例如,我们是否应该期望或要求基于两个记忆系统的心理结构的区别能够平滑地映射到神经生理区别上?最后一个问题可能尤其难以回答。例如,信息处理的模态阶段模型并不能整齐地映射到大脑区域,导致一些认知神经科学家认为心理学家的模态模型不切实际。 Ranganath、Libby 和 Wong (2012) 和 Oberauer (2009) 提出,据称位于单独 STM 中的项目是 LTM 中当前已激活的项目(但请参阅 Norris,2017)。
How cognitive scientists have defined, and classified, forms of long-term memory raise some important conceptual issues because the bases of the classification vary from one taxonomy to another. Sometimes it’s psychological structure, sometimes it’s reportability, sometimes it’s simply methodological, and in the background lurk possible neurophysiological ways of characterizing memory storage by location, neural connectedness, types of neurons, or even neurotransmitters involved. Finally, once the distinctions are made, we can ask how they relate to one another. For example, should we expect or require that a distinction based on the psychological structures of two memory systems map smoothly onto a neurophysiological distinction? This last question can be especially difficult to answer. For example, the modal stage model of information processing does not map neatly onto brain areas, leading a few cognitive neuroscientists to reject psychologists’ modal model as mythical. Ranganath, Libby, and Wong (2012) and Oberauer (2009) propose that items supposedly in a separate STM are items in LTM that are currently activated (but see Norris, 2017).
在艾宾浩斯(Ebbinghaus)创立的言语学习范式(特别是关于词汇表学习)的背景下,图尔文(Tulving,1972)提出,长期记忆(LTM)存在不同形式,这些形式由其心理功能和结构定义。图尔文认为,学习词汇表涉及两个记忆系统。首先,实验参与者会创造一段关于他们生活中新事件的记忆;其次,他们会运用一种已经存在的记忆形式,即对词汇表单词含义的记忆。因此,他将第一种记忆称为情景记忆,将第二种记忆称为语义记忆。
In the context of the verbal learning paradigm invented by Ebbinghaus, and specifically about word-list learning, Tulving (1972) proposed that there were different forms of LTM defined by their psychological functions and structure. Tulving argued that learning a list of words involved two memory systems. First, being participants in an experiment created a memory of a new episode in their lives; second, they were deploying an already existing form of memory, memory for the meaning of the words in the list. Hence, he dubbed the first kind of memory episodic memory, and the second, semantic memory.
情景记忆的组织方式是时间性的。当我们搜索它时,我们会沿着我们生活的时间线进行搜索,找出所需记忆在一系列其他记忆中发生的时间。所以,如果我问你上周二下午1点在哪里,你可能会回忆起你的课程安排和社交互动,最终想起上完心理学课后,你和朋友在一家露天咖啡馆共进午餐。如今,“自传体记忆”这个术语已经在很大程度上取代了图尔文最初提出的“情景记忆”。
The organization of episodic memory is temporal. When we search it, we search on a timeline of our lives, working out when a requested memory occurred in a sequence of other memories. So, if I ask you where you were last Tuesday at 1 PM you might recall your class schedule and social interactions to finally retrieve that after psych class you were having lunch with a friend at an outdoor café. Today, the term autobiographical memory has largely replaced Tulving’s original episodic memory.
语义记忆的组织结构由词义构成。例如,当回忆“长颈鹿”、“茄子”、“狒狒”、“送奶工”这样的列表时,参与者倾向于按语义类别对条目进行分组,例如长颈鹿和狒狒,送奶工和牙医,等等。我们很少在记忆中为单词添加可时间定位的标签(你可能不知道自己是什么时候学到长颈鹿的),但在某些特殊情况下,你可能会这样做(比如你昨天去看了牙医)。历史可以改变记忆:你曾经遇到过送奶工吗?(我家遇到过。)打印机是工作还是设备?
The organization of semantic memory is structured by the meaning of words. For example, when recalling a list such as the giraffe, eggplant, baboon, milkman list, participants tend to group the items by semantic category, giraffe with baboon, milkman with dentist, and so on. We rarely have temporally locatable tags on memory for words (you probably don’t know when you learned what a giraffe was), though in some idiosyncratic cases you may (you saw the dentist yesterday). History can alter memorability: Have you ever had a milkman? (My family did.) Was printer a job or a device?
20世纪40年代,英国哲学家吉尔伯特·赖尔(Gilbert Ryle,1946年,1949年)区分了两种类型的知识:知识如何(knowing-how)和知识如何(knowing-that)。前者指的是学习到的活动,例如骑自行车、系鞋带或做煎蛋卷。知识如何指的是我们已知的事实,例如“巴黎是法国的首都”或“煎蛋卷是用鸡蛋做的”。重要的是,这两个类别之间存在重叠,但不完全重叠。NBA球星可以投进三分球,但他们可能无法描述其中涉及的物理原理——他们拥有知识如何,但没有知识如何——而物理学家通常恰恰相反,拥有知识如何,却没有知识如何。在某些情况下,知识如何和知识如何可能部分重叠。我可以教你如何做煎蛋卷,直到把它抛成最终的形状,这需要实际的运动技能学习;可以演示,但你必须练习。1
In the 1940s, British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1946, 1949) drew a distinction between two types of knowing, knowing-how and knowing-that. The first referred to learned activities such as riding a bicycle or tying one’s shoes or making omelets. Knowing that referred to things we know as facts, such as “Paris is the capital of France,” or “Omelets are made with eggs.” Importantly, the categories overlap, but incompletely. NBA stars can sink three-point shots, but they probably can’t describe the physics involved—they have know-how without knowing-that—while physicists are usually the reverse, having know-that without the know-how. In some cases, it’s possible for knowing-how and knowing-that to overlap partially. I can teach you how to make an omelet up to the point of tossing it into its final form, which takes actual motor-skill learning; it can be shown, but you must practice.1
Squire & Zola-Morgan (1988) 借鉴临床和实验神经科学,对程序性学习(或记忆)和陈述性学习(或记忆)进行了类似的区分。程序性学习是指你能做的,而陈述性学习是指你能谈论的。从某种意义上说,这种区分是赫尔和托尔曼学习理论的核心区别。赫尔强调做/程序,而托尔曼强调陈述/知识。由于缺乏赖尔或斯奎尔的区分,他们认为这场战斗是“非此即彼”,而不是实际上的“两者兼而有之”。
Drawing on clinical and experimental neuroscience, Squire & Zola-Morgan (1988) made a similar distinction, between procedural learning (or memory) and declarative learning (or memory). Procedural learning is what you can do, declarative learning is what you can talk about. In a sense, this distinction was the core difference between Hull’s and Tolman’s theories of learning. Hull emphasized doing/procedure, while Tolman emphasized declaring/knowledge. Lacking either Ryle’s or Squire’s distinctions, they saw their battle as either-or rather than, as it really was, both-and.
LTM 记忆类型的最后一个主要分类是外显记忆和内隐记忆(Graf & Schacter, 1985)。目前,最好将其作为对各种记忆实验的描述性、方法论性区分 (Schacter, 1987)。外显记忆是人们有意识地提取的记忆,而内隐记忆则是那些在自身未被意识到的情况下影响行为的记忆。
The final major taxonomy of LTM memory types is between explicit and implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985). For now, it’s best to present this as a descriptive, methodological distinction about kinds of memory experiments (Schacter, 1987). Explicit memories are those that people consciously retrieve, while implicit memories are memories that influence behavior without themselves coming to awareness.
内隐记忆的例子来自认知启动研究。让我们回到长颈鹿、茄子、狒狒的列表来进行说明。在使用这些物品的启动实验中,我们向参与者逐个显示计算机屏幕上的单词。我们要求他们在看到每个单词时尽快说出它,并测量每个单词开始被说出所需的时间:它的延迟或反应时间。我们可以操纵单词的前后呈现之间的关系。例如,假设第三个单词是“狒狒”,如上所示。最初呈现的单词是启动,而后面的单词是目标。我们感兴趣的是看看启动是否促进(引发)对目标的反应。
Examples of implicit memory come from studies of cognitive priming. Let’s return to the giraffe, eggplant, baboon list to illustrate. In a priming experiment with these items, we present participants with the words one at a time on a computer screen. We ask them to say each word as quickly as possible when they see it, and we measure how long it takes for each word to begin being said: its latency or reaction time. We can manipulate the relationship between earlier and later presentations of the words. Suppose, for example, the third word is “baboon,” as above. The initially presented word is the prime and the later word is the target. We are interested in seeing if the prime facilitates (primes) response to the target.
现在想象第六个单词是这些中的一个:狒狒;狒狒;黑猩猩;狮子;打印机。我们通常会发现,与初始呈现的反应时间相比,身份启动狒狒(相同字体的相同单词)的 RT 最短;狒狒(不同字体的相同单词)稍长一些;语义启动黑猩猩(相关物种)和狮子(另一种丛林动物)稍长一些;与对照组相比没有变化,对照组的第一个单词是语义上不相关的目标打印机。因为呈现时间很短,所以参与者通常不会注意到启动和目标之间的关系,从而使启动成为内隐记忆的问题。
Now imagine that the sixth word is one of these: baboon; baboon; chimpanzee; lion; printer. We will typically find that compared to the reaction time for the initial presentation, the RT will be shortest for the identity prime baboon (same word in same typeface); a bit longer for baboon (same word in different typeface); a bit longer for the semantic primes chimpanzee (related species) and then lion (another jungle animal); and unchanged compared to controls where it was the first word, the semantically unrelated target printer. Because presentation times are brief, participants usually don’t notice the relationships between primes and targets, making priming a matter of implicit memory.
我们可以通过改变任务来强化启动效应的内隐、无意识影响。参与者首先像在短期记忆实验中一样学习一串单词,并接触潜在的启动效应。为了验证这一点,他们随后进行一个单词片段补全任务,填补单词片段中缺失的空格,例如 b__o_n。一组(外显记忆组)被告知部分单词片段来自之前的记忆列表;另一组(内隐记忆组)则没有被告知。此外,两组都看到了填充词,也就是说,这些单词之前没有出现过,以减少内隐组注意到单词重复的机会。然而,两组都对重复的单词(即启动词)表现出了更强的理解能力。最有趣的是,患有失忆症的受试者在完成单词片段拼图时会完全忘记参与初始列表学习任务,但他们对目标词仍然会表现出正常或接近正常的启动(Graf & Schacter, 1985)。他们失去了形成外显记忆的能力,但他们仍然会受到他们没有意识到的刺激的正常启动。
We can strengthen the case for implicit, unconscious influence of primes by changing the task. Participants first learn a list of words as in a short-term memory experiment, exposing them to potential primes. To test this, they later do a word fragment completion task, filling out missing spaces in word fragments such as b__o_n. One group, the explicit memory group, is told that some of the word fragments came from the earlier memory list; the other, the implicit memory group, is not told. In addition, both groups see filler words, that is, words not presented earlier, to reduce the chance the implicit group notices the word repetitions. However, both groups show enhanced solution for the repeated, i.e., primed words. Most interestingly, subjects with amnesic syndrome, who by the time of doing the word fragment puzzle will have completely forgotten participating in the initial list learning task, will nevertheless display normal to near normal priming for the target words (Graf & Schacter, 1985). Their ability to form explicit memories is lost, but they continue to be normally primed by stimuli of which they are not aware.
与注意力和模式识别的研究一样,长期记忆的认知科学始于德国,由赫尔曼·艾宾浩斯(Hermann Ebbinghaus,1850-1909)开创。艾宾浩斯建立了一套严谨的方法论,直到20世纪60年代,它一直主导着相关研究。然而,他却在研究材料选择上做出了一个决定性的决定,让科学家们走进了一条漫长的死胡同(Kintsch,1985)。
Like the study of attention and pattern recognition, the cognitive science of long-term memory began in Germany with the work of Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909). Ebbinghaus established a rigorous methodology that dominated research until the 1960s. Unfortunately, he made a fateful decision about what material to use that sent scientists down a long blind alley (Kintsch, 1985).
艾宾浩斯于 1885 年出版了《论记忆》 (Über das Gedachtnis)。与当时大多数心理学家一样,艾宾浩斯采用了联想主义的思维概念,因此他认为联想的形成是学习和记忆的基本过程。他将联想称为连接思想的“心理线索”。他想研究这些线索以及它们如何独立于内容来连接和解开思想。因此,他拒绝研究单词、诗歌或段落等有意义的材料,因为他认为人们学习、记忆和遗忘它们的方式会混淆理解的认知过程和联想学习。实际上,艾宾浩斯试图解开记忆的戈耳迪之结;像亚历山大一样,他成功了,但没有在关节处雕刻出自然的形状。
Ebbinghaus published On Memory (Über das Gedachtnis) in 1885. Like most psychologists of the time, Ebbinghaus adopted the associationist conception of the mind, and thus he saw association formation as the basic process of learning and memory. He called associations “mental threads” that connect ideas. He wanted to study the threads and how they bind and unbind ideas independently of their content. He therefore rejected studying meaningful material such as words, poems, or paragraphs, because how people learn, remember, and forget them would confuse, as he thought, cognitive processes of comprehension with association learning. Ebbinghaus, in effect, sought to cleave the Gordian knot of memory; like Alexander, he succeeded at the cost of not carving nature at the joints.
为了检验他的线索,艾宾浩斯发明了无意义音节,即在两个辅音之间放置一个元音:TOB、SAB、GEN等等。这些音节很容易构造,并能产生大量可学习的材料。由于它们毫无意义,需要纯粹的记忆,这就排除了兴趣、与已学内容的相关性以及对意义的理解等因素。为了进行实验控制,艾宾浩斯构建了音节列表,并以恒定的速度在一天中的固定时间呈现。整个过程很容易量化:艾宾浩斯可以测量他(他的第一个参与者)在改变自变量时学习或重新学习音节列表所花费的时间,希望像巴甫洛夫一样,发现联想学习的科学规律。
To examine his threads, Ebbinghaus invented the nonsense syllable, constructed by placing a vowel between two consonants: TOB, SAB, GEN, and so on. They were easy to make up and produced a large amount of learnable material. Being meaningless, they required sheer memorization, ruling out such factors as interest and relevance to what has already been learned as well as comprehension of meaning. To impose experimental control, Ebbinghaus constructed lists of syllables to be presented at a constant rate of speed and at consistent times of the day. The whole procedure was easily quantifiable: Ebbinghaus could measure how long it took him (his first participant) to learn or relearn lists of syllables as he changed independent variables, hoping, like Pavlov, to discover scientific laws of associative learning.
就启发价值而言,艾宾浩斯的方法取得了巨大的成功,因此它在人类学习中长期占据主导地位。我们只讨论其中一项发现,即艾宾浩斯遗忘曲线。关于记忆的一个最明显的事实是,我们学的东西越久远,就越难记住。根据个人经验,我们只能这么说。但艾宾浩斯的实验使得更精确地提出问题并获得定量答案成为可能。在一系列实验中,艾宾浩斯记住了八组包含 13 个无意义音节的音节表;之后,在不同的时间之后,他再次记住了它们。因此,艾宾浩斯可以根据重新学习的难度准确地问出:在给定时间内,一组无意义音节中有多少被忘记了?
As far as heuristic value goes, Ebbinghaus’ method was a smashing success, hence its dominance of human learning for so long. We will look at just one finding, the Ebbinghaus curve of forgetting. One of the most obvious facts about memory is that the longer ago we learned something, the harder it is to remember. Based on personal experience, we can say no more than that. But Ebbinghaus’s experiments made it possible to frame the question more precisely and receive a quantitative answer. In a series of experiments, Ebbinghaus learned by heart eight lists of 13 nonsense syllables each; later, after differing amounts of time, he learned them by heart again. Consequently, Ebbinghaus could ask precisely, in terms of difficulty of relearning: How much of a list of nonsense syllables is forgotten at a given time?
图6.1展示了艾宾浩斯实验的结果;它显示了遗忘材料的百分比随初始学习后小时数的变化。大多数遗忘发生得很快。学习后仅一小时,超过55%的无意义音节就被遗忘了,而超过8.8小时的额外遗忘在31天后也只有14%。艾宾浩斯准确地展示了遗忘发生的速度。艾宾浩斯的遗忘曲线简直是老师的噩梦:课后几个小时,学生们就忘记了大部分所教的内容!
Figure 6.1 illustrates the results of Ebbinghaus’ experiments; it shows the percent of material forgotten as a function of hours after initial learning. Most forgetting takes place quickly. Only an hour after learning, more than 55 percent of the nonsense syllables have been forgotten, while the additional loss past 8.8 hours is only 14 percent after 31 days. Ebbinghaus showed exactly how quickly forgetting takes place. Ebbinghaus’ curve of forgetting is a teacher’s nightmare: Just hours after class, students will have forgotten most of what was taught!
另一方面,并非所有记忆都会以如此惊人的速度衰退。例如,在一项巧妙的实验中,Bahrick、Bahrick 和 Wittlinger(1975)利用高中毕业纪念册,测量参与者从毕业两周到54年后对同学姓名和面孔的记忆。对于姓名,他们采用了自由回忆和再认记忆法。在自由回忆中,参与者被要求记住尽可能多的同学姓名。为了测试再认记忆,他们要求同学姓名以名单与非同学的对照姓名混杂在一起。对于图片,识别记忆的测量方法是将同学的年鉴照片与同期其他高中年鉴中的对照照片混杂在一起;参与者需表明是否记得每张照片中的人。在线索回忆程序中,自由回忆被部分模仿,该程序会给出图片的线索,并询问参与者是否记得这些学生。Bahrick等人发现,即使在最长的时间内,对姓名和面孔的识别记忆也几乎没有下降。姓名的自由回忆和图片的线索回忆确实会随着时间的推移而下降,并且与艾宾浩斯曲线的形状一致,尽管速度要慢得多。对无意义音节的记忆仅需几个小时,而对姓名和面孔的记忆则需要几十年。一般而言,视觉记忆(尤其是通过识别评估的视觉记忆)比言语记忆要强得多,对朋友等重要社会信息的记忆也是如此。
On the other hand, not all memories decay at such an alarming rate. For example, in a clever experiment, Bahrick, Bahrick, and Wittlinger (1975) used high school yearbooks to measure participants’ memory of names and faces of fellow students from two weeks to 54 years after graduation. For names, they used free recall and recognition memory methods. In free recall, participants are asked to remember as many fellow students’ names as possible. To test recognition memory, fellow students’ names were shown in lists mixed up with control names of non-fellow students. For pictures, recognition memory was measured by yearbook pictures of fellow students mixed up with control pictures from yearbooks of other high schools from the same period; participants indicated whether they remembered the person in each picture. Free recall was partially imitated in a cued recall procedure, in which cues to the pictures were given, and participants were asked if they recalled the students. Bahrick et al. found that recognition memory for both names and faces scarcely declined at all even over the longest periods. Free recall of names and cued recall of pictures did decline over time and in accord with the shape of Ebbinghaus’ curve, though much more slowly. What took mere hours for nonsense syllables took decades for names and faces. In general, visual memory, especially as assessed by recognition, is much more robust than verbal memory, as is memory for socially important information such as friends.
一些批评者拒绝信息处理模态模型的原因之一是,区分短期记忆和长期记忆有时会遇到困难(Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014; Shevlin, 2020;另见Norris, 2017)。例如,定义短期记忆(STM)的现象之一是序列位置效应,但它也出现在长期记忆(LTM)中。一些研究要求美国人自由回忆他们的总统,并发现了强烈的序列位置效应(DeSoto & Roediger, 2019)。只有林肯的总统任期在中间位置突出(图6.2)。
One of the reasons why some critics reject the modal model of information processing is the occasional difficulty of distinguishing short-term and long-term memory (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014; Shevlin, 2020; but see Norris, 2017). For example, one of the phenomena that defines STM is the serial position effect, but it appears in LTM, too. Several studies have asked Americans to free-recall their presidents and found a strong serial position effect (DeSoto & Roediger, 2019). Only Lincoln’s presidency stands out in the middle (Figure 6.2).
此外,所有形式的记忆都可以进行策略管理,从而模糊了短期记忆 (STM) 和长期记忆 (LTM) 之间的界限。一个重要的例子是前瞻性记忆(Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996; Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008; MacBride & Workman, 2017; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007)。当我们思考记忆时,我们会想到回顾性记忆,就像奥古斯丁和普鲁斯特所探讨的那种。然而,我们也以不同的方式使用长期记忆,就像在购物清单中列出待办事项一样。回顾性记忆和前瞻性记忆并非旨在作为两种不同的记忆形式,而是作为使用现有长期记忆的不同方式,而使用前瞻性记忆需要谨慎的策略管理。我们必须列出清单,记住要参考它,并监控我们的行为,注意在正确的时间按正确的顺序做事,并且不要忘记任何一件事。2它涉及元记忆——思考记忆——就像我们离开家时问自己“我关掉烤箱了吗?”,或者反思我们个人的记忆故障,“我不擅长将名字与面孔匹配”,或衰老的影响,“这些天我经常处于舌尖状态。”你可以想象,有效地运用前瞻性记忆在现实生活中非常重要(Dismukes,2012;Walter&Meier,2014)。
Moreover, all forms of memory can be strategically managed, blurring the distinction between STM and LTM. An important example is prospective memory (Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996; Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008; MacBride & Workman, 2017; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). When we think of memory, we think of retrospective memory, the kind probed by Augustine and Proust. However, we also use LTM in a different way, as providing a list of things to do as in a shopping list. Retrospective and prospective memory are not intended as separate forms of memory, but as different ways of using existing LTM, and using prospective memory requires careful strategic management. We must form the list, remember to consult it, and monitor our behavior, being careful to do things in the right order at the right time and not to forget any of them.2 It involves metamemory—thinking about memory—as when we ask ourselves, “Did I turn off the oven?” when leaving the house, or reflecting on our personal memory glitches, “I’m bad at matching names to faces,” or effects of aging, “I get in tip-of-the-tongue states more often these days.” As you can imagine, effective prospective memory use is important in real life (Dismukes, 2012; Walter & Meier, 2014).
诸如此类的考量表明,STM 不仅仅是一个容量有限的盒子,用于短暂地存储输入的想法,它还管理着 Atkinson 和 Shiffrin 模态模型中提到的控制过程,从而催生了工作记忆(WM) 的概念。迄今为止,最具影响力的工作记忆理论是艾伦·巴德利 (Alan Baddeley) 的理论。巴德利提出的该模型是一种非正式的模型,旨在指导研究,但受到了更明确的计算方法的挑战,例如 Oberauer (2009; 2019; 详见 Shevlin, 2020)。为了便于我们探讨,我们将继续使用巴德利的模型。
Considerations such as these indicated that STM was more than simply a limited capacity box in which incoming ideas could be briefly placed, but also managed the control processes mentioned in the Atkinson and Shiffrin modal model, creating the concept of working memory (WM). By far the most influential theory of working memory is Alan Baddeley’s. Baddeley proposed the model as an informal one meant to guide research and has been challenged by more explicit computational approaches, such as Oberauer (2009; 2019; for review, Shevlin, 2020). For our purposes, we will stick with Baddeley.
Baddeley (2012) 提出的模型由几个部分组成(图 6.3)。Baddeley 从智力心理测量学中引入了流体系统和晶体系统之间的区别。智力的一个公认分类是流体智力和晶体智力。晶体智力大致就是你所知道的东西。它有两个重要组成部分:情景记忆(我们对自己过去的了解)和语义记忆(我们对思想含义的认识)。后者对智力的重要性超乎你的想象。例如,智商测试的词汇分项与整体智商的相关性约为 0.80。
Baddeley (2012) presents his model as composed of several components (Figure 6.3). Baddeley imported the distinction between fluid and crystallized systems from the psychometrics of intelligence. One widely acknowledged division of intelligence is between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence. Crystallized intelligence is roughly what you know. Its two important components are episodic memory, what we know of our own past, and semantic memory, our knowledge of the meaning of ideas. The latter is more important for intelligence than you might think. For example, the vocabulary subtest of IQ tests correlates about .80 with overall IQ.
流体智力与解决问题有关。它包含三个缓冲区,提供感官输入和长时记忆(LTM,晶体智力)之间的接口。视觉空间速写板将视觉记忆和视觉输入汇集到一个可以整合和操控它们的地方,就像你在视觉记忆中搜索特定信息一样。语音回路对听觉记忆和输入也起着同样的作用,就像你复述“长颈鹿……茄子……狒狒……”这样的列表一样。情景缓冲区保存绑定的情景——即在我们通常的多模态体验中,感官已经结合在一起的输入和记忆——用于短暂的存储和操控,因此是当前输入与新情景记忆形成之间的关键接口(Baddeley、Allen & Hitch,2011;Popov、Marevic、Rummel & Reder,2019)。中央执行器负责监督这些容量有限的缓冲区,它管理整个系统的信息处理。
Fluid intelligence is about problem solving. It contains three buffers that provide interfaces between sensory input and LTM (crystallized intelligence). The visuo-spatial sketchpad brings together visual memories and visual inputs into a place where they can be integrated and manipulated, as when you search a visual memory for a specific bit of information. The phonological loop does the same for auditory memories and inputs, as when you rehearse a list such as Giraffe … Eggplant … Baboon…. The episodic buffer holds bound episodes—that is, inputs and memories in which the senses have been united in our usual multi-modal experiences—for brief storage and manipulation and is therefore the key interface between current input and the formation of new episodic memories (Baddeley, Allen, & Hitch, 2011; Popov, Marevic, Rummel, & Reder, 2019). Supervising these limited capacity buffers is the Central Executive, which manages information processing in the system as a whole.
以下是工作记忆在双任务跨度任务中的运用示例(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980),因为两个过程必须在一段时间内同时进行(Hunt, 2011)。参与者会看到一些句子,并需要重复每个句子的最后一个单词;完成这些句子后,参与者需要回忆每个句子的最后一个单词。
Here is an example of working memory in use (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) in what is called a dual-task span task because two processes must be simultaneously performed over a span of time (Hunt, 2011). The participant is shown a number of sentences and has to repeat the last word of each sentence; when the sentences are done, the participant is asked to recall the pronounced last word of each sentence.
呈现的句子:
Sentences presented:
第一项任务是关注句子并重复最后一个单词。同时,必须调用记忆来存储最后一个单词,以便在最后进行检索。注意这与多任务处理的相似性,即尝试同时执行多个信息处理(Covre、Baddeley、Hitch & Bueno,2019;Popov、Marevic、Rummel & Reder,2019)。这种相似性使我们认识到,工作记忆(即使不一定完全相同)是系统2思维的关键组成部分,它涉及有意识地、策略性地部署资源有限的信息处理。大量研究表明,双跨度测试和其他工作记忆效率指标与流体智力心理测量指标之间的相关性接近1.00(Kyllonen & Christal,1990;Engle et al.,1999;Hunt,2011;Chuderski,2015)。事实上,Conway、Macnamara 和 Engel de Abreu(2013)得出结论:“智力测试可能会被新的工作记忆测试所取代。” 此外,即使工作记忆能力与流体智力并不完全相同,它也已被证明对学业成绩(Alloway 和 Alloway,2010)以及工作记忆受损驾驶员的车祸增加(Walshe 等人,2019)至关重要。
The first task is attending to the sentences and repeating the last word. At the same time, memory must be called on to store the last word for retrieval at the end. Notice the similarity to multitasking, trying to perform more than one information process at the same time (Covre, Baddeley, Hitch, & Bueno, 2019; Popov, Marevic, Rummel, & Reder, 2019). This similarity points us to the idea that working memory, if not necessarily identical to, is the key component of System 2 thinking, involving conscious, strategic, deployment of resource-limited information processes. Extensive research has shown that the correlation between performance on dual span and other measures of working memory efficiency with psychometric measures of fluid intelligence approach 1.00 (Kyllonen, & Christal, 1990; Engle et al., 1999; Hunt, 2011; Chuderski, 2015). Indeed, Conway, Macnamara, & Engel de Abreu (2013) conclude that, “[T]he enterprise of intelligence testing could be replaced by a new enterprise of working memory testing.” Moreover, even if it isn’t identical to fluid intelligence, working memory ability has been shown to be critical to school achievement (Alloway & Alloway, 2010) and to increased crashes in drivers with impaired WM (Walshe et al., 2019).
奥古斯丁称记忆为“一种深邃而无边的多样性”。与其他记忆结构(感觉记忆、短期记忆和工作记忆)相比,长期记忆既不受存储容量的限制,也不受有限的认知资源的限制。长期记忆不仅没有明显的容量上限,而且其容量会随着经验的增长而增长。我们学得越多,就能储存得越多。
Augustine calls memory “a deep and boundless manifoldness.” Compared to the other memory structures, sensory memory, STM, and working memory, long-term memory is constrained neither by storage capacity nor by limited cognitive resources. Not only does LTM have no discernable upper limit on capacity, but also its capacity grows with experience. The more we learn, the more we can store.
由于LTM的容量是无限的,因此,至关重要的是,其信息必须以易于理解的方式进行组织。在讨论实时问题时,我们以被困在有火灾威胁的房间里为例。在这种情况下,生存取决于快速知道房间里哪些东西能帮助我们逃脱,哪些不能。奥古斯丁关于记忆的直觉性洞穴和洞穴隐喻在此失效,因为它混淆了自传体记忆和知识,而知识正是对有效行为至关重要的记忆储存。
Because the capacity of LTM is infinite, it’s vital that its information be structured in ways that make it accessible. In discussing the real-time problem, we used the example of being caught in a room threatened by fire. In this scenario, survival depended on quickly knowing what items in the room could help us escape, and which could not. Here, Augustine’s intuitive caves and caverns metaphor for memory breaks down because it conflates autobiographical memory and knowledge, which is the memory store important for effective behavior.
与个人记忆不同,语义记忆和知识是内容可寻址的。这意味着有意义相关的想法被存储在一起,因此访问一个想法就可以访问相关的想法。标准计算机内存不是内容可寻址的,构建内容可寻址的存储器一直是人工智能面临的一大挑战。我去英国图书馆的研究之旅体现了内容可寻址和非内容可寻址检索系统之间的重要区别。英国图书馆,例如牛津大学的博德利图书馆,历史悠久,早期的图书管理员只是将书籍送到书架上。为了方便查找,每本书都分配了一个书架号,并逐月逐年地创建了书名和书架号(以及随着新建筑的建造以存储更多书籍,位置也随之变化)的粘贴集合。因此,如果有人在寻找一本特定的书,比如格罗斯的《古物3》(1772 年),他会找到一本标有大致出版日期的书架号簿,然后翻阅笔记本找到它的位置和书架号。当你到达指定地点时,你的书会放在旁边,旁边是同时送来的其他书。格罗斯的《古物》可能放在修道院史、园艺书、外科书籍或其他任何书籍旁边。至少在当时(1988年),除了少数例外(例如伦敦大学),英国图书馆的书籍是无法进行内容寻址的:书籍的地址(书架号)并不能透露书籍的内容。
Unlike personal memory, semantic memory and knowledge are content addressable. This means that ideas that are meaningfully related are stored together, so that having access to one idea opens up access to related ideas. Standard computer memory is not content addressable and building content addressable memories has been a big challenge to AI. My research trip to British libraries exemplifies the important differences between content addressable and non-content addressable retrieval systems. British libraries, such as Oxford’s Bodleian, are ancient, and in the early days librarians simply placed books on shelves as they arrived. To make books findable, each book was assigned a shelf number, and pasted-together collections of books’ names and shelf numbers (and, as new buildings were built to store yet more books, locations) were created month by month and year by year. Thus, if one were looking for a particular book, say Grose’s Antiquities3 (1772), one would find a shelf number book for the approximate publication date and leaf through the notebook to find its location and shelf number. When you arrive at the location, there would be your book, flanked by other books that came in at the same time. Grose’s Antiquities might be next to a monastic history, a book on gardening, a text on surgery, or anything else. At least at the time (1988) and with a few exceptions (e.g., University of London), books in British libraries were not content addressable: A book’s address (the shelf number) revealed nothing about the content of the book.
你可能熟悉美国图书馆系统,它们的书架是内容可寻址的,要么通过杜威十进制分类法,要么在高等教育中使用国会图书馆(LOC)系统。这里有一本非随机抽样图书的 LOC 书架号:BF81.L4。仅凭地址,你就能了解大部分内容。B 表示你位于图书馆的哲学区。BF 表示你位于哲学区的心理学区,绝大多数心理学书籍都存放在这里。其他一些书架上也有一些,比如自然科学区(Q)、学习区(LB)或精神病学区(RC)。81 表示你位于心理学史和方法论区,可能是历史区,因为它们的编号较低。L 表示作者(谦虚的)姓氏以 L 开头。显然,语义记忆不使用 LOC 或杜威系统来组织其知识库,但它是内容可寻址的。认知科学的经验问题是探索人类记忆如何是如何组织的,以及对于人工智能的工作来说,如何在机器中有效复制,例如专家系统或自动驾驶汽车。
You are probably familiar with American library systems, whose shelves are content addressable, either by the Dewey Decimal System or, in higher education, the Library of Congress (LOC) system. Here’s a LOC shelf number for a book not sampled at random: BF81.L4. From the address alone, you can figure out much of the content. The B tells you you’re in the Philosophy section of the library. BF tells you you’re in the psychology section of Philosophy, where the vast majority of psychology books are shelved. There are a few elsewhere, in Q, natural science, LB, learning, or RC, psychiatry. The 81 tells you you’re in history and methodology of psychology books, probably history because they have the lower numbers. The L tells you that the last name of the (modest) author begins with L. Obviously, semantic memory does not use the LOC or Dewey system to organize its store of knowledge, but it is content addressable. The empirical question for cognitive science is to discover how human memory is organized and, for work in AI, how it can be usably duplicated in machines, such as expert systems or self-driving cars.
这项研究始于Bousfield (1953) 在自由回忆中发现的类别聚类现象。当人们回忆从几个类别中抽取的单词列表时,他们倾向于将同一类别中的单词一起提取出来。长颈鹿、茄子、狒狒的列表就是他提出的一个。两种相互竞争的解释引发了争议。Bousfield认为,参与者首先回忆的是类别,然后是该类别下的项目。另一种观点则更为简单,认为由于这些单词本身已经通过意义关联起来,因此无需援引其在上级类别中的共同成员关系 (Cofer, 1965)。
The search began with Bousfield’s (1953) finding of category clustering in free recall. When people recall lists of words drawn from a few categories, they tend to retrieve items from the same category together. The giraffe, eggplant, baboon list was one of his. Controversy was provoked by two rival explanations. Bousfield thought that participants recalled the categories and then the items under the category. The alternative view was simpler, arguing that because the words themselves were already associated by meaning, invoking common membership in a superordinate category was unnecessary (Cofer, 1965).
工作记忆模型的发展为聚类研究带来了新的启示。聚类并非像联想那样是一个自动的信息处理过程,而可以被视为一种战略决策,即如何编码和检索超出短期记忆(STM)容量的列表,从而对认知资源提出要求。参与者之间存在个体差异。一些人倾向于在语义上聚类他们的回忆,而另一些人则没有,前者比后者记住了列表中的更多单词(Puff、Murphy & Ferrara,1977),这表明前者的信息处理管理效率更高。后来的研究表明,参与者最初如何选择将单词编码为类别成员,以及/或者如何注意到类别并使用它们来帮助在语义长期记忆(LTM)中搜索列表中的成员,这支持了以下观点:类别列表学习是对工作记忆的双重任务评估,任务包括项目存储和检索,以及注意并记住未提及的类别标签(Gruenewald & Lockhead,1980;Cinan,2003)。
The development of models of working memory threw new light on clustering. Clustering was not an automatic information process as was association but could be viewed as a strategic decision about how to encode and retrieve a list that exceeded the capacity of STM and thus placed demands on cognitive resources. There were individual differences between participants. Some tended to semantically cluster their recalls and others did not, with the former remembering more words from the list than the latter (Puff, Murphy, & Ferrara, 1977), suggesting more efficient management of information processing. Later studies showed that how participants chose to initially encode words as members of categories and/or noticed the categories and used them to help search semantic LTM for the members that were on the list, supported the idea that categorical list learning was a dual task assessment of working memory, the tasks being item storage and retrieval plus noticing and keeping in mind the unmentioned category labels (Gruenewald & Lockhead, 1980; Cinan, 2003).
Deese (1959)、Roediger 和 McDermott (1995、2000) 范式或 DRM 范式说明了语义联想对记忆的强大影响,并且它为后来的研究主题——虚假记忆的产生——提供了启示(Gallo, 2010)。与 Bousefield 范式一样,参与者听到或阅读一串他们之后会回忆起来的单词。以下是其中一个 DRM 单词表:休息、睡觉、打瞌睡、疲倦、打鼾、醒来、小睡、清醒、做梦、平静、瞌睡、打盹、打哈欠、毯子、沉睡。在此单词表中,所有单词都是相关的,因此我们看不到任何聚集现象。然而,我们确实发现了一个不包含在列表中的“回忆起的”单词,即诱导词 SLEEP。由于 sleep 与列表中所有其他单词都有关联,因此接触该单词表就产生了虚假记忆。
The Deese (1959), Roediger, McDermott (1995, 2000), or DRM, paradigm illustrates the powerful effect of semantic association on memory, and it throws light on a later topic, the creation of false memories (Gallo, 2010). As in the Bousefield paradigm, participants hear or read a list of words that they later recall. Here is one DRM list: REST BED DOZE TIRED SNORE WAKE NAP AWAKE DREAM PEACE DROWSY SNOOZE YAWN BLANKET SLUMBER. In this list, all the words are related, so we don’t see any clustering. What we do find, however, is a “recalled” word not contained in the list, the lure word, SLEEP. Because sleep is associated with all the other words on the list, exposure to the list has created a false memory.
然而,长时记忆的结构远不止语义联想,正如舌尖现象(简称TOT)所体现的那样。每个人都经历过这种意识状态——几乎但并非完全能够回忆起一个单词或名字——但第一位对此进行评论的心理学家是威廉·詹姆斯(1890)。詹姆斯指出,TOT状态是意识中的一种缺口,但这种缺口非常活跃。正如奥古斯丁所观察到的,如果朋友提出答案,我们会拒绝错误的答案;我们会感到焦虑,只有当正确的词语最终出现时,我们才会感到轻松。正是这种活动使TOT成为奥古斯丁记忆悖论的一个绝佳例证。显然,从某种意义上说,我们知道我们在记忆中寻找,但同样明显的是,我们并没有。在认知科学教师讨论的所有认知现象中,这是我们最常被问到的问题:为什么会发生TOT?我们能做些什么来应对?
However, there’s more to the structure of LTM than semantic association, as shown by the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, or TOT for short. Everybody has experienced this state of consciousness—almost but not quite being able to retrieve a word or name—but the first psychologist to remark upon it was William James (1890). James pointed out that the TOT state was a gap in consciousness, but it was a very active gap. As Augustine observed, if friends suggest answers, we reject wrong ones; we feel anxious, and relief comes only when the right word finally emerges. It’s the activity that makes TOT a wonderful example of Augustine’s paradox of memory. Clearly, in one sense we know what we’re looking for in memory, but equally clearly, we don’t. Of all the cognitive phenomena teachers of cognitive science discuss, it’s the one we’re most often asked about: Why does TOT happen and what can one do about it?
不幸的是,这很难进行研究,因为我们无法随心所欲地让它发生。布朗和麦克尼尔(1966)开发了一种程序,只要有足够多的参与者,通常至少会在少数人身上引发TOT。他们召集了几百名参与者,向他们宣读他们希望出现在部分参与者词汇表中但数量又足够少的单词的定义,以至于他们可能会陷入TOT。我用这个方法在课堂上进行了35年的演示,发现有时效果很好,有时却惨不忍睹。
Unfortunately, it’s very hard to investigate because we can’t make it happen at will. Brown and McNeill (1966) developed a procedure that, given enough participants, will usually induce TOT in at least a few. They gathered several hundred participants together and read them definitions of words that they hoped would be in some participants’ vocabularies but were rare enough that they might fall into TOT. I used this as a class demonstration for over 35 years and found that sometimes it worked beautifully and sometimes it failed miserably.
我将以我遇到这个方法时进入TOT状态的单词为例。它的定义如下。如果幸运的话,你就能体验到TOT。
I’ll use as an example the word that put me in TOT when I met the method. Here’s the definition. With luck, you will experience TOT.
一种具有 60° 刻度弧和瞄准装置的仪器,用于测量物体之间的角距离,尤其是用于在导航中测量高度。
An instrument with a graduated arc of 60° and a sighting mechanism, used for measuring the angular distances between objects and especially for taking altitudes in navigation.
报告称处于 TOT 状态的参与者随后填写了一份简短的问卷,例如询问“你能说出第一个音节吗?”“你能想到押韵的吗?”“你能想到一个意思相近的词吗?”
Participants who reported being in TOT then filled out a brief questionnaire, asking, for example, “Can you name the first syllable?” “Can you think of a rhyme?” “Can you think of a word of similar meaning?”
如果参与者体验到TOT状态,他们就能像在现实生活中一样,回答其中一些问题,并拒绝关于目标词的错误建议,而无需提取物品本身。就我而言,作为一名历史爱好者,我毫不意外地得到了该物品的中世纪祖先——星盘,而没有得到六分仪本身(图6.4)。在我的一堂课上,一个学生可以画出一个六分仪,而无需说出它的名字。
If they experience the TOT state, participants can, as in real-life TOT, answer some of these questions and reject wrong suggestions about the target word, without retrieving the item itself. In my case, and unsurprisingly for a history buff, I got the item’s medieval ancestor, the astrolabe, without getting the item itself, the sextant (Figure 6.4). In one of my classes, a student could draw a sextant without naming it.
尽管对研究提出了挑战,但TOT状态本身就足够引人入胜,并已引发了大量研究(Brown,1991,2012)。然而,由于其脆弱性和难以捉摸的性质,无论是在理论层面还是实践层面,都鲜有探讨。两位研究者(Taylor & Mackay,2003)在评论一本关于TOT的书籍时,称其既是一座金矿,也是一座充满挑战的宝库。
Despite the challenge it presents to investigation, the TOT state is fascinating enough to have generated a great deal of research (Brown, 1991, 2012). Unfortunately, because of its fragility and elusive nature, there is not much to say about it theoretically or practically. Reviewing a book on TOT, two investigators (Taylor & Mackay, 2003) call it both a gold mine of findings and a can of worms.
就我们的目的而言,TOT 状态表明,词语并非仅仅通过其含义存储在 LTM 中(正如类别聚类和 DRM 结果所暗示的那样)。相反,词语在记忆中也被编码为具有特征性声音和音节划分的物理对象,并且通常附带图像甚至历史故事(星盘看起来不像六分仪)。在检索时,必须具备一定数量的最低限度的特征才能使整个词语浮现在脑海中。
For our purposes, the TOT state shows that words are not stored in LTM solely by their meanings, as category clustering and the DRM results might suggest. Instead, words are also encoded in memory as physical objects with characteristic sounds and syllabic divisions, and often with images and even historical stories attached (an astrolabe does not look like a sextant). At retrieval, some minimum number of characteristics must be available for the whole word to come to mind.
最后,句子记忆表明,记忆行为更多的是重构而非记忆。正如普鲁斯特所写:“回忆过去的事物不一定是回忆事物的本来面目。” 威廉·F·布鲁尔突破了以词汇为中心的语言学习传统,进行了一系列关于句子记忆的长期实验,揭示了呈现的句子在编码过程中如何系统地发生改变。我(他的研究助理)阅读了大约十几个句子的列表,然后进行了一些简单的心算(例如,32 × 74 的乘法),以消除近因效应。然后,参与者收到一张写有每个句子前几个单词的答题纸,并被要求完成每个句子。
Finally, memory for sentences shows that the act of remembering is more reconstruction than memory. As Proust wrote, “Remembrance of things past is not necessarily remembrance of things as they were.” Moving past the word-centric verbal learning tradition, William F. Brewer conducted a long series of experiments on sentence memory, demonstrating systematic ways in which presented sentences were altered during encoding. I (his research assistant) read lists of about a dozen sentences, which were followed by performance of some simple mental algebra (e.g., multiply 32 × 74) to eliminate recency effects. Then, participants were given an answer sheet with the first few words of each sentence and were asked simply to complete each one.
其中一个句子是“子弹击中了靶心”。在答题纸上,参与者填写的是“子弹 _____________________”。绝大多数学生回忆起的是“子弹击中了靶心”(Brewer,1975)。他提出,参与者并没有存储包含“struck”一词的句子的表面结构,而是存储了句子的整体含义,传统上称为 gist 。在检索时,gist 被正确地记住了,但被包装成了“struck”的同义词“hit”,这在口语英语中更为常见。gist 的概念也在 DRM 范式的一个理论中得到运用。从某种意义上说,bed、rest、……等单词列表的 gist 与 sleep 有关,因此参与者错误地回忆起它曾在原始列表中(Gallo,2010)。
One sentence was, “The bullet struck the bullseye.” On the answer sheet, participants completed, “The bullet _____________________.” Students overwhelmingly recalled, “The bullet hit the bullseye” (Brewer, 1975). He proposed that participants did not store the surface structure of the sentence with the word “struck,” but they stored the overall meaning of the sentence, traditionally called the gist. At retrieval, the gist was remembered correctly but dressed up in a synonym for “struck,” “hit,” which is a little more common in colloquial English. The idea of gist is also deployed in one theory of the DRM paradigm. In a sense, the gist of the list of words bed, rest, … etc., concerns sleep, so participants falsely recall it as having been on the original list (Gallo, 2010).
更复杂的处理过程可以更显著地改变回忆,赋予句子一个隐含的背景故事。例如,“心不在焉的教授没有车钥匙”几乎从未被准确回忆,而是以某种形式被回忆成“心不在焉的教授忘记了[或丢失了]他的车钥匙”(Brewer,1977)。在这种情况下,参与者推断出钥匙丢失的合理原因,并将其包含在他们之后回忆的句子主旨中。记忆是对经验的合理重构而非记录,这一观点对于理解Simons和Chabris(2011)记录的一些记忆迷思至关重要。
More complex processing can change recall more dramatically, giving sentences an implicit backstory. For example, “The absent-minded professor didn’t have his car keys” is almost never recalled accurately, but as some form of “The absent-minded professor forgot [or had lost] his car keys” (Brewer, 1977). In this case, participants inferred a plausible reason for the missing keys and included it in the stored gist of the sentence that they recalled later. The idea that memory is a plausible reconstruction of experience rather than its recording is important to understanding some of the myths of memory documented by Simons and Chabris (2011).
到目前为止,我们关注的研究主要集中在记忆在提取时是如何形成的,尽管我们也注意到了提取过程中的编码过程。然而,有两种理论观点强调了编码在决定记忆内容方面的作用。
The research we have looked at so far has focused on how memories are shaped at the time of retrieval, although we have noted encoding processes along the way. Two theoretical perspectives, however, emphasize the role of encoding in determining what is remembered.
第一个是Tulving 和 Thompson (1973, p. 369) 提出的编码特异性原则:“对感知内容执行的特定编码操作决定了存储的内容,而存储的内容决定了哪些检索线索能够有效地提供对存储内容的访问。”更通俗地说,该原则认为,记忆形成时出现的许多刺激都与目标记忆一起编码,它们后来的存在或缺失可以促进或抑制检索目标的能力。
The first is the encoding specificity principle proposed by Tulving and Thompson (1973, p. 369): “Specific encoding operations performed on what is perceived determine what is stored, and what is stored determines what retrieval cues are effective in providing access to what is stored.” More informally, the principle holds that many of the stimuli present when a memory is formed are encoded with the target memory, and their later presence or absence can facilitate or inhibit ability to retrieve the target.
为了证明这一点,Tulving 和 Thompson 利用了语言同音异义词,即发音相同但含义不同的词,例如pitcher,可以表示棒球位置或陶器。使用传统的单词表学习方法,他们列出了一些单词表,其中一些单词有同音词。在呈现每个单词之前,他们都会提供一个提示,让参与者被告知这个提示可以帮助他们思考即将呈现的单词。例如, Pitcher前面可能是“棒球位置”。然后测试对列表的识别记忆,将目标词的呈现与未呈现的单词(和提示)混合在一起。对于同音词,提示切换为目标词的其他含义;对于 pitcher ,提示是“陶器”(Thiemann,1984)。结果表明,通过未呈现的提示获得的同音词识别率极低。这令人惊讶,因为参与者刚刚看到“水罐”这个词,而“一件陶器”是其有效线索。Tulving 和 Thompson 得出结论,在形成列表的自传体记忆时,参与者在编码时将他们对目标词的语义记忆与列表呈现时与之配对的特定刺激整合在一起,从而有助于将目标词作为自传体记忆痕迹进行检索。再认测试不仅测试语义记忆,还测试自传体记忆(Wiseman & Tulving,1975)。
To demonstrate this, Tulving and Thompson exploited linguistic homophony, the existence of words that sound the same but have different meanings, such as pitcher, which can mean a baseball position or an item of pottery. Using the traditional word-list learning method, they made up lists of words, some of which had homophones. Before each word was presented, they provided a cue that participants were told would help them think about the item about to be presented. Pitcher, for example, might be preceded by “a baseball position.” Recognition memory for the list was then tested, presentation of target words being mixed up with non-presented words (and cues). For the homophones the cues were switched to the other meanings of the target words; for pitcher, “an article of pottery” (Thiemann, 1984). Results were that recognition for homophones cued by non-presented cues was extremely poor. This is surprising because participants had just seen the word “pitcher,” for which “an article of pottery” is a valid cue. Tulving and Thompson concluded that in forming an autobiographical memory for the list, participants had at the time of encoding integrated their semantic memories for target words with the specific stimuli paired with them when the list was presented, facilitating the retrieval of the targets as autobiographical memory traces. The recognition test did not test only semantic memory, but tested autobiographical memory, too (Wiseman & Tulving, 1975).
Tulving 和 Thompson 提出编码特异性原则是较老的心理学概念“刺激条件恢复”的一个特例,根据该原则,记忆形成时出现的所有刺激都会与目标记忆相关联,即使这些刺激与目标记忆无关。例如,Weingartner、Adefris、Eich 和 Murphy(1976)将编码特异性与已经建立的状态依赖性学习的临床概念联系起来,在该概念中,当一个人处于与记忆形成时相同的身体或心理状态时,记忆更容易被检索。他们发现,醉酒时形成的记忆在再次醉酒时比清醒时更容易被检索到。类似的研究表明,记忆检索也与情绪有关。当处于特定情绪时,人们会更容易回忆起在类似情绪下形成的记忆(Bower,2003)。这一发现与理解和治疗抑郁症有关(Loeffler、Myrtek 和 Peper,2013)。抑郁症患者常常反复思考过去,对过去的不愉快经历耿耿于怀,这会使他们的抑郁症状持续并恶化,形成一个可能致命的恶性循环 (Gaddy & Ingram, 2014)。
Tulving and Thompson presented the encoding specificity principle as a special case of the older psychological concept of reinstatement of stimulus conditions, according to which all stimuli present at memory formation are attached to a target memory even when the stimuli are not related to it. For example, Weingartner, Adefris, Eich, and Murphy (1976) linked encoding specificity to the already established clinical concept of state-dependent learning, in which memories were easier to retrieve when a person is in the same physical or psychological state as when the memory was formed. They found that memories formed while intoxicated were more readily retrieved when intoxicated again than when sober. Similar research established that memory retrieval was also mood dependent. When in a particular mood, people find it easier to recall memories formed when they had been in similar moods (Bower, 2003). This finding is relevant to understanding and treating depression (Loeffler, Myrtek, & Peper, 2013). Depressives often ruminate on their past, lingering over previous unhappy experiences, which maintains and worsens their depression in a potentially lethal spiral (Gaddy & Ingram, 2014).
各种实验都调查了在记忆测试中呈现与任务无关的刺激(编码时出现)可能会影响检索的想法(例如,Balch & Louis,1996音乐;Ciccione & Brelsford,1975,用于正字法),但积极效应难以复制,而且通常很弱,容易受到任务指令的影响。这或许可以解释为与巴甫洛夫条件反射中的阻断类似。回想一下,在阻断实验中,当一个新的CS与一个既定的CS和US一起呈现时,它本身并不会变成CS。然而,也有一个短暂的例外。如果在第一次配对新的CS之后,将其作为CS进行测试,它可能会引发较弱的CR。在标准阻断实验中,进一步的配对会将这种尚未成熟的反应视为不必要的反应而消除。在记忆实验中,待记忆的单词会在新的语境中呈现一次,因此它们可能会与实验语境中的所有刺激相关联。因此,当单词仍在该语境中被检索时,无关刺激的持续影响可能会有助于回忆,因为一次呈现的CS会触发轻微的CR。无论如何,不要指望通过在课堂上学习考试来提高你的成绩!
Various experiments investigated the idea that presentation at memory test of task-irrelevant stimuli present at encoding might affect retrieval (e.g., Balch & Louis, 1996 for music; Ciccione & Brelsford, 1975, for orthography), but positive effects proved hard to replicate and were typically weak and easily affected by task instructions. This might be explained as a parallel to blocking in Pavlovian conditioning. Recall that in blocking when a new CS is presented along with an established CS and US, it does not become a CS itself. However, there is a fleeting exception. If, after the first pairing of the new CS, it’s tested as a CS, it may provoke a weak CR. Further pairings, as in standard blocking experiments, eliminate the fledging response as unneeded. In memory experiments, to-be-remembered words are presented once in a novel context, and thus they may become associated with all the stimuli in the experimental context. Thus, while still in that context the word is asked for at retrieval, the lingering effect of irrelevant stimuli may aid recall, as a once-presented CS triggers a mild CR. In any event, don’t count on studying for a test in your classroom to raise your grade!
编码影响记忆存储和检索的另一种方式是加工深度(Craik & Lockhart, 1972)。这一概念建立在与TOT状态相关的观察结果之上,即单词除了含义之外,还具有其他特征。此外,与启动效应一样,这些特征可以独立地影响信息处理,因此,尽管目标词“狒狒”(BABOON)只有一个含义,但“狒狒”比“狒狒”更适合作为它的启动词。Craik和Lockhart提出,处理不同的特征可以被认为是从浅层加工到深层加工的深度层次结构。例如,在解答字谜时,参与者将单词视为需要重新排列的字母,而不是有意义的整体,因此,当所有生成的单词在语义上相关时,人们从列表中回忆起的单词数量并不会像往常一样增加(Leahey, 1979)。
Another way in which encoding affects how memories are stored and retrieved is depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This concept builds on something observed in connection with the TOT state, that words have characteristics other than meaning. In addition, as with priming, these characteristics can independently affect information processing, so that while the target word BABOON has only one meaning, BABOON is a better prime for it than baboon. Craik and Lockhart proposed that processing the different features could be thought of as a hierarchy of depth from shallow processing to deep processing. For example, in solving anagrams, participants see words as letters to be rearranged not as meaningful wholes, so that when all the resulting words are semantically related, people don’t show the usual increase in number of words recalled from a list (Leahey, 1979).
考虑询问有关一系列单词的以下问题(摘自 Craik & Tulving,1975 年,第 272 页)。
Consider being asked the following questions about a series of words (from Craik & Tulving, 1975, p. 272).
| 处理级别 | 问题 | 回答 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 是的 | 不 | ||
结构 Structural |
这个词是大写字母吗? Is the word in capital letters? |
桌子 TABLE |
桌子 table |
音素 Phonemic |
这个词和重量押韵吗? Does the word rhyme with weight? |
箱 crate |
市场 MARKET |
类别 Category |
这个词是指一种鱼吗? Is the word a type of fish? |
鲨鱼 SHARK |
天堂 heaven |
句子 Sentence |
“他在街上遇见了一个_________。” “He met a _________ in the street.” |
朋友 FRIEND |
云 cloud |
他们设计了实验任务,让参与者接触一系列单词,并要求他们根据这些问题的变体以某种方式处理这些单词。参与者可能会听一串单词,然后找出所有与“crate”押韵的单词,例如(bait、mate、date等),或者找出与“shark”相关的单词(trout、salmon、cod等)。等)。然后,他们被要求通过自由回忆或识别来回忆单词列表,在后一种情况下,记录检索单词的延迟时间。他们发现,处理的层次越深,给定单词被自由回忆或识别的可能性就越大,而处理越深入,识别速度就越快。应用我们所学到的工作记忆知识,似乎在编码时,执行系统会管理其有限的资源,尽可能少地进行处理(系统 2 比较懒惰),在所需的最浅深度停止处理。如果是这样,这意味着语义处理并不像在解释其他一些认知现象(如斯特鲁普效应)(Eidels、Ryan、Williams 和 Algom,2014)时所假设的那样完全自动化。
They devised experimental tasks that exposed participants to lists of words that in one way or another asked them to process the words according to variations on these questions. Participants might listen to a list of words and pick out all the words rhyming with crate, for example (bait, mate, date, etc.), or for words related to shark (trout, salmon, cod, etc.). Then they were asked to recall the list by free recall or recognition, and, in the latter case, latencies to retrieve the word were taken. They found that the deeper the level of processing, the more likely a given word was freely recalled or recognized, and that deeper processing caused faster recognition. Applying what we’ve learned about working memory, it appears that at the time of encoding the executive manages its limited resources to doing as little processing as possible (System 2 is lazy), cutting off processing at the shallowest needed depth. If so, it means that semantic processing is not as fully automatic as assumed in explaining some other cognitive phenomena, such as the Stroop Effect (Eidels, Ryan, Williams, & Algom, 2014).
此时,请停止阅读并尽可能回忆上一章末尾阅读的段落,包括标题。
At this point, please stop reading and recall as best you can the passage, including title, you read at the end of the last chapter.
到目前为止,除了一个例外,我们讨论记忆的理论都是基于一种直觉理论,即痕迹理论(Bartlett,1932;Wagoner,2013)。该理论认为,经历会在我们的大脑/心灵中留下痕迹,这些痕迹可以被激活,记忆就能被准确而完整地提取出来。普鲁斯特对逝去时光的追寻,出乎意料地始于一天,那天他喝了茶,吃了一块他年轻时吃过的特别饼干。他陷入了一段快乐却漫无目的的遐想,试图在几天的茶和饼干中重温这段遐想,并思考自己的感受从何而来。最终,茶和饼干的味道奏效了——他回到了在贡布雷的童年时光,回忆起教堂、街道、学校,事实上,“贡布雷及其周边环境,无论是城镇还是花园,都从我的那杯茶中,逐渐成形,逐渐成形。”他对贡布雷的记忆痕迹因久违而消逝,但饼干和茶解开了一切的谜团。
So far, with one exception, we have discussed memory in terms of an intuitive theory called trace theory (Bartlett, 1932; Wagoner, 2013). The idea is that experiences leave traces behind in our brain/mind, that these traces can be activated, and the memories retrieved accurately and in toto. Proust’s search for lost time unexpectedly begins one day when he drinks tea and eats a special cookie from his youth. He enters a happy but unfocused reverie that he tries to recapture over several days of tea and cookies, wondering whence came his feelings. Finally, the taste of the tea and cookie works—he’s thrown back into his childhood in Combray, remembering the church, the streets, the school, indeed “the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea.” The traces of his memory of Combray had become lost with disuse, but the cookies and tea unlocked everything.
记忆痕迹理论最早由联想主义者(Brewer & Nakamura,1984)正式提出,并由此通过艾宾浩斯的《论记忆》进入心理学,并延续到言语学习研究中。记忆中的信息以各种方式编码和关联,它们之间的联想联系决定了哪些信息可以被提取或遗忘。
Trace theory of memory had been more formally stated by associationists (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984), and from them it entered psychology via Ebbinghaus’s On Memory, and continued in verbal learning research. Items in memory are encoded and associated in various ways, and the associative links between them determine what can be retrieved or forgotten.
我们对痕迹理论的一个有益的例外是记忆中的句子“心不在焉的教授没有他的车钥匙”,这句话通常被误读为“心不在焉的教授忘记了[或丢失了]他的车钥匙”。诚然,这里有一个痕迹,但记忆已经被一个既不是遗忘(没有钥匙的基本事实仍然存在)也不是联想效应的过程所改变——“没有钥匙”与“忘记”或“丢失”没有关联。相反,对这句话的错误记忆是由于泛泛知识,即那些并非关于某个人、某个地点或某件事,而是关于一个多面刻板印象的知识。我们得知自己面对的是一位心不在焉的教授,于是自然而然地会用这个刻板印象来解释他为什么没有带车钥匙。
Our instructive exception to trace theory was memory for the sentence, “The absent minded-professor didn’t have his car keys,” which is typically mis-retrieved as “The absent-minded professor forgot [or lost] his car keys.” There is a trace here, to be sure, but the memory has been altered by a process that is neither forgetting—the basic fact of not having keys remains—nor an effect of association—didn’t have has no association with forgot or lost. Instead, the misremembering of this sentence is due to a piece of generic knowledge, that is, knowledge that isn’t about a person, place, or thing, but about a multifaceted stereotype. We learn that we’re dealing with an absent-minded professor, and so we naturally use the stereotype to provide a reason why he doesn’t have his car keys.
我们拥有许多高度结构化的通用知识。你对新的诊所是什么样子以及在那里会发生什么有着预期。你对校园有一个通用的心理地图;不是记忆中的图像,而是一幅缺乏情景细节(例如天气)的图画。你有一个关于如何在各种餐厅行动的脚本(Shank & Abelson,1977);当你走进一家新餐厅时,你会寻找线索来判断它是哪种类型的。有桌布吗?那么你应该等待入座,即使没有任何指示。所有这些都是认知科学中最重要的概念之一的一个例子,即图式,它是由英国心理学家弗雷德里克·巴特利特 (Bartlett, 1932; Brewer, 2000; Wagoner, 2013) 首次提出的,尽管早些时候冯特 (Wundt) 以Gesamtvorstellung 的术语提出过,即“有组织的整体思想”(Leahey, 2018; Leahey & Holtzman, 1979)。
We possess many different highly structured pieces of generic knowledge. You have expectations about what a new doctor’s office will look like and what will happen there. You have a generic mental map of your campus; not an image from memory, but a picture lacking episodic detail, such as weather. You have a script (Shank & Abelson, 1977) for how to act in a variety of restaurants; when you enter a new restaurant, you look for cues as to which type it is. Are there tablecloths? Then you should wait to be seated even if there’s no sign to tell you so. All of these are examples of one of the most important concepts in cognitive science, the schema, first proposed by British psychologist Frederick Bartlett (Bartlett, 1932; Brewer, 2000; Wagoner, 2013), although earlier offered by Wundt under the term Gesamtvorstellung, “organized whole idea” (Leahey, 2018; Leahey & Holtzman, 1979).
巴特利特最著名的研究是《幽灵之战》。巴特利特认为,痕迹理论从根本上来说存在缺陷,因为它将记忆视为一种被动记录,由感觉刻蚀笔在蜡板上形成,在适当的情况下可读。相反,巴特利特认为,记忆是通过人类在追寻意义后所进行的主动推理过程(重新)建构的。我们不是经验的被动记录者,而是主动构建对经验的最佳诠释,借鉴一生中积累的想法、概念、期望和态度,然后将它们作为动态心理结构(称为图式)存储在记忆中。当需要检索记忆时,建构过程会再次发生,我们会创建最可信的过去画面。我们不知道最初的建构过程、后来的重建过程,也不知道它们所利用的图式,这给心理学研究带来了挑战。如何揭示建构和重建过程?巴特利特的《幽灵之战》试图应对这一挑战。
Bartlett’s most famous study involved The War of the Ghosts. Bartlett believed that trace theory was fundamentally flawed because it saw memory as a passive recorder, created by the stylus of sensation etching on a wax tablet, readable under the right circumstances. Instead, Bartlett argued, memories were (re)constructed by an active process of inferences guided by human effort after meaning. Rather than being passive recorders of experience, we actively construct the best interpretation of experience we can, drawing on ideas, concepts, expectations, and attitudes built up over a lifetime, and these are then stored in memory as dynamic mental structures called schemas. When it comes time to retrieve a memory, the constructive process occurs again as we create the most plausible pictures of our pasts. We are not aware of the process of the original process of construction, the later process of reconstruction, nor of the schemas they exploit, creating a challenge for psychological research. How can the construction and reconstruction processes be revealed? Bartlett’s War of the Ghosts attempted to meet the challenge.
文化创造图式。一个没有餐馆或餐馆出现之前的文化,不会有各种各样的餐馆脚本。一个没有巫师的文化,不会有关于巫师的图式。只有狩猎成为日常活动的文化,才会有关于狩猎的图式。不同文化(和时代)对来世以及鬼魂的存在和行为的图式也大相径庭。因此,巴特利特选择了一个加拿大本土文化的民间故事,并要求他的英国参与者聆听并回忆这个故事。《鬼魂之战》中默默嵌入的图式与英国文化图式并不相符,因此,当他的参与者试图从他们所听到的内容中寻找意义时,他们会运用自己的图式,将其揭示为记忆的扭曲。我开展了巴特利特的研究长达35年,研究了数千名学生,我将与你们分享我最喜欢的一段回忆(图6.5)。它的独特之处在于它以绘画而非口头记忆的形式呈现,但它是重建记忆的一个绝佳典型例子。
Cultures create schemas. A culture without, or in an era before, restaurants, will not have varied restaurant scripts. A culture without shamans will not have schemas about them. Only a culture in which hunting is routine will have schemas about hunting. And cultures (and eras) differ greatly in their schemas about the afterlife and the existence and behavior of ghosts. So, Bartlett chose a folktale from a Canadian native culture and asked his British participants to listen to and recall it. The schemas silently embedded in the War of the Ghosts would not match up with British cultural schemas, so that as his participants tried to find meaning in what they heard, they would apply their own schemas, revealing them as distortions of memory. I ran Bartlett’s study for 35 years and with thousands of students, and I will share with you my all-time favorite recall (Figure 6.5). It’s unique in being presented as a drawing rather than as a verbal memory, but it’s a wonderfully typical example of reconstructive memory.
这里有迹可循:两个年轻人、战士、独木舟、战斗、篝火旁的村民。然而,许多细节已丢失;比如为什么这两个来自埃古拉克的年轻人会在河边。在这种情况下,用图画说明原因可能比较困难,这也凸显了巴特利特创造性但非结构化和开放式程序的缺陷。然而,在书面回忆中,他们晚上外出的原因——猎海豹——即使在第一次直接回忆中也常常是开放的。通常,它会被替换为钓鱼,甚至是钓海豹,尤其是在第二次回忆中,然后就变成了钓鱼。巴特利特的英国参与者没有猎海豹的图式,所以他们失去了基本原理,或者用更英国的钓鱼图式取而代之。
There are traces here: The two young men, the warriors, the canoes, the battle, the villagers around the fire. Many details, however, have been lost; such as why the two young men from Egulac were down near the river. It could be that in this case showing the cause might be hard in a drawing, which highlights shortcomings of Bartlett’s creative but unstructured and open-ended procedure. However, in written recalls the reason for their evening out—seal hunting—is often left open even in the first, immediate recall. Often, it’s replaced by fishing, or even by fishing for seals, especially in a second recall before becoming simply fishing. Bartlett’s British participants didn’t have a schema for seal hunting, and so they lost the rationale or replaced it with the more British schema of fishing.
然而,在这个样本中,最能揭示重建记忆的变化在于参战年轻人的命运以及对鬼魂主题的处理。故事中,年轻人中枪了,但他并没有感到不适,直到第二天早上他向村子讲述了自己的故事后才死去。其他战士是鬼魂,尽管没有解释为什么或年轻人是如何发现这一点的。在回忆录中,年轻人在战斗中阵亡,尸体被送回村子。最终,这位年轻的英雄并没有像故事中那样死去,而是复活了。因此,无法解释的鬼魂和一个令人费解的死亡,对于加拿大本土人来说一定是具有图式意义的,但却被强大的欧洲死亡和变形图式所取代,让 21 世纪的美国人民更能理解这个故事。
In this specimen, however, the changes that best reveal reconstructive memory concern the fate of the young man who goes to war and the handling of the ghost theme. In the story, the young man is shot, but he does not feel ill and he does not die until the morning after he tells his tale to the village. The other warriors were the ghosts, though no explanation of why or how the young man figures it out is given. In the recall, the young man is killed in battle and his body is returned to the village. In the end, instead of dying, as in the story, the young hero is resurrected. Thus, unexplained ghosts and a puzzling death, which must have made schematic sense to the native Canadians, are replaced by a powerful European schema of death and transfiguration, making more sense of the story for a 21st-century American.
巴特利特的思想和发现颇具启发性,但由于种种原因,包括行为主义在美国的主导地位以及联想主义在世界范围内的盛行,这些思想和发现影响力甚微,巴特利特的传记作者甚至宣告图式理论已死。然而,随着认知科学(包括重要的人工智能)在20世纪70年代开始研究更高级的心理过程,行为主义和联想主义的缺陷逐渐显现。在探索处理思维,尤其是专业知识的方法的过程中,认知科学家重新发现了图式(Brewer & Nakamura,1984)。
Bartlett’s ideas and findings were suggestive, but for a variety of reasons, including the dominance of behaviorism in America and of associationism everywhere, they exerted little influence and the schema idea was pronounced dead by Bartlett’s biographers. However, as cognitive science, including importantly AI, began to study the higher mental processes in the 1970s, the shortcomings of behaviorism and associationism became apparent. Looking around for ways to handle thinking and especially expertise, cognitive scientists rediscovered the schema (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984).
然而,巴特利特略显模糊和整体化的图式版本需要理论上的完善,而他印象派的准实验结果则需要重复和更定量的处理。在理论方面,明斯基(1975)发表了一篇里程碑式的论文。明斯基致力于人工智能研究,其中的一个主要问题是:如何以清晰易懂的方式表示复杂的概念及其之间的关系,从而使人工智能能够模拟人类智能。他以一个新名称——框架——重新定义了图式的概念,并对其进行了更精确的定义,以便在人工智能系统中部署。
However, Bartlett’s somewhat vague and holistic version of the schema needed theoretical sharpening, and his impressionistic quasi-experimental results needed replication and more quantitative treatment. On the theoretical side, a landmark paper was Minsky (1975). Minsky worked in AI, wherein how to represent complex concepts and relations between them in perspicuous ways so that AI could emulate human intelligence was a major issue. He revived the concept of schema under a new name, the frame, which he defined more precisely for deployment in AI systems.
框架是一种数据结构,由连接到一组槽位的节点连接在一起,每个槽位都包含用于存储框架主体信息的位置。槽位提供了用于编码通常在刻板印象情境中遇到的信息的位置。具有槽位的体验特征很容易被注意到和回忆,而与图式不一致的特征通常会被忽略或无法回忆,就像隐形大猩猩的例子一样。当你的球赛图式被激活时,你往往看不到闯入的大猩猩。一些槽位已经填充了默认值,这些默认值反映了在相关事件中通常会发现的特征;因此,它们通常会覆盖实际情景记忆的编码,而被记住。此外,随着记忆随时间推移而变化,即使情景事件最初被编码,变化也会逐渐被默认值取代。一些默认设置具有反映不同刻板印象设置的范围值,例如作为一名员工或一个家庭男人,因为同一个人可以被编码到不同的图式中。这标志着图式/框架的一个重要方面。它们并非孤立存在,而是构成一个由相互关联的模式组成的整体网络的一部分。例如,医生办公室的模式会包含一个指向其他模式(例如医生、药品、建筑物等)的指针,以及指向模式脚本(例如医生办公室内发生的事情等)的指针。4
A frame is a data structure held together by a node that is connected to a set of slots, each of which contains places to store information about the subject of the frame. Slots provide locations in which to encode information typically encountered in stereotyped situations. Features of an experience that have slots will be easily noticed and recalled, whereas schema incongruent features will often be missed or not recalled, as in the case of the invisible gorilla. When your ball-game schema is activated, you tend not to see the intruding gorilla. Some slots are already filled in with default values reflecting features typically found in the event in question; thus, they will often override the encoding of actual episodic memories and be remembered instead. Also, as memories change over time, even when episodic events were initially encoded, change will drift toward replacement by the defaults. Some of the default settings have range values reflecting different stereotyped settings, such as being an employee or a family man, as the same person can be encoded in different schemas. This marks an important aspect of schemas/frames. They do not exist as isolated entities but are part of a holistic web of interconnected schemas. A doctor’s office schema, for example, will have a pointer to other schemas such as physician, medicine, building, etc., and to schema-scripts such what happens in a doctor’s office, etc.4
当你形成记忆时,图式会被实例化(Rumelhart,1980)。当你走进医生的办公室,或者遇到一位J. Smith先生时,你开始形成关于……的情景记忆。事件本身。根据图式理论,你激活了一个或多个图式,它们会引导你对事件的感知、解读和编码,并在之后引导你对事件的回忆。简而言之,你会用情景信息填充框架的槽位,并遵循我们之前提到的编码约束和过程。存储在记忆中的是填充好的、实例化的图式,而这个图式在存储过程中可能会进一步改变,并在回忆时被重新提取。
When you form a memory, schemas are instantiated (Rumelhart, 1980). When you enter a doctor’s office or meet a Mr. J. Smith, you begin to form an episodic memory of the event. According to schema theory, you have activated one or more schemas, and they guide your perception, interpretation, and encoding of the event, and will later guide your recall of it. In short, you fill in the frame’s slots with episodic information, subject to the sort of encoding constraints and processes we’ve noted. What gets stored in memory is the filled-in, instantiated schema, and it is this schema that may be further altered during storage and will be retrieved at recall.
在一项被广泛引用的研究中,Brewer 和 Treyens (1981) 在实验控制下,利用自然场景来检验图式理论的预测。参与者报告了研究结果,但被告知实验室尚未准备好,于是在他们误认为是研究生助理办公室的地方(图 6.6)等候了几分钟。之后,他们被带到另一个房间,根据实验条件,通过绘画、描述或进行再认记忆测试(将房间里曾经存在和不存在的物品混在一起)来回忆起办公室。
In a widely cited study, Brewer and Treyens (1981) used a naturalistic setting under experimental control to test predictions from schema theory. Participants reported for a study but were told that the lab was not quite ready and waited for a few minutes in what they believed to be the graduate research assistant’s office (Figure 6.6). They were then taken to another room, where, depending on experimental condition, they recalled the office by drawing it, describing it, or performing a recognition memory test, mixing up items that had been in the room and items that had not.
仔细观察照片,你会发现有些物品符合研究生的刻板印象,比如桌椅、打字机(当时的)或海报。其他一些物品则出乎意料,比如骷髅或酒瓶。还有很多物品则介于两者之间,比如雨伞或螺丝刀。重要的是,照片中没有典型的研究生办公用品;没有书籍或期刊。
Inspection of the photo will show that some of the items are stereotypical for a grad student schema/frame, such as the tables and chairs, the typewriter (at the time), or the poster. Others are unexpected, such as the skull or the wine bottle. Many are in between, such as the umbrella or the screwdriver. Importantly, typical grad student office items are absent; there are no books or journals.
除了一个例外,所有回忆方法的结果都支持了 Brewer 和 Treyen 基于图式理论的预测。符合图式预期的物品(例如打字机)尤其容易被记住。符合图式预期的物品预期但实际缺失的事物(例如书籍)经常被错误地报告为存在。他们增加了一个新的预测,将图式理论与语言学中关于对话的“既定-新”契约相结合。随着对话的进行,对话会积累知识,每个人都将已经说过的内容视为既定内容,并只添加新的想法。在自由回忆条件下,Brewer 和 Treyens 预测图式会提供大量无需重复的既定事实。因此,所有房间都有墙壁、地板和天花板,因此它们都是更大的房间或办公室框架的一部分,可以被视为理所当然,即使它们是可以编码的情景数据的一部分,正如在再认测试中发现的那样。有趣的是,一些参与者在自由回忆条件下确实报告了墙壁等信息。5
With one exception, the results from all recall methods supported Brewer and Treyen’s predictions from schema theory. Present items that matched schema expectations (e.g., the typewriter) were especially well remembered. Items that fit schema expectations but were absent (e.g., books) were often falsely reported as present. They added a new prediction that combines schema theory with what is known in linguistics as the given-new contract about conversations. As they proceed, conversations accumulate knowledge, each person taking as given what’s already said and adding only new ideas. In the free-recall conditions, Brewer and Treyens predicted that schemas provide a large number of given facts that don’t need to be repeated. Thus, all rooms have walls, a floor, and a ceiling, and so are part of a larger room or office frame that can be taken for granted, even though they are part of the episodic data that could be encoded, as found during recognition tests. A few participants did, interestingly, report the walls and so on in the free recall conditions.5
意外的发现是,与研究生图式明显不同的项目(例如头骨)被很好地记住,甚至比图式一致的项目更容易被记住。Pezdek 等人 (1989) 在后续研究中探究了原因,该研究重复了 Brewer 和 Treyens 的实验。Pezdek 等人提出,由于差异项目不符合图式,因此它们在工作记忆中会得到更多的处理。此外,差异项目的查看时间更长,因此它们比预期项目编码得更详细,使它们以后更容易记住。考虑到我们对工作记忆和记忆监控的讨论,这些提议可以结合起来说,WM 中的执行过程会将更多的时间和注意力分配给令人惊讶的输入(与预测处理架构中的错误传播消息一致),从而使意外项目更重要,因此更有可能被存储和检索。
The unexpected finding was that items saliently discrepant from the grad student schema (e.g., the skull) were well remembered, even better remembered than schema-consistent items. Why was explored in a follow-up study by Pezdek et al. (1989) that replicated Brewer and Treyens’s experiment. Pezdek et al. proposed that because discrepant items don’t fit the schema they receive more processing in working memory. Additionally, discrepant items are looked at longer, and thus they are encoded in more detail than expected items, making them easier to remember later. Considering our discussion of working memory and memory monitoring, these proposals can be combined by saying that executive processes in WM allocate more time and attention to surprising inputs (consistent with error propagation messages in the predictive processing architecture), making unexpected items more important and therefore more likely to be stored and retrieved.
记忆是一种心理时间旅行,从现在回到过去。图式在心理时间旅行中也发挥着作用(Schacter、Addis & Buckner,2007),即想象我们可能做的事情或成就,例如赢得诺贝尔奖或成为美国总统或英国首相。如果说记忆是一种想象性的重构,正如巴特利特所言,那么想象未来也是如此,因为可能发生的事件是由图式构建的。鲁宾(Rubin,2014)要求参与者回忆过去并想象未来的痛苦事件,结果发现未来事件被评为比过去事件更具创伤性。事实上,未来事件被评为非常负面,以至于符合创伤后应激障碍(PTSD)的诊断标准。同样,哈特(Hart)、范·埃普斯(van Epps)和施韦策(Schweitzer,2019)发现,人们在谈话中通常不会问敏感问题,因为他们认为这样做的后果比实际更糟糕。
Remembering is a sort of mental time travel, moving from the present to the past. Schemas also play a role in mental time travel to the future (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), imagining things we might do or achieve such as winning the Nobel Prize or becoming US president or British prime minister. If memory is an imaginative reconstruction, as Bartlett suggested, then imagining the future is, too, as possible events are constructed from schematic ones. Asking participants to recall past and to imagine future painful events, Rubin (2014) found that future events were rated as more traumatic than past ones. In fact, future events were rated so negatively that they met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Similarly, Hart, van Epps, and Schweitzer (2019) found that people often don’t ask sensitive questions during conversations because they imagine the consequences of doing so to be worse than they would be.
记忆结构在专业知识中起着关键作用。临床心理学家被认为是人类行为方面的专家,但他们的专业知识却是由相互关联的图式构成的 (Kim & Ahn, 2002)。人们或许认为,现实世界的经验能够提升从课堂和书籍中习得的临床判断能力,但事实并非如此。临床医生的经验越丰富,就越有可能记错病例,从而将过于明确的结构强加于患者身上 (Weine & Kim, 2018)。
Memory structures play a key role in expertise. Clinical psychologists are supposed to be experts in human behavior, but their expertise is structured as patterns of interlocking schemas (Kim & Ahn, 2002). One might think that real-world experience would improve clinical judgment learned from classes and books, but it turns out not to be true. The more experience a clinician has, the more likely it is that he or she will misremember cases, imposing more clear-cut structure on them than is warranted (Weine & Kim, 2018).
最后,顺着明斯基的说法,我一直把图式/框架称为“刻板印象”。我们所认为的刻板印象,其实只是一套关于我们社会世界的图式。我们几乎对万事万物都有图式。鉴于“刻板印象”一词如今带有污名,你可能会怀疑它们是否准确。关于哺乳动物神经系统的一个事实是,它非常擅长在自身经验中发现并响应模式。事实上,它最基本的认知功能很可能就是良好的模式发现和物体分类能力,这种能力在数百万年的进化过程中得到了磨练和提升。因此,即使人类社会生活是进化的新生事物,发现模式和形成图式(也就是刻板印象)的能力应该仍然有效。在多年的一系列研究中,Lee Jussim 和他的同事表明“刻板印象的准确性是社会心理学中最大和最可重复的发现之一”(Jussim、Crawford & Rubenstein,2015 年,第 490 页;Jussim、Cain、Crawford、Harber & Cohen,2009 年;Jussim、Crawford、Anglin、Chambers、Stevens & Cohen,2016 年;Jussim、Stevens & Honeycutt,2018 年)。
Finally, following Minsky, I have been calling schemas/frames “stereotypes.” What we think of as stereotypes are just a set of schemas about our social world. We have schemas for just about everything. Given that the term “stereotype” carries an aura of stigma today, you might wonder if they are accurate. One fact about the mammalian nervous system is that it’s very good at finding and responding to patterns in its experience. In fact, its most basic cognitive function is probably good pattern-finding and object classification, honed and improved over millions of years of evolution. Therefore, even though human social life is an evolutionary newcomer, finding patterns and forming schemas—stereotypes—should still work well. In a series of studies over many years, Lee Jussim and his colleagues have shown that “stereotype accuracy is one of the largest and most replicable findings in social psychology” (Jussim, Crawford, & Rubenstein, 2015, p. 490; Jussim, Cain, Crawford, Harber, & Cohen, 2009; Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Chambers, Stevens, & Cohen, 2016; Jussim, Stevens, & Honeycutt, 2018).
心理学家很少研究这个话题。最著名的研究是卢里亚在20世纪20年代进行的《记忆大师的思维》(1987年)。然而,有必要将针对刻意培养记忆技能的记忆大师(也称为记忆运动员)的研究与那些天生记忆力出众的人区分开来。后者拥有极其卓越的自传体记忆(HSAM),而针对他们以及患有相反情况——严重自传体记忆缺陷(SDAM)——的人的研究才刚刚开始(Palumbo、Sheldon & Levine,2018年)。
Psychologists have rarely studied the topic. The most famous study is Luria’s Mind of a Mnemonist (1987) done in the 1920s. However, it’s important to separate studies of mnemonists, also called memory athletes, who deliberately cultivate memory skills, from people whose memory is naturally outstanding. They have highly superior autobiographical memory (HSAM), and research into them and people with the opposite condition, severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM), is just beginning (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018).
真正的超强记忆自恋症(HSAM)案例罕见:大多数自称是研究参与者的人都不符合条件。一个重要的标准是,记忆必须清晰地记录琐碎和重要事件;也就是说,它不能像记忆专家那样,是努力记住某些事情的结果。研究表明,HSAM 并非由记忆形成时特别好的编码所致,因为 HSAM 受试者的近期记忆与对照组相同,但随着时间的推移,他们的记忆衰退程度要小得多。他们也并不比对照组更容易捏造虚假记忆 (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018; Patihis et al., 2013)。
Genuine cases of HSAM are rare: Most people who present themselves as research participants don’t qualify. An important criterion is that memory must be vivid for both trivial and important events; that is, it can’t be a result of trying to remember some things well, as mnemonists do. Investigation shows that HSAM is not caused by especially good encoding at time of memory formation, because HSAM subjects’ memories are the same as controls for recent memories, but they show much less decay in memory over time. They are also not more prone to false memory fabrication than controls (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018; Patihis et al., 2013).
SDAM 的图像并非 HSAM 的镜像 (Palombo, Alain, Söderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015)。SDAM 与另一种认知综合征——心盲症6 (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015; Keogh & Pearson, 2018) 相关。心盲症患者缺乏视觉意象;当他们闭上眼睛时,世界就消失了,他们无法想象一个红苹果或身处沙滩。同样,个体在心理意象方面的差异早在科学心理学发展史中就已被认识到 (Galton, 1880; Titchener, 1918; Brewer & Schommer-Aikins, 2006),并且这种差异在“无意象思维”的争论中发挥了作用,但随着心理学转向行为研究,这一话题逐渐消亡。SDAM 的认知缺陷发生在编码阶段,而非存储阶段:SDAM 患者的大脑中没有可供存储的图像。重要的是要认识到,SDAM 并非失忆症。患有 SDAM 的人虽然知道自己的过去,但无法(自传式地)记住这些事实。如果任务不依赖于心理意象,学习和记忆就不会受到影响 (Palombo, Alain, Söderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015)。
The picture of SDAM is not a mirror image of HSAM (Palombo, Alain, Söderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015). SDAM is linked to another cognitive syndrome, aphantasia6 (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015; Keogh & Pearson, 2018). People with aphantasia have no visual imagery; when they close their eyes the world disappears, and they can’t imagine a red apple or being on a beach. Again, individual differences in mental imagery were recognized early in the history of scientific psychology (Galton, 1880; Titchener, 1918; Brewer & Schommer-Aikins, 2006), and they played a role in the imageless thought controversy, but psychology’s shift toward behavior study caused the topic to wither away. The cognitive shortcoming in SDAM occurs during encoding, not storage: the SDAM subject’s mind has no images to store. It’s important to realize that SDAM is not amnesia. People with it know their past as a set of facts, but they do not (autobiographically) remember it. Learning and memory are intact if the tasks do not depend on mental images (Palombo, Alain, Söderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015).
这两种情况会影响记忆和认知的其他方面。例如,人们在回忆中表现出自我参照效应,能够更好地检索直接涉及自我的记忆,而不是不涉及自我的记忆。这种效应在超强自恋型记忆(HSAM)的参与者中似乎略有增强,他们对真实的自传体记忆的记忆比在实验室中形成的记忆更清晰。与过去的情感联系也会发生改变。在超强自恋型记忆中,受试者的记忆在情感上尤其强烈——他们倾向于沉迷于个人过去,并且会更多地参与幻想 (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018)。在非超强自恋型记忆中,情况则相反。受试者往往在情感上与记忆保持距离,这可能是因为他们并不真正将自己视为体验的中心 (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018),而且由于缺乏想象,他们的幻想能力非常弱,甚至根本不会。
The two conditions have effects on other aspects of memory and cognition. For example, people show a self-reference effect in recall, being better able to retrieve memories directly involving the self than memories that don’t. This effect seems slightly heightened in HSAM participants, who remember real autobiographical memories better than those formed in the laboratory. Emotional connection to the past is also altered. In HSAM, subjects’ memories are especially emotionally strong—they tend to obsess over the personal past, and they engage in more fantasy (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018). In SDAM the opposite is true. Subjects tend to be emotionally distant from their memories, perhaps because they do not literally see themselves as the center of experience (Palumbo, Sheldon, & Levine, 2018), and, lacking imagery, they fantasize very weakly, if at all.
Brown & Kulik (1977) 提出了“闪光灯记忆”的概念,即对令人意外的情绪事件的生动且看似准确的记忆。有趣的是,他们并没有真正断言这些记忆是准确的(Brewer,2006),而是将其视为理所当然。他们试图通过采访人们关于他们在1963年11月22日得知约翰·F·肯尼迪遇刺事件时的记忆来描述这一新提出的记忆类型。7
Brown & Kulik (1977) introduced the idea of “flashbulb” memories, vivid and seemingly accurate memories for surprising emotional events. Interestingly, they did not actually assert that the memories were accurate (Brewer, 2006) but took it for granted. They attempted to characterize this new proposed class of memories by interviewing people about their memories of learning of John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963.7
从方法论上讲,闪光灯记忆的研究非常困难。像布朗和库利克这样的回顾性研究无法解决准确性问题,因为没有参与者原始记忆的记录作为基准,也没有同期的“普通”记忆作为对照,来比较闪光灯记忆的生动性和准确性。当然,科学家不可能仅仅为了做实验就引发惊天动地的事件。逐渐形成的一个现成的研究方案是,在闪光灯事件发生时,手头上要准备好调查问卷,以便快速采访参与者(通常是心理学课程的学生),了解他们对闪光灯事件和对照事件的记忆。针对各种潜在的闪光灯记忆事件,已经进行了许多类似的研究,但出于显而易见的原因,研究最多的是2001年9月11日世界贸易中心的恐怖袭击。讽刺的是,我写这篇文章的时间正是2021年9月11日。
Methodologically, flashbulb memory is hard to investigate. Retrospective studies, such as that of Brown & Kulik, can’t settle the accuracy issue because there is no record of participants’ original memories to use as a baseline, nor do we have control, “ordinary” memories from the same period to compare for vividness and accuracy to the flashbulb memory. And, of course, scientists can’t cause world-shaking events just to do experiments. What gradually emerged as a ready-to-go research protocol was to have surveys on hand in case a flashbulb event occurred, in order to quickly interview participants (often students in psychology classes) about their memories for both the flashbulb and a control event. A number of such studies have been performed on various potential flashbulb memory events, but for obvious reasons the most studied one is the terror attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Ironically, I’m writing this on 9/11/21.
Talarico 和 Rubin (2003) 于 9 月 12 日对 54 名杜克大学学生进行了结构化访谈,询问他们如何得知袭击事件,并以早期的日常事件(例如参加派对)作为对照记忆。之后,他们在袭击发生后 224 天内每隔一段时间再次采访参与者。他们的研究重点是两起事件记忆的鲜明度与准确性之间的关系。他们以 9 月 12 日收集的第一批回忆作为比较基准。研究结果的核心如下图所示(图 6.7)。
Talarico and Rubin (2003) conducted structured interviews with 54 Duke University students on September 12 about how they learned of the attacks, and, for a control memory, an earlier everyday event, such as attending a party. They then re-interviewed the participants at intervals up to 224 days after the attacks. The focus of their study was the relation between the vividness of the memories of the two events and their accuracy. They used as a baseline for comparison the first recalls collected on September 12. The crux of their results is shown in these graphs (Figure 6.7).
以首次回忆作为衡量记忆准确性的最佳指标,我们发现闪光灯记忆和日常记忆的一致性都会随着时间的推移而降低。也就是说,在Talarico和Rubin所采样的任何时间点,它们的准确性都没有差异。另一方面,闪光灯记忆依然鲜活,并伴有意象,而日常记忆则变得苍白,成为知识而非自传体经验的一部分。简而言之,闪光灯记忆的独特之处在于其鲜活性,而非其准确性;它们之所以看似准确,只是因为它们鲜活(Talarico和Rubin,2007;Hirst和Phelps,2016)。长期的跟踪研究支持了他们的结论(Conway、Skitka、Hemmerich和Kershaw,2009;Curci和Luminet,2006;Hirst、Phelps、Buckner等人,2009;Hirst、Phelps、Meksin等人,2015)。
Taking the first recall as our best measure of memory accuracy, we see that both flashbulb and everyday memories become less consistent over time. That is, there is no difference in their accuracy at any point sampled by Talarico and Rubin. On the other hand, flashbulb memories remain vivid and accompanied by imagery, while everyday memories become wan and part of knowledge rather than autobiographical experience. In short, flashbulb memories are unique in their vividness rather than their accuracy; they seem accurate only because they are vivid (Talarico & Rubin, 2007; Hirst & Phelps, 2016). Long-term follow-up studies have supported their conclusions (Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich, & Kershaw, 2009; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Hirst, Phelps, Buckner et al., 2009; Hirst, Phelps, Meksin et al., 2015).
Lanciano、Curci 和 Semin(2010)就为何生动性不能预测准确性提出了答案。已证实情绪记忆比非情绪记忆更生动,但生动性是一个模棱两可的概念(Brewer,2006)。例如,它是指整体亮度,还是像电视机上设置的特殊色彩平衡?Luciano、Curci 和 Semin 进行了类似闪光灯记忆的实验,发现情绪记忆比非情绪记忆更精细,因为几乎所有体验细节,无论多么无关紧要,最初都会被编码。然而,随着时间的推移,闪光灯记忆会像普通记忆一样发生变化,同时保持同样高水平的细节,因此看起来像照片一样生动。总而言之,与日常记忆不同,它们在主观上保持生动,但与日常记忆一样,它们的准确性会越来越低。
Lanciano, Curci, and Semin (2010) have proposed an answer to why vividness does not predict accuracy. It has been established that emotional memories are more vivid than non-emotional memories, but vividness is an equivocal concept (Brewer, 2006). Is it, for example, overall brightness or a special color balance, as one might set on a TV? Luciano, Curci, and Semin performed experimental analogs to flashbulb memories and found that emotional memories are more fine-grained than non-emotional memories because almost every detail of experience, no matter how irrelevant, is initially encoded. However, over time, flashbulb memories change in the same way as ordinary memories while retaining the same high level of detail and thus seeming photograph-like and vivid. In sum, unlike everyday memories, they stay subjectively vivid, but, like everyday memories, they become less and less accurate.
到目前为止,我们已将记忆视为一个科学研究领域。现在,我们转向探讨如何利用记忆作为过去事件的证据。我们的第一个应用领域是临床心理学和精神病学。第二个应用领域是法医学,其中记忆被用作犯罪证据。记忆作为证据的案例提出了一个重要问题:除了通常的遗忘和记忆篡改过程之外,当记忆作为证据时,人们的记忆还会受到朋友以及警察、律师和治疗师等有权有势且利益相关方的质询,他们的问题可能会导致进一步的记忆扭曲,甚至根据暗示的叙述制造虚假记忆。当认知科学介入这些领域时,争议随之而来,有时被称为“记忆战争”(Crews,1995;Loftus,2019;Otgaar 等人,2019;Patihis 等人,2014;Patihis 和 Younes Burton,2015)。
So far, we have considered memory as a field of scientific investigation. We now turn to the use of memory as providing evidence of past events. Our first setting is clinical psychology and psychiatry. The second setting is forensic, in which memories are used as evidence about crimes. An important issue raised by cases of memory as evidence is that in addition to being changed by the usual processes of forgetting and memory alteration, when memory is evidence, people’s memory is interrogated by friends and by powerful and interested parties such as police, lawyers, and therapists, and their questions may cause further memory distortions and even create false memories out of suggested narratives. When cognitive science intrudes in these areas, controversies follow, sometimes dubbed the “memory wars” (Crews, 1995; Loftus, 2019; Otgaar et al., 2019; Patihis et al., 2014; Patihis & Younes Burton, 2015).
我们还探讨了多种形式的遗忘和记忆提取失败,但不包括所谓的压抑机制,即刻意拒绝不愉快的记忆进入意识。请记住,虽然压抑是一种所谓的逃避痛苦的策略,但它是一个无意识的过程。它不同于有意识地选择避免沉湎于某些记忆,抑郁症患者可能会被教导这样做,以避免陷入抑郁的恶性循环。
We have also considered many forms of forgetting and memory retrieval failure, except for the alleged mechanism of repression, the deliberate refusal to allow unpleasant memories into awareness. Keep in mind that while repression is an alleged strategy to avoid distress, it is an unconscious process. It is not the same as consciously choosing to avoid dwelling on certain memories, as a depressive might be taught to do to avoid a depressive spiral.
虚假记忆可以通过多种实验方法植入,通常是让参与者回忆童年时期经历过的一件事,而实验者事先咨询过家人和朋友,知道这件事并没有发生 (Nichols, Bogart & Loftus, 2015)。一些研究中使用的一个场景是,让参与者乘坐(并不存在)热气球,并提供简短的叙述,有时还会附上一张照片作为佐证,等待一段时间,然后让新的实验者要求参与者回忆该事件,通常会使用治疗师常用的引导式想象技术。参与者可以轻松地检索这些植入的记忆,并添加新的细节。原始叙述中没有的内容(Wade、Garry、Read & Lindsay,2002)。与之一起呈现的照片可以增强或削弱原始叙述的效果。Hessen-Kayfitz、Scoboria 和 Nespoli(2017)获得了参与者儿时的照片。其中一半的照片经过处理,看起来像是在热气球之旅中拍摄的,而另一半参与者看到的是与假定的热气球之旅同一年份的非特定图像。也许与直觉相反,经过处理的照片削弱了错误记忆的植入,而一般的年龄图片则强化了它。作者认为,特定的热气球之旅图片限制了参与者的想象力,而一般图片则让其自由发挥,使由此产生的错误记忆更加个人化,因此更容易让人相信。
False memories can be experimentally implanted by a variety of methods, usually by suggesting to participants that as a child they experienced an event that the experimenter knows, through prior consultation with family and friends, did not happen (Nichols, Bogart, & Loftus, 2015). One scenario used in several studies is suggesting that participants took a (non-existent) hot air balloon flight, providing a brief narrative and sometimes a photo as support, waiting a while, and then having new experimenters ask participants to recall the event, frequently using the guided imagery techniques employed by therapists. Participants have no trouble retrieving these implanted memories, adding new details that were not in the original narrative (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Photographs presented with it can enhance or weaken the effects of the original narrative. Hessen-Kayfitz, Scoboria, and Nespoli (2017) obtained photos of their participants as children. Half of the photos were doctored to look like they had been taken as part of the balloon ride, while the other half of participants saw non-specific images from the same year as the supposed balloon trip. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the doctored photos weakened the implantation of the false memory while the generic age picture strengthened it. The authors suggest that the ride-specific picture constrained the imagination of the participant, while the generic picture allowed it free rein, making the resulting false memory more personal and thus believable.
Otgar、Verschuere、Meijer 和 Oorsouw(2012)运用乘坐热气球的方法来探究儿童的错误记忆,探究儿童的回忆是否反映了实验中形成的记忆痕迹,还是仅仅是对成人权威的顺从。他们在记忆提取过程中向参与者提出的问题,要么与故事情节相符(例如,“我坐过热气球。”),要么与故事情节相符(例如,“我坐过火箭。”)。在某些情况下,孩子们被告知要说实话(例如,回答火箭问题“不”,有时则撒谎(回答火箭问题“是”。)测量错误和反应延迟。作者提出,如果回忆只是符合实验的要求,即不是真实的记忆痕迹,那么如果他们被告知撒谎说乘坐过热气球,他们实际上是在说实话,因为他们会否认他们乘坐过热气球,而如果他们只是顺从,说他们乘坐过热气球就是谎言。当参与者被告知撒谎说乘坐过热气球时,他们需要更长的时间来做出反应,并且更有可能给出错误的反应,这表明为了产生谎言,需要对反应进行更多的处理。因此,作者得出结论,真实的记忆痕迹已经被植入。
Otgar, Verschuere, Meijer, and Oorsouw (2012) used the balloon ride method to investigate false memories in children, asking if children’s recalls reflected memory traces formed by the experiment or were merely compliance with adult authorities. Among the questions they asked the participants during memory retrieval were ones that were either true about the narrative (e.g., “I have flown in a hot air balloon.”) or false (“I have flown in a rocket.”). In some cases, the children were told to tell the truth (e.g., answer the rocket question “No.” and sometimes to lie (answer the rocket question “Yes.”) Errors and latencies to respond were measured. The authors proposed that if the recalls were simply compliance with the demands of the experiments, i.e., were not real memory traces, then if they were told to lie about taking a balloon ride they would actually be telling the truth because they would be denying that they had taken a balloon ride, whereas if they were complying only, saying they had taken the balloon ride would be the lie. Participants took longer to respond and were more likely to give the wrong response when they were told to lie about the balloon ride, indicating more processing of the response in order to produce the lie. Thus, the authors concluded that real memory traces had been implanted.
通过提出一个重要的问题,可以进一步探究顺从与记忆之间的关联:错误记忆会产生行为后果吗?(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009) 毕竟,如果错误记忆在长期记忆中停滞不前,它们可能与个人问题或社会问题无关。Bernstein 和 Loftus (2009) 基于巴甫洛夫条件反射的发现来解答这个问题。研究表明,包括人类在内的许多物种都具有先天倾向,会自动将恶心(作为无条件反应 (UR))与味觉(作为条件刺激 (CS))联系起来,尤其是最近体验到的新奇味觉。Bernstein 和 Loftus 向成年人植入了虚假记忆,让他们回忆儿时因薯片或巧克力曲奇(不太可能是新奇的——也就是说,只吃过一次)或草莓冰淇淋(更有可能只吃过一次)而生病的经历。薯片和曲奇组的参与者并未表现出对这些食物的后天厌恶。然而,40% 的草莓冰淇淋组参与者在之后的聚会上表现出厌恶。反过来,他们发现参与者会相信,他们小时候第一次吃芦笋时就爱上了它。现在期待着再次享用它。这些巴甫洛夫式的反应不太可能是顺从实验者要求的结果——真正的虚假记忆已经被创造出来了。而且我们发现虚假记忆可以体现在行为中。
A further window on the issue of compliance vs. memory can be opened by asking an additional important question: Are there behavioral consequences to having false memories (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009)? After all, if false memories sit inertly in LTM they may not matter as a personal problem or social issue. Bernstein and Loftus (2009) built on findings in Pavlovian conditioning to address the question. It’s been shown that many species, including humans, have an innate tendency to automatically associate nausea as an unconditional response (UR) with tastes as conditional stimuli (CSs), especially recently experienced novel tastes. Bernstein and Loftus implanted in adults false memories about having been made sick as children by either potato chips or chocolate chip cookies (unlikely to have been novel—that is, eaten just once) or by strawberry ice cream (more likely to have been eaten just once). Chip and cookie participants showed no acquired aversion to eating those foods. However, 40 percent of the strawberry ice cream group showed aversion to eating it at a later party. Flipping the feelings around, they found that participants led to believe they had loved asparagus the first time they had it as children now looked forward to eating it again. It’s unlikely that these Pavlovian responses could be the result of compliance with experimenters’ demands—real false memories had been created. And we see that false memories can manifest in behavior.
研究还探讨了那些真正遭受过性虐待的人身上发生了什么。他们压抑了自己的记忆吗?Goodman 等人(2003 年)对遭受过性虐待的参与者进行了一项前瞻性研究。大多数此类人群研究都是回顾性的,找到曾经遭受虐待的参与者,然后回顾事件的起源。在前瞻性研究中,调查会跟踪遭受虐待的参与者并观察他们的结果。Goodman 等人证实了其他研究的发现,即虐待记忆并没有被压抑。事实上,让幸存者感到痛苦的是虐待记忆的侵入性——他们无法摆脱它们。
Research also took up the question of what happened to people who actually experienced sexual abuse. Did they repress their memories? Goodman et al. (2003) performed a prospective study on sexually abused participants. Most studies of populations such as this are retrospective, finding participants who had been abused and then looking back in time for the originating event. In a prospective study, investigation follows participants who were abused and looks at their outcomes. Goodman et al. confirmed what other studies had found, that memories of abuse were not repressed. Indeed, what was distressing to the survivors was the intrusiveness of the abuse memories—they could not escape them.
诸如此类的科学发现挑战了临床医生关于压抑和性虐待幸存者治疗的说法,记忆之战由此拉开帷幕(Crews,1995;Prendergast,2017)。双方的争论愈演愈烈,以至于美国心理学会(APA)任命了一个由双方代表组成的委员会来解决这些问题。但由于争议过于深刻且情绪化,最终报告放弃了寻找解决方案的尝试,而是在一系列章节中反复讨论这些问题,却没有得出一个总体结论(APA,1998)。
Scientific findings such as these challenged clinicians’ claims about repression and the treatment of sexual abuse survivors, and the memory wars began (Crews, 1995; Prendergast, 2017). They became so bitter that the American Psychological Association appointed a commission containing representatives of both camps to settle the issues, but the dispute was so deep and emotional that the final report gave up on finding solutions and rehashed the issues in a series of chapters with no overall conclusion (APA, 1998).
实践者与认知科学家之间仍然存在分歧,前者倾向于相信压抑记忆综合征的存在,而后者则不认同(Patihis 等人,2014;Patihis、Ho、Loftus 和 Herrera,2018)。此外,认知科学家并不认为压抑是记忆提取失败的一种表现形式(Bonanno,2006;Patihis、Lilienfeld、Ho 和 Loftus,2014)。然而,临床心理学家和大众媒体仍然以“分离性遗忘症”为名来推广压抑的概念(Otgaar 等人,2019)。
There remains a gap between practitioners, who still tend to believe in repressed memory syndrome, and cognitive scientists, who don’t (Patihis et al., 2014; Patihis, Ho, Loftus, & Herrera, 2018). Moreover, cognitive scientists don’t believe that repression is a form of memory retrieval failure (Bonanno, 2006; Patihis, Lilienfeld, Ho, & Loftus, 2014). Clinical psychologists and popular media, however, still push the idea of repression under the term “dissociative amnesia” (Otgaar et al., 2019).
目击证人证词研究也引发了争议,尽管没有那么激烈,而且法医技术也在逐步改进,以尽量减少记忆扭曲。与图式理论一样,目击证人证词及其局限性的研究可以追溯到行为主义心理学兴起之前,始于雨果·明斯特伯格 (1908) 的《证人席上》,书中讲述了一个启发现代实验的演示:表演(或拍摄)一桩犯罪并收集有关目击者的证词。我在一个大礼堂教授心理学导论时,重复了这个实验作为演示。我让我的助教从他的朋友中找出一个我不认识的“肇事者”。在我讲授记忆的那天,他走到礼堂前面,一边向我挥舞着一个物体,一边大喊“砰砰”(最初的研究使用了一把枪——如今在校园里开枪可不是个好主意),然后从侧门跑了出去。我向后倒去,现场一片寂静。然后我站起来,让大家讲述当时的情景,并描述凶手。一个学生发誓说她看到我身上血流如注!关于枪手的描述五花八门,有身高,也有体重,还有衣着。一周后,我们安排了一次列队。助教是最常见的枪手,虽然第二个选择是凶手,但他不是。由大多数证人选择。我的演示结果与更精确控制的实验研究结果(Loftus,1979)具有代表性,研究结果表明,虚假的犯罪记忆可以被植入(Shaw,2020)。
Studies of eyewitness testimony have also sparked controversy, albeit less acrimonious, and with gradual improvement of forensic techniques to minimize memory distortions. As with schema theory, studies of eyewitness testimony and its limitations go back to the pre-behaviorist days of psychology, beginning with Hugo Münsterberg’s (1908) book, On the Witness Stand, which relates a demonstration that inspired experiments in the modern era: Stage (or film) a crime and collect eyewitness testimony about it. I repeated the experiment as a demonstration when I taught introductory psychology in a large auditorium. I had my teaching assistant find a “perpetrator” I did not know from among his friends. On the day I lectured about memory, he came down to the front of the auditorium, waved an object at me while shouting “BANG BANG” (the original study used a gun—not a good idea on campuses these days) and ran out a side door. I fell backward, causing great silence, then got up and asked everyone to recount what happened and describe the perpetrator. One student swore she saw blood spurting out of me! Descriptions of the shooter were all over the place, both with regard to height and to weight and clothing. A week later we staged a line-up. The TA was the most common choice as the shooter, and although the second choice was the guilty party, he was not chosen by a majority of witnesses. The results of my demonstration are typical of more precisely controlled experimental studies (Loftus, 1979), and findings have shown that false memories of committing crimes can be implanted (Shaw, 2020).
当然,目击者的记忆容易受到扭曲、夸大和遗忘的影响,这一点我们在普通记忆中已经讨论过。此外,犯罪发生的环境与实验室中的记忆研究截然不同,它们往往充满惊喜、威胁和压力,而且通常发生在感知上极具挑战性的环境中。
Of course, eyewitness memories are subject to the vagaries of distortion, elaboration, and forgetting we have already discussed in the case of ordinary memories. In addition, crimes occur in very different circumstances than memory research in a lab, being surprising, threatening, and stressful, and they often occur under conditions that are perceptually challenging.
此外,由于目击者的记忆会成为犯罪证据,它们会受到调查人员和律师的法医审查,更不用说记者和其他与证人见面的人员了。后续的询问以及(如果进行)列队询问可能会引入新的元素——事后信息——这些信息可能会以重要的方式改变记忆。事后信息的潜在影响一直是目击者证词研究的主要焦点(Loftus,2019)。例如,在一项早期研究中(Loftus & Palmer,1974),参与者观看了一场车祸的影片,之后被问到:“你看到坏掉的车头灯了吗? ”或“你看到一个坏掉的车头灯了吗?”。回答第一个问题的人数是回答“是”人数的两倍,尽管没有人看到坏掉的车头灯。他们还被问到:“两辆车相撞时的速度大约是多少?”,或者同样的句子,只是将“撞”改为“撞”。回答“碎玻璃”的人对速度的估计比回答“撞玻璃”的人要快(41英里/小时对34英里/小时),尽管两者都被高估了。一周后,同样的受试者被问及是否在影片中看到过碎玻璃(没有);回答“碎玻璃”的人比回答“撞玻璃”的人更多地谎报看到了碎玻璃。显然,碎玻璃与人们对汽车相撞时会发生什么情况的图式知识相符。因此,问题的措辞有助于通过激活和检索长期记忆中的相关知识来引导重建。
Moreover, because eyewitness memories become evidence of crimes, they undergo forensic scrutiny by investigators and lawyers, not to mention reporters and others who meet the witnesses. Subsequent questioning and, when they occur, line-ups, can introduce new elements—post-event information—that may alter memories in important ways. Possible effects of post-event information have been the main focus of research in eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 2019). For example, participants in one early study (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) saw a film of an auto accident and were later questioned, “Did you see the broken headlight?” or “Did you see a broken headlight?” Twice as many questioned with the first question responded “yes,” even though no one saw a broken headlight. They were also asked, “About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” or the same sentence with “smashed” replaced by “hit.” The speed estimates were faster by those questioned with “smashed” than those questioned with “hit” (41 mph versus 34 mph), though both were overestimates. One week later, the same people were asked if they had seen any broken glass in the film (there was none); more “smashed” participants falsely reported that they had seen it than did “hit” participants. Apparently broken glass is consistent with one’s schematic knowledge about what happens when cars smash into each other. The wording of the question thus helps guide reconstruction through the activation and retrieval of relevant knowledge from long-term memory.
类似的研究质疑目击证人证词的有效性,因为它们表明,警方的问询可能会植入或篡改记忆,就像在压抑记忆案件中发生的那样,例如通过提出诸如“你确定那天晚上在酒吧没看到鲍勃·史密斯”之类的诱导性问题。将嫌疑人与与嫌疑人不太相似的陪衬放在一起,可能会对嫌疑人产生偏见。最后,当DNA证据开始推翻定罪时,绝大多数错误定罪都涉及至少一份虚假的目击证词。因此,司法系统进行了改革,指示陪审团对目击证人的证词持怀疑态度(Loftus,2019;Well,2020)。
Similar studies impugned the validity of eyewitness testimony by showing that police interviews could implant or alter memories as had happened in the repressed memory cases, for example by asking leading questions such as, “Are you sure you did not see Bob Smith in the bar that night?” Line-ups could be biased against suspects by putting them with foils who did not closely resemble them. Finally, when convictions began being overturned by DNA evidence, the vast majority of wrong convictions had involved at least one false eyewitness statement. As a result, the legal system instituted reforms such that juries were instructed to be skeptical of eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 2019; Well, 2020).
然而,最近的研究表明,虽然改革势在必行,但完全否定目击者记忆的做法并不合理。Wixted 及其同事(Wixted、Mickes 和 Fisher,2018)尤其指出,目击者陈述就像 DNA 一样,也可能被滥用,但如果使用得当,它们将具有巨大的价值,尤其是在犯罪调查中。他们通过实证研究证明,高可信度的初始目击者报告相当准确(Wixted 等人,2015;Wixted 和 Wells,2017)。在政策方面,Wixted指出,正如CSI技术人员需要接受DNA及其他法医证据收集、保存和解读方面的专业培训一样,警方和其他调查人员也需要接受根据认知科学研究已确立的程序收集、保存和解读目击者报告的专业培训。他赞同先前关于庭审中目击者证词的改革建议。到那时,犯罪发生数月甚至数年之后,记忆本身就具有可塑性,已经被时间和事后信息严重篡改,最终被彻底污染。
However, more recent research suggests that while reform was needed, wholesale rejection of eyewitness memory was not warranted. In particular, Wixted and his associates (Wixted, Mickes, & Fisher, 2018) have argued that like DNA itself, eyewitness statements can be misused, but, if used rightly, they have great value, especially in the investigation of crime. Empirically, they have shown that high-confidence initial eyewitness reports are quite accurate (Wixted et al., 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). With regard to policy, Wixted points out that just as CSI technicians need to be properly trained in the collection, preservation, and interpretation of DNA and other forensic evidence, police and other investigators need to be properly trained in collecting, preserving, and interpreting eyewitness reports following the procedures established already by cognitive science research. He agrees with earlier reform proposals about eyewitness testimony at trial. By then, months and even years after the crime took place, memories, being malleable, have been so altered by time and post-event information as to be hopelessly contaminated.
我们已经追溯了信息从感觉到记忆的处理过程。尽管关于动物是否具有自传体记忆仍存在一些争议,但我们已经触及了亚里士多德的动物心智和笛卡尔的野兽机器与人类之间的分界线。下一章将探讨传统上被称为“理性”的高级心理过程及其结果——决策。
We have followed the processing of information from sensation through memory. Although there is some dispute about whether animals have autobiographical memory, we have reached the dividing line between Aristotle’s animal mind and Descartes’s beast-machine, on the one hand, and human beings on the other. The next chapter takes up what has traditionally been called the higher mental processes of reason and its outcome, decision making.
本章的要点是不要相信你的记忆,但更准确地说,认知科学所证明的是记忆的可塑性,而不是遗忘性。奥古斯丁用洞穴来比喻记忆,承认事物可能会在记忆中丢失,存放在洞穴中的瓮可能会破碎并溶解。但他肯定没有想到瓮会变成钟乳石或冬眠的青蛙。从他那个时代到现在,关于记忆的比喻都将其描绘成一个被动的储存库(Draaisma,2000)。然而,对意义的追求并不止于编码。记忆会朝着图式的默认值漂移;每一次记忆活动都会创造一次对意义的新的追求和新的记忆;神经系统将记忆传播到整个大脑,神经过程总是在重新连接神经元之间的连接。记忆是动态的,而不是静态的。从进化的角度来看,记忆的进化是为了满足我们当前的需求,应对适应性挑战,而不是为了保留过去的真实形象。
The takeaway from this chapter is don’t trust your memory, but, more precisely, what cognitive science demonstrates is the malleability of memory, not forgetfulness. Augustine’s caves metaphor for memory recognized that things can be lost in memory, that an urn stored in a cave might break up and dissolve away. But he surely didn’t think that the urn might morph into a stalactite or a hibernating frog. Metaphors for memory from his time to the present have pictured it as a passive repository (Draaisma, 2000). The effort after meaning, however, does not end at encoding. Memories drift in the direction of schemas’ default values; every act of memory creates a new effort after meaning and a new memory; the nervous system spreads memories out over the whole brain, and neural processes are always rewiring the connections between neurons. Memory is dynamic, not static. In evolutionary terms, memory evolved to serve our current needs, to meet adaptive challenges, not to preserve a True image of the past.
记忆研究的奠基人是赫尔曼·艾宾浩斯(1885/1913)。《记忆:对实验心理学的贡献》(Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology),由HA·鲁格(HA Ruger)和CE·布森纽斯(CE Bussenius)译。(纽约:教师学院出版社)。网址:https ://books.google.com/books/about/Memory.html ?id=oRSMDF6y3l8C,或访问以下网址阅读原文:https://www.google.com/books/edition/%C3%9Cber_das_Ged%C3%A4chtnis/kfA0AAAAMAAJ ?hl=en&gbpv=0 。
The founding work of the study of memory was Herrmann Ebbinghaus, (1885/1913). Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology, trans. H. A. Ruger & C. E. Bussenius (New York: Teachers College Press). Available at: https://books.google.com/books/about/Memory.html?id=oRSMDF6y3l8C, or, for the original: https://www.google.com/books/edition/%C3%9Cber_das_Ged%C3%A4chtnis/kfA0AAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0.
弗雷德里克·巴特利特爵士在其著作《记忆:实验与社会心理学研究》(英国剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1932年)中开创了现代建构主义记忆观。可访问以下网址: https ://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2273030_5/component/file_2309291/content 。
Sir Frederick Bartlett began the modern constructivist view of memory with his Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1932). Available at: https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2273030_5/component/file_2309291/content.
柏拉图曾谴责文字的发明者摧毁了人类的记忆;而目前的嫌疑人是谷歌(Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011 [讽刺的是,以下链接与上述链接相似。])。文字出现之前的人们发展出了许多记忆技巧。希腊吟游诗人通过背诵《伊利亚特》和《奥德赛》来娱乐大众。弗朗西丝·耶茨在《记忆的艺术》(纽约:兰登书屋,2011)一书中探讨了文艺复兴时期记忆术的历史。
Plato once denounced the inventor of writing for destroying human memory; the current suspect is Google (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011 [ironic following links above.]). Preliterate peoples developed many techniques for remembering. Greek bards provided entertainment with their recitations of the Iliad and Odyssey, learned by heart. Frances Yates discusses the history of mnemonics through the Renaissance in The Art of Memory (New York: Random House, 2011).
学生们经常向专家寻求关于如何提高记忆力的建议。我所知道的唯一一本基于真实研究的书籍是JB Worthen和RR Hunt合著的《记忆术:21世纪的记忆术》(纽约:心理学出版社,2011年)。
Students often ask for expert advice on improving memory. The only book I know based on real research is J. B. Worthen and R. R. Hunt, Mnemonology: Mnemonics for the 21st Century (New York: Psychology Press, 2011).
对目击证人证词可错性的研究,使得认知心理学家被传唤为专家证人(我曾与辩护律师交谈,但从未被传唤)。目击证人证词研究领域最著名的先驱人物是伊丽莎白·洛夫特斯(Elizabeth Loftus),她撰写了一本关于她作为专家证人经历的、类似真实犯罪与心理学结合的著作,名为《辩方证人:被告、目击证人和审判记忆的专家》(纽约:圣马丁出版社,2015年)。
Research on the fallibility of eyewitness testimony led cognitive psychologists to be called as expert witnesses (I once talked to defense lawyers but was never called). The best known, and pioneer of, eyewitness testimony research was (and is) Elizabeth Loftus, who wrote a sort of true-crime-meets-psychologist book about her experiences as an expert witness, K. Ketcham and E. Loftus, Witness for the Defense: The Accused, the Eyewitness, and the Expert Who Puts Memory on Trial (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015).
好像什么都有电影列表。这里有一个关于回忆的电影列表:https://imagejournal.org/top-25-films-on-memory/。
There seem to be movie lists for everything. Here’s one for memory: https://imagejournal.org/top-25-films-on-memory/.
“无辜者计划”致力于推翻基于不充分科学发现而做出的定罪,该计划列出了一系列有关错误定罪的电视节目和电影:https://innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/。
The Innocence Project, which works to overturn convictions based on poor scientific findings, has a list of TV shows and films about wrongful convictions: https://innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/.
英国广播公司 (BBC) 制作了一系列纪录片短片,记录了一项实验,该实验以酒吧里发生的一起谋杀案开始,并跟踪了不知情的参与者目击者接受警方审讯的过程。https ://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00s6qdj。
The BBC did a set of documentary shorts following an experiment that begins with a staged murder in a pub and follows the unwitting participant-eyewitnesses as they are interrogated by police. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00s6qdj.
认知心理学已被应用于理解电影的多个层面,例如AP Shimamura,AP的《心理电影学:探索电影中的认知》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2013年)。编剧们引用了我研究生导师Bill Brewer、WF Brewer和E. Lichtenstein合著的一篇论文《故事是为了娱乐:故事的结构情感理论》,发表于《实用主义杂志》第6卷(1982年),第473-486页。 https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(82)90021-2。以下是其中一种用途:https://screencraft.org/2017/09/28/three-psychological-structures-screenwriters-can-use-to-engage-audiences/。
Cognitive psychology has been applied to understanding film at many levels, e.g., A. P. Shimamura, A. P., Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the Movies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Screenwriters have cited a paper co-authored by my graduate school mentor, Bill Brewer, W. F. Brewer and E. Lichtenstein, “Stories Are to Entertain: A Structural-Affect Theory of Stories,” Journal of Pragmatics 6 (1982): 473–486. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(82)90021-2. Here’s one use: https://screencraft.org/2017/09/28/three-psychological-structures-screenwriters-can-use-to-engage-audiences/.
最具争议的魔术分支是心灵魔术。它的兴起源于一场名为唯心论的宗教运动,该运动与早期认知心理学相交叉(Leahey & Leahey,1983)。唯心论始于 1848 年,当时两个无聊的少女福克斯姐妹表演了几个把戏,让很多人相信死者的灵魂依然活着,而且会在房屋里作祟。她们成为了第一批灵媒,唯心论创造了鬼魂的刻板印象和鬼屋的比喻,这些在今天的恐怖电影中仍然存在。唯心论是科学时代的一种宗教,因为它提供了人类个性存在及其在肉体死亡后继续存在的明显证据(Myers,1901 8),而不是将其视为一种信仰。因此,它与心理学、心灵研究、灵魂联系在一起,并成立了专业组织来对后来被称为超自然的精神现象进行科学研究。弗洛伊德认为这是一种职业选择;冯特写了一篇关于德国通灵者的文章;詹姆斯是美国心灵研究协会的创始人之一。统计学首次应用于心理数据的研究是由超心理学家完成的。
The most controversial department of magic is mentalism. It arose because of a religious movement, spiritualism, that intersected with early cognitive psychology (Leahey & Leahey, 1983). Spiritualism began in 1848 with the tricks performed by two bored teenage girls, the Fox sisters, that convinced many that the spirits of the dead live on and can haunt houses. They became the first spirit mediums, and spiritualism created the stereotypes of ghosts and the tropes of haunted houses that endure in horror movies today. Spiritualism was a religion for a scientific age because it offered apparent evidence of the existence of the human personality and its survival after bodily death (Myers, 19018), rather than taking it as a matter of faith. It thus became associated with psychology, the study of psyche, the soul, and professional organizations were formed to carry out scientific investigations of spiritual, later dubbed paranormal, phenomena. Freud considered it a career option; Wundt wrote an article about a German psychic; and James was a founder of the American Society for Psychical Research. The first applications of statistics to psychological data were done by parapsychologists.
不可避免地,一些声称能够帮助幸存者与亲人取得联系的人形成了市场。这些后来被称为“灵媒”的人,有些是真诚的;有些是真诚的,但却用诡计“助长”他们的效果;还有些纯粹是骗子。胡迪尼在招魂术盛行的时期失去了母亲,他寻求灵媒的安慰,但他识破了他们的诡计,并对他们进行了猛烈的攻击。阿尔弗雷德·比奈调查魔术师以击败灵媒(LaChapelle,2008)。也出现了一些魔术师,他们充当娱乐媒介,但声称自己没有超自然力量——心灵感应者。心灵感应的问题之一是,人们常常相信心灵感应者是真正的灵媒,即使他们并非如此。胡迪尼拜访了《福尔摩斯》的作者亚瑟·柯南·道尔,后者(和他的妻子)相信胡迪尼确实拥有通灵天赋,无论胡迪尼如何辩解和演示。福尔摩斯的作者,文学作品中最理性的人物,竟然会相信通灵术(以及其他东西),这证明了人类需要相信。
Inevitably there arose a market for people who claimed to be able to put survivors in touch with their loved ones. Some of the mediums, as they came to be called, were sincere; some were sincere but “helped” their effects with trickery; and some were simply frauds. Houdini, who lost his mother in the heyday of spiritualism, sought them out for comfort, but he recognized their trickery and campaigned ferociously against them. Alfred Binet investigated magicians to defeat mediums (LaChapelle, 2008). There also came into existence magicians who performed as mediums for entertainment but claimed no paranormal powers—mentalists. One of the problems with mentalism is that people often believe mentalists are real mediums even when they are not. Houdini visited Arthur Conan Doyle, the author of Sherlock Holmes, who believed (along with his wife) that Houdini had real psychic gifts, no matter Houdini’s protestations and demonstrations. That the author of Holmes, literature’s most rational being, could fall for psychics (and other things) is a testament to the human need to believe.
心灵魔术在魔术界备受争议的一个主要原因是,它太容易触动人们最脆弱、最敏感的部位,似乎能给予他们无法给予的东西——与挚爱的逝者建立联系。9我在这里提出这一点因为唯灵论创造了我们随身携带的关于灵魂、闹鬼和灵异现象的图式,而这些图式被一种名为“冷读”(Hyman,2007;Shermer,2010)的虚假灵媒/心灵术所利用。冷读可以让人们认为你比你更了解他们,并引导他们误以为你与他们已故的亲朋好友保持联系,而实际上除了共同的社交图式之外,他们一无所知。10我个人认为这种魔法是在玩火,我也理解,如果人们被通灵者/心灵术士愚弄了,他们有时会不喜欢魔术师。
A major reason mentalism is controversial among magicians is that it’s too easy to touch people in their tenderest, most vulnerable places, and to seem to offer them something they cannot give, connection to their beloved dead.9 I bring this up here because spiritualism created the schemas we carry around about souls and hauntings and spirit manifestations, and these are exploited by a fake medium/mentalist practice called cold reading (Hyman, 2007; Shermer, 2010). It’s possible to make people think you know them better than you do and lead them down a garden path to thinking you are in touch with their dead relatives and friends, without knowing anything at all except for shared social schemas.10 I personally think this kind of magic is playing with fire and understand that people sometimes don’t like magicians if they’ve been fooled by psychics/mentalists.
最简单的语言就能暗示出图式和情绪。不妨想想史蒂芬·平克提出的以下对话:
Schemas and emotions can be cued by the simplest language. Consider the following dialogs suggested by Steven Pinker:
她:我现在就走。
他:玩得开心。
对比
她:我要离开你了。
他:他是谁?!!
She: I’m leaving now.
He: Have a good time.
vs.
She: I’m leaving you.
He: Who is he?!!
一个词;两种不同的场景/模式。
One word; two different scenarios/schemas.
内容
Contents
Intelligence: The Symbol System Approach
Problem Solving: Representation and Search
Representation and the Combinatorial Explosion
Human Problem Solving: Bounded Rationality
Intuition and Expertise: Production Systems
Intelligence: Artificial Neural Networks
Three Projects in the Study of Rationality
The Normative and Descriptive Projects: Case Studies in Rationality
Investigating Reasoning: The Wason 4 Card Selection Task
The Logical Norms of Propositional Reasoning with Implication
Do People Reason with the Norms of Propositional Logic?
Investigating Decision Making: Behavioral Economics
The Economic Norms of Decision Making and Games
Do People Decide Using the Normative Principles of Decision Making and Game Theory?
The Descriptive Rules of Thinking and Decision Making
Are Heuristics and Biases Bugs or Features?
Bugs: Suffering from Dysrationalia
Features: Using the Adaptive Toolkit of Fast and Frugal Heuristics
The Remediation Project: Meliorism, Nudging, and Institutional Reform
现在,我们来探讨传统上被认为是人类独有的认知功能,即高级心理过程。我们还会遇到在低级认知中很少出现的道德和社会政策问题。由于高级心理过程传统上将我们定义为智人,即“智者”,因此正确使用高级心理过程具有规范性,它为他人和社会设定了标准。与停车计时器交谈的精神分裂症患者可能会被强制驱逐出社会并被监禁。老年人可能有法定监护人来管理他们的事务,自闭症患者也是如此(Cowen,2020)。因犯罪受审但被判定为精神错乱的人不会被与有罪的人一起监禁,而是与精神病患者一起监禁,因为只有理性的、有选择的人类才会在道德上犯下任何罪行。
We now arrive at cognitive functions traditionally thought to be uniquely human, the higher mental processes. We also meet moral and social policy issues that rarely arise about lower-level cognition. Because the higher mental processes traditionally define us as Homo sapiens, “wise man,” right use of the higher mental processes is normative, setting standards to which we are held by others and by society. Schizophrenics who talk to parking meters may be removed from society and confined against their will. Elderly persons may have legal guardians appointed to manage their affairs, as can autistics (Cowen, 2020). Persons tried for crimes but who are found insane are not imprisoned with the guilty but confined with the mentally ill because only rational, choosing humans can be morally guilty of anything.
西蒙(1992,2000)区分了两种智力形式:问题解决和直觉。尽管他受过经济学方面的训练(1981年诺贝尔奖;莱希,1993,2003),但他后来却对经济学感到失望,转而投身心理学。他和艾伦·纽厄尔着手构建一个通用的问题求解器,能够解决从逻辑证明到国际象棋的任何问题(纽厄尔、肖,& Simon, 1959; Ernst & Newell, 1969)。在此模型的基础上,他们构建了人类解决问题的计算机模拟(Newell、Shaw & Simon, 1959; Newell & Simon, 1972)。
Simon (1992, 2000) distinguished two forms of intelligence, problem solving and intuition. Although trained as an economist (1981 Nobel Prize; Leahey, 1993, 2003), he became disenchanted and left it for psychology. He and Allan Newell set out to build a general problem solver capable of solving any problem from logic proofs to chess (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1959; Ernst & Newell, 1969). Building on that model, they constructed a computer simulation of human problem solving (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1959; Newell & Simon, 1972).
教育家 Carl Bereiter 曾说过,当你不知道该做什么时,你所需要的就是智力。另一方面,直觉依赖于知识,在人工智能中被称为领域特定智能。由于直觉——“跟随你的直觉”——似乎根本不涉及可辨别的心理处理,因此似乎不可能用计算的方式处理它。然而,在研究模式识别时,我们了解到,直观地看到问题的解决方案,或者至少是它们敏锐的表述,取决于深厚的知识,就像专家和新手棋手对棋局的看法之间的差异一样。Kiesel 等人 (2009) 向新手和大师展示了棋盘位置的图片,询问每个棋盘是否有可用的将军步骤。在参与者不知情的情况下,在显示每张图片之前,会显示另一个棋盘位置(素数)并进行遮蔽,以便它永远不会被看到;每个被遮蔽的位置都有或没有可用的将军步骤。研究人员测量了对目标图片做出判断的延迟。新手棋手没有表现出启动条件的影响。然而,当启动条件与目标条件匹配时(即启动条件和目标条件都有或都没有可用的将棋),大师的判断速度更快。专家棋手会对他们看到的局面表现出直觉,但这种直觉是由他们自己没有意识到的认知过程所驱动的。
The educator Carl Bereiter once remarked that intelligence is what you need when you don’t know what to do. Intuition, on the other hand, depends on knowledge, and in AI is called domain-specific intelligence. Because intuition—“going with your gut”—seems to involve no discernable mental processing at all, it might seem impossible to treat computationally. However, in studying pattern recognition we learned that intuitively seeing solutions to problems, or at least their perspicacious representation, depends on profound knowledge, as in the difference between expert and novice chess players’ perceptions of chess positions. Kiesel et al. (2009) showed novices and masters pictures of board positions, asking if each board had or did not have a checking move available. Unknown to participants, before each picture was displayed, another board position was shown (a prime) and masked, so that it was never seen; each masked position had or did not have a checking move available. The researchers measured latency to making the judgment about the target picture. Novice players showed no effect of the primes. However, masters’ judgments were faster when the prime matched the target (i.e., prime and target both had or did not have a checking move available). The experts exhibited intuition about the positions they saw, but this intuition was informed by cognitive processes of which they were unaware.
问题求解分为两个阶段:表征和搜索。表征是关键过程,因为它构建了问题的框架。好的表征包含与问题解决方案相关的元素,并排除不相关的元素。更正式地说,表征创建了一个包含可能步骤的空间,供人们朝着解决方案迈进,然后人们在这个空间中搜索通往解决方案的路径。你可以看到国际象棋对这一问题求解理论的影响:棋盘和棋子定义了一个起点和一个可能性范围,棋手通过应用移动算子,每次探索一步,寻找将死的机会。然而,国际象棋存在所谓的组合爆炸:仅前四步就开启了大约2880亿种可能性。组合爆炸是大多数重要问题的典型特征,它会压垮信息处理系统。西蒙和纽厄尔发现了人们应对信息过载的方法。在此过程中,他们创造了一个关于理性的重要新定义——有限理性。
There are two phases to problem solving, representation and search. Representation is the critical process because it frames the problem. A good representation includes elements of a problem that are relevant to its solution and excludes elements that are not. More formally, the representation creates a space of possible steps toward a solution, and one then searches the space for a path to the solution. You can see the influence of chess on this theory of problem solving: The board and the chess pieces define a starting point and a field of possibilities that players explore a move at a time by applying movement operators, searching for checkmate. However, chess suffers from what is called a combinatorial explosion: The first four moves alone open up some two hundred and eighty-eight billion possibilities. Combinatorial explosion is typical of most problems of any importance and overwhelms information processing systems. Simon and Newell discovered ways people use to cope with information overload. In doing so they created a critical new definition of rationality, bounded rationality.
为了说明 GPS 方法,我们来看一个简单的单人游戏——汉诺塔(Anderson,1993)。你可以买一个,它们有更多塔和/或圆盘的版本(图 7.1)。
To illustrate the GPS approach, we’ll look at a simple one-person game, the Towers of Hanoi (Anderson, 1993). You can buy one, and they come in versions with more towers and/or disks (Figure 7.1).
游戏的目标是将所有三个垫圈从左塔移到右塔,从而重现相同的金字塔结构。每次只能移动一个盘子,并且不能将较大的盘子放在较小的盘子上。与国际象棋不同,游戏中只有一个操作员,负责将盘子移动到塔上。因此,可以显示游戏中所有可能的合法位置。图 7.2显示了汉诺塔问题的完整状态(或搜索)空间。下一步是搜索该空间以找到解(最右边的位置,底行)。
The goal of the game is to move all three washers from the left tower to the right tower, reproducing the same pyramid configuration. You may move only one disk at a time, and you may not place a larger disk on a smaller disk. Unlike chess, there’s only one operator, moving a disk to a tower. It is therefore possible to display all the possible legal positions of the game. Figure 7.2 shows the complete state (or search) space for the Towers of Hanoi problem. The next step is to search the space to find the solution (right-most position, bottom row).
搜索可以是盲目的,也可以是智能的。在盲目搜索中,系统搜索状态空间,而不评估每个新生成的位置对目标移动的帮助程度。在智能搜索中,使用一个或多个评估函数来评估每一步的进展。无论哪种情况,搜索都可以是广度优先或深度优先的。在广度优先搜索中,系统会从整个状态空间中的给定位置生成所有可能的移动。因此,在我们的汉诺塔示例中,系统会生成起始位置,然后生成第二层位置可用的单个走法,依此类推。状态空间会慢慢显现出来。在深度优先搜索中,系统从起始点生成单个走法,然后从起始点生成到第三层位置的单个走法,依此类推,直到到达最后一层。
Search can be blind or intelligent. In blind search the system searches the state space without evaluating how well each newly generated position helps move toward the goal. In intelligent search one or more evaluation functions are used to assess the progress of each move. In either case, search can be breadth-first or depth-first. In breadth-first search, the system generates every possible move from a given position across the whole state space. So, in our Towers of Hanoi example, the two moves available from the starting position would be generated, then the single moves available at the second-level positions would be generated, and so on. The state space would then be slowly revealed. In depth-first search, the system generates a single move from the starting point, then from it generates a single position to the third level and so on until the last level is reached.
广度优先搜索比较保守,因为最终会生成整个状态空间并揭示通往目标的路径。深度优先搜索可能显得“有见地”。在汉诺塔游戏中,系统可能会随机选择从起点到目标的直线位置,从而超越广度优先策略。另一方面,如果它做出错误的选择,就不得不浪费时间回溯到起始位置。最后,搜索可以是正向链接或反向链接。到目前为止的示例都是正向链接,因为我们从起始位置开始并寻找目标位置。在反向链接中,系统从目标位置开始并寻找通往起始位置的路径。反向链接在诸如汉诺塔之类的问题中最有用,因为这些问题具有唯一的解决方案。在国际象棋之类的问题中,存在许多可能的将死,从其中一个将死反向追溯到初始棋盘设置没有多大意义。
Breadth-first searches are conservative because eventually the whole state space is generated and a path to the goal is revealed. Depth-first search can appear “insightful.” In the Towers of Hanoi, the system might at random choose the straight line of positions from start to goal and outrun a breadth-first strategy. On the other hand, if it makes poor choices it will have to waste time backtracking to the starting position. Finally, search can be forward or backward chaining. The examples so far are of forward chaining because we begin at the starting position and look for the goal position. In backward chaining, the system starts with the goal position and seeks a path to the starting position. Backward chaining is most useful in problems such as the Towers of Hanoi, which have unique solutions. In problems such as chess, where there are many, many checkmates possible, working backward from one of them to the initial board setup makes little sense.
智能搜索或剪枝树会尝试避免搜索到达目标的无用或不必要的长路径。汉诺塔(至少在其三塔三盘形式中)非常简单,因此生成整个搜索空间也很容易。然而,在大多数游戏中,组合爆炸会对其产生不利影响。为了应对大多数问题的状态过度增长,尝试找到关闭某些发展路线的方法很有用,这样就不必生成和搜索它们。这样做需要评估移动的比较价值的方法。例如,国际象棋选手已经开发出几种评估位置的指标。其中最简单的指标之一是物质平衡。每个棋子都被分配一个点值:兵值一分,马和象值三分,车值五分,后值九分。因此,在游戏的任何时候,都可以看到哪个玩家领先。例如,如果白方吃掉了车和兵,而黑方吃掉了象和马,则物质平衡为均等。在考虑可能导致换子行动的棋步时,棋手可以通过计算所涉及的点数来评估。白方可能认为可以用马吃掉兵,但意识到马会被黑方的其他兵吃掉,导致净损失两点。由于这是一个糟糕的结果,白方可能决定不这样做,从而从搜索空间中剔除所有相关的棋步。
Intelligent search, or pruning the tree, tries to avoid searching futile or unnecessarily long pathways to the goal. The Towers of Hanoi—at least in its three tower, three disk form—is so simple that generating the entire search space is easy. However, in most games the combinatorial explosion militates against it. To cope with the lush growth of states for most problems, it’s useful to try to find ways to close off some lines of development so they don’t have to be generated and searched. Doing so requires ways to evaluate the comparative worth of moves. For example, chess players have developed several metrics for assessing positions. One of the simplest is material balance. Each chess piece is assigned a point value: Pawns are worth one point, knights and bishops are worth three, rooks are worth five, and the queen is worth nine. Therefore, at any point in the game, it’s possible to see which player is ahead on points. If, for example, White has taken a rook and pawn while Black has taken a bishop and a knight, material balance is even. In considering a move that will result in an exchange of pieces a player can evaluate it by counting the points involved. White might see that it’s possible to take a pawn with a knight but realize that the knight would then be taken by one of Black’s other pawns, resulting in a net loss of two points. Because this is a poor outcome, White might decide not to make it, thus pruning all its attached moves from the search space.
到目前为止,我们一直在讨论像GPS这样的人工智能程序是如何运作的。然而,纽厄尔和西蒙的最终目标是编写一个计算机模拟程序,提供人类解决问题的计算理论,带领他们和我们探讨人类理性这一更宏大的问题。
So far, we have been discussing how an AI program such as GPS might operate. However, Newell and Simon ultimately wanted to write a computer simulation program, providing a computational theory of human problem solving, taking them and us to the larger question of human rationality.
即使是汉诺塔状态空间包含的位置也比人类工作记忆所能容纳的还要多。计算机系统可以轻松地存储所有这些位置,并计算出从起点到目标的最佳路径。1西蒙认为,人类拥有有限的智力。提出这个想法是他获得诺贝尔奖的主要原因(Leahey,2003)。正如我们将看到的,当西蒙提出有限理性时,它在经济学中是一种异端邪说,并且在有关人类理性的辩论中仍然存在争议。我们智力的界限很广泛,包括我们的认知系统的各个方面以及我们做出决策的环境的各个方面。我们工作记忆容量的四项限制是人类智力内部认知界限的一个例子;实时问题是任何代理智力外部环境界限的一个例子。
Even the Towers of Hanoi state space contains more positions than can be held in human working memory. A computer system could handily store them all and work out the optimal path from start to goal.1 Human beings, Simon argued, possess bounded intelligence. Proposing this idea was the main reason for his Nobel Prize (Leahey, 2003). As we will see, when Simon put bounded rationality forward, it was high heresy in economics, and it remains controversial in debates about human rationality. The bounds on our intelligence are broad and include aspects of our cognitive systems and aspects of the environment in which we make decisions. The four-item limit on our working memory capacity is an example of an inner, cognitive bound on human intelligence; the real-time problem is an example of an outer, environmental bound on any agent’s intelligence.
为了解释有限智能,纽厄尔和西蒙引入了启发式概念。传统上,启发式与算法形成对比。算法是一种有效的决策程序,也就是说,如果应用正确,就能保证解决问题的规则。你在学校学到的算术规则就是算法的例子。启发式是一种经验法则,它有助于解决问题,但不能保证解决问题。物质平衡评估函数就是启发式的一个例子。在物质点上领先是好事,但并非不可战胜。因为它很简单,早期的计算机象棋程序就采用了它,并且经常被人类大师击败,他们会用后牺牲作为巧妙设置的陷阱。
To explain bounded intelligence, Newell and Simon introduced the concept of the heuristic. Traditionally, heuristics are contrasted with algorithms. An algorithm is an effective decision procedure, that is, a rule that, if applied correctly, guarantees a solution to a problem. The rules you learned in school to do arithmetic are examples of algorithms. A heuristic is a rule of thumb, a rule that helps solve a problem but does not guarantee it. The material balance evaluation function is an example of a heuristic. Being ahead on material points is good, but it is not undefeatable. Because it’s simple, early computer chess programs incorporated it and could often be defeated by human masters who would offer Queen sacrifices as cleverly laid traps.
当 Newell 和 Simon 对比启发式和算法时,后者术语显得晦涩难懂,但如今在谈论人工智能和社交媒体时,它却被随意使用。强调它们之间的区别是值得的。规则在一个计算级别可以是启发式,但在另一个计算级别可以是算法。例如,“寻求最优物质平衡”是一个经验法则,是下棋的启发式方法。但在计算机中实现它是由一种算法计算出来的,该算法将白棋和黑棋的点数相加,然后比较两者。人工神经网络 (ANN) 学习中的反向传播规则是一种算法,但选择在每次通过训练集时尝试的连接强度变化程度是人工智能艺术的问题——一种启发式方法。在互联网上谈论“算法”时,记住这些区别很重要。当 Google 在您的浏览器中向您展示广告时,它遵循的是算法计算出的启发式方法。如果你在亚马逊上买了一把电钻,你可能会突然看到锤子和锯子的广告,因为有一个启发式规则:“寻找一种工具的人很可能也在寻找——或者可能还不知道自己想要——其他工具”,但这并没有体现出像 3 + 3 = 6 这样的算法。然而,在谷歌的计算机中,启发式规则被转换成机器代码,并由真正的算法计算。它们保证给出数值答案,但不能保证凿子的销售。
When Newell and Simon contrasted heuristics and algorithms, the latter term was arcane, though today it gets tossed around when talking about AI and social media. It’s worthwhile to stress the difference. A rule can be a heuristic at one computational level but an algorithm at another. For example, “Seek superior material balance” is a rule of thumb, a heuristic for playing chess. But implemented in a computer it is calculated by an algorithm that adds up the point values of the White and Black pieces and compares the two. The back-propagation rule in artificial neural network (ANN) learning is an algorithm but choosing the degree of change to connection strength to try out on each pass through the training set is a matter of AI art—a heuristic. It’s important to keep these differences in mind when talking about “algorithms” on the Internet. When Google shows you ads in your browser, it’s following heuristics computed by algorithms. If you bought an electric drill on Amazon, you may suddenly see ads for hammers and saws because there’s a heuristic, “People looking for one tool are probably looking for—or may not yet know they want—others,” but this does not state an algorithm like 3 + 3 = 6. In Google’s computers, however, the heuristic rule is converted to machine code and computed by real algorithms. They guarantee a numerical answer but not a sale of chisels.
让我们回到汉诺塔问题,看看人们是如何解决的2 (Anderson, 1993; Luger, 1976)。参与者不会生成整棵树,但他们应用了两个相关的 heu风险分析,手段-目的分析(有时也称为差异缩减)和子目标。在手段-目的分析中,你要检查你拥有的(或你现在所处的位置)和你想要的(或你想达到的位置)之间的差异,并分析你现有的手段,以减少两者之间的差异。
Let’s return to the Towers of Hanoi to see how people solve it2 (Anderson, 1993; Luger, 1976). Participants don’t generate the whole tree, but they apply two related heuristics, means-ends analysis (sometimes called difference reduction) and subgoaling. In means-ends analysis you examine the difference between what you have (or here, where you are) and what you want (or where you want to be), and you analyze the means you have available to reduce the difference between the two.
以下是我在课堂上演示汉诺塔问题时的一个典型方案。学生参与者可能会说:“我想把 3 号圆盘放到 3 号塔上,但我做不到,因为 2 号圆盘在 3 号圆盘上。[这确立了第一个子目标:移动 2 号圆盘。] 但我做不到;我需要把 1 号圆盘从 2 号圆盘上移开。[这确立了第二个子目标,这是可以实现的。]”参与者将 1 号圆盘移动到 3 号塔上,使得第二个子目标可以实现;参与者将 2 号圆盘移动到 2 号塔。“1e 号圆盘上没有圆盘,但是我无法移动它,因为 1 号圆盘在 3 号塔上。[新的子目标设定。] 将 3 号圆盘移动到 2 号塔上的 2 号塔上。“现在我可以将 3 号圆盘移动到 3 号塔”[第二个子目标达成。] 现在将 1 号圆盘移动到 1 号塔,将 2 号圆盘移动到 3 号塔的 3 号圆盘上,并将 1 号圆盘移动到 3 号塔上。游戏结束。
Here’s a typical protocol from my class demonstrations of the Towers of Hanoi problem. The student-participant might say, “I want to get disk 3 onto Tower 3, but I can’t do that because smaller disk 2 is on disk 3 [This establishes a first subgoal, move disk 2.] But I can’t do that; I need to move disk 1 off disk 2. [Establishes second subgoal, which is achievable.]” Participant moves disk 1 to Tower 3, making second subgoal achievable; participant moves disk 2 to Tower 2. “No disk is on disk 1e, but I can’t move it because disk 1 is on Tower 3. [New subgoal set.] Moves disk 3 onto Tower 2 above disk 2. “Now I can move disk 3 to Tower 3” [Second subgoal achieved.]. Now moves disk one to Tower 1, disk 2 onto disk 3 at Tower 3, and disk 1 onto Tower 3. Game over.
启发式方法在人类理性的框架内,通过最小化对工作记忆的需求,却能有效地解决问题。你一直在使用它们,却不知道它们的名字。“我想成为一名临床心理学家,所以我必须获得博士学位。但要做到这一点,我需要心理学学士学位。我能考上哪所拥有心理学学士学位的学校?我得和我的指导顾问谈谈。” 这种情况会持续下去,最终演变成“首先,我必须注册心理学101课程。哎呀,名额满了!!!” 等等,持续了很多年,还背负着学生贷款……“经济学101课程开放了。也许读MBA也不错。”
Heuristics stay within the bounds of human rationality by minimizing demand on working memory yet lead to effective problem solving. You use them all the time without knowing their names. “I want to be a clinical psychologist, so I must get a doctoral degree in it. But to do that, I need a Bachelor’s in psychology. What school with a Bachelor’s in psychology can I get into? I need to talk to my guidance counselor.” This continues down to “First, I’ve got to register for PSYC 101. OOPS it’s full!!!!” and so on for many years and student loans…. “ECON 101’s open. Maybe an MBA isn’t so bad.”
对专业知识的研究使认知科学家相信,智力不仅仅是解决问题的能力(例如,Ericsson & Charness,1994)。还需要对世界的知识,尤其是对某些领域的详细了解。然而,一个艰巨的挑战依然存在,因为大多数关于世界的知识是隐性的,或者正如哲学家迈克尔·波兰尼(1966)在他开创性的书《隐性维度》中所说,是默会的:我们知道的多于我们能说的。事实上,这个问题从一开始就浮现在这本书的背景中,因为它是各种认知架构之间的主要分歧之一。具身认知最有说服力的说法之一是,我们与世界的物理互动产生了不能简化为命题的身体知识。神经网络和预测处理架构将隐性知识定位在我们大脑复杂的神经结构和功能中,这些结构和功能阻止它们转化为符号。
Research on expertise convinced cognitive scientists that there was more to intelligence than problem-solving ability (e.g., Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Knowledge of the world, especially detailed knowledge of some domain, was needed as well. However, a daunting challenge remained because most knowledge of the world is implicit, or tacit as philosopher Michael Polanyi (1966) put it in a pathbreaking book, The Tacit Dimension: we know more than we can tell. In fact, this issue has been floating in the background of this book from its beginning, as it’s one of the major disagreements between the various architectures of cognition. One of embodied cognition’s most persuasive claims is that our physical interactions with the world give rise to bodily knowledge that cannot be reduced to propositions. The neural network and predictive processing architectures locate tacit knowledge in the complex neural structures and functions of our brains that resist translations into symbols.
然而,符号系统方法的倡导者渴望用单一的认知理论创建一个统一的认知科学领域(Newell,1990,1992;Anderson,2007)。为此,他们采用并修改了一种称为生成系统的计算机架构(例如,Newell,1973,1980;Lovett & Anderson,2005;Young,2001)。信息处理模型中知识表征的缺点在于,在被检索到工作记忆之前,它是被动的。然而,隐性长期知识并不通过工作记忆运作,因为在工作记忆中,我们实际上可以讲述我们所知道的一切。Chabris 采访的那位大师能够清晰地表达他的一些专业知识——他曾与心理学家合作,并掌握了诸如组块之类的术语——但这很费力,而且显然,他知道的比能说的要多。认知建模者需要一种方法来激活长期知识,使其能够自行引发行为,而无需加载到工作记忆中。
Nevertheless, advocates of the symbol-system approach were eager to create a unified field of cognitive science using a single theory of cognition (Newell, 1990, 1992; Anderson, 2007). To do this, they adopted and modified a computer architecture called the production system (e.g., Newell, 1973, 1980; Lovett & Anderson, 2005; Young, 2001). The shortcoming of knowledge representation in information processing models is that it’s passive until it has been retrieved into working memory. However, tacit long-term knowledge does not operate through working memory because then we could, in fact, tell everything we know. The grandmaster interviewed by Chabris could articulate some of his expertise—he’d been working with psychologists and had picked up terms such as chunking—but it was hard work and, clearly, he knew more than he could say. Cognitive modelers needed a way to make long-term knowledge active, able to cause behavior on its own without being loaded into working memory.
产生式系统为计算系统添加了新的长期记忆形式——规则记忆,具体来说,是用于称为产生式的规则的记忆。产生式是一种“如果……则”形式的计算规则,它指定一个或一组条件,以及在满足该条件时应采取的行动。例如,如果条件 (a)、条件 (b) 或条件 (c) 为真, 则 采取行动X。
A production system adds a new form of long-term memory to computational systems, rule memory, specifically, for rules called productions. A production is a computational rule of if ... then form that specifies a condition or set of conditions and an action to be taken if the condition or conditions obtain, for example, IF condition (a), and condition (b), or condition (c) is true, THEN take action X.
生产系统通常用于编程视频游戏中的非玩家角色(Waveren,2001;Schiel,nd),例如传奇的 FPS、Quake。3图 7.3显示了 NPC 生产系统的结构以及它如何在计算周期中运行。
Production systems are often used to program non-player characters in video games (Waveren, 2001; Schiel, n.d.), such as the legendary FPS, Quake.3 Figure 7.3 shows the structure of an NPC’s production system and how it operates through a computational cycle.
计算周期从 NPC“感知”它所处环境的情况开始,包括其健康和武器统计数据、与敌人的距离等因素,掩护地点,以及敌人的健康和武器状态。这些信息被加载到工作内存中,在那里它们成为可能与规则内存中的产生式匹配的潜在条件。例如,一个产生式是如果 敌人可见 并且 (我的生命值< 20% 或 他的武器>>我的), 那么 提出撤退,其中>>表示“比...强大得多”。假设NPC的敌人(玩家)在走廊尽头可见,并且拥有比NPC强大得多的武器。然后条件将与规则匹配,并且操作将被提交给冲突解决算法,该算法将选择一个提议的操作,然后执行该操作。在这种情况下,NPC将撤退到走廊的一个角落并躲在它后面。这个动作将启动一个新的计算周期,因为游戏情况已经改变,必须重新感知。
The computational cycle begins with the NPC “sensing” what it can see in its situation, including factors such as its health and weapon statistics, distance to the enemy, places in which to take cover, and the health and weapon stats of the enemy. These facts are loaded into working memory, where they become potential conditions that might match a production in rule memory. For example, one production is IF enemy is visible AND (my health is < 20% OR his weapon >> mine), THEN propose retreat, where >> means “much stronger than.” Let’s suppose that the NPC’s enemy (the player) is visible down a corridor and has a much stronger weapon than the NPC. Then the conditions will match the rule and the action will be proposed to a conflict resolution algorithm that will choose one proposed action, which will then be carried out. In this case, the NPC will retreat to a corner in the corridor and hide behind it. This movement will set off a new computational cycle because the game situation has changed and must be re-sensed.
在应用人工智能领域,生产系统过去和现在都被用来通过一种名为知识工程的实践来创建专家系统(Buchanan、Davis、Smith & Feigenbaum,2018)。知识工程师——一位人工智能专家——会与某个领域的公认专家(例如电视剧《豪斯医生》中的人物)面谈,试图提取构成该从业者专业知识的生产规则。为了让专家清晰地表达隐性知识,这个过程通常包括展示专家不熟悉但面试官熟悉的案例,并引出专家的意见,并根据需要提出问题。
In applied AI, production systems were and are used to create expert systems via a practice called knowledge engineering (Buchanan, Davis, Smith, & Feigenbaum, 2018). The knowledge engineer—an AI specialist—sits down with a recognized expert in a field—such as Dr. House from the TV show—and tries to extract the production rules comprising the practitioner’s expertise. To get the expert to articulate tacit knowledge, the procedure usually involves showing cases unfamiliar to the expert but known to the interviewer, and elicits opinions, asking questions as needed.
事实上,豪斯医生就是专家系统的绝佳范例,豪斯医生和他的团队在诊断过程中就体现了这一点。他们的白板就是工作记忆,豪斯医生首先列出本周病例的症状。随着他们所学产生式中的条件被触发,团队提出诊断和行动建议。建议的行动有:抽血、活检等。新的事实被添加到白板上,一些诊断被排除,一些诊断被保留,一些诊断被添加。条件匹配,新的行动被采取,增加了戏剧张力。在某个时刻,豪斯医生通常会被一个看似无关的事件4推动,从而恢复一个特别隐性的产生式,决定诊断,并在 41 分钟时治愈病人。
House, in fact, is an excellent example of an expert system in action, as House and his team embody one during their diagnostic sessions. Their whiteboard is working memory, and House begins by listing presenting symptoms from this week’s case. The team suggests diagnoses and actions, as conditions in their learned set of productions are triggered. Actions are proposed: blood drawn, biopsies taken, etc. New facts are added to the board, some diagnoses are eliminated, some remain, and some new ones are added. Conditions are matched and new actions taken, increasing dramatic tension. At some point, House typically is nudged by a seemingly irrelevant event4 to recover an especially tacit production, decides on a diagnosis, and cures the patient at the 41-minute mark.
访谈结束后,AI专家会将专家的陈述编入专家系统外壳的生成规则内存中,该外壳包含整个系统的其他结构。专家系统的目标是让专业知识随时随地可用,尤其是在没有维柯丁成瘾的情况下!
After the interview, the AI specialist codifies the expert’s statement into the production rule memory of an expert system shell containing the rest of the structures of the whole system. The goal of expert systems is having expertise available everywhere, especially without a Vicodin habit!
尽管科学界对此充满热情,但联结主义人工智能直到 2010 年代中期所谓的深度学习人工神经网络 (ANN) 兴起才取得进展 (Le Cun,Bengio 和 Hinton,2015;Bengio,2016)。正如我们所见,军事的实际需求促成了人工智能的首次繁荣,而实际需求和资金推动了深度学习的诞生,但在这种情况下,它源于私人利益而非军事利益。Facebook、亚马逊和谷歌等科技公司(1985 年 PDP 宣言的作者之一 Geoffrey Hinton 现在是谷歌的杰出研究员)希望尽可能精准地定位他们的好友推荐和热门故事推荐、产品推荐以及搜索结果和广告投放。
Despite enthusiasm in the scientific community, connectionist AI achieved little until the rise of so-called deep learning artificial neural networks (ANNs) in the mid-2010s (Le Cun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015; Bengio, 2016). As we’ve seen, it was the practical needs of the military that caused the first flourishing of AI, and practical need and funding drove the creation of deep learning, but in this case, it was via private rather than military interest. Tech firms such as Facebook, Amazon, and Google—where Geoffrey Hinton, one of the authors of the 1985 PDP manifesto, is now Distinguished Researcher—want to target their friending and trending story recommendations, their product recommendations, and their search results and advertisement placements as precisely as possible.
科技公司利用各种模式:点赞模式可能为 Facebook 用户带来新朋友;新闻阅读模式可能推荐某篇文章;购物模式可能推荐新产品;网站链接模式可以对 Google 搜索结果进行优先排序。模式识别是神经网络最擅长的领域,数学和计算能力的进步使得构建和调整大型多层网络(深度学习也因此得名)成为可能,这种网络远比 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的网络强大得多。它们能够非常有效地在数十亿个数据点中寻找模式。
Tech firms exploit patterns: patterns of likes that might suggest a possible new friend for a Facebook user, a pattern of news story reading that might suggest a particular article, a pattern of purchases that might suggest a new product, or a pattern of links between websites to prioritize a Google search result. Pattern recognition is what neural networks do best, and advances in mathematics and computing power have made it possible to construct and tune large, multiple layered networks (hence, the name deep learning), far more powerful than the networks of the 1980s and 1990s. They are very effective at finding patterns among billions of data points.
更具心理学意义的是,一个深度学习计算机程序击败了世界排名第三的围棋大师李世石,在一场锦标赛中五局四胜(Sneed,2016)。围棋是一种战略性棋盘游戏,有点像国际象棋,但在更大的棋盘上进行,棋盘上有黑白棋子,其理念是将棋子放在对手棋子的周围并将其吃掉。国际象棋被认为比围棋简单,李世石的失败令人大吃一惊。国际象棋是由标准符号系统程序掌握的,这些程序每秒可以尝试数百万次移动和反击,以找到最佳移动。然而,众所周知,围棋需要玩家在棋盘上出现的马赛克中看到规律,区分强弱模式,而这是符号系统所不具备的技能。
Of more psychological relevance was the announcement that a deep learning computer program had defeated the world’s number three Go master, Lee Sedol, winning four out of five games in a tournament (Sneed, 2016). Go is a strategic board game, a bit like chess, but played on a larger board on which black and white stones are placed, the idea being to place stones that surround those of your opponent and capture them. Chess is considered to be simpler than Go, and Sedol’s defeat came as a huge surprise. Chess was mastered by standard symbol system programs, which can try out millions of moves and countermoves per second to find the best ones. Go, however, famously requires players to see patterns in the emerging mosaics on the board, distinguishing between weak and strong patterns, a skill that symbol systems don’t have.
获胜的围棋程序名为“Deep Mind”(Silver 等人,2016)。Deep Mind 的数学原理非常复杂,但粗略地说,它是一个混合联结主义/符号系统程序。深度学习网络经过训练可以区分强弱模式,而符号系统组件则生成可能的走法。该程序在与人类对手对弈之前,通过数千次自对弈来学习。虽然 Deep Mind——就像之前的蛮力计算机象棋程序一样——并不试图模仿人类;但它的胜利表明,人工智能正日益展现出与人类水平相当的智能,但这并不意味着拥有类人智能。
The winning Go program is called Deep Mind (Silver et al., 2016). The mathematics of Deep Mind is complex, but roughly speaking it is a hybrid connectionist/symbol system program. Deep learning networks are trained to tell weak and strong patterns apart, while the symbol system components generate possible moves. The program learned by playing against itself thousands of times before playing against human opponents. While Deep Mind—like the brute force computer chess programs that went before it—does not try to imitate humans; its victory shows that AI is increasingly showing human-level intelligence, which does not mean human-like intelligence.
因此,尚不清楚这些成功对认知科学的贡献有多大,因为深度学习在揭示或解释认知的同时,也制造了不少神秘的事物。一些人工智能科学家甚至将机器学习称为“炼金术”,而人工智能也正经历着自身的复制危机(Hutson,2018,2019)。
Therefore, it’s not clear how much these successes are contributing to cognitive science, because Deep Learning creates at least as much mystery about cognition as it reveals or explains. Some AI scientists even call machine learning “alchemy” and AI is going through its own replication crisis (Hutson, 2018, 2019).
ANN 最严重的问题从一开始就存在。由于它们不是编程的,而是学习的,即使是创造它们的科学家也不知道它们内部发生了什么:它们是不透明的。随着 ANN 越来越深,其中的奥秘也越来越深。在应用中,尤其是在医疗诊断等专家系统中,这个问题被称为可解释性失败。使用产生式构建的专家系统可以通过检索产生该行为的相关产生式来解释其行为。ANN 做不到这一点,而相信一个类似魔法系统的诊断会加深人类对人工智能的普遍怀疑。欧盟很快将要求专家系统自我解释,美国国防部高级研究计划局 (DARPA) 正在资助这方面的研究。认知科学的讽刺结果是 Voosen (2019) 所说的“人工智能神经科学”。认知神经科学家必须研究大脑隐藏的工作原理,现在人工智能“神经科学家”必须对他们自己的创造物做同样的事情。
The most serious problem with ANNs has been around since the beginning. Because they are not programmed, but learn, even the scientists who create them don’t know what’s going on inside: they are opaque. As the ANNs get deeper and deeper, the mysteries inside get deeper, too. In applications, especially expert systems such as for medical diagnosis, the problem is known as a failure of explainability. An expert system built with productions can explain its behavior by retrieving the relevant productions that produced the behavior. ANNs can’t do that, and trusting, say, diagnoses to what amounts to a magical system deepens human suspicions about AI in general. The European Union will soon require expert systems to explain themselves and DARPA is funding research on the question. The ironic outcome for cognitive science is what Voosen (2019) calls “AI neuroscience.” Cognitive neuroscientists have to investigate the hidden workings of the brain, and now AI “neuroscientists” have to do the same thing for their own creations.
Zador (2019) 认为,目前的 ANN 无法很好地模拟人类思维,因为它们的制造者忽略了人类智力的关键事实,即人类智力是进化而来的。Zador 指出,ANN 最常见的模式学习方法是监督学习,即 ANN 通过尝试标记照片来做出反应,然后被告知照片中的物体是什么,并通过反向传播调整其连接权重。借助现代计算机,ANN 可以在短时间内处理成千上万个这样的配对。然而,儿童通常看不到如此整齐排列的物体和标签,他们一生中看到的物体和标签的数量也不如 ANN 在几分钟内看到的那么多。然而,幼儿却能轻松快速地掌握事物的名称。ANN 无法很好地模拟人类学习,因为它们缺乏一个关键因素:先天性。ANN 处于学习理论中极端的后天培养端,因为每个 ANN 一开始的连接强度都是随机的——它对世界一无所知。但我们已经看到,现存的哺乳动物的大脑并非如此,它们已经知道,例如,光来自上方的单一光源,而这种知识有助于模式识别。
Zador (2019) argues that current ANNs are poor models for human thought because their makers ignore the key fact about human intelligence, namely that it evolved. Zador points out that the most common method of pattern learning in ANNs is supervised learning, in which the ANN responds to a photo by trying to label it, is then told what the object in the photo is, and adjusts its connection weights via backpropagation. With modern computers, an ANN can go through thousands and millions of such pairs in a short period of time. However, children don’t usually see such neatly paired objects and labels, and they can’t see as many of them in their lifetimes as an ANN sees in a few minutes. Yet very young children readily and rapidly acquire names for things. ANNs are poor models of human learning because they lack something critical: innateness. ANNs are at the extreme nurture end of theories of learning because each ANN starts out with randomized connection strengths—it knows nothing at all about the world. But we have seen that this is not true of existing mammalian brains, which come already knowing, for example, that light comes from above from a single light source, and this knowledge facilitates pattern recognition.
类似的担忧也出现在自然语言处理(即通过图灵测试)的人工智能领域。目前最主流的自然语言处理(NLP)程序是谷歌赞助的 GPT-3。5 NLP对于谷歌实现将搜索结果从任何语言翻译成任何其他语言的目标至关重要。GPT-3 可以通过部分图灵测试(Lacker,2020;Cowen,2020b),甚至可以回应哲学家对其性能的批评(Weinberg,2020)。然而,GPT-3 并不使用语法来理解它所读的内容,而是使用一种人工智能版本的古老语言学习方法,称为英语近似法(Deese,1961)。句子中任何单词与可能跟在其后的另一个单词之间存在统计依赖关系。因此,在英语中,“The”后面不会跟着另一个“the”,6也不太可能跟着另一个“the”。动词后跟名词,并且后面很可能跟着名词。此外,提示中的单词越多,下一个单词的限制就越大,因此“当技术人员修理调制解调器时,她发现她必须更换……”后面不会跟着“海象”或“眯眯眼”。GPT-3 是一种人工神经网络 (ANN),它会从互联网上搜索较长的句子,并记录字符串与下一个出现的单词之间的统计依赖关系。当提示一个新的字符串需要翻译时,它会使用统计数据来猜测下一个单词。它给出了可用的结果,但它不是人类语言理解的模型,而且与人类相比,它在接触到错误信息后很难学会说真话。7
Similar concerns arise in the AI field of natural language processing, i.e., passing the Turing test. The reigning NLP program is Google-sponsored GPT-3.5 NLP is important to Google’s goal of being able to translate search results from any language to any other. GPT-3 can pass some Turing tests (Lacker, 2020; Cowen, 2020b), and it can even reply to philosophers’ critiques of its performance (Weinberg, 2020). However, GPT-3 does not use syntax to understand what it reads but uses an AI version of an old verbal learning method called approximations to English (Deese, 1961). There are statistical dependencies between any word and another word that might follow it in a sentence. Thus, the prompt “The” will not be followed by another “the” in English,6 is unlikely to be followed by a verb, and is most likely to be followed by a noun. Furthermore, the more words in a prompt the more constrained the next word will be, so “As the technician worked to repair the modem, she found that she had to replace the …” won’t be followed by “walrus” or “squinch.” GPT-3 is an ANN that scrapes the Internet for longish sentences and catalogs the statistical dependencies between word strings and the next occurring word. When given a prompt of a new string to translate, it uses its statistics to guess the next word. It gives usable results, but it’s not a model for human language understanding, and, compared to humans, it has a hard time learning to tell the truth after being exposed to misinformation.7
Dunietz (2020) 认为,GPT-3 及其竞争对手代表着人工智能的死胡同。通过图灵测试的竞争已经变成了一场比拼,看谁的 ANN 规模最大,谁能处理最长的字符串。相反,人工智能应该尝试模拟人类的语言理解,Dunietz 建议将故事理解作为工程的试验台,从空间、时间、因果关系和动机等主题来分析故事。这看起来像是回归巴特利特叙事图式的传统,但并未被承认。
Dunietz (2020) argues that GPT-3 and its rivals represent a dead end for AI. The quest to pass the Turing test has become a competition to see whose ANN is the biggest and who can process the longest strings. Instead, AI should try to emulate human language understanding, Dunietz suggesting story understanding as a testbed for engineering, analyzing stories in terms of themes such as space, time, causality, and motivation. This looks like an unacknowledged return to the Bartlett tradition of narrative schemas.
以下论文的目的是研究进行推理的思维活动的基本规律;用微积分的符号语言表达它们,并在此基础上建立逻辑科学和构建其方法;使该方法本身成为应用概率数学原理的一般方法的基础;最后,从这些研究过程中出现的各种真理要素中收集一些有关人类思维的性质和构成的可能暗示。
乔治·布尔(1854),《思维规律研究》,第1页
The design of the following treatise is to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is performed; to give expression to them in the symbolical language of a Calculus, and upon this foundation to establish the science of Logic and construct its method; to make that method itself the basis of a general method for the application of the mathematical doctrine of Probabilities; and, finally, to collect from the various elements of truth brought to view in the course of these inquiries some probable intimations concerning the nature and constitution of the human mind.
George Boole (1854), An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, p. 1
智力长期以来被认为是一种单一的心理能力。在心理测量学中,它是g因素;在非正式信息处理中,它是工作记忆效率。这也是西蒙和纽厄尔的通用问题求解器背后的理念,该程序提出,是可以应用于任何问题(无论其领域)的算法和启发式方法。但我们看到了他们如何意识到专家智能除了依赖于解决问题的技能外,还依赖于特定领域的知识,从而推动了生产系统和知识工程的发展。
Intelligence has long been considered a single psychological capacity. In psychometrics it’s the g factor, and in informal information processing it’s working memory efficiency. It’s the idea behind Simon and Newell’s General Problem Solver, which proposed that there are algorithms and heuristics that can be applied to any problem regardless of its domain. But we saw how they came to realize that expert intelligence depended on domain-specific knowledge in addition to problem-solving skills, leading to the development of production systems and knowledge engineering.
人类思维的通用观点中蕴含着一种假设,即思维是对逻辑和理性的正确运用。逻辑规则在范围和应用上具有普遍性和普遍性;正如斯多葛学派所观察到的,我们可以对任何事物进行逻辑思考。它们是真正的算法:如果正确地应用于真实的前提,它们就能保证得出有效的结论。最后,由于它们体现了理性,因此它们具有规范性,定义了我们应该相信什么。正如 3 + 2 约束我们相信 5 是答案一样,假设p蕴含q且p为真,那么我们必须并且应该相信q也为真。
Nested within the general-purpose view of human thinking is an assumption that thinking is the right use of logic, of reason. The rules of logic are general and universal in scope and application; it’s possible to think logically about anything, as the Stoics observed. They are true algorithms: applied correctly to true premises they guarantee reaching valid conclusions. Finally, because they embody reason, they are normative, defining what we ought to believe. Just as 3 + 2 binds us to believe 5 is the answer, so given that p implies q and that p is true, then we must and should believe that q is also true.
布尔的这段引言表达了认知科学领域这一颇具影响力的观点。布尔并非将他的“符号语言”作为阐明思维的工具,而是将其视为一幅揭示“人类思维的本质和构成”的图景。布尔认为,逻辑不仅为我们提供了思维运作方式的科学描述,也为我们提供了思维运作方式的规范性说明。将这两种观点区分开来,引发了伟大的理性之争。
The quotation from Boole expresses this influential viewpoint in cognitive science. Boole does not offer his “symbolical language” as a tool for clarifying thinking, but as a picture revealing “the nature and constitution of the human mind.” Boole says that logic gives us a scientific description of how the mind does work as well as a normative account of how it should work. Levering these claims apart caused the great rationality debate.
这一过程始于联想主义的发展。休谟认为,实践结论是通过联想而非逻辑得出的。他(1740/1777/1962,第72页)写道:
The process began with the development of associationism. Hume argued that practical conclusions were reached by association, not by logic. He (1740/1777/1962, p. 72) wrote,
由于这种通过心智活动,我们能够从原因推断结果(如巴甫洛夫条件反射),反之亦然,这对于所有人类的生存至关重要,因此,我们不太可能将其信任于……理性,因为理性是缓慢的……在婴儿期根本不会出现任何程度的……并且,在最好的情况下,也只是……极易犯错。
as this operation from the mind, by which we infer effects from causes [as in Pavlovian conditioning], and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to … reason, which is slow … appears not, in any degree, during … infancy, and, at best, is … extremely liable to error and mistake.
“自然智慧”赋予我们这种“本能或机械倾向”,它“运作时绝对可靠”,在出生时就已存在,在其他缺乏逻辑的动物身上也同样存在。因此,形成普遍结论或习惯的能力建立在联想而非逻辑或理性之上,建立在我们从有限事例中进行概括的倾向之上,以及建立在我们认为原因必然与结果相联系的倾向之上。康德对理性至上论的重申,削弱了休谟的影响力,直到20世纪才有所减弱。
The “wisdom of nature” has implanted in us this “instinct or mechanical tendency” that is “infallible in its operation” and appears at birth and in other animals, which lack logic. Thus, the ability to form general conclusions, or habits, is founded on association, not logic or reason, on our propensity to generalize from limited instances, and on our propensity to feel causes necessarily linked to effects. Kant’s reassertion of the primacy of reason blunted the force of Hume’s influence until the 20th century.
一门社会科学探讨了科学(描述“是什么” )与规范(规定“应该是什么”)之间的区别。经济学家区分了积极的 和规范经济学8(例如,弗里德曼,1953)。实证经济学家的工作是发现经济行为规律,就像物理学家的工作是发现物质规律一样。例如,实证经济学家应该能够预测利率变动对经济增长的影响,就像物理学家可以预测施加力对物体的影响一样。你向规范经济学家咨询有关 401(k) 的建议:如果美联储降息 25 个基点,我应该如何调整我的投资组合?显然,这两种经济实践是相互交织的,因为如果没有关于经济行为的预测性科学知识,财务顾问的建议就毫无价值。
One social science has addressed the difference between science, which describes what is, and norms, which prescribe what ought to be. Economists distinguish between positive and normative economics8 (e.g., Friedman, 1953). The job of the positive economist is to discover the laws of economic behavior, just as the job of the physicist is to discover the laws governing matter. The positive economist should be able to predict, for example, the effect of an interest rate change on economic growth the way a physicist can predict the effect on an object of the application of force. You consult a normative economist for advice about your 401(k): How should I (ought I) change my portfolio if the Fed drops interest rates 25 basis points? Obviously, these two economic practices are intertwined because, without predictive scientific knowledge about economic behavior, the advice of financial advisers would be worthless.
当我们思考规范时,我们往往首先想到的是那些权威超越自然的道德律令,例如柏拉图的《善的形式》或大多数宗教的造物主上帝。其他规范则由社会自身建立,旨在使事情有序进行,例如制定诸如在道路哪一侧行驶或陪审团需要多少票才能定罪之类的规则。同样,一些规范性规则构成了某种生活方式,通常是一种游戏。例如,在美式橄榄球中,由于担心脑损伤,铲球方式在过去几年发生了很大变化。另一方面,越位规则本身就有助于构成橄榄球这项运动。在美式橄榄球或足球中,你可以越位,但它们不是一回事,在棒球中你也不能越位。
When we think of norms, we tend to think first of moral edicts whose authority lies outside nature, as for example in Plato’s Form of the Good or in most religions’ creator-God. Other norms are set up by societies themselves to get things done in orderly ways, establishing rules such as on which side of the road to drive or how many votes a jury needs to convict. Similarly, some normative rules constitute a certain way of life, often a game. For example, in American football, how tackles may be made has changed a great deal over the past few years because of fear of brain damage. On the other hand, being offside is a rule that by itself helps constitute football as a practice. You can be offside in American football or soccer, but they are not the same thing, and you can’t be offside in baseball.
然而,对于伟大的理性之争来说,至关重要的是一种源于自然本身而非社会或其他外部权威的规范概念。这种规范概念是由自然功能的存在所创造的。例如,一旦确定心脏是一个循环血液的器官(这是它的功能),就有可能探究一颗特定的心脏是否运转良好。正常的心脏能充分地循环血液,压力既不太高也不太低。如果一颗心脏产生的血压过高,可以服用药物来恢复正常功能。如果一颗心脏完全崩溃,可以通过人工植入物来增强其功能,甚至可以更换一颗新的、更正常的心脏。要评估人类是否理性,我们必须首先问,如果有的话,理性服务于什么自然功能。
Critical to the great rationality debate, however, is a concept of norms that derives from nature itself rather than from society or another outside authority. This concept of norm is created by the existence of natural functions. For example, once it was established that the heart is an organ that circulates the blood—that’s its function—it becomes possible to ask whether a given heart is doing a good job or not. A normal heart circulates the blood thoroughly and with neither too much nor too little pressure. If a given heart generates too much blood pressure, medicine can be given to restore normal function. If a heart breaks down completely, it may be augmented by artificial implants or even replaced with a new, more normal, heart. To evaluate whether humans are rational, we must first ask what natural function, if any, reason serves.
一个重要的科学挑战在于,某些器官或系统的功能存在与否,因为有时我们并不清楚这些功能究竟是什么。亚里士多德认为大脑负责冷却血液(它看起来确实像个散热器),而心脏是思考和感觉的中心(我们至今仍会说“我全心全意地爱你”)。在现代神经科学中,早在海马体的记忆功能被阐明之前,它就已经是一个解剖学上可定义的器官了。
An important scientific challenge is posed by the existence of organs or systems that have functions because sometimes it’s unclear what the function is. Aristotle thought that the brain was for cooling the blood (it does look like a radiator) and the heart was the seat of thinking and feeling (we still say, “I love you with all my heart”). In modern neuroscience, the hippocampus was an anatomically definable organ long before its memory functions were worked out.
理性大辩论的参与者们对理性所起的自然功能持有强烈分歧。此外,我们必须考虑理性可能没有自然功能。功能,而是一种在我们大脑进化到一定规模时才出现的能力。一些认知科学家认为意识就是这样的。或者,再举一个例子,我们不太可能为了进行高等物理计算而进化出计算微积分的能力。
Participants in the great rationality debate disagree strongly over what natural function reason performs. Moreover, one must entertain the possibility that it has no natural function but is an ability that just appeared when our brains evolved to a certain size. Some cognitive scientists believe that consciousness is like that. Or, to pose another example, it’s unlikely that the ability to do calculus evolved so we can do advanced physics.
毫不奇怪,认知科学的哲学传统将理性视为我们通向真理的途径。作为认识论者,哲学家们的主要关注点是根除错误,并为人类知识奠定基础。因此,理性的功能在于发现可证成的真信念。布尔在他那个时代代表了这一传统,而福多尔(2000)在我们这个时代则代表了这一传统。在心理学领域,让·皮亚杰(1947、1970、1971)的发生认识论就属于这一传统。皮亚杰的认知发展理论认为,儿童会经历不同的发展阶段,在这些阶段中,心智会构建日益复杂的逻辑形式,从而更好地理解物质世界。当今的心理学家普遍拒绝这种观点,称之为规范主义(Elqayam & Evans, 2011)或知性主义(Mercier, 2016;Mercier & Sperber, 2019)。对皮亚杰的挑战开启了理性之争。
Unsurprisingly, the philosophical tradition in cognitive science viewed reason as our path to truth. As epistemologists, philosophers’ leading concern was rooting out error and establishing the foundations for human knowledge. The function of reason was thus discovering justifiable true beliefs. Boole represented this tradition in his time, and Fodor (2000) does in ours. In psychology, Jean Piaget’s (1947, 1970, 1971) genetic epistemology belonged to it. Piaget’s theory of cognitive development said the child goes through stages of development in which the mind constructs increasingly sophisticated forms of logic that create better knowledge of the physical world. Psychologists today generally reject this viewpoint, calling it normativism (Elqayam & Evans, 2011) or intellectualism (Mercier, 2016; Mercier & Sperber, 2019). Challenging Piaget was the beginning of the rationality debate.
然而,经济学家对理性的功能有不同的看法。对他们来说,人类日常生活的主要目标并非思考真与美(济慈,1820),而是分配稀缺资源,以尽可能地获得幸福。因此,他们关注的不是良好的推理,而是良好的决策,这是理性的标志。通过做出正确的决策,人们能够实现自己的目标,例如成为一名临床心理学家或获得MBA学位。
Economists, however, have a different take on rationality’s function. For them, the primary goal of human beings in everyday life isn’t contemplating Truth and Beauty (Keats, 1820) but allocating scarce resources to be as happy as possible. Hence, they focus not on good reasoning but on good decision making as the hallmark of rationality. By making good decisions people achieve their goals, such as becoming a clinical psychologist or an MBA.
通过关注可衡量的结果,例如收入、财富或社会地位的提升,经济学家为评估理性提供了一种重要的科学工具,即创建量化的理想化模型来预测人们应该如何选择以最大化自身福祉的能力。弗里德曼(1953)在一篇颇具影响力的论文中,让我们设想预测和解释一位台球大师的行为。鉴于台球运动的环境与牛顿力学中物体在无摩擦(或摩擦力极小)的(小)宇宙中运动的环境最为接近,因此,关于选手策略的最佳理论——也就是最能预测选手如何选择和执行击球的理论——是将她的表现归因于对牛顿定律的了解。她不太可能了解这些定律,但她确实体现了这些定律,而我们将牛顿物理学归因于她,比任何其他竞争理论都能更好地解释她的行为。此外,玩家对牛顿原理的了解或体现越好,该玩家在赢得比赛和赚取金钱方面的富裕程度就越高。
By focusing on measurable outcomes, such as income, wealth, or improved social status, economists bring an important scientific tool to bear on evaluating rationality, the ability to create quantitative, idealized models that predict how people ought to choose to maximize their well-offness. In an influential paper, Friedman (1953) asks us to imagine predicting and explaining the behavior of a master billiard player. Given that billiards provides as close to a Newtonian environment of objects moving in a (small) universe of no (or minimal) friction, the best theory of a player’s strategy—that is the one that will best predict how the player chooses and executes her shots—is to attribute her performance to knowledge of Newton’s laws. It’s unlikely that she knows them, but she does embody them, and our attribution to her of Newtonian physics provides a better explanation of her behavior than any rival theory. Moreover, the better a player’s knowledge or embodiment of Newtonian principles is, the better that player’s well-offness will be in terms of games won and money earned.
我们将重点关注与重大理性辩论相关的两条研究线索——逻辑推理和决策——围绕斯蒂奇 (2012) 提出的三个理性研究“项目”展开。
We will focus on two lines of investigation bearing on the great rationality debate—logical reasoning and decision making—organized around three “projects” in research on rationality suggested by Stich (2012).
首先是规范性项目:人们应该如何推理和决策?这是哲学家、数学家和规范经济学家的研究课题,旨在阐明推理和决策的正式规范规则。其次是描述性项目。这是心理学家和行为经济学家的研究课题,旨在探究人类的实际推理和决策是否符合规范规则;如果不符合,那么遵循了哪些规则(如果有的话)?第三是政策制定者的补救性项目,旨在提出社会改善或应对人类非理性的方法。
First is the normative project: How ought people reason and make decisions? This is the project of philosophers, mathematicians, and normative economists setting out the formal, normative rules of reason and decision making. Second is the descriptive project. This is the project of psychologists and behavioral economists discovering whether actual human reasoning and decision making conform to the normative rules and, if they do not, what rules, if any, do they follow? Third is the remediation project of policymakers, proposing ways society can improve or cope with human irrationality.
20 世纪 60 年代中期,彼得·沃森(Peter Wason,1966、1968;沃森和约翰逊-莱尔德,1972)提出了一项实验,该实验已被证明是探究人类推理逻辑最稳健的实验(Evans,2017;Ragni、Kola 和约翰逊-莱尔德,2018)。这项实验通常被称为选择任务,并有多种变体。图 7.4展示了它的经典形式。
In the mid-1960s Peter Wason (1966, 1968; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) introduced what has proven to be the most robust experiment for investigating the logic of human reasoning (Evans, 2017; Ragni, Kola, & Johnson-Laird, 2018). Known usually as the selection task, it has been run in many variants. Figure 7.4 shows its classical form.
实验者向参与者展示桌上的这四张卡片,并陈述一条可能适用于这些卡片的规则。参与者被要求选择所有能够证明规则错误的卡片,但不要选择任何不能证明规则错误的卡片。
The participant is shown these four cards on a table, and the experimenter states a rule that may apply to the cards. The participant is asked to choose all cards that can show the rule to be false but none of the cards that cannot.
沃森的灵感源自皮亚杰的认知发展理论。皮亚杰声称,人们在青少年时期会发展出根据命题逻辑原理进行推理的能力。如果真是这样,那么他们应该能够完成这项简单的任务,而这项任务仅仅依赖于理解命题逻辑的一条规则——实质蕴涵,也就是用“如果……那么”语句进行推理。
Wason was motivated by Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. Piaget claimed that during adolescence people develop the ability to reason according to the principles of propositional logic. If so, they should be able to do this simple task that depends on understanding just one rule of propositional logic, material implication, that is, reasoning with “if … then” statements.
在命题逻辑中,两个命题通过一个逻辑运算符连接起来,连接句的真值是一个函数,该函数由真值表定义,该真值表是组成命题的真值模式的函数。图7.5是蕴涵式(也称为条件式)的真值表。用文字表达,该规则为“如果p,则q”。P是蕴涵式的前提;q是蕴涵式的后件。
In propositional logic two propositions are connected by a logical operator, and the truth value of the joint sentence is a function, defined by a truth table, of the pattern of truth values of the component propositions. Figure 7.5 is the truth table for implication, also known as the conditional. In words, the rule is read “If p, then q.” P is the antecedent of the implication; q is the consequent.
请注意,条件断言“如果 p ... 则 q”仅在前提为真(或发生)且后果为假(或未发生)时才为假。因此,在沃森卡片的例子中,唯一可以证伪规则的卡片是正面为 7 而背面为 M 以外的字母的卡片。在使用蕴涵推理时,有两个有效推论和两个无效推论。第一个是肯定前件:给定“如果 p,则 q”为真(即真值表的第 2 行未发挥作用);被告知 p 为真,因此你可以推断出 q 成立(你必须位于真值表的第 1 行)。第二个有效推论是否定后件:同样,给定“如果 p,则 q”为真(即真值表的第 2 行未发挥作用);被告知 q 为假,因此你可以推断 p 也为假(你必须位于真值表的第 4 行)。
Note that the conditional claim, “if p … then q,” is false only when the antecedent is true (or occurs) and the consequent is false, or fails to occur. In the case of Wason’s cards, therefore, the only card that can falsify the rule is a card with a 7 on its front and a letter other than M on its back. When reasoning with implication, there are two valid and two invalid inferences. The first is modus ponens: You are given “If p, then q,” as true (that is, line 2 of the truth table is not in play); are told that p is true, and you therefore may infer that q follows (you must be on line 1 of the truth table). The second valid inference is modus tollens: Again, you are given “If p, then q,” as true (that is, line 2 of the truth table is not in play); are told that q is false, so you may infer that p is also false (you must be on line 4 of the truth table).
第一个无效推论是否定前件;你处于肯定前件的情况,但你被告知 p 为假。因为真值表中唯一不起作用的行是第 2 行,所以无论前件的真值状态如何,整体蕴涵都为真。这里有一个例子:在之前的一场足球比赛中,你说如果你心爱的 Fredonia Wombats 队在第四节进攻时争取达阵,那么他们就会赢得比赛。然而,教练选择了轻松的三分球。除非 Wombats 队尝试达阵但输了,否则你不会希望你的主张无效。不尝试达阵使你的主张保持不变,即为真。另一个无效推论是肯定后件。你处于否定后件的情况,但被告知后件 q 为真。但是,真值表中唯一不起作用的行是第 2 行;第 1 行和第 3 行都有效。因此,前件可以是真也可以是假。无法得出任何推论。在足球的例子中,如果有人知道你的预测,并且知道袋熊队赢了(但没看过比赛),他不应该就此断定你的预测是正确的,也就是说,他们在第四次进攻时选择了达阵。他们可能踢进了那个射门得分,然后在之后的6码进攻中获胜。
The first invalid inference is denial of the antecedent; you are in the modus ponens situation, but you are told that p is false. Because the only line of the truth table not in play is line 2, the overall implication is true regardless of the truth status of the antecedent. Here’s an example: Earlier in a football game, you said that if your beloved Fredonia Wombats went for the TD on fourth and goal, then they would win the game. However, coach went for the easy three. You would not want your claim to have been invalidated unless the Wombats tried for the TD and lost. Not trying for the TD left your claim intact, i.e., true. The other invalid inference is affirmation of the consequent. You are in the modus tollens situation, but are told that the consequent, q, is true. Again, however, the only line of the truth table not in play is line 2; lines 1 and 3 are in play. Therefore, the antecedent can be true or false. No inference can be drawn. In the football example, if someone knew your prediction and knew the Wombats had won (but had not seen the game) he should not conclude that your prediction was true, i.e., that they went for the TD on fourth down. They might have kicked the field goal and won later anyway on a pick 6.
现在你应该能够算出 Wason 选择任务的正确答案了。卡片 A 是肯定前件卡,应该选择它,因为如果卡片背面(另一面)出现 X,规则就会被证伪(即你位于真值表的第 2 行)。卡片 D 是否定后件卡,应该选择它,因为如果卡片正面出现 7,你位于真值表的第 2 行,规则必然为假。卡片 B 是否定前件卡,不应选择,因为你可能位于真值表的第 3 行或第 4 行,而规则为真。最后,卡片 C 是肯定后件卡,不应选择,因为你必须位于真值表的第 1 行或第 3 行,而规则为真。
You should now be able to work out the right answer to Wason’s selection task. Card A is the modus ponens card, and it should be chosen because if, say, an X turned up on the back (the other side) the rule would be falsified (i. e., you are on line 2 of the truth table). Card D is the modus tollens card and should be chosen, because if there’s a 7 on the front, you are on line 2 of the truth table, and the rule must be false. Card B is the denial of the antecendent card, not to be chosen, because you could be on either line 3 or 4 of the truth table, and the rule is true. Finally, card C is the affirmation of the consequent card, not to be chosen, because you must be on line 1 or 3 of the truth table, and the rule is true.
简而言之,每个参与者都应该只选择 A 牌和 D 牌作为可能伪造的牌。他们真的这么做了吗?
In short, every participant should pick just cards A and D as the potentially falsifying cards. Do they?
不是。最常见的错误是选择卡片 A 和 C;几乎没有人会选择卡片 A 和 D(参见 Evans,1982 年;Johnson-Laird 和 Byrne,1991 年、1999 年;Wason 和 Johnson-Laird,1972 年)。起初,各种研究者认为选择任务的原始形式由于没有内容(我们现在称之为抽象形式)而过于困难,因此提出了不同的版本。通常,具体版本(我们将这样称呼它们)似乎能带来更好的推理。问为什么成为了伟大理性辩论中的第一个争议。格里格斯的饮酒年龄问题就是一个例子(Cox 和 Griggs,1982 年;Griggs 和 Cox,1982 年、1983 年)(图 7.6)。
No. The most common error is to choose cards A and C; practically no one chooses cards A and D (see Evans, 1982; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 1999; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). Initially thinking that the original form of the selection task was too hard because it had no content (we’ll now call it the abstract form), various investigators presented it in alternative versions. Often, the concrete versions (as we will call them) seemed to bring forth better reasoning. Asking why became the first controversy in the great rationality debate. An example is Griggs’ drinking age problem (Cox & Griggs, 1982; Griggs & Cox, 1982, 1983) (Figure 7.6).
早期研究表明,参与者的推理能力会因社会环境而增强,因为社会环境会涉及到发现作弊者——那些通过自私地违反规范而获益的人。因此,在一项实验(Johnson-Laird & Wason,1972)中,扮演邮政检查员的参与者擅长选择违反邮资规定的信封(例如,一等信件的邮票太少)。表面上看,格里格斯的实验似乎也是如此。饮酒者可能只有20岁,而17岁的青少年可能在可乐里加了苏格兰威士忌,这两者都是潜在的违法者。事实上,格里格斯在他位于佛罗里达州的大学发现,参与者会选择符合规范的卡片A和D。然而,当他前往英国重复这项实验时,英国参与者的选择很糟糕。尽管当时英国对饮酒的年龄限制与美国相同,但当时并没有严格执行。9格里格斯认为,美国参与者只是通过熟悉程度来了解哪些顾客需要被检查:他们是依靠记忆的专家,而不是依靠推理解决问题的能手。然而,他的英国参与者并非美国饮酒规则的专家,他们试图(但很失败地)推理出答案。其他发现也支持格里格斯的观点。系统2承受的认知负荷会导致推理能力下降,而系统1承受的负荷则不会:逻辑推理需要意识(DeWall、Baumeister & Masicampo,2008)。这为“系统2比系统1更不理性”这一令人惊讶的观点提供了重要的初步线索(Oaksford & Hall,2016)。
Earlier research had suggested that participants’ reasoning was enhanced by social contexts in which detecting cheaters—people who benefit by selfishly violating norms—was involved. Thus, in one experiment (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1972) participants acting as postal inspectors were good at choosing envelopes that violated postage rules (e.g., too little postage on a first-class letter). Superficially, the same seems true in Griggs’ experiment. The drinker with alcohol might be just 20, and the 17-year-old might have Scotch in his Coke, both potential scofflaws. In fact, Griggs found at his university in Florida that participants made the normative choices of cards, A and D. However, when he traveled to Britain and repeated the experiment, British participants chose badly. Although at the time England had the same age restrictions on drinking alcohol as the US, they were not then strictly enforced.9 Griggs argued that American participants simply knew by familiarity which patrons needed to be checked: They were experts drawing on memory, not problem solvers drawing on reasoning. His British participants, however, were not experts at American drinking rules, and they tried (badly) to reason their way to their answers. Other findings support Griggs’s idea. Cognitive loads imposed on System 2 cause reasoning to worsen, while loads on System 1 do not: Logical reasoning requires consciousness (DeWall, Baumeister, & Masicampo, 2008). This is an important first clue to the surprising idea that System 2 is more irrational than System 1 (Oaksford & Hall, 2016).
在沃森开创性研究之后的几十年里,选择任务及其乘法变体已在数百名甚至数千名参与者身上进行过测试(参见 Ragni、Kola 和 Johnson-Laird 于 2018 年撰写的综述和荟萃分析)。其中,获得最有力支持的理论是 Johnson-Laird 的模型理论,该理论提出,参与者应构建任务的心理模型,并尝试想象或寻找与既定规则相反的反例。当呈现方式通过熟悉性(如 Griggs 的研究)或明确的道德原则(如果信件是头等信件,则必须贴上头等邮票)或审慎原则(如果实验室技术人员处理血液,则必须戴手套)来辅助这种想象时,推理能力会得到提高。
In the decades following Wason’s pathbreaking work, the selection task and multiplying variants have been run on hundreds, if not thousands, of participants (see review and meta-analysis by Ragni, Kola, and Johnson-Laird, 2018). The best supported theory, Johnson-Laird’s model theory, proposes that participants build a mental model of the task and try to imagine or look for a counterexample to the stated rule. Reasoning improves when the presentation aids such imagining, through familiarity (as in Griggs work) or a clear moral (If a letter is first class it must bear first-class postage) or prudential (If a lab tech is working with blood, he must wear gloves) rule.
无论如何,有一点很明显:知识分子的假设,即人们通常按照逻辑规则从前提推理到结论,是不正确的。
In any event, it is clear that the intellectualist hypothesis, that people routinely reason from premises to conclusions by following the rules of logic is not true.
现在我们来谈谈一个问题,它的解决是塑造现代世界的关键:我们应该如何做出那些结果无法预见的决定?从某种意义上说,我们在本章中,我一直在思考这个问题。棋手并不知道在每种情况下自己都在采取最佳策略,因为对手可能会想到一个她意想不到的策略。然而,在游戏之外更广阔的世界里,决策会带来更重要的后果。想象一下,在18世纪,有人要求你投资从伦敦到中国的商船之旅(Rowe,2010)。你可能会从你的投资中赚到一大笔钱,但如果船在海上沉没,你就会失去一切。那么,理性的,也就是最好的做法是什么呢?
We now come to a question whose resolution was a key to making the modern world: How should we make decisions whose outcome cannot be foreseen? In one sense, we have been considering this throughout the chapter. A chess player doesn’t know that she’s making the best move in each situation because her opponent may think of a strategy that she hasn’t anticipated. However, in the larger world outside games, decisions carry more weighty consequences. Imagine in the 18th century being asked to invest in a merchant voyage from London to China (Rowe, 2010). You might make a fortune on your investment, but if the ship goes down at sea, you lose everything. What’s the rational, i.e., best, thing to do?
这个问题最早由17世纪的法国数学家提出。一些数学家受雇于渴望提高赌博胜率的贵族,但其核心人物是布莱斯·帕斯卡(1623-1662)。他是一位数学家(他发明了最早的机械计算器之一)和科学家,但由于宗教信仰危机,他隐居修道院。在那里,他参与撰写了一本影响深远的著作《逻辑,或思考的艺术》(Arnauld & Nicole,1683年)。正如书名所示,这本书以布尔式的语气开篇:“逻辑是正确引导推理以获得事物知识的艺术”(第24页)。帕斯卡的贡献是迈向经济学的第一步,即在不确定条件下进行决策的科学。帕斯卡让无神论者就上帝的存在打赌,他希望说服无神论者相信信仰上帝是理性的(Pascal,1670年)。
This question was first taken up by French mathematicians in the 17th century. Several were employed by aristocrats eager to improve their chances at gambling, but the central figure was Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), mathematician (he built one of the first mechanical calculators) and scientist, but who, due to a crisis of religious faith, retired to a monastery. There, he participated in writing an influential book, Logic, or the Art of Thinking (Arnauld & Nicole, 1683). As its title suggests, the book begins in a Boolean tone: “Logic is the art of directing reasoning aright in attaining the knowledge of things” (p. 24). Pascal’s contribution was the first step toward a science of economics, of decision making under uncertainty. Pascal asked atheists to place a bet on the existence of God and he hoped to persuade atheists that belief in God was rational (Pascal, 1670).
帕斯卡赌注的结构为决策理论提供了模板。你需要在几种不同的行动方案中做出选择,每种方案都会带来不同的后果。在帕斯卡赌注中,有两个选择:相信上帝的存在或拒绝上帝的存在。世界有两种可能的状态:上帝存在或不存在,每种状态都会给你带来不同的结果或收益(图7.7)。
The structure of Pascal’s wager provided the template for decision-making theory. You have a choice to make among several alternative courses of action, each of which has different consequences. In Pascal’s wager, there are two choices: Believe in God’s existence or reject it. There are two possible states of the world: God exists or does not exist, and each has different outcomes, or payoffs, for you (Figure 7.7).
在第一栏中,我们看到,无论你是否相信上帝,上帝的不存在都不会对你人生的幸福产生多大影响——你会享受尘世的生活。然而,上帝可能存在,却会对死后的生活产生巨大的影响。如果上帝存在,你将在天堂体验永恒的幸福。如果上帝不存在,你将在地狱遭受永恒的痛苦。对帕斯卡来说,无神论者的选择应该很明确:相信相信上帝。当帕斯卡发现这场赌注无法使任何人改变信仰时,他是第一个对人类理性感到绝望的人。
In the first column, we see that whether you believe in Him or not, God’s non-existence would make little difference to your life’s happiness—you would enjoy life on earth. However, God’s possible existence makes a big difference after death. If God exists, you will experience an eternity of bliss in heaven. If God does not exist, you will suffer an eternity of pain in hell. To Pascal, the atheist’s choice should be clear: Believe in God. Pascal was the first person to despair of human rationality when he discovered that the wager made no converts.
贵族们的数学专家们通过添加概率、期望和效用的概念,对帕斯卡的简单赌注进行了进一步的阐述。人们至少从古埃及就开始赌博了,在古埃及的墓葬中,我们发现了刻有铭文的骨头,它们是骰子的前身。然而,似乎直到17世纪才有人将概率视为一个可计算的值。在帕斯卡的赌注中加入概率,可以计算出如何在经济学中称之为“不确定性”的条件下做出决策。不过,我将遵循塔勒布(2007)和吉格伦泽(2008)略有不同的用法:在确定性、风险和不确定性条件下进行决策。
The aristocrats’ mathematical boffins elaborated Pascal’s simple wager by adding the concepts of probability, expectation, and utility. People have been gambling at least since ancient Egypt, where among tomb goods we find incised bones that were precursors of dice. Nevertheless, it appears that no one thought of probability as a computable value until the 17th century. Adding probability to Pascal’s wager makes it possible to calculate how to make decisions under uncertainty, as it’s called in economics. However, I am going to follow Taleb’s (2007) and Gigerenzer’s (2008) somewhat different usage: decision making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty.
表7.1展示了帕斯卡赌注的一个版本,其中引入了期望值的概念。这是一个小版本的问题:我应该投资朋友的贸易企业吗?
Table 7.1 shows a version of Pascal’s wager introducing the concept of expectation. It’s a small version of the question, should I invest in my friend’s trading venture?
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你有一个选择,它有两个不确定但可计算的结果。每个选择的预期值是通过将每一行的收益或损失乘以其概率,然后将所有行的结果相加得出的。理性选择是预期值较高的选择。
You have a choice that has two uncertain—but calculable—outcomes. The expected value of each choice is calculated by multiplying the gain or loss by its probability in each row, then summing the results across the rows. The rational choice is the one with the higher expected value.
最后,必须添加风险规避和效用的概念才能全面了解理性经济人,即理性决策者。想象一下,一天下午我遇到你,你说你饿了。我有一些薯片袋,可以给你一份,你接受了。这并不是一个艰难的决定。但假设我说,我可以给你一个交易:1.25 美元肯定可以让你得到一袋薯片,或者你可以赌 1.25 美元抛硬币,如果正面朝上,你可以得到两袋,但如果反面朝上,你就得不到薯片。如果你通过决策表运行这个,每次下注的预期值都是一袋薯片(p = 1 × 1 袋 = 1 袋预期值 vs. p = 0.5 × 2 袋 = 1 袋预期值)。你会选择哪一个?你应该无所谓,但大多数人会选择肯定的事情——他们厌恶风险。结论是,结果不仅仅与金钱有关,还与什么是有用的、什么对你有效用有关。作为一个饥饿的人,对于你来说,获得薯片肯定比用同样的钱得不到薯片的可能性更有效用。最后,请注意,你当前的财富会改变效用。假设你的背包里有 50 袋薯片,我提出我的报价。你很可能会冒险再买两袋,因为你甚至不需要一袋。这就是边际效用递减的思想。如果你没有薯片,一袋薯片的效用很高,但如果你有很多袋薯片,下一袋薯片的效用就不高(在边际上)。你拥有的东西越多,下一单位薯片的价值就越低。
Finally, the concepts of risk aversion and utility must be added to get the full picture of Homo economicus, man the rational decision maker. Imagine that I come across you one afternoon, and you say you’re hungry. I’ve got some bags of potato chips and offer you one, and you take it. Not a hard decision. But suppose instead I said, I’ll offer you a deal: $1.25 gets you one bag of chips for sure, or you can bet $1.25 on a coin flip such that if it’s heads you get two bags, but if it’s tails you get no chips. If you run this through the decision table, the expected value of each bet is one bag of chips (p = 1 × 1 bag = 1 bag expected value vs. p = 0.5 × 2 bags = 1 bag expected value). Which do you choose? You should be indifferent, but most people choose the sure thing—they are averse to risk. The conclusion is that outcomes are not just about money, they are about what is useful, what has utility for you. As a hungry person, getting chips for certain has more utility to you than the possibility of no chips for the same money. Finally, note that your current wealth changes utilities. Suppose you have 50 bags of chips in your rucksack and I make my offer. You might very well take the risk of getting two more because you don’t need even one very much. This is the idea of diminishing marginal utility. If you have no chips, one bag has high utility, but if you’ve got lots of bags, the next bag (at the margin) doesn’t. The more you have of something the next unit of that thing loses value.
18世纪,杰里米·边沁(Jeremy Bentham,1748-1832)试图将经济学家的行为效用概念转化为心理学概念(Bentham,1789),他声称效用只是快乐的另一种说法,如果是负值,则为痛苦。因此,人们应该能够构建一个心理物理的快乐/痛苦量表,以应对那些不涉及金钱。信奉边沁功利主义的思想家有时会谈到幸福的“享乐”或痛苦的“痛苦”。想象一下,你在一个阴沉的早晨醒来,想知道是否应该带上一把伞。你权衡着带伞的享乐和痛苦,淋湿还是保持干燥,以及可能丢失伞等等,如表7.2所示。
In the 18th century, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) tried to turn economists’ behavioral concept of utility into a psychological one (Bentham, 1789), claiming that utility is simply another name for pleasure, or when negative, pain. Thus, one should be able to formulate a psychophysical scale of pleasure/pain to address choices that don’t involve money. Thinkers who follow Bentham’s utilitarianism sometimes speak of “hedons” of happiness or “agons” of pain. Imagine that you wake up one grey morning and wonder if you should pack an umbrella. You weigh the hedons and agons of carrying it, getting wet vs. staying dry, possibly losing it, etc., as shown in Table 7.2.
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您应该选择带来最少痛苦或最大快乐的结果。
You should choose the outcome leading to the least pain or greatest pleasure.
边沁的观点颇具牛顿式的风格,也是他提出的改良方案中的第一个提案。他提出,我们是理性的,我们运用他提出的幸福演算——幸福演算——来做出决策,但如果我们将其量化,就能提升我们的推理能力,就像炮兵通过反复试验学会了以中等精度射击,但通过运用经典物理学,他们的射击精度得到了极大的提升。边沁的最终目标不仅是改善个人决策,更是改善政府的政策制定,而这正是当今理性大辩论的焦点。10
Bentham’s point of view here is rather Newtonian and is the first proposal in the ameliorative project. He proposed that we are rational, making decisions by means of his felicific calculus—calculus of happiness—but that we can improve our reasoning if we quantify it, just as artillerymen who by trial and error had learned to shoot with modest accuracy greatly improved it by employing classical physics. Bentham’s ultimate goal was not just improving individual decision making but also governmental policymaking, a focus of today’s great rationality debate.10
这个问题由来已久:决策者应该如何做出对整个社会最有利的决策?功利主义以新的视角看待这个问题。个人天生自私,追求自身幸福,而这又是科学真理,无法通过设定公正的监护人或信赖君主的高瞻远瞩来回避。立法机构并非好到哪里去,因为它们是由一群自私的个体组成的(研究它们构成了经济学的一个分支,称为公共选择理论;Buchanan & Tullock, 1962)。边沁的愿景是运用幸福演算,将所有公民的幸福加总,从而计算出最多人的最大幸福,从而消除人类个体的个体判断。
The problem was ancient: How should policymakers make decisions that are best for their whole society? Utilitarianism placed the problem in a new light. Individuals are naturally selfish, pursuing their own happiness, and, as this is a scientific truth, it can’t be evaded by positing disinterested guardians or trusting to the elevated perspective of monarchs. Legislatures aren’t much better because they are collections of selfish individuals (studying them constitutes a branch of economics called public choice theory; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Bentham’s vision was to eliminate idiosyncratic human judgments by using the felicific calculus to sum across the pleasure of all citizens, computing the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
到目前为止,我们讨论的都是一些与自然结果(例如抛硬币和天气)相关的决策。随着计算机的发展,以及在许多情况下引入了相同的思想家(冯·诺依曼和摩根斯特恩,1944),决策理论也得到了扩展,扩展到你的选择会影响他人选择的情形,例如国际象棋或扑克等游戏。如果再增加一个人,决策理论将进入一个更加复杂、更具心理维度的空间,因为你不仅要考虑是否会下雨,或者是否会正面朝上,还要考虑其他玩家会如何回应你的选择。
So far, we have considered decisions that pit you against natural outcomes, such as coin flips and weather. At the same time as computers were being developed and including in many cases the same thinkers (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), decision-making theory was extended to cases in which the choice you make affects the choices of others, as in games such as chess or poker. Adding another human being takes decision theory into a more complex and psychological space, as you must consider not just whether it will rain or not, or if heads will come up or not, but how the other player will respond to your choices.
博弈论推理最著名的例子是囚徒困境,我们在《法律与秩序》等犯罪剧中经常看到。两个人因犯罪被捕,每个人都面临一个交易:要么牵连他们的同伙,要么冒着同伙背叛的风险。正如杰克·麦考伊曾经说过的:“第一个举手的人就能成交!” 我们可以用一个常用的表格来概括这个决策过程(表 7.3)。
The most famous example of game theory reasoning is the prisoner’s dilemma, which we see in crime shows such as Law and Order. Two people are arrested for a crime, and each is offered a deal to implicate their partner in crime or risk that the partner will betray them. As Jack McCoy used to say, “First one to raise their hand gets the deal!” We can use the usual table to sketch the decision (Table 7.3).
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在这种情况下,我们无需计算期望值,即可根据决策理论评估我们的选择。假设你是斯泰西。如果你选择保持沉默,你最好的结果就是入狱一年,前提是(!)约翰也保持沉默。如果你牵连约翰,你的另一个选择,你最好的结果就是获得自由,前提同样是约翰保持沉默。考虑到这个收益矩阵,以及经济学原则——你始终应该做出效用最大化的选择——理性的选择是背叛——牵连约翰。此外,你意识到约翰也面临着同样的交易,对他来说,理性的选择是也包括背叛,所以你应该尽快背叛。然而,请注意,如果我们将斯泰西和约翰视为共同伴侣,视角就会发生变化。最糟糕的共同结果是双方都背叛(四年监禁),其次是一方告发另一方(三年监禁),最好的结果是双方都保持沉默(两年监禁)。纯粹自私的效用最大化意味着背叛,而公共效用最大化则意味着利他主义。多数人的效用应该大于少数人的效用吗?哪种选择是理性的,尚无定论(Ostrom,2009)。
We don’t need to compute expectations in this case to evaluate our choices from decision theory. Imagine you are Stacey. If you choose to stay silent, your best outcome is one year in prison, assuming (!) that John stays silent, too. If you implicate John, your other option, your best outcome is going free, again assuming that John stays silent. Given this payoff matrix, and the economic principle that you should always make the choice that maximizes your utility, the rational choice is defection—implicate John. Moreover, you realize that John is being offered the same deal, for whom the rational choice is also defection, so you should defect as soon as possible. Observe, however, that if we consider Stacy and John as a joint partnership, the perspective changes. The worst joint outcome is for both to defect (four years in prison), the next worst is for one to inform on the other (three years in prison), and the best outcome is for both to stay silent (two years in prison). Purely selfish utility maximization suggests defection, while communal utility maximization suggests altruism. Should the utility of the many outweigh the utility of the few? Which choice is rational is up for grabs (Ostrom, 2009).
我们先来问问动物是否会遵循这些规律。休谟在发展其将联想推理替代为逻辑推理的过程中,写道(1740/1777/1962,第111页):“任何我们用来解释人类理解运作的理论……如果我们发现相同的理论……能够解释其他动物的相同现象,那么它将获得额外的权威。” 值得注意的是,第一批将经济理论应用于个体行为的心理学家是激进的行为主义者,他们与经济学家一样,对内在心理原因不屑一顾。
Let’s begin by asking if animals follow them. In developing his associative alternative to reasoning as logic-following, Hume wrote (1740/1777/1962, p. 111) “any theory by which we explain the operations of the understanding … in man will acquire additional authority if we find the same theory … explain(s) the same phenomenon in other animals.” Significantly, the first psychologists to apply economic theory to individual behavior were the radical behaviorists, who share economists’ disdain for inner mental causes.
经济学是关于选择的,行为学家使用并发强化计划来研究动物的选择。老鼠的斯金纳箱中不止一个杠杆,而是有多个,通常是两个,每个杠杆按照不同的强化计划提供强化物。然后,我们可以认为老鼠拥有一种价值储存手段(不是美元或加密货币,而是按压杠杆),它可以用来获取强化物。想象一只老鼠,它的两个杠杆以不同的比率提供食物颗粒,一个是固定比率 (FR) 5,另一个是 FR 10。假设食物颗粒相同,那么很容易做出决定:只按下 FR 5 的杠杆,因为它的颗粒只需按压 5 个杠杆,是 FR 10 杠杆的一半。固定间隔 (FI) 计划的两个杠杆会引发相同的决定:按下需要等待的时间更短的杠杆。
Economics is about choice, and behaviorists study choice in animals using concurrent schedules of reinforcement. Instead of there being one lever in a rat’s Skinner box, there are several, typically two, and each one delivers reinforcers on different schedules of reinforcement. We can then think of the rat as having a store of value—not dollars, or crypto, but bar presses—it can deploy to get reinforcers. Imagine a rat whose two levers deliver food pellets at different ratios, one at Fixed Ratio (FR) 5 and the other at FR 10. Assuming the food pellets are the same, this poses an easy decision: Press only the FR 5 lever because its pellets cost only 5 bar presses, half as expensive as the FR 10 lever. Two levers on Fixed Interval (FI) schedules elicit the same decision: Press the lever that requires less waiting.
如果我们有两个按可变间隔 (VI) 时间表运行的杠杆,例如 VI 30 秒和 VI 60 秒,事情会变得更加困难。请记住,经济模型认为参与者会尝试(并且应该尝试)最大化他们获得的效用,而上面的 FI 和 FR 示例就是这么做的。因此,显然在我们的新案例中,老鼠应该比 VI 60 杠杆更多地按下 VI 30 杠杆,因为它掉落弹丸的速度是 VI 60 杠杆的两倍。然而,由于时间表是可变的,当老鼠按下 VI 30 杠杆时,VI 60 时间表会超时,从而只需按一次即可获得食物。
Things become more difficult if we have two levers running on Variable Interval (VI) schedules, say VI 30 sec and VI 60 sec. Remember that economic models maintain that actors try, and should try, to optimize the amount of utility they get, and the FI and FR examples above do that. So clearly in our new case the rat should press the VI 30 lever more than the VI 60 lever because it drops pellets at twice the rate. However, because the schedules are variable, there will come a moment while the rat is pressing VI 30 that the VI 60 schedule times out, making food available for a cheap single press.
为了最大化其效用,大鼠应该以一定的速率按压VI 60杠杆,而它们也确实这样做了,这遵循了所谓的匹配定律(Herrnstein,1961)。动物会将它们按压每个杠杆的速率与每个杠杆产生回报的速率相匹配(表7.4)。
To optimize its utility, rats should press the VI 60 lever at some rate, and they do, following what’s called the matching law (Herrnstein, 1961). Animals match the rate at which they press each lever to the rate at which each lever pays off (Table 7.4).
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在这种情况下,VI 30 杠杆的出力速度是 VI 60 杠杆的两倍,因此参与者前者的杠铃推举力度将是后者的两倍,从而最大限度地发挥其效用。老鼠是理性的!
In this case, the VI 30 lever delivers pellets at twice the rate of the VI 60 lever, and so the participants will bar press twice as much on the former as the latter, maximizing their utility. Rats are rational!
匹配律可以用于研究动物的效用函数。假设你制作了老鼠的美食颗粒。然后,你可以将普通颗粒放在一个杠杆上,将美食颗粒放在另一个杠杆上,并调整强化物的比例,直到参与者的比例趋于稳定,比如说,将美食杆的按压次数是普通颗粒杆的3倍。你可以得出结论,老鼠从美食杆获得的效用是普通颗粒杆的3倍。经济学家称之为显示性偏好:无需询问人们的喜好,因为我们可以从购买等行为中推断出来。金钱可以替代边沁式的享乐主义和竞争主义。
The matching law allows investigation of utility functions in animals. Suppose you made gourmet rat pellets. You could then put regular pellets on one lever and gourmet pellets on the other and adjust the ratio of reinforcements until the participant’s ratios became stable, say pressing the gourmet bar 3× as much as the regular pellet bar. You could conclude that the rats got 3× the utility from the gourmet bar. Economists call this revealed preference: It’s not necessary to ask people their likes and dislikes because we can infer them from behavior such as purchases. Money can stand in for Bentham-type hedons and agons.
匹配律的发现改变了行为学家对行为和效果律的理解。即使斯金纳箱中只有一个操作器,老鼠也能做除了按压杆之外的其他事情,例如探索、梳理毛发或打盹。效果律并非像斯金纳所认为的那样是关于学习,而是通过改变环境中的激励来改变生物体的选择。实际上,所有行为都是选择行为,赫恩斯坦(Herrnstein,1970)修改了他的方程式,将行为数量大于两种的情况纳入其中。这超出了本章的讨论范围,但匹配律对斯金纳理论和行为分析有着深远的影响。请参阅Reed and Kaplan(2011)的精彩评论。有趣的是,如果有选择,动物会更倾向于通过解决难题(例如按压杆)来获取食物,而不是简单地吃免费食物,这种现象被称为“反免费食物” ( Counterfreeloading)(Carder & Berkowitz,1970;Taylor,1975),但猫除外(Fell,2020),它们会“免费食物”。11
Discovery of the matching law changed behaviorists’ concepts of behavior and the law of effect. Even if there is only one manipulandum in its Skinner box, a rat can do other things than bar press, such as explore, groom, or nap, and the law of effect is less about learning, as Skinner thought, than changing the incentives in an environment to alter organisms’ choices. In reality, all behavior is choice behavior, and Herrnstein (1970) revised his equation to incorporate situations in which the number of behaviors is greater than two. It’s outside the scope of this chapter, but the matching law has deep ramifications for Skinnerian theory and behavior analysis. See Reed and Kaplan (2011) for an excellent review. Interestingly, given a choice, animals prefer to solve puzzles (such as bar pressing) for food rather than simply eat free food, a phenomenon called contrafreeloading (Carder & Berkowitz, 1970; Taylor, 1975), except for cats (Fell, 2020), who freeload.11
回到人类,我们应该回到弗里德曼所说的台球大师。理性大辩论的关键在于人们是否遵循逻辑或决策的规范,而弗里德曼的观点有时被戏称为人类永远不会犯错。但没有人否认这一点。即使是台球大师也会偶尔失手——听到分散注意力的细微噪音;在一场漫长的比赛结束后感到疲惫;布洛菲尔德在他的伏特加马提尼里下了毒——但每个错误都是独一无二的,超出了科学解释的范围。这就是为什么传统经济学研究海量数据集、整个人口和行业的行为。一个行为者会在钟形曲线的一侧犯错(也许是投资过于保守),而另一个行为者则会在另一侧犯错(Dixit,2014)。在中值处是人类的普遍倾向,这应该是理性的效用最大化者,即“经济人”。
Returning to humans, we should go back to Friedman’s master billiards player. The key issue in the great rationality debate is whether people follow the norms of logic or decision making, and Friedman’s view is sometimes parodied as proposing that people never make errors. But no one denies this. Even the master billiard player will miss the occasional shot—hearing a small noise that diverts attention; being tired at the end of a long match; Blofeld has put poison in his vodka martini—but each mistake is sui generis, lying outside the scope of scientific explanation. This is why traditional economics studies huge data sets, the behavior of whole populations and industries. One actor will err on one side of the bell curve (investing too conservatively, perhaps) while another will err on the other side (Dixit, 2014). At the mean will lie the general human tendency, which should be the rational utility maximizer, Homo economicus.
我将只讨论一个质疑标准经济决策理论的实验范式,即开启行为经济学的实验——最后通牒博弈(Thaler,2015;Cartwright,2014;有关其他博弈的评论,请参阅 van Dijk & De Dreu,2021)。在标准版本中,两位参与者聚在一起,通过抛硬币决定其中一人成为游戏中的提议者,另一人成为接受者;提议者获得 10 张 1 美元钞票。游戏规则如下。P 必须与 A 分割 10 美元中的一部分,但分割方式可以由 P 选择,从保留 9 美元给出 1 美元到保留 1 美元给出 9 美元。反过来,A 可以选择接受或拒绝分割。如果 A 接受,实验结束,每个玩家都保留自己的钱。但是,如果 A 拒绝分割,实验者将拿回钱,两位玩家都空手而归。在相关的独裁者博弈中,A必须接受P提出的任何分割方案,此外P可以拿走A的部分或全部资金。如果你扮演这两个角色,你会怎么做?
I’ll discuss just one experimental paradigm that questions the standard economic theory of decision making, the experiment that launched behavioral economics, the ultimatum game (Thaler, 2015; Cartwright, 2014; for a review of other games, see van Dijk & De Dreu, 2021). In the standard version, two participants are brought together, and a coin flip determines that one will be the proposer in the game and the other the acceptor; the proposer is given 10 $1 bills. Here are the rules of the game. P must split some of the $10 with A, but it can be any split P chooses, from keeping $9 and giving $1 to keeping $1 and giving $9. In turn, A can choose to accept or reject the split. If A accepts, the experiment ends, and each player keeps their money. However, if A rejects the split, the experimenter takes the money back and both players go home empty handed. In the related dictator game, A must accept any split P proposes, and in addition P can take some or all of A’s money. What would you do in each role?
在最后通牒博弈中,理性经济人应该这样推理:作为P:“对我来说最好的选择是留下9美元,拿出1美元。如果我是A,我会接受1美元,因为否则我什么也得不到。如果实验者直接把我叫过去说:‘给你1美元,要不要都行,我都会接受。’因此,A不会拒绝我提供的1美元。9/1的分割方案代表了这种情况下的最佳结果。”作为A:“我愿意接受任何分割方案,因为拒绝分割方案会让我身无分文。”在独裁者博弈中,P不仅应该不分割,还应该接受A的钱,因为这是最好的结果。
Homo economicus should reason this way in the ultimatum game: As P: “The best thing for me is to keep $9 and give $1. If I were A, I would accept the $1, because otherwise I wouldn’t have anything. If the experimenter had simply called me in and said, ‘Here’s a dollar, take it or leave it, I’d take it.’ A won’t, therefore, reject my offered $1. The 9/1 split represents the best outcome in this situation.” As A: “I will accept any split, as rejecting it would leave me moneyless.” In the Dictator Game, not only should P offer no split, but should take A’s money, too, as the best outcome.
在这些实验中,人们是否遵循决策的经济规则?几乎从不(Camerer & Fehr,2004;Dixit,2014;Debove、Baumard & André,2016;Lin 等人,2020)。在最后通牒博弈中,提议者通常提供 5 美元对 5 美元的分配方案,而接受者通常会拒绝任何低于 6 美元对 4 美元的分配方案。在独裁者博弈中,几乎所有独裁者要么拿走所有资金(包括接受者的资金),要么让接受者保留他们的资金(实际上是 50-50 的分配)。这些博弈中的行为几乎不受赌注的影响——当赌注是 1 个月的工资时,人们的行为与赌注只有 5 美元时的行为相同。在一场独裁者博弈中,参与者首先赚钱——而不是被……,得出了一个潜在的重要发现。给予——他们用来玩游戏的钱。在游戏中,独裁者几乎一律保留自己的收益,就像往常一样,但他们不会从接受者那里拿走任何东西。
Do people follow the economic rules of decision making in these experiments? Almost never (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Dixit, 2014; Debove, Baumard, & André, 2016; Lin et al., 2020). In the Ultimatum Game, proposers usually offer $5–$5 splits and acceptors usually reject any split worse than $6–$4. In the dictator game, almost all dictators either take all the money (including the acceptor’s) or let the acceptors keep their money (effectively a 50–50 split). Behavior in these games is little affected by the stakes—behavior with a month’s wages on the table is the same as when only $5 is. A potentially important finding emerged in a dictator game in which participants first earned—rather than being given—the money they played with. In the game, dictators almost uniformly kept their earnings, as usual, but they did not take any from the acceptor.
我能“计算天体的运行,却计算不出人的疯狂”。
艾萨克·牛顿谈投资南海泡沫(Odlyzko,2019)
I can “calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people.”
Isaac Newton on investing in the South Sea Bubble (Odlyzko, 2019)
第一次投资泡沫发生在英国政府授予南海公司太平洋贸易垄断权之时。艾萨克·牛顿早早入市,在价格飙升时获利了结。但他又重新入市,在南海公司被证明是骗局后蒙受了损失。牛顿悲叹自己的命运,并用知识分子的视角看待理性:不遵循逻辑规律的人是疯子,他们的行为难以预测。然而,尽管与正式规范不一致,但在我们回顾的实验中,参与者的行为并非难以预测。在选择任务中,几乎没有人会选择D牌。最后通牒博弈和独裁者博弈中的货币分配并非随机,也并非遵循正态分布。在最后通牒博弈中,均等分配占80%,而且没有逐渐减少到1美元和10美元的分配。看来,人们并非逻辑学家,也并非冷酷无情的利己主义者,但他们也并非疯狂到难以预测。
The first investment bubble occurred when the British government granted the South Sea Company a monopoly on trade in the Pacific. Isaac Newton bought early, taking profits as prices soared, but he got back in, suffering losses when the company turned out to be a fraud. Lamenting his fate, Newton voiced the intellectualist take on reason: People who don’t follow the laws of logic are insane, making their behavior unpredictable. However, although inconsistent with formal norms, the behavior of participants in the experiments we’ve reviewed are not unpredictable. Hardly anyone in the selection task chooses card D. Monetary splits in the ultimatum and dictator games are not random, nor do they follow a normal distribution. In the former, even splits are 80 percent of the choices, and there’s no gradual fall-off to $1 and $10. People, it seems, are not logicians or ruthlessly self-interested, but neither are they unpredictably crazy.
实验心理学的创始人威廉·冯特拒绝将逻辑作为解释人们如何思考的理论(Wundt, 1973)。相反,我们应该关注人们在思考时所做的事情,Elqayam 和 Evans(2011)将这种方法称为描述主义。主要的替代思维和决策理论由西蒙和他的有限理性概念以及卡尼曼的双系统认知理论创立。他们说,人们遵循系统规则和策略(称为启发式),并且在推理中容易受到系统性偏见的影响。大理性辩论涉及启发式的使用和偏见在多大程度上会损害人类的理性。人们是否可预测地具有非理性(Ariely, 2008),或者我们是否拥有凡人的理性(Gigerenzer, 2008)?
The founder of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, rejected logic as a theory for explaining how people think (Wundt, 1973). Rather, we should attend to what people do when they think, an approach Elqayam and Evans (2011) call descriptivism. The main alternative theories of thinking and decision making were founded by Simon and his concept of bounded rationality, and Kahneman’s two-system theory of cognition. They say that people follow systematic rules and strategies called heuristics and are subject to systematic biases in reasoning. The Great Rationality Debate concerns to what extent use of heuristics and being subject to biases impugns human rationality. Are people Predictably irrational, (Ariely, 2008), or do we possess Rationality for mortals (Gigerenzer, 2008)?
启发式方法和偏见的清单很长,而且还在不断增长。12在这里,我将分别列出其中的几种。
The list of heuristics and biases is long and growing.12 Here, I will list a few of each.
人格和社会心理学中有一个主题是“人格感知”。哪些特质决定了我们对刚认识的人的喜欢程度或信任程度?为了探究这个问题,实验人员通常会要求参与者想象他们即将与某人见面,并列出该假设对象的一系列性格特征。然后,参与者需要用数字来判断自己对目标对象的喜欢、信任或钦佩程度。假设你被要求用10分量表来评估你对艾伦和迪克两个人的总体喜爱程度,他们的特质如下:
A topic in personality and social psychology is person perception. What traits determine how much we like or trust a person we’ve just met? To investigate this question, experimenters typically ask participants to imagine they are about to meet someone, and a list of that hypothetical person’s personality traits is presented. Participants then offer a numerical judgment of how much they expected to like or trust or admire the target person. Suppose you are asked to estimate your overall liking of two people, Alan and Dick on 10-point scales, and these are their traits:
艾伦:聪明、勤奋、冲动、挑剔、固执、嫉妒
迪克:嫉妒、勤奋、冲动、挑剔、固执、聪明
Alan is: Intelligent, Industrious, Impulsive, Critical, Stubborn, Envious
Dick is: Envious, Industrious, Impulsive, Critical, Stubborn, Intelligent
除了“聪明”和“嫉妒”的位置互换外,这两个列表完全相同。如果人们只是平等地衡量每个特质的价值,正如优化透镜模型所说他们应该如此,那么整体的喜好程度应该相同。一个可靠的发现是,第一个呈现的特质影响最大,无论它是什么。
The lists are identical except for swapping the positions of intelligent and envious. If people simply weigh the value of each trait equally, as an optimizing lens model says they ought, then overall liking should be the same. A robust finding is that the first trait presented has the greatest effect, no matter what it was.
使用锚定和调整启发法可以解释第一印象的力量。在现实生活中,关于其他人的信息会随着时间推移而分散,这对理性构成了制约,需要采取令人满意的策略。你的第一印象形成了一个锚点,将之后了解到的特质的影响束缚住。聪明是个好特质,所以你预计会喜欢艾伦,或许在你的量表上给他打 8 分。勤奋也不错,所以你稍微调高一点到 8.5 分。其余特质都是中性到不好的,所以你调低了分数。对于迪克,你从嫉妒这个锚定特质开始,或许你的整体喜欢程度从 3 开始。然后随着其他特质的加入,你进行上下调整。但是,即使列表相同,由于你一开始的锚点非常不同,所以你会预计自己更喜欢艾伦而不是迪克。
Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic explains the power of first impressions. In real life, information about other people comes spread out in time, a constraint on rationality requiring a satisficing strategy. Your first impression forms an anchor tethering the effects of traits learned about later. Intelligence is a good trait, so you expect to like Alan, perhaps assigning him an 8 on your scale. Industrious is good, too, so you adjust a little upward, to 8.5. The remaining traits are neutral to bad, so you adjust downward. With Dick, you begin with the anchoring trait envious, perhaps starting your overall liking at 3. You then adjust up and down as the other traits come in. However, even though the lists are the same, because you start with very different anchors, you will expect to like Alan more than Dick.
除了得出人们遭受“可补救的非理性思维”的结论外,我们还能如何解释“战争、经济衰退……宗教狂热……[和]破裂的婚姻”?
Stanovich,2004,第159页
How can we explain “wars, economic busts…religious fanaticism…[and] broken marriages” except by concluding that people suffer from “remediable irrational thought?”
Stanovich, 2004, p. 159
尽管斯坦诺维奇是一位心理学家,但在理性方面(斯坦诺维奇、托普拉克与韦斯特,2020),他是一位规范主义者(斯坦诺维奇,2012)。他(斯坦诺维奇,2004)希望通过创造一个认知改革的“非凡文化项目”(第xii页),将人类从迫在眉睫的大灾变和非理性的反乌托邦中拯救出来,并通过“构建一种与生物学和认知科学相符的替代世界观”(第3页)来“实现我们作为人的目标”(第xiii页)。斯塔诺维奇认为,生物遗传基因和文化遗传模因几乎就是系统 1 中的错误、“有害的”(第 180 页)和“令人讨厌的”(第 192 页)生物,它们会入侵、误导和破坏系统 2 的自主理性自我。对于斯塔诺维奇和其他人来说,“大理性”辩论的风险极高 (Leahey, 2004)。
Despite being a psychologist, Stanovich is a normativist (Stanovich, 2012) with respect to rationality (Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2020). He (Stanovich, 2004) wants to rescue humans from a looming cataclysm and Dystopia of irrationality by creating “a remarkable cultural project” of cognitive reform (p. xii) that will “fulfill our goals as people” (p. xiii) by “constructing an alternative world-view consistent with biological and cognitive science” (p. 3). Stanovich regards biologically inherited genes and culturally inherited memes as almost literally bugs, “pernicious” (p. 180) and “nasty” (p. 192) creatures from System 1 who invade, mislead, and sabotage the autonomous rational self of System 2. For Stanovich and others, the stakes of the Great Rationality debate are as high as can be (Leahey, 2004).
斯坦诺维奇嘲笑那些将启发式和偏见视为我们进化思维的积极特征的认知科学家,称其为“盲目乐观者”。他指的是西蒙及其追随者,例如吉格伦泽(2008,2018a;诺德利、托德和吉格伦泽,2018)。他们称自己的方法生态理性(Todd, Gigerenzer & the ABC Research Group, 2012),但他们并非盲目乐观主义者。他们从西蒙提出的经济学问题出发:“当新古典经济学模型所假设的理性条件不成立时,人们如何推理?”(Simon, 1989, p. 377),并探究了其他人很少做的事情,即启发式方法是否有效(Schurz & Hetwig. 2019)。
Stanovich derides as “Panglossian” cognitive scientists who see heuristics and biases as positive features of our evolved minds, having in mind Simon and his followers, such as Gigerenzer (2008, 2018a; Nordli, Todd, & Gigerenzer, 2018). They call their approach ecological rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012), but they are not Panglossians. They begin with Simon’s question drawn from economics, “How do people reason when the conditions for rationality postulated by the model of neoclassical economics are not met [emphasis added]?” (Simon, 1989, p. 377), and investigate what few others do, whether or not heuristics work (Schurz & Hetwig. 2019).
首先,当正式的思维和决策模型适用于特定情况时,他们并不拒绝。卡尼曼与经济学家弗农·史密斯(2002年、2008年)共同获得了诺贝尔奖,后者多年来一直致力于实验经济学研究。史密斯的实验复制了现实生活中的市场,在这种市场中,价格信息可以自由获取,交易成本低,参与者彼此不认识。他发现,在这种情况下,理性经济人(Homo economicus)的经济模型预测得到了证实。他的研究结果在世界各地数千个社会实验中得到了证实(Smith & Wilson,2018年;Lin et al.,2020年)。
To begin with, they do not reject formal models of thinking and decision making when they are appropriate to the situation. Kahneman shared his Nobel Prize with economist Vernon Smith (2002, 2008), who had been doing experimental economics for many years. Smith’s experiments replicated real-life markets, in which information about prices is freely available, transaction costs are low, and the participants don’t know each other, finding that under such conditions predictions from economic models of Homo economicus are confirmed, and his results have held up well through thousands of experiments in societies around the world (Smith & Wilson, 2018; Lin et al., 2020).
让我们看一个有效启发式的例子,它也将具身认知引入我们的视角。外野手如何移动来接飞球?这似乎涉及到一个经典物理学问题:挥棒的力量作用于球的质量,导致球在空间中做抛物线运动,而外野手的任务是计算球的轨迹,并移动拦截。然而,虽然这里不存在框架问题,但却存在实时性问题,因为计算时间比球的飞行时间更长。此外,我们知道外野手不会计算,因为如果他们必须在球在空中时站着不动并指向球的落地位置,他们就无法做到这一点;相反,他们会使用凝视启发式(Gigerenzer & Gray, 2017)。他们会注视着空中的球,并朝着球跑去,调整速度以保持视线角度不变,最终在接近地面时拦截球。从猛禽(猛禽)到接飞盘的狗(Gigerenzer & Gray, 2017),许多动物也使用凝视启发法。二战期间,英国皇家空军(RAF)发现了凝视启发法,并将其转化为意识,这使得英国皇家空军比一直未能掌握凝视启发法的德国空军更具优势。战后,凝视启发法成为空对空导弹(例如美国“响尾蛇”导弹)的基础(Hamlin, 2017)。即使在纯人工智能设备中,这种简单的启发法也比形式计算更有效。
Let us look at an example of an effective heuristic that also introduces embodied cognition into our picture. How does an outfielder move to catch a fly ball? It appears to involve an exercise in classical physics: The ball’s mass is struck by the swung bat’s force resulting in the ball’s parabolic movement through space, and the fielder’s job is to calculate the ball’s trajectory, moving to intercept it. However, while there is no frame problem here, there is a real-time problem as the calculations take longer than the flight of the ball. Moreover, we know that fielders don’t calculate because if they have to stand still while the ball is in the air and point where it will land, they can’t do it; instead, they use the gaze heuristic (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2017). They keep their eyes on the ball in the air and run toward it, adjusting their speed to keep the angle of gaze constant, and they intercept the ball near the ground. The gaze heuristic is also used by many animals from raptors (birds of prey) to dogs catching frisbees (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2017). It was discovered—made conscious—by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in World War II, giving the RAF an advantage over the Luftwaffe, which never figured it out. After the war it became the basis of air-to-air missiles, such as the US Sidewinder (Hamlin, 2017). The simple heuristic worked better than formal computation even in a pure AI device.
即使像吉格伦泽这样不认为启发式方法不合理的研究人员,也认同规范主义者的观点,认为人类的决策可以改进,尤其是在金融和医疗等机构中。本文将简要讨论改良主义的例子,包括教导人们成为更优秀的推理者、助推法以及利用框架效应引导人们做出正确决策,以及改革制度程序以改善集体思考和决策。
Even researchers such as Gigerenzer, who don’t think that heuristics are irrational, agree with normativists that human decision making can be improved, especially in institutions such as finance and medicine. Here, we will briefly discuss examples of meliorism, teaching people to be better reasoners, nudging, and using framing effects to lure people into making good decisions, and reforming institutional procedures to improve collective thinking and deciding.
在会计和经济学中,沉没成本是指无法收回其价值的投资;例如,你在度假游轮上支付的不可退还的订金——无论你去不去,都无法取回。沉没成本谬误是指你让未来的决策受到沉没成本的影响。它在人类和组织中非常常见(Arkes & Blumer,1985),甚至在动物中也非常常见(Sweis et al.,2018)。
In accounting and economics, a sunk cost is an investment whose value cannot be recovered; an example is a non-refundable deposit such as you might make on a vacation cruise—whether you go or not, you can’t get your money back. The sunk cost fallacy occurs when you let a decision about the future be affected by consideration of sunk costs. It is very common in people and organizations (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) and even in animals (Sweis et al., 2018).
例子比比皆是。一个著名的例子给这个谬误起了另一个名字,即协和式飞机谬误。20 世纪 60 年代,英国和法国政府成立了一家公司,制造超音速运输机协和式飞机。但在中途,他们意识到这架客机永远无法盈利,因为研发的沉没成本无法偿还。法国人和英国人并没有放弃,他们说我们花了太多钱,不能放弃,就像你生病了,待在家里会更好,但还是会去坐邮轮一样,他们说如果你不去,你的订金就浪费了。但协和式飞机的成本和你的订金都已经损失了——浪费了——而且无法收回。协和式飞机的投资者为了追逐已经消失的资金而损失了更多的钱,而你在船上过得痛苦不堪,也失去了效用。即使不涉及金钱,也会有沉没成本(Olivola,2018);恋爱关系持续的时间越长,分手就越难。
Examples abound. A famous one gave the fallacy another name, the Concorde Fallacy. In the 1960s the British and French governments set up a company to build a supersonic transport, the Concorde. It became clear mid-way that the airliner would never be profitable because the sunk costs of development could not be repaid. The French and British didn’t give up, saying we spent too much to quit, just as you might go on your cruise even though you’ve become ill and would be better off at home, saying that if you don’t go, you’ll have wasted your deposit. But the Concorde’s cost and your deposit are already lost—wasted—and can’t be recovered. The Concorde’s investors lost still more money chasing money already gone, and you will lose utility by being miserable aboard ship. Even when money isn’t involved sunk costs occur (Olivola, 2018); the longer a romantic relationship has lasted, the harder it is to break up.
尽管谚语“覆水难收”、“莫把钱扔到九霄云外”,以及莎士比亚名言“木已成舟,既已成舟”都提醒我们要避免沉没成本谬误,但显然我们还需要进一步的补救措施。在这种情况下,研究发现,进行沉没成本方面的短期培训可以减少错误的沉没成本思维(Larrick、Morgan 和 Nisbett,1990;Strough 等,2016)。理查德·尼斯贝特在一次演讲中将理解这一理念描述为“像病毒一样”,可以改变你的整个人生。他说,这番话听起来颇具禅宗(或斯多葛学派)的韵味:“你的整个人生从现在开始!”
Although proverbs, “It’s no use crying over spilt milk,” and “Don’t throw good money after bad,” and a Famous Shakespearian Quote, Lady Macbeth’s “What’s done is done,” remind us to avoid sunk cost fallacies, it’s clear further remediation is needed. In this case, brief training in sunk costs has been found to reduce fallacious sunk-cost thinking (Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990; Strough et al., 2016). In a talk, Richard Nisbett described grasping the idea as working “like a virus” that can change your whole life. He said the lesson sounds rather Zen [or Stoic], “Your whole life starts right now!”
这是泰勒和桑斯坦(2008)创造的一个术语。其理念遵循斯金纳的理论:创造一种环境,温和地推动人们做出更好的决策,但不要公开透明地表达出来(de Ridder、Kroese 和 van Gestel,2021)。他们最喜欢的例子是退休规划。通常,当人们被聘用从事新工作时,他们会填写一份包含个人数据的电脑表格。其中一个问题是:“你想加入 401(k) 养老金吗?”表格通常默认选项填写为“否”。但他们表示,应该填写“是”。这并不剥夺员工做出其他决定的能力——这不是强制性的家长式作风——而是会引导员工朝着正确的方向发展。这种安静的家长式作风通常比强制性家长制(Sunstein,2017),但有时它不起作用,命令变得更可取,例如戴口罩以防止大流行疾病传播的情况(Sunstein,2020)。
A term coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). The idea is Skinnerian: Create environments that gently push people into making better decisions, without being open and obvious about it (de Ridder, Kroese, & van Gestel, 2021). Their favorite example involves planning for retirement. Often when people are hired for new jobs, they fill out a computerized form with their personal data. Among the questions is, “Do you want to sign up for a 401(k) fund?” The form usually has the default choice filled in as “No.” But it should, they say, be filled in with “Yes.” This does not remove the person’s ability to decide otherwise—it’s not coercive paternalism—but does nudge the employee in the right direction. This kind of quiet paternalism is usually preferable to coercive paternalism (Sunstein, 2017), but it sometimes doesn’t work, and commands become preferable, as in the case of wearing masks to prevent the spread of pandemic disease (Sunstein, 2020).
这是 Gigerenzer(Gigerenzer 和 Kurzenhäuser,2005;Gigerenzer 和 Gaissmeier,2011;Raab 和 Gigerenzer,2015)特别关注的领域。他认为,通过应用快速简便的启发式方法取代医生不信任的直觉和数学模型(或人工神经网络),可以改善医疗等机构的决策。例如,在心脏医学领域,Gigerenzer 的团队已经证明,在实时决策如何治疗心脏病患者时,简单的三步决策树比直觉或方程式更快、更可靠、更准确。航空公司飞行员会遵循详尽的程序清单,以避免记忆失误并减少认知负荷。
This has been a special focus of Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Gigerenzer & Gaissmeier, 2011; Raab & Gigerenzer, 2015), who believes decision making in institutions such as medicine may be improved by the application of fast and frugal heuristics to replace physicians’ intuitions and mathematical models (or ANNs) they don’t trust. For example, in cardiac medicine, Gigerenzer’s team has shown that a simple three-step decision tree is much faster, more reliable, and more accurate than intuition or equations in making real-time decisions about how to treat heart patients. Airline pilots follow extensive checklists of procedures to avoid memory lapses and reduce cognitive load.
人们创造自己的历史,但这并不是随心所欲地创造的;他们不是在自我选择的环境下创造的,而是在已经存在的、既定的、从过去传承下来的环境下创造的。
卡尔·马克思,路易·拿破仑的雾月十八日 (1851) 14
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.
Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoléon (1851)14
让我们尝试理解“理性大辩论”,并转向弗农·史密斯(2002,2008)继亚当·斯密(1776)、哈耶克(例如,1948)和西蒙(1981)之后,对建构理性和生态理性所做的区分。古典经济理论家运用科学理性构建逻辑和数学模型,以预测和解释现代条件下的人类思维和决策。然而,史密斯指出,他们随后犯了一个笛卡尔式的错误(哈耶克,1948),认为“社会制度是并且应该由人类理性的自觉演绎过程创造”(第505页)。对建构主义者来说,思考和决策是双重理性的:社会制度是理性建构的,而那些理论描述和解释行为的理论是由社会科学家理性建构的。因此,正如规范主义者所言,人类理性在于遵循逻辑和决策规则。
Let us try to make sense of the Great Rationality Debate by turning to a distinction that Vernon Smith (2002, 2008), following Adam Smith (1776), Hayek (e.g., 1948), and Simon (1981), makes between constructive rationality and ecological rationality. Classical economic theorists used scientific reason to construct logical and mathematical models to predict and explain human thinking and decision making under modern conditions. However, they then made a Cartesian mistake (Hayek, 1948), Smith says, by believing that therefore, “social institutions were and should be created by conscious deductive processes of human reason” (p. 505). To the constructivist, thinking and deciding are doubly rational: Social institutions were rationally constructed, and the theories that describe and explain behavior were rationally constructed by social scientists. Therefore, as the normativists would have it, human rationality consists in following the rules of logic and decision making.
但这种解释本末倒置,把笛卡尔置于马之前。马就是历史。斯密从马克思著名的洞见入手(尽管斯密将其归功于哈耶克,1948年,以及西蒙,1989年),即人们的行为——创造他们自己的历史——不仅受自然世界的约束,也受他们所生于其中的文化和社会的约束。因此,我们的理性在前几代人创造的一套规则中运作,而我们最多只是模糊地意识到这些规则。因此,存在着“理性秩序概念的第二种形式”,即生态理性,
But this account has things backward, putting Descartes before the horse. The horse is history. Smith begins with the insight famously expressed by Marx (though attributed by Smith to Hayek, 1948, and Simon, 1989) that people act—make their own histories—bound not only by the natural world, but also by the cultures and societies into which they are born. Thus, our rationality acts within a set of rules created by the generations preceding us and of which we are at best dimly aware. There is thus a “second of concept of rational order,” ecological rationality,
生态理性是一种未经设计的生态系统,源于文化和生物进化过程:自成体系的行为原则、规范、传统和道德。生态理性运用理性——理性重构——来审视基于经验和民间知识的个体行为,而这些个体在运用建构主义工具进行决策方面能力有限;理解人类文化中涌现的秩序;探索文化和生物遗产中规则、规范和制度所蕴含的潜在智慧,这些智慧源于人类互动,而非人类的刻意设计。人们遵循规则,却无法将其清晰地表达出来,但规则是可以被发现的。
as an undesigned ecological system that emerges out of cultural and biological evolutionary processes: home grown principles of action, norms, traditions, and morality. Ecological rationality uses reason—rational reconstruction—to examine the behavior of individuals based on their experience and folk knowledge, who are ‘naïve’ in their ability to apply constructivist tools to the decisions they make; to understand the emergent order in human cultures; to discover the possible intelligence embodied in the rules, norms and institutions of our cultural and biological heritage that are created from human interactions but not by deliberate human design. People follow rules without being able to articulate them, but they can be discovered.
传统比你更聪明。吉格伦泽和他的团队致力于探索人类通过生物和文化进化习得的原则——快速而节俭的启发法。对他们来说,理性的衡量标准是适应性结果,而非遵循规范主义者的明确规则。
Tradition is smarter than you are. Gigerenzer and his team work to discover the principles—the fast and frugal heuristics—that people have acquired through biological and cultural evolution. For them, rationality is measured by adaptive outcome, not following normativists’ explicit rules.
接下来的两章将探讨认知科学的生物学,首先从认知神经科学开始,这是近因关系的底层。最后一章将探讨终极因果关系,即人类认知过程的演化,并略微涉及遗传学,终极因果关系与近因关系在此交汇。
Our next two chapters are about the biology of cognitive science, beginning with cognitive neuroscience, the bottom level of proximate causation. The last chapter is about ultimate causation, the evolution of human cognitive processes, with a bit of genetics, where ultimate causation meets proximate causation.
传统比你聪明得多。正如我们将在最后一章所学到的,文化能力是智人的杀手级应用。我们不必依赖达尔文式的自然选择在漫长的世代中缓慢地发挥作用,而是依赖于适应性的洞见和实践,它们可以通过融入文化而立即传承下去。重要的是,智慧的文化编码并非总是有意识的。传统就像具身认知:它们植根于实践,而非理念。例如,杰出的武士刀日本武士的15 个武器都是根据编码尚未发现的冶金知识的传统制作的。
Tradition is much smarter than you are. As we will learn in the final chapter, the capacity for culture is Homo sapiens’ killer app. We don’t have to depend on the slow action of Darwinian selection acting over long generations of change, but on adaptive insights and practices that can be passed on immediately by being built into cultures. Importantly, cultural encoding of wisdom is not always conscious. Traditions are like embodied cognition: They are embedded in practice, not ideas. For example, the outstanding katana of the Japanese samurai15 were made according to traditions that encoded metallurgical knowledge yet to be discovered.
抛硬币。说真的。莱维特(2021)发现,通过抛硬币暗示做出生活改变(比如寻找新工作等重大改变)的人比对照组更有可能做出改变,并且比没有抛硬币暗示做出改变的人对改变感到更快乐。莱维特的结论是,人们在估计自己能从生活改变中获益多少时过于保守,而抛硬币有助于改善这种偏见。
Flip a coin. Seriously. Levitt (2021) has found that people who made a change in their lives—serious changes such as looking for a new job—suggested by the flip of a coin were more likely to change than controls and happier with their change than those who did it without the flip. Levitt concludes that people are too conservative in estimating how much they might benefit from life changes and the coin flipping helps ameliorate this bias.
用外语思考。Hayakawa 等人(2016)发现,如果人们用成年后学习的外语思考,他们会做出更功利的选择。他们认为,外语比母语更能减少干扰情绪。
Think in a foreign language. Hayakawa et al. (2016) found that people made more utilitarian choices if they thought about them in a foreign language learned in adulthood. They proposed that the foreign language evoked less distracting emotion than native language.
向神经多样性人群学习。Rozenkrantz、D'Mello 和 Gabrieli(2021)回顾了关于自闭症谱系障碍 (ASD) 的研究,结果表明,在许多情况下,ASD 参与者比对照组做出的选择更符合规范理性,包括在我们评测过的经济游戏中,而且他们表现出的认知偏差更少。他们得出结论,ASD 患者比其他人更少受情绪干扰,更少依赖直觉,更容易受到细节的引导。
Learn from the neurodiverse. Rozenkrantz, D’Mello, and Gabrieli (2021) review research on autism spectrum disorder (ASD), showing that, in many cases, ASD participants make more normatively rational choices than controls, including in economic games such as we reviewed, and they show fewer cognitive biases. They conclude that people with ASD are less distracted by emotion, less reliant on intuition, and more guided by details than others.
保持坚忍。不要“诉诸情感”。以上所有研究结果表明,情绪化会降低信息处理和决策能力,甚至连第一点都做不到——人们过于害怕改变。以掌控情绪(从而运用逻辑)为核心的哲学,正是古老的斯多葛主义。以下是一些书籍。
Be a stoic. Don’t “reach out with your feelings.” All the findings above suggest that emotional involvement can degrade information processing and decision making, even the first one—people are too fearful of change. The philosophy that sets at its center mastering one’s emotions—hence, their involvement with logic—is ancient Stoicism. Here are some books.
罗马最伟大的两位斯多葛学派学者分别是罗马奴隶爱比克泰德(生于公元65年左右)和罗马皇帝马可·奥勒留(公元121-180年)。16爱比克泰德的名言被汇编成一本简短的斯多葛学派手册《手册》( https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45109/45109-h/45109-h.htm)。另请参阅英伍德(Inwood)编著的《牛津简明斯多葛学》 (2018年)。奥勒留的斯多葛学派思想在其自传《沉思录》(http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/meditations.html)中有所体现。心理学家唐纳德·罗伯逊(Donald Robertson)撰写了两本关于斯多葛主义的著作,分别是《如何像罗马皇帝一样思考:马可·奥勒留的斯多葛哲学》(纽约:圣马丁出版社,2019年)和《认知行为疗法(CBT)的哲学:作为理性与认知心理治疗的斯多葛哲学》(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社,2019年)。将斯多葛主义视为一种伦理哲学,参见 LC Becker 的《新斯多葛主义:修订版》(新泽西州普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,2017 年)。
Two of the greatest Roman Stoics were Epictetus (born c. 65 CE), a Roman slave, and Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE), a Roman emperor.16 Epictetus’s sayings were collected into a brief Stoic handbook, the Enchiridion (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45109/45109-h/45109-h.htm). See also the Oxford Short Stoicism by Inwood (2018). Aurelius’s Stoicism shows in his autobiography, Meditations (http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/meditations.html). Psychologist Donald Robertson has written two books on Stoicism, How to Think Like a Roman Emperor: The Stoic Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius (New York: St. Martin’s, 2019) and The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Routledge, 2019). For a scholarly treatment of Stoicism as an ethical philosophy, see L. C. Becker, A New Stoicism: Revised Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
由于近期的政治和外交政策事件,理性话题成为新闻热点。心理学家史蒂芬·平克的两本新书分别是:《理性:它是什么,为什么它似乎稀缺,为什么它重要》(纽约:企鹅出版社,2021);平克可能是在世的最著名的认知心理学家。此外,还有茱莉亚·加莱夫的《侦察兵心态:为什么有些人看得清楚,而有些人看得不清楚》(纽约:企鹅出版社,2021)。加莱夫主持播客http://rationallyspeakingpodcast.org。经济学家布莱恩·卡普兰的著作是《理性选民的神话:民主国家为何选择糟糕的政策》(修订版)(新泽西州普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,2011)。他所说的理性是指投票是为了自身利益。选民表达的是他们的态度。许多经济学家不投票,因为他们的投票影响选举结果的可能性太小,不值得花费时间和精力去投票。最后,正如阿富汗和伊拉克战争所表明的那样,所谓的专家往往不善于预测未来。谁能做到?是的。菲利普·泰特洛克多年来一直研究预测能力,发现有些人在这方面非常出色:菲利普·泰特洛克和丹·加德纳合著的《超级预测:预测的艺术与科学》(纽约:皇冠出版社,2015年)。成为专家通常与预测无关——它需要一种特殊的性格,最重要的是,即使会令人尴尬,也要乐于修改自己的预测(做一个坚忍的人)。任何人都可以注册他的“良好判断力项目”,https://www.gjopen.com。
Because of recent political and foreign policy events, the topic of rationality is much in the news. Two new books by psychologists are Steven Pinker, Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters (New York: Penguin, 2021); Pinker is probably the most famous living cognitive psychologist. Also, Julia Galef, The Scout Mindset: Why Some People See Things Clearly and Others Don’t (New York: Penguin, 2021). Galef hosts a podcast http://rationallyspeakingpodcast.org. Economist Brian Caplan has written The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). By rational he means voting in one’s self-interest. Instead, voters express their attitudes. Many economists don’t vote because the chance that their vote swings an election is too small to be worth the time and effort it takes to vote. Finally, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq showed, so-called experts are often terrible at predicting the future. Can anyone? Yes. Philip Tetlock has studied forecasting ability for many years and has discovered that some people are great at it: Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown, 2015). Being an expert often has nothing to do with it—it takes a particular sort of personality, most importantly, being open to revising one’s forecasts even if it’s embarrassing (be a Stoic). Anyone can sign up for his Good Judgment Project, https://www.gjopen.com.
别太自大,孩子。记住理性主义反讽定律:你越是沾沾自喜地发现别人有偏见,你现在就越有可能成为这种偏见的受害者(斯科特·亚历山大,https ://astralcodexten.substack.com ;他也写过一些关于预测处理的精彩介绍性文章,尤其是从精神病学的角度)。
Don’t get cocky, kid. Remember the Law of Rationalist Irony: The smugger you feel about having caught a bias in someone else, the more likely you are falling victim to that bias right now (Scott Alexander of https://astralcodexten.substack.com; also has great introductory essays on predictive processing, especially from a psychiatric perspective).
除了误导之外,魔术师的另一个重要心理工具是“含糊其辞”(equivoque),也称为“魔术师的选择”。它用途广泛,既可以用于最简单的纸牌戏法,也可以用于构建复杂冗长的舞台表演。它尤其受到心灵魔术师的青睐,其中包括最著名的魔术师兼心灵魔术师戴伦·布朗(Derren Brown)。其基本原理是引导人们做出看似自由的选择,而实际上却由魔术师掌控。您可以访问以下链接找到详细的概述:https://rebelmagic.com/equivoque-magic/。
In addition to misdirection, another important psychological tool of magicians is equivoque, also called magician’s choice. It’s versatile and can be used for the simplest of card tricks or used to build complex and lengthy stage performances, and it is especially employed by mentalists, including Derren Brown,17 the most famous of all magician-mentalists. The basic idea is to lead people to make what appear to be free choices that are really controlled by the magician. A good overview can be found at: https://rebelmagic.com/equivoque-magic/.
内容
Contents
Goals: Reduction or Replacement
Strategies: Top-Down and Bottom-Up
Clinical Cognitive Neuroscience
Animal Models and Experimentation
Positron Emission Tomography (PET)
图 8.1 中的东西起什么作用?
What does the thing in Figure 8.1 do?
既然生命不过是肢体的运动,我们怎能说所有自动机(像钟表一样,靠弹簧和轮子自行运转的机器)都拥有人工生命呢?心脏不过是一根弹簧;神经不过是许多弦;关节不过是许多轮子,驱动着整个身体运动?
托马斯·霍布斯(1651年,第1页)
For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body?
Thomas Hobbes (1651, p. 1)
霍布斯是第一个提出动物和人类是自动机、机器的人,但他对大脑只字未提,暗示心脏是生命和思维的动力。理解大脑的困难很大程度上在于它的概念晦涩难懂,难以用比喻来描述。心脏、神经和关节的形状和结构,或者沃康松鸭的胃和肠,都暗示着我们已经理解的类似物,但观察大脑却可能除了像一块大海绵之外什么也解释不了。拆开大脑并了解其运作方式需要智慧和先进的技术,从用于简单手术的石器到功能磁共振成像(fMRI)和光遗传学。
Hobbes was the first to suggest that animals and humans were automata, machines, but said nothing about the brain, insinuating that the heart was the agent of life and thought. Much of the difficulty of understanding the brain is its conceptual opacity, its resistance to metaphor. The shapes and structures of the heart, nerves, and joints, or the stomach and intestines of Vaucanson’s duck, suggest already understood analogs, but looking at the brain suggests nothing except, perhaps, a big sponge. Taking the brain apart and learning about its workings demands cleverness and advancing technology, from stone tools for simple surgery to fMRIs and optogenetics.
我们和动物一样,所有意识状态都是由脑物质的分子变化直接引起的,没有证据表明任何意识状态是有机体物质运动变化的原因。由此可见,我们的精神状态仅仅是有机体自动发生的变化在意识中的象征;举一个极端的例子,我们称之为意志的感觉并非自愿行为的原因,而是大脑状态的象征,而大脑状态是该行为的直接原因。我们是有意识的自动机,灵魂与身体的关系就像钟表与机械装置的关系,意识对钟表敲击时发出的声音作出回应。
托马斯·亨利·赫胥黎(1825–1895)1
All states of consciousness are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance in us as in [animals], and there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. It follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which takes place automatically in the organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata, and the soul stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to the works, and consciousness answers to the sound which the bell gives out when it is struck.
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895)1
随着生物学的发展,一些科学家积极复兴霍布斯的论题:作为动物,人类是机器,并且在此基础上补充了心智是大脑运作的偶然副产品的观点。托马斯·H·赫胥黎(1825-1895)就是生理学和进化论趋于一致的例子。赫胥黎受过医学训练,是达尔文的“斗牛犬”,是他最激烈的公开辩护人。作为英国科学的主要组织者和发言人(Desmond,1994),他的思想对公众具有重要意义。詹姆斯(1890)创造了“副现象主义”一词,即心智和行为的自动机理论来描述赫胥黎的论题,并强烈驳斥其“无礼”。
As biology matured, some scientists aggressively revived Hobbes’ thesis that as animals, humans are machines, to which they added the claim that mind was an accidental by-product of the brain’s operation. Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895) is an example of physiology and evolution converging on this conclusion. Huxley was trained in medicine and was Darwin’s “bulldog,” his fiercest public defender. As the leading organizer of and spokesman for science in Britain (Desmond, 1994), his ideas carried weight with the public. James (1890) coined the term epiphenomenalism, or the automaton theory of mind and behavior for Huxley’s thesis, forcefully rejecting it as an “impertinence.”
尽管如此,威廉·冯特还是宣告了心理学与生理学的联盟,詹姆斯也追随他的脚步,走上了他们一致认为是心理学成为一门科学的唯一道路。与生理学的联盟也带来了与医学的交汇,因为生理学作为一门科学的重要性在于,在古代盖伦的思想被现代社会抛弃之际,它能够为医学提供新的实证基础。医学也为研究身心提供了新的方法,即研究因脑损伤和疾病而遭受精神和行为障碍的患者。
Nevertheless, Wilhelm Wundt proclaimed an alliance between psychology and physiology, and James followed him on what they agreed was the only path to psychology as a science. The alliance with physiology also brought an interface with medicine because physiology’s importance as a science lay in providing a new empirical basis for medicine as ancient Galenic ideas were discarded in the modern era. Medicine also provided new methods of investigating mind and body in the form of patients suffering mental and behavioral disorders caused by brain damage and illness.
最古老的外科手术是环钻术,即在头骨上开一个洞,这从史前化石中可以得知(Gross,2012;图 8.2)。
The oldest surgical procedure is trepanning, cutting a hole in the skull, known from prehistorical fossils (Gross, 2012; Figure 8.2).
虽然我们无法确定最初为何进行环钻术,但它仍然是一种偶尔有用的手术。受伤时,大脑会肿胀,环钻术可以缓解压力,在愈合过程中减少脑损伤。对我们来说,环钻术的启示在于它在世界各地都有考古记录。尽管像亚里士多德这样的希腊思想家认为心脏掌控着思想,但环钻术表明医生们更早地认识到了这一点。
Although we can’t be sure exactly why trepanning was first done, it remains an occasionally useful procedure. When injured, the brain swells and trepanning can ease the pressure, reducing brain damage while it heals. For us, the revealing thing about trepanning is that it’s recorded archaeologically all over the world. Although Greek thinkers such as Aristotle thought the heart held the mind, trepanning shows that physicians knew better sooner.
功能定位——心理过程在身体和/或大脑中发生的位置——是认知神经科学中一个永恒的谜题。青铜时代的希腊人将心智划分为分散在身体各处的微型心智。笛卡尔将思考和反思意识保留给灵魂,将其他“心智”功能归于大脑,并将两者的相互作用定位在松果体中。唯物主义者否认灵魂的存在,将所有心智过程视为大脑过程。激进唯物主义者期待着将心智对话从语言中彻底清除,就像恶魔和天使的对话被彻底清除一样。其中一位名叫保罗·丘奇兰德的学者在一次会议上表示,如果他认为民间心理学是天生的,他就会重新连接自己的大脑。
Localization of function—where mental processes take place in the body and/or brain—is the enduring puzzle of cognitive neuroscience. Bronze Age Greeks divided mind into mini-minds scattered around the body. Descartes reserved thinking and reflective consciousness to the soul and assigned other “mental” functions to the brain and located the interaction of the two in the pineal gland. Materialists deny there’s a soul, seeing all mental processes as brain processes. Radical materialists look forward to expunging mental talk from language the way demon and angel talk has been. One of them, Paul Churchland, said at a conference that if he thought folk psychology was innate, he’d have his brain rewired.
一些伊斯兰医生,例如丝绸之路沿线布哈拉的伊本·西那(980-1037),提出了一种影响深远的脑功能定位理论。他们将亚里士多德的心智官能理论与希腊罗马的思想相结合,认为心理活动发生在大脑各个液体脑室中,将官能分配到各个脑室,并绘制出与身体和感官的连接。欧洲医学在中世纪采纳了这些思想(Leahey,2018)(图8.3)。
An influential picture of localization of function in the brain was proposed by various Islamic physicians such as Ibn-Sina (980–1037) of Bukhara on the Great Silk Road. They synthesized Aristotle’s faculty theory of the mind with Greek and Roman beliefs that mental activities took place in the various fluid ventricles of the brain, assigning faculties to the various ventricles, and mapping connections to the body and senses. European medicine adopted these ideas in the Middle Ages (Leahey, 2018) (Figure 8.3).
图中,各种能力始于额头上汇聚成常识的特殊感觉。然后,其他能力则遵循亚里士多德的记忆处理阶段,背面。Nous (心灵)被省略,因为它是伊斯兰教和基督教的非物质人类灵魂。2
In the figure, the faculties begin with the special senses that unite in common sense in the forehead. Then the others follow Aristotle’s stages of processing to memory at the back. Nous, (mind) was omitted as being Islam’s and Christianity’s non-physical human soul.2
维也纳医生弗朗茨·约瑟夫·加尔(1758-1828)采取了更激进的定位方法,他抛弃了哲学心理学,转而非正式地观察人类行为,列出了人与人之间存在差异的特征、倾向和能力,例如数学能力、偷窃倾向、社会性行为、宗教信仰等。他认为,这些特征、倾向和能力分别位于大脑的不同部位。他的理论虽然新颖,但方法却错了。他认为,能力或倾向越强,其大脑区域就越大,在大脑表面形成山丘;而较弱的能力或倾向则会留下山谷。这些山丘和山谷应该会在上面的头骨上造成凹凸不平。加尔试图通过寻找头骨独特的人并发现他们独特的技能和缺陷,以及测量数学家、音乐家和杀手等神童的头骨,将大脑区域与智力关联起来。不幸的是,加尔的旧学生 JC Spurzheim(1776-1832)将加尔的头骨学说变成了颅相学的伪科学,使功能定位的思想声名狼藉(Leahey & Leahey,1983)(图 8.4)。
A more radical approach to localization was taken by Viennese physician Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), who ditched philosophical psychology for informal observation of human behavior, drawing up a list of traits, propensities, and abilities that varied from person to person, such as mathematical ability, tendency to steal, sociosexuality, religiosity, etc. He proposed that each of these was housed in a different part of the brain. While his theory was innovative, his method was mistaken. He thought that the stronger an ability or propensity, the larger would be its brain area, forming a hill on the brain’s surface; weaker ones would leave valleys. The hills and valleys should cause bumps and recesses on the skull above. Gall tried to correlate brain areas with mental faculties by looking for people with distinctive skulls and discovering their unique skills and deficiencies, and by measuring the skulls of prodigies such as mathematicians, musicians and murderers. Gall’s quondam student, J. C. Spurzheim (1776–1832) unfortunately turned Gall’s doctrine of the skull into the pseudoscience of phrenology, bringing the idea of localization of function into disrepute (Leahey & Leahey, 1983) (Figure 8.4).
加尔的主要批评者是法国著名生理学家玛丽-让-皮埃尔·弗卢朗(Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens,1794-1867)。作为一名笛卡尔主义者,他拒绝接受颅相学关于灵魂可以存在于大脑皮层被分割成多个部分。他通过对动物大脑造成损伤(加尔认为这种做法不道德)并观察结果来反驳加尔的观点。他推断,如果心理功能依赖于特定的大脑区域,那么离散的损伤将导致离散行为的丧失。然而,他发现损伤对行为有总体影响,而且随着损伤面积的扩大,累积效应会更强。他得出结论:大脑皮层并非一组心理器官,而是像灵魂一样,一个单一的器官,只做一件事:群体作用理论。
Gall’s major critic was eminent French physiologist, Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens (1794–1867). As a Cartesian, he rejected phrenology’s suggestion that the soul could be divided into parts. He rebutted Gall by making lesions in animal brains (a procedure Gall rejected as immoral) and observing the results, reasoning that if mental functions depend on specific brain areas, discrete lesions will lead to loss of discrete behaviors. Instead, he found that lesions had gross effects on behavior and as lesions got larger the cumulative effects were stronger, concluding that instead of being a set of mental organs, the cortex, like the soul, was a single organ doing one thing: the doctrine of mass action.
在弗洛伦斯的研究和颅相学的污名化之间,大脑层面定位的概念被抛弃了,尽管它被接受用于皮层下功能。皮埃尔-保罗·布罗卡(Pierre-Paul Broca,1824-1880)在著名的萨尔佩特里埃医院。他最著名的病人是“Tan”(维克多·勒博涅饰),之所以这样称呼,是因为他只会说这个词。然而,他的语言理解能力完好无损。尸检时,布罗卡医生发现Tan的左半球皮质存在一个巨大且不断扩大的病变,导致他丧失了语言能力。生产性语言在大脑中有一个特定的位置(图8.5)。
Between Flourens’ research and the stigma of phrenology, the idea of localization at the cerebral level was abandoned, although it was accepted for subcortical functions. It was revived by the clinical observations of Pierre-Paul Broca (1824–1880) at the prestigious Salpêtrière hospital. His most famous patient was “Tan” (Victor Leborgne), so-called because that was the only thing he could say. However, his ability to understand language was intact. At autopsy, Broca found that Tan’s cortex had a massive and growing lesion in the left hemisphere, causing his loss of speech. Productive language had a brain location (Figure 8.5).
最后,弗里奇(Fritsch)和希茨格(Hitzig)在1870年通过实验确定了感觉输入和运动输出的定位。他们用微弱的电流刺激狗暴露的皮层的不同区域,发现产生了特定的运动(图8.6)。
Finally, localizations for sensory inputs and motor outputs were experimentally established by Fritsch and Hitzig (1870). Using mild electric currents, they stimulated different areas of the exposed cortex of a dog and found that specific movements resulted (Figure 8.6).
这种局部化理论的复兴被称为“新颅相学”。然而,除了语言之外,新的局部化区域是感觉、运动反应以及两者之间的联想,而不是亚里士多德或高尔的认知能力。
This revival of the theory of localization was called the “new phrenology.” However, except for language, the new localized areas were for sensations, motor responses, and associations between the two, not the cognitive faculties of Aristotle or Gall.
在第二章中,我们讨论了不同解释层次理论之间的关系,而正是在认知神经科学中,这个问题才变得具有科学和社会意义。从T.H.赫胥黎到保罗(1981)和帕特里夏(2013,2019)·丘奇兰,一些思想家期待着神经科学理论有一天能在科学和日常生活中取代心理学理论。另一些人则同意詹姆斯的观点,认为这种希望是危险的无礼。在本书中,我悄悄地淡化了两种关于心灵和大脑的观点。首先是笛卡尔和宗教中的实体二元论。很少有科学家为它辩护,如果它是正确的,那么灵魂和意识就完全脱离了科学。另一种观点是唯物主义的对立面,泛心论,即所有物质都具有一定程度的意识的理论。尽管最近流行起来(Skrbina,2005),但它在认知科学中并没有获得足够的关注(Lamme,2018;Leahey,2005c),在认知科学中,每个人都同意心智与大脑紧密相连:每一个精神和/或意识事件或过程都依赖于(专业术语是“随附于”)某些大脑事件或过程。这种关系的本质仍有待商榷。
In Chapter 2 we discussed relations between theories at different levels of explanation, and it is in cognitive neuroscience where the question becomes scientifically and socially important. From T. H. Huxley to Paul (1981) and Patricia (2013, 2019) Churchland, some thinkers look forward to the day when neuroscientific theories will have ousted psychological ones both in science and in everyday life. Others agree with James that this hope is a dangerous impertinence. In this book I have quietly downplayed two positions on mind and brain. First is substance dualism as found in Descartes and religion. Few scientists defend it, and if it’s true, soul and consciousness simply stand outside science. The other view is materialism’s opposite, panpsychism, the theory that all matter possesses some degree of consciousness. Although newly popular (Skrbina, 2005), it has gained no traction in cognitive science (Lamme, 2018; Leahey, 2005c), wherein everyone agrees that mind and brain are intimately connected: Every mental and/or conscious event or process depends on (the technical phrase is supervenes on) some brain event or process. Up for debate is the nature of the relationship.
在科学哲学中,适用于同一主题的理论通过还原或替换相互关联。在还原过程中,高级理论(例如孟德尔的基因)中的术语与低级理论(例如DNA的编码序列)中的概念相一致,并用低级理论来解释高级理论的运作方式。高级理论在科学中被保留为在其领域内有效的理论,但同时也被编织进了更广阔的科学世界图景中。
In philosophy of science, theories applying to the same subject matter are related by reduction or replacement. In reduction, terms in the higher-level theory (e.g., Mendel’s genes) are identified with concepts in a lower-level theory (e.g., coding sequences of DNA), and the lower-level theory is taken to explain how the higher-level theory works. The higher-level theory is retained in science as valid for its domain but is woven into the larger scientific world-picture.
在认知科学中,工作记忆和长期记忆之间的差异或许能够整齐地映射到大脑的不同区域,从而验证心理上的区别在物理上是真实存在的。另一方面,存储区域可能不止两个,或者只有一个,并且会在不同时间和不同条件下通过不同的存储和检索过程进行访问。在这种情况下,或许认知理论需要被一种更符合生理学的理论所取代。
In cognitive science, the difference between working and long-term memory might tidily map on to distinct regions of the brain, validating the psychological distinction as physically real. On the other hand, there might be more than two storage areas, or just one that is accessed at different times and under differing conditions by varying storage and retrieval processes. In this case, perhaps the cognitive theory would have to be replaced by a more physiologically realistic one.
如果认知理论不能简化为生理理论,或许它们可以或应该被取代,即所谓的取消主义(eliminativism)。赫胥黎含蓄地持有这种观点,而丘奇兰夫妇等人则明确地持有这种观点。取消主义者认为,正如普通人对物体在空间中的运动方式、对化学和物理现实的本质以及对地球在宇宙中的位置的认识存在错误一样,他们对于自己的思维和大脑如何运作以及两者如何联系的认识也肯定可能存在错误,而且确实存在错误。最终,他们声称,正如人们不知道燃素是什么(或曾经不知道燃素是什么),也不再用它来解释化学反应一样,未来的人们将不知道什么是信念或动机,也不会用它们来解释行为。取而代之的是内侧颞叶取代“信念”,杏仁核取代“动机”,伏隔核取代“动机”。正如保罗·丘奇兰(Paul Churchland)所写(1981,第90页):“民间心理学的原则性取代不仅完全有可能,而且代表了我们目前能够想象到的最有趣的理论取代之一。” 另一方面,杰里·福多尔(Jerry Fodor)(1987,第xii页)写道:“如果常识性心理学崩溃,那将是我们人类历史上最大的智力灾难,无可比拟。”
If cognitive theories cannot be reduced to physiological ones, perhaps they can or should be replaced, the position known as eliminativism, held implicitly by Huxley and explicitly by the Churchlands and others. Eliminativists believe that just as ordinary people were wrong about how objects move in space, wrong about the nature of chemical and physical reality, and wrong about the position of the earth in the cosmos, they certainly may be, and indeed are, wrong about how their minds and brains work and how the two are connected. Ultimately, they claim, just as people don’t know what phlogiston is (or was) and no longer use it to explain chemical reactions, future people won’t know what beliefs or motives are and won’t use them to explain behavior. In place will be references to the medial temporal lobe replacing “belief” and the amygdala and to the nucleus accumbans replacing “motive.” As Paul Churchland writes (1981, p. 90): “the principled displacement of folk psychology is not only richly possible, it represents one of the most intriguing theoretical displacements we can currently imagine.” On the other hand, Jerry Fodor (1987, p. xii) writes, “if commonsense psychology were to collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species.”
认知神经科学为马尔的认知研究框架开辟了新的视角(Cowell & Huber,2020)。除加尔(Gall)外,先前回顾的认知神经科学都采用自上而下的方法连接身心。理论家们借鉴了现有的官能心理学,主要是亚里士多德的理论,并提出了官能位于大脑不同区域的观点,这些区域是通过基本解剖学已知的。加尔是个例外,因为他摒弃了关于心灵的哲学观点,试图将独特的行为模式与皮层区域直接联系起来。当他的颅相学演变为颅相学时,旧的哲学思辨模式带着不同的官能体系回归了(Leahey & Leahey,1983)。
Cognitive neuroscience opens a new perspective for Marr’s framework for studying cognition (Cowell & Huber, 2020). Except for Gall, the cognitive neuroscience reviewed earlier took a top-down approach to connecting mind and body. Theorists adopted existing faculty psychology, primarily Aristotle’s, and proposed locations of the faculties in different areas of the brain known by basic dissection. Gall was the exception because he rejected philosophical ideas about the mind and tried to directly link distinctive behavioral patterns to regions of the cortex. When his craniology morphed into phrenology, the old mode of philosophical speculation returned with a different set of faculties (Leahey & Leahey, 1983).
直到19世纪末20世纪初,神经元和突触才被发现,神经信息处理的电化学特性才初露锋芒。随着神经科学的成熟,科学家们开始采用一种自下而上的新方法来研究大脑,致力于揭示包括人类大脑在内的动物大脑的整个神经网络。这张图谱被称为连接组(Seung,2012;Rossini等人,2019)3(图8.7)。
It was not until the late 19th and early 20th centuries that neurons and synapses were discovered and the first glimmerings of the electro-chemical nature of neural information processing emerged. As neuroscience has matured, a new bottom-up approach to the brain is being taken, as scientists work to reveal the entire neural network of animal brains, including the human brain. The map is called the connectome (Seung, 2012; Rossini et al., 2019)3 (Figure 8.7).
这种方法的重点在于将大脑视为一个网络,而高度专业化的大脑区域(福多尔模块)的概念则被忽略了。在理解人类大脑方面,人们已经取得了许多进展,并且仍在不断取得进展,但目前尚无普遍性的综合研究成果。
The focus of this approach is on the brain as a network, and the concept of tightly specialized brain regions—Fodorian modules—falls away. Much progress has been and is being made in understanding the human brain, but no general synthesis is in sight.
破碎之物照亮了完整的事物。
卢克·迪特里希(Luke Dittrich),《病人 H. M》(2016)
The broken illuminate the unbroken.
Luke Dittrich, Patient H. M (2016)
布罗卡与谭的研究是临床神经科学的早期应用,旨在研究疾病、事故或手术造成的脑损伤对思维和行为的影响。在本节中,我将讨论一些临床综合征,以证明直觉和意识看似统一的心理过程,实际上是由大脑的不同部分执行的。
Broca’s research with Tan was an early use of clinical neuroscience, studying the effects on mind and behavior of brain damage caused by disease or accident or by the effects of surgery to correct a problem. In this section, I will discuss some clinical syndromes, demonstrating that abilities appearing to intuition and consciousness to be unified mental processes are, in fact, carried out by very different parts of the brain.
大脑分为两个半球,在布罗卡发现语言只存在于左半球之前,人们长期以来一直认为左半球和右半球是镜像。这对动物来说确实如此,但在人类中,两个半球负责许多不同的认知过程,这在所谓的裂脑患者身上得到了显著体现。两个半球通过一个称为胼胝体的致密神经体连接。对于癫痫患者,有时会切断胼胝体以防止癫痫从一个半球蔓延到另一个半球。由于新药可以抑制癫痫,这种手术如今几乎不再进行。然而,对裂脑患者的研究(Gazzaniga,2005)已经为认知过程的半球特化提供了相当多的启示,正如在脚注视频中艾伦·阿尔达参观 Gazzaniga 实验室所见。
Brains are divided into two hemispheres, and before Broca’s discovery that language was found only in the left hemisphere, it was long assumed that the left and right hemispheres were mirror images. This is true of animals, but in humans the two hemispheres are responsible for many different cognitive processes, dramatically revealed in so-called split-brain patients. The two hemispheres are connected by a dense body of nerves called the corpus callosum. In patients with epilepsy, the corpus callosum was sometimes severed to prevent seizures spreading from one hemisphere to the other. Because new drugs can inhibit seizures, this surgery is almost never performed today. However, research with split-brain patients (Gazzaniga, 2005) has thrown considerable light on hemispheric specialization of cognitive processes, as seen in the footnoted video in which Alan Alda visits Gazzaniga’s lab.
正如布罗卡所表明的,语言位于左半球,而加扎尼加则将推理、解释和信息搜索功能添加到左半球,并将冲突解决和信念更新以及面部识别和其他非语言能力置于右半球(Marinsek, Turner, Gazzaniga, & Miller, 2014)。这是纯右撇子的情况,但左撇子是一群特立独行的人(McManus, 2019)。一些左撇子的大脑与右撇子的大脑如出一辙,但介于两者之间的人,他们左右手都灵活,或者更喜欢用左手做一些通常用右手做的事情。我有一个怪癖,我会用左手来做大多数魔术师用右手做的硬币动作,这让从视频中学习变得很棘手。更重要的是,人们普遍认为学习风格存在惯用右手(“创造性”)和惯用左手(“线性”)之分,但这纯属虚构 (Jarrett,2015;Satel & Lilienfeld,2013),应用于教育领域非常危险(Newton & Salvi,2020)。在认知神经科学领域,裂脑患者究竟是像加扎尼加所说的那样,在一个身体里拥有两种思维,还是拥有一个拥有两种输入源的单一意识主体(Pint、de Haan & Lamme,2017)仍存在争议。
As Broca showed, language is in the left hemisphere, to which Gazzaniga adds reasoning, explanation, and information-seeking, while placing conflict resolution and belief updating in the right, along with face recognition and other non-linguistic abilities (Marinsek, Turner, Gazzaniga, & Miller, 2014). This is the picture for pure right-handers, but left-handers are an idiosyncratic bunch (McManus, 2019). A few left-handers’ brains are mirror images of those of right-handers, but in between there’s a spectrum of people who are ambidextrous or prefer to use the left hand for a few things usually done right-handed. I have a quirk of using my left hand for coin moves most magicians do with their right hands, making learning from videos tricky. More importantly, the idea that there are right-handed (“creative”) and left-handed (“linear”) learning styles is widely believed but is a myth (Jarrett, 2015; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013), dangerous when applied in education (Newton & Salvi, 2020). In cognitive neuroscience, whether split-brain patients have two minds in one body, as Gazzaniga says, or a single consciousness agent with two sources of input (Pint, de Haan, & Lamme, 2017) remains contentious.
如果说有什么事物看起来是一个无缝衔接、统一的过程,那它就是视觉意识。正如詹姆斯(1890)所写:“意识……本身并非被切碎。‘链条’或‘火车’之类的词语并不能恰当地描述它,因为它最初呈现的样子就是这样。它并非连接在一起的,而是流动的。”(第239页)然而,在大脑中,视觉意识以两条独立的流的形式流动,执行着两种不同的功能,正如盲视现象(Weiskrantz,1986)所证明的那样。图8.8显示了从视觉表征区域出发的两条处理流。一条流进行模式识别——确定物体是什么,另一条流则确定它在空间中的位置——它在哪里。在盲视中,“什么”流被切断,但“哪里”流却完整无缺。
If anything seems to be a seamless, unitary process, it’s visual consciousness. As James (1890) wrote, “Consciousness … does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly, as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows” (p. 239). However, in the brain, visual consciousness flows in two separate streams performing two different functions, as the phenomenon of blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986) demonstrates. Figure 8.8 shows two streams of processing proceeding from the visual representation area. One stream performs pattern recognition—determining what an object is, and the other results in determining its location in space—where it is. In blindsight, the “what” stream is severed but the “where” stream is intact.
盲视患者否认自己能看到医生举起的手指数量,但当被要求猜测时,他们却能准确回答。在视频脚注中,一位病人走过一条走廊,尽管费了不少劲,但研究人员在走廊里设置了障碍物。他能分辨出危险在哪里,但不知道危险是什么。有趣的是,盲视患者除非被迫,否则绝不会运用他们潜意识里掌握的信息。视频中的病人坚持了数周才完成测试。你应该感谢你的两条小溪,让你能够一边走路一边发短信。
Patients with blindsight deny that they can see how many fingers a doctor holds up before them, but, when urged to guess, can answer accurately. In the footnoted video, a patient walks—albeit with effort—down a hall in which researchers placed obstacles. He could tell where danger lay, but not what the danger was. Interestingly, patients with blindsight never use the information unconsciously available to them unless pushed to do so. The patient in the video resisted for weeks taking the test shown. You should thank your two streams for your ability to walk and text at the same time.
最近,Pitcher 和 Ungerleider (2021) 提出了第三种通路,它对视野中的人脸进行差异化处理,而不仅仅是关注的人脸和看到的人类运动。他们推测,这条通路是人类独有的,对社会智力(我们的关键适应能力)至关重要。
Recently, Pitcher and Ungerleider (2021) have proposed a third stream that differentially processes faces across the visual field, not just an attended face, and seen human movement. They theorize that this pathway is distinctly human and is important to social intelligence, our key adaptation.
患有卡普格拉妄想症(Capgras delusion)或卡普格拉综合征(Capgras syndrome)的人会相信自己认识的人——即使是配偶或亲戚——被替换成了另一个人。在典型案例中(Alexander、Stuss & Benson,1979),患者的复制品被连续替换成新的,直到患者“遇到”了超过2000个复制品。例如,一个男人可能认出复制品的长相和行为举止与他的母亲一模一样,但却坚称那不是他的母亲(Chhaya,2017),有时这种妄想会导致敌意和攻击行为。卡普格拉妄想症可能表现为造成这种现象的因素有很多,从神经症到脑外伤,再到老年性脑退行性疾病(Pandis、Agrawal & Poole,2018)。在大多数情况下,其原因在于杏仁核(处理情绪的最重要结构)与视觉处理其余部分之间的连接丧失。继续举个例子,患者认出了自己的母亲,但由于杏仁核没有被激活,患者通常不会产生看到母亲时产生的温暖感,于是患者认定那不是母亲,而是一个陌生人,代替了她(Ellis & Young,1990)。同样,心理上看似统一的体验,在神经学上却复杂且易碎。
In Capgras delusion, or syndrome, a person comes to believe that someone they know—even a spouse or relative—has been switched with a double. In the defining case (Alexander, Stuss, & Benson, 1979), duplicates were serially replaced with new ones until the patient had “met” more than 2,000 doubles. A man may recognize, for example, that the double looks and acts exactly like his mother, but insist it’s not she (Chhaya, 2017), and sometimes the delusion leads to hostility and aggression. Capgras delusion can be caused by several factors from neurosis to brain trauma to degenerative brain diseases of aging (Pandis, Agrawal, & Poole, 2018). In most cases, the cause lies in loss of connection between the amygdala—the most important structure for processing emotion—and the rest of visual processing. The patient’s mother, to continue the example, is recognized, but without activation of the amygdala the usual warm feeling associated with seeing her is absent, and the patient concludes it’s not mother but a stranger who has been substituted for her (Ellis & Young, 1990). Again, what appears to be unitary experience psychologically is complex and fragmentable neurologically.
临床综合征对认知神经科学的贡献巨大,并且仍在持续,但仅凭这些综合征得出的结论存在重大局限性。脑外伤和疾病不受大脑内部解剖边界的限制,因此我们可能不清楚受损区域的哪个部分会导致特定的心理或行为问题。此外,正如老一辈颅相学家所坚持的那样,如果我们缺乏关于心理功能运作方式的理论——例如马尔计算层理论——我们就无法将计算与实际操作精确地匹配起来。例如,在布罗卡区(Broca)被损伤175年后,科学家们仍在争论哪些语言能力会因布罗卡区哪些部分受损而受损(Ardila、Bernal & Rosselli,2016),或者布罗卡区究竟是科学发现的自然大脑区域,还是一个方便的虚构科学所发明的虚构概念(Fedorenko & Blank,2020)。
Clinical syndromes have contributed—and still contribute—much to cognitive neuroscience, but there are important limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn from them alone. Brain trauma and disease don’t respect the anatomical borders within the brain, so it can be unclear what part of a damaged area causes a particular mental or behavioral problem. Furthermore, as the old phrenologists insisted, if we lack a theory of how a mental function works—i.e., a Marr computational level theory—we can’t precisely match up computation to implementation. For example, 175 years after Broca, scientists still dispute which linguistic abilities are harmed by damage to which parts of Broca’s area (Ardila, Bernal, & Rosselli, 2016), or if Broca’s area is a natural area of the brain that science discovered or a convenient fiction science invented (Fedorenko & Blank, 2020).
为了更精准地探索脑损伤对认知功能的影响,神经科学家开始使用动物模型,以便通过实验施加损伤。该方法是通过损伤或消融(切除)不同的脑区,并/或切断它们之间的连接,来确定哪些能力受损,哪些能力得以保留(Vaidya 等人,2019)。弗洛伦斯旨在质疑颅相学的研究项目,是消融手术的早期应用。
In order to more accurately and precisely discover the effects of brain damage on cognitive functions, neuroscientists have turned to animal models, on which damage can be experimentally imposed. The method is to lesion or ablate—remove—different brain areas and/or sever the connections between them to determine which abilities are impaired and which are spared (Vaidya et al., 2019). Flourens’ research program to discredit phrenology was an early use of ablation surgery.
实验动物模型方法的一个典型例子是约瑟夫·勒杜克斯(Joseph LeDoux)对大鼠巴甫洛夫恐惧条件反射的神经基础的研究(LeDoux,1994、1996、2020)。在恐惧条件反射中,条件刺激(CS)——勒杜克斯使用了声音——与非条件刺激(US)——电击——配对,以产生对CS的条件性恐惧。早期的临床研究结果表明,习得性恐惧刺激的感官和情感层面是可分离的。例如,19世纪的神经学家爱德华·克拉帕雷德(Édouard Claparède,1873-1940)曾与一位失忆症患者合作,他每天都必须通过握手来重新介绍自己。有一天,克拉帕雷德在他的……里藏了一根针用手刺伤了病人。下次见面时,病人照例没认出克拉帕雷德,但拒绝与他握手。克拉帕雷德成了一个引发恐惧的刺激物,但病人却不记得原因。
An elegant example of the experimental animal model approach is Joseph LeDoux’s investigation of the neural bases of Pavlovian fear conditioning in rats (LeDoux, 1994, 1996, 2020). In fear conditioning, a Conditional Stimulus (CS)—LeDoux used sounds—is paired with an Unconditional Stimulus (US)—shock—to produce conditioned fear of the CS. Earlier clinical findings suggested that the sensory and emotional aspects of learned fear-producing stimuli were separable. For example, the 19th-century neurologist Édouard Claparède (1873–1940) worked with an amnesic patient to whom he had to introduce himself anew every day by shaking hands. One day, Claparède hid a pin in his hand and pricked the patient with it. The next time they met, the patient as usual did not recognize Claparède, but he refused to shake his hand. Claparède had become a fear-producing stimulus, but the patient did not remember why.
在完整的哺乳动物大脑中,情绪刺激的处理过程如图8.9所示。刺激输入在耳朵中被记录,并被处理到感觉丘脑(大脑的关键感觉中转站),然后通过两条路径到达杏仁核:一条路径经由感觉皮层,在那里被听到;另一条路径直接到达杏仁核,大致相当于大脑的情绪中心。LeDoux 将第一条路径称为“高路”,因为它很长但神经元丰富;另一条路径称为“低路”,因为它很短但神经元稀疏。
In an intact mammalian brain, the processing of emotional stimuli takes place as shown in Figure 8.9. Stimulus input is registered in the ear and processed to the sensory thalamus (the brain’s key sensory relay station) and then by two paths to the amygdala, one going via the sensory cortex, where it is heard, and the other directly to the amygdala, roughly the brain’s emotion center. LeDoux calls the first path the “high road” because it is long but rich in neurons, and the other the “low road” because it is short but sparse in neurons.
在一系列实验中,LeDoux 证实,切断听觉丘脑和听觉皮层之间的联系不会破坏巴甫洛夫的恐惧条件反射,但损伤听觉丘脑或听觉回路更早期的部分会消除恐惧条件反射。看来,我们不需要真正感知到刺激就能将其与震惊联系起来,从而引起恐惧。进一步的研究证实,导致和控制恐惧及恐惧行为的关键大脑结构是杏仁核。通过向大脑其他部位投射信息,杏仁核控制着对恐惧的各种行为反应,包括原地僵住、血压升高、释放与压力相关的激素以及惊吓反射。
In a series of experiments, LeDoux established that severing the connection between the auditory thalamus and the auditory cortex did not disrupt Pavlovian fear conditioning, but that lesions to the auditory thalamus or earlier in the auditory circuit abolished fear conditioning. It appears that actual perception of a stimulus is not necessary for us to associate it with shock, and therefore for it to cause fear. Further investigations established that the crucial brain structure that causes and controls fear, and fear behavior, is the amygdala. Via projections to other parts of the brain, the amygdala controls the various behavioral responses to fear, including freezing in place, increase in blood pressure, release of hormones related to stress, and the startle reflex.
LeDoux 还发现,听觉丘脑分别向杏仁核和听觉皮层投射信息,通过“高路”到达皮层,通过“低路”到达杏仁核。现在,恐惧条件反射发生的原因变得清晰起来,当丘脑向皮层的投射被切断。恐惧引发的行为(即对产生恐惧的刺激(US),例如休克)的各种无条件反应)由杏仁核控制,因此可以通过直接从丘脑的投射激活,丘脑也记录了听觉刺激(CS)。这样,CS和US可以在没有感觉皮层参与的情况下关联起来,并且CS可以在没有被体验的情况下引发恐惧行为。LeDoux的研究解释了Claparède的失忆症患者的变化。丘脑和杏仁核之间的皮层下连接完好无损,但杏仁核和皮层之间的连接已经丢失。因此,Claparède的病人从未学会认出他(皮层记忆功能),但却学会了害怕他(皮层下杏仁核功能)。
LeDoux also found that the auditory thalamus projects separately to the amygdala and to the auditory cortex, by the “high road” to the cortex and the “low road” to the amygdala. It now became clear why fear conditioning could take place when the thalamus’s projections to the cortex were severed. The behaviors elicited by fear (i.e., the various unconditional responses to a fear-producing US such as shock) were controlled by the amygdala and could therefore be activated by projections directly from the thalamus, which also registered the auditory CS. Thus, CS and US could be associated without involvement of the sensory cortex, and the CS could come to provoke fearful behaviors without being experienced. LeDoux’s work explains the change in Claparède’s amnesic patient. The subcortical connections between the thalamus and amygdala were intact, but connections between the amygdala and the cortex had been lost. Thus, Claparède’s patient never learned to recognize him (a cortical memory function) but did learn to fear him (a subcortical amygdala function).
然而,在“主路”被切断的大鼠中,巴甫洛夫的恐惧条件反射发生了改变。它们能够获得基本的条件反射——害怕未曾听到的刺激,但却无法表现出更复杂的巴甫洛夫能力,例如辨别学习。从人类中心主义的角度来看,受损的大鼠似乎能够学会直觉地预知即将发生的坏事,但仍然无法意识到威胁的性质。这一结论很重要,因为它表明记忆遍布大脑各处,而非位于传统上被称为“印迹”的“箱子”中。恐惧记忆中的情绪部分属于丘脑-杏仁核连接的一部分,而信号的识别则取决于皮层。我们将在关于记忆的案例研究中再次讨论这一点。此外,LeDoux 的研究还表明意识具有因果作用,这削弱了自动机论。无意识的过程提醒我们威胁的存在,但警醒的意识揭示了威胁的性质,使我们能够精准有效地应对。
However, Pavlovian fear conditioning was altered in rats whose high road was severed. They could acquire basic conditioning—fearing the unheard stimulus, but they did not display more sophisticated Pavlovian abilities such as discrimination learning. To be a bit anthropocentric, it appears that damaged rats could learn to intuit that something bad was about to happen but remained unaware of the nature of the threat. This conclusion is important because it shows that memories are spread around the brain, not located in bins traditionally called “engrams.” The emotional part of fear memory is part of the thalamus-amygdala connection, while the identity of the signal depends on the cortex. We will return to this point in our Case Study on memory. Also, LeDoux’s research suggests a causal role for consciousness, undermining the automaton thesis. Unconscious processes alert us to a threat’s existence, but alerting consciousness reveals the nature of the threat, allowing precise and effective coping.
虽然手术损伤比脑外伤更精确,但并非完美无缺。为了到达待损伤区域,外科医生通常必须穿过其他组织,有时必然或无意地损伤这些组织。此外,尽管现代脑图谱相当精确,但关于不同脑结构之间的轮廓和连接仍然存在争议,例如关于布罗卡区的引证。因此,在针对同一理论结构或过程的实验中,科学家们对于哪些脑区和神经束被消融或切断存在分歧。
While surgical lesions are more exact than brain trauma, they are not perfect. In order to get at an area to be lesioned, the surgeon often must go through other tissue, sometimes damaging it necessarily or inadvertently. Additionally, while modern maps of the brain are quite accurate, there are still arguments about the lineaments of and connections between various brain structures, as the citations about Broca’s area attest. Therefore, scientists can disagree about which brain areas and nerve tracts have been ablated or cut in experiments on the same theoretical structure or process.
由于篇幅所限,有些相关方法无法一一讨论,因此有必要提及。其中一种方法是单细胞记录,即将电极放置在目标神经元内或附近,以便监测其活动。埃里克·坎德尔因对海蛞蝓(Aplysia)的巴甫洛夫条件反射研究而获得诺贝尔奖7,海蛞蝓作为模型器官的吸引力在于可以移除其整个神经系统并在体外进行研究。然而,这种方法在更复杂的生物体中使用起来比较困难。第二种方法是经颅磁刺激(TCMS)。TCMS 设备看起来像一根带有一个(或两个)甜甜圈的魔杖。附在末端。该磁棒会在被放置的颅骨区域下方的大脑上产生强大但紧密聚焦的磁场。您可能听说过中医药用于治疗抑郁症。最初人们认为中医药会在人类身上产生与脑损伤相当的暂时性症状,但这种想法被证明是过于简单了,它在认知科学中的应用才刚刚开始 (Pitcher, Parkin, & Walsh, 2021)。另一项新技术是光遗传学。可以操纵生物体的基因使某些神经元对光敏感,这样就可以在研究人员的控制下打开或关闭它们 (Boyden, 2015; Pama, Claudia, & Bernhard, 2013),以研究从简单的联想连接到社会行为的任何事物 (Yang et al., 2021)。光遗传学是如此新颖,以至于像中医药一样,它对认知神经科学的贡献才刚刚开始 (Goshen, 2014)。此外,与 TCMS 一样,它为医学神经科学带来了希望的可能性(White、Mackay & Whittaker,2020 年)。
Some related methods that space precludes discussing should be mentioned. One is single-cell recording, in which an electrode is placed in or near a neuron of interest so that its activity can be monitored. Eric Kandel won the Nobel Prize7 for his study of Pavlovian conditioning in the sea slug Aplysia, whose attractiveness as a model organ was that its entire nervous system could be removed and studied in vitro. However, it is harder to use in more complex organisms. A second is transcranial magnetic stimulation (TCMS). A TCMS device looks like a magic wand with a doughnut (or two doughnuts) attached to the end. The wand generates a powerful but tightly focused magnetic field on the brain under the area of the skull over which it’s held. You may have heard of TCMS as a treatment for depression. It was originally thought that TCMS produced temporary equivalents of brain lesions in humans, but that picture proved simplistic, and its application to cognitive science is just beginning (Pitcher, Parkin, & Walsh, 2021). Another new technique is optogenetics. An organism’s genes can be manipulated to make some neurons sensitive to light, so that they can be turned on or off under a researcher’s control (Boyden, 2015; Pama, Claudia, & Bernhard, 2013) to study anything from simple associative connections to social behavior (Yang et al., 2021). Optogenetics is so new that like TCMS its contribution to cognitive neuroscience is just beginning (Goshen, 2014). Also, like TCMS, it raises hopeful possibilities for medical neuroscience (White, Mackay, & Whittaker, 2020).
最后,说到动物模型,某些真菌会相互交换磷,并且遵循理性经济学的原则(Loch-Temzelides,2021),而秀丽隐杆线虫会根据边际效用理论的预测(Katzen 等人,2021)选择食物来源,并使用与哺乳动物相同的神经递质多巴胺作为效用的衡量标准。“边际革命”博客的经济学家 Alex Tabarrok 表示:“如果经济学在人类以外的所有地方都有效,那将非常有趣。” 8我们将在下一章详细讨论这一点。
Finally, speaking of animal models, certain fungi exchange phosphorus with each other and do so following the principles of rational economics (Loch-Temzelides, 2021), and the nematode worm C. elegans chooses between food sources in line with predictions from marginal utility theory (Katzen et al., 2021), using the same neurotransmitter, dopamine, as the measure of utility that’s used in mammals. Alex Tabarrok, an economist at the blog Marginal Revolution, said that “It would be amusing if economics turns out to work well everywhere except for humans.”8 We’ll say more about this in the next chapter.
大脑活动产生的电活动可以通过脑电图 (EEG) 和脑磁图 (MEG) 读取。参与者佩戴一顶带有电极的帽子,电极接触头骨,读取穿过大脑皮层的脑电波的电压和时间进程。使用相同实验装置的一项相关技术是诱发脑电位或事件相关脑电位 (ERP) 研究,即在参与者响应刺激或认知任务时监测他们的大脑活动。然后将产生的电压波报告为正电压或负电压,以及它们在诱发刺激出现后大约多久出现(例如,N1 为第一个负电压,P2 为第二个正电压)。
The brain’s activities produce electrical activity that can be read by electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). The participant wears a cap with electrodes touching the skull, and they read the voltage and time course of brain waves passing through the cortex. A related technique using the same experimental set-up is the study of evoked or event-related brain potentials (ERP), in which participants’ brain activity is monitored as they respond to stimuli or cognitive tasks. The resulting voltage waves are then reported as positive or negative and about how long after the evoking stimulus they occur (e.g., N1 is first negative, P2 is second positive).
例如,Cutmore 等人(2015)在改良版 Wason 选择任务中测量了 ERP。参与者观看通常的四张卡片阵列,然后观看一张可能证伪规则、不证伪规则或无关紧要(例如带有“&”符号)的卡片,并说出这张卡片属于哪个类别。参与者接受训练,直到他们的答案近乎完美,以消除误差作为变异源。他们发现,晚期负波 (N2) 与处理有意义的卡片有关,而非控制卡片,尤其与对带有负面措辞的卡片(非 p 和非 q)的反应有关。人们早已观察到在 Wason 任务和语言处理中处理否定的困难(Wason & Johnson-Laird,1972)。
For example, Cutmore et al. (2015) measured ERPs in a modified version of Wason’s selection task. Participants viewed the usual four-card array and then a card which could falsify the rule, not falsify the rule, or was irrelevant (e.g., bore an “&” sign) and said to which class the card belonged. Participants were trained until their answers were nearly perfect to eliminate error as a source of variance. They found that late negative waves (N2) were associated with processing of meaningful cards as opposed to the control cards, and especially with responding to the negatively worded cards (Not-p, and not-q). Difficulty handling negation in the Wason task and in language processing generally has long been observed (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).
电生理学的缺点在于它无法识别特定脑结构或脑回路中的活动,而且脑电波究竟起什么作用(如果有的话)也尚不清楚。当然,脑电波是由大脑产生的,但或许只是因果信息处理的副产品。因此,电生理学或许可以为认知神经科学提供间接线索——其价值在于它可以无害地使用——但它的结论需要更深入的分析。
The shortcoming of electrophysiology is that it cannot identify activity in specific brain structures or circuits, and it is unclear what, if anything, brain waves do. They are produced by the brain, of course, but perhaps only as by-products of causal information processing. Thus, electrophysiology may offer indirect clues in cognitive neuroscience—valuable as it can be used without harm—but its suggestions will need literally deeper analysis.
20 世纪 80 年代,新的大脑成像方法应运而生,并推动了认知神经科学的重大发现。这些方法极大地提高了在身体和大脑中可获得图像的分辨率,经过适当的修改,它们不仅可以为科学家提供大脑结构的图像(静态成像,旧的 X 射线和 CAT 扫描可以显示这一点,而且比它们有了很大的改进),还可以提供大脑瞬时运作的图像(功能成像)。早期的结果令人着迷,方法也成倍增加。然而,由于复制危机等争议以及神经科学特有的问题,早期清晰图像的光彩已经变得模糊和褪色。在本节中,我将讨论两种方法和示例结果,然后讨论一些争议。
In the 1980s new methods for imaging the brain were developed and fostered dramatic findings in cognitive neuroscience. These methods greatly improved the resolution of the images obtainable in the body and brain, and, suitably modified, they promised to give scientists pictures not only of the brain’s structures—static imaging, which older X-rays and CAT scans showed, but also much improved over them—but of its moment-to-moment operations—functional imaging. Early results were beguiling, and methods multiplied. However, the early luster of crisp images has fogged and faded because of controversies like those in the replication crisis plus issues unique to neuroscience. In this section, I will discuss two methods and example findings, and then take up some of the controversies.
最早的实用技术之一是正电子发射断层扫描(PET),它比CAT扫描更好。PET利用了血液与神经活动的关系,就像汽油与汽车发动机的动力输出的关系:做功越多,需要吸收的血液或汽油就越多。在PET扫描中,患者(最初开发用于临床诊断)或参与者会接受注射一种半衰期很短的正电子发射放射性同位素。大脑中的神经元会随着它们抽取的血液吸收示踪剂,作为燃料,它们消耗的血液越多,释放的放射性就越强。然后,扫描仪可以生成图像,显示哪些区域的工作强度最大。
One of the first functional techniques was positron emission tomography, PET scans, better than CAT scans. PET exploits the fact that blood is to neural activity what gasoline is to a car’s engine’s power output: More work requires more uptake of blood or gasoline. In PET, a patient (it was originally developed for clinical diagnosis) or participant receives an injection of a positron-emitting radioactive isotope with a very short half-life. Neurons in the brain absorb the tracer with the blood they draw for fuel, and the more blood they use the more radioactivity they emit. The scanner then can make up an image showing which areas are working the hardest.
认知神经科学中PET的一个例子是Haier等人(1992)对学习引起的神经处理变化的研究,这是Haier旨在发展智力神经科学解释的大型项目的一部分(Haier,2017)。他让不熟悉电脑游戏《俄罗斯方块9》的参与者在放射性示踪剂被吸收的同时玩这款游戏。进入他们的大脑。他们花了几周时间做“家庭作业”,每天练习几个小时。最后,他们在实验室里再次玩俄罗斯方块,并对他们大脑进行了PET扫描。图8.10显示了一位参与者的初始表现和最终表现。
An example of PET in cognitive neuroscience is Haier et al.’s (1992) study of changes to neural processing caused by learning, part of Haier’s larger project of developing a neuroscience explanation of intelligence (Haier, 2017). He had participants unfamiliar with the computer game Tetris9 play it while the radioactive tracer was being absorbed into their brains. They spent several weeks doing “homework,” practicing the game for hours a day. Finally, they played Tetris again in the lab and their brains were PET scanned. Figure 8.10 shows initial performance and final performance in one participant.
如你所见,首次玩游戏时,参与者的大脑确实在努力工作,但由于玩家操作缓慢且容易出错,因此效率不高。经过数周的练习,游戏变得快速、流畅且高效;Haier 说,他几乎无法跟上玩家的棋子落入的轨迹。然而,玩家的大脑活动几乎不比静息状态时活跃——几乎看不到任何活动红点。Haier 将此称为智力的效率方面——学习使行为更有效、更专注,同时消耗的生物燃料更少。
As you can see, when playing the game for the first time, the participant’s brain is working hard, indeed, but it is not working effectively because the player’s actions are slow and error-prone. After weeks of practice, play was fast, fluid, and efficient; Haier said he could hardly follow the tiles as they fell into the player’s patterns. Nevertheless, the player’s brain was barely more active than when in its resting state—nary a red spot of activity to be seen. Haier calls this the efficiency aspect of intelligence—learning makes behavior more effective and focused yet at less cost in biological fuel.
换句话说,对习得行为的控制权从系统 2(驱动因素)转移到系统 1(大象)。在 2020 年(2021 年)东京夏季奥运会上,超级明星体操运动员西蒙娜·拜尔斯因“稍微扭动了一下”而退出比赛,她解释说,在一次动作中,“我不知道自己在空中。我可能会伤到自己。” 10 扭动是体操运动员的用语,指的是有意识地意识到自己在做什么,而不是机械地去做,这会破坏成功的表现。拜尔斯可能会摔倒在脖子或头部。在体操、俄罗斯方块或任何需要快速反应行为的情况下,我们应该练习、练习、再练习,然后把事情留给大象和具身认知。在英语中,我们说“熟能生巧”,但德语版本更接近认知科学:Übung macht die Meister,“熟能生巧”。
Put another way, control of learned behavior passes from System 2, the driver, to System 1, the elephant. At the 2020 (2021) Tokyo Summer Olympics, superstar gymnast Simone Biles withdrew because she had “a little bit of the twisties,” elaborating that during one routine, “I had no idea I was in the air. I could have hurt myself.”10 The twisties is gymnast-speak for becoming consciously aware of what one is doing rather than doing it automatically, and it destroys successful performance. Biles could have fallen on her neck or head. In gymnastics, Tetris, or any situation where fast responsive behavior is needed, we should practice, practice, practice, and then leave things to the elephant and embodied cognition. In English we say, “practice makes perfect,” but the German version is closer to cognitive science: Übung macht die Meister, “practice makes the master.”
脑成像的一个重要问题是分辨率。最明显的是视觉分辨率,我们熟悉相机和视频显示器的分辨率。然而,在功能性成像时,我们也必须考虑时间分辨率,这也是关于功能成像能做什么、不能做什么的争论中的一个议题。时间分辨率的一个方面与视觉分辨率直接类似:图像的时间尺度是多少?它能展现神经区域在几分钟内的运作吗?是一分钟?一秒?还是一毫秒?考虑到思维的持续流动和信息处理步骤自适应所需的快速性,细粒度的时间分辨率至关重要。
An important issue in brain imaging is resolution. Most obvious is visual resolution, which we are familiar with from cameras and video displays. However, in functional imaging we must consider temporal resolution, too, and it’s an issue in debates about what we can and can’t learn from functional imaging. One aspect of temporal resolution is a direct analog to visual resolution: What is the timescale of the image? Does it show a neural area’s operations over several minutes? A minute? A second? A millisecond? Given the constant flow of thought and the adaptively necessary rapidity of information processing steps, fine-grained temporal resolution is important.
时间分辨率的第二个方面具有时间旅行的特性:我们什么时候测量大脑活动?是在拍摄快照的那一刻?几分钟前?还是几小时前?例如,在PET扫描中,放射性示踪剂需要相当长的时间才能穿过大脑,而生成的图像显示的是拍摄前大约一小时左右的大脑活动。
The second aspect of temporal resolution has a time-travel quality to it: When are we measuring brain activity? At the moment a snapshot is taken? A few minutes ago? Hours ago? For example, in the case of PET, it takes quite some time for the radioactive tracer to work its way through the brain, and the resulting images display the activity of the brain about an hour or so before they are captured.
认知神经科学中最广泛使用的成像方法是磁共振成像 (MRI)。与 PET 类似,它最初是为临床诊断而开发的,您可能也接受过 MRI 检查。它的空间分辨率远高于 CAT(目前仍在急诊室用于快速诊断)或 PET,而且不需要放射性示踪剂。它唯一的局限性在于无法用于软组织内有金属的患者,因为扫描仪会产生强大的磁场。网上有很多大型金属物体(例如地板抛光机)被吸入 MRI 设备开口的照片。
The most widely used imaging method in cognitive neuroscience is magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Like PET, it was originally developed for clinical diagnosis, and you may have had one. Its spatial resolution is much better than CAT (still used in emergency rooms for quick diagnoses) or PET, and it does not need a radioactive tracer. Its only limitation is that it can’t be used on people with metal in their soft tissue because the scanner generates a powerful magnetic field. There are many photos on the net of big metal objects, such as a floor polisher, sucked into the opening of MRI devices.
布罗卡对神经科学做出了巨大贡献,因为他没有解剖谭的大脑,而是将其完整地留给了后来拥有更先进方法的研究人员。图8.11展示了谭大脑的结构性MRI图像,显示其损伤比从外部看到的更深、更广泛。MRI技术为科学家提供了清晰的活体大脑结构图像,避免了解剖带来的混乱。
Broca made a great contribution to neuroscience when he refrained from doing something, dissecting Tan’s brain, leaving it intact for later researchers with better methods. Figure 8.11 shows structural MRI images of Tan’s brain, showing that it suffered lesions much deeper and more extensive than could be seen from the outside. MRI gives scientists remarkably clear pictures of the structures of living brains, without the messiness of dissection.
经过适当调整,MRI 可以做到 PET 的功能,以更精细的空间和时间分辨率揭示大脑在信息处理过程中的活动程度;这就是功能性MRI,简称 fMRI。与 PET 类似,它测量流向大脑不同区域的血流量,读取所谓的BOLD(血氧水平依赖性)信号。氧气由血红蛋白携带,而血红蛋白具有磁化能力,因此可以通过 MRI 测量。
Suitably tweaked, MRI can do what PET does, reveal the degree of activity in a brain as it goes about information processing, and at finer spatial and temporal resolutions; this is functional MRI, or fMRI. Like PET, it measures blood flow to different areas of the brain, reading what’s called the BOLD—Blood Oxygen Level Dependent—signal. The oxygen is carried by hemoglobin, which is magnetizable and therefore measurable by MRI.
成像方法(主要是功能磁共振成像)已被用于探索各种沃森选择任务中推理的神经基础。目前已探讨的两个问题是:逻辑推理和一般智力之间是否存在差异?以及是否有证据表明大脑中存在进化特化的心理模块?
Imaging methods—mostly fMRI—have been used to discover the neural bases of reasoning in versions of the Wason selection task. Two questions that have been addressed are, Is there a difference between logical reasoning and general intelligence? And is there evidence for evolutionarily specialized mental modules in the brain?
正如我们之前所了解的,一般智力很大程度上取决于工作记忆的容量和有效运用,而猿、猴和鸟等动物能够解决问题。这表明,推理能力可能只是通用智力的另一种表现形式。另一方面,推理运用命题,即用文字表达的想法,包括诸如“如果……那么”之类的逻辑运算符。因此,推理能力可能与一般智力和问题解决能力相分离,我们或许可以使用功能磁共振成像(fMRI)来区分两者。布罗卡区可能与推理能力有关,但与问题解决能力无关。
As we learned earlier, general intelligence is largely a function of the capacity and effective use of working memory, and animals such as apes, monkeys, and birds can solve problems. This suggests that reasoning might simply be another manifestation of general-purpose intelligence. On the other hand, reasoning employs propositions, ideas expressed in words, including logical operators such as “if … then.” Therefore, reasoning might be separate from general intelligence and problem solving, and we might use fMRI to separate the two. It might be that Broca’s area is involved in reasoning but not problem solving.
已有研究对此问题进行了探讨,但结果相互矛盾。一些研究似乎表明,推理如同一般智力一样,仅发生在额叶皮质中——人类的额叶皮质比其他任何物种都发达得多,并且语言区域仅在问题以文字形式呈现时才会参与,并且必须以非语言方式编码才能进行进一步处理 (Coetzee & Monti, 2018)。其他研究结果表明,推理需要运用语言和额叶皮质以外区域的社会生活知识 (Canessa et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2020)。此外,Ermer et al. (2006) 报告称,先前被证明支持心智理论构思的皮质区域在涉及社交交流的沃森问题中被激活,但在涉及自身安全推理的沃森问题中则未被激活。此类发现与下一章将要回顾的关于人类智力进化的社会脑理论相一致。
Studies have been done to investigate this question but yield conflicting results. Some research seems to show that reasoning, like intelligence in general, occurs only in the frontal cortex—much more highly developed in humans than any other species, and that language areas are involved only when a problem is presented in words and must be encoded non-linguistically for further processing (Coetzee & Monti, 2018). Other findings suggest that making inferences in reasoning requires use of language and knowledge of social life in areas outside the frontal cortex (Canessa et al., 2005; meta-analysis by Wang et al., 2020). Additionally, Ermer et al. (2006) report that cortical areas previously shown to support Theory of Mind ideation are activated in Wason problems involving social exchanges but not in ones involving reasoning about one’s safety. These sorts of findings are consistent with the social brain theory of the evolution of human intelligence reviewed in the next chapter.
人们常说一张图片胜过千言万语,但更准确的说法是,一张图片比千言万语更有说服力和吸引力。脑部扫描,尤其是 MRI,非常清晰,就像我们透过玻璃清楚地看到大脑一样。然而,人脑含有大约 860亿个神经元,它们由 100,000英里的轴突连接(皮层是一块 4 毫米厚的薄片,大小与展开的报纸相当),并挤在我们的头骨中。MRI 无法看到细胞层面的东西。想象一下,将大脑放置在一个紧密贴合的盒子中,该盒子被分成1立方毫米的细胞;每个细胞都是一个体素,即视频屏幕像素的三维版本,是 MRI 的空间分辨率。每个体素包含大约 95,000 个神经元。fMRI 的分辨率为3立方毫米。此外,体素不会在关节处雕刻大脑,而只是简单地叠加在图像上。这意味着,尽管 MRI 图像令人印象深刻,但它仍然是模糊的(尽管比其他方法的图像效果更好),并非大脑结构的图像,而是任意绘制的立方体,模糊了大脑功能区域之间的界限。最终,BOLD 信号的原始读数必须通过复杂的数学/物理模型转换成图像,而这些模型有多个,并且会根据相同的输入产生不同的图像。
They say a picture is worth a thousand words, but it would be more accurate to say a picture is more persuasive and compelling than a thousand words. Brain scans, especially MRIs, are so crisp and clear that it suggests we’re seeing the brain through a glass, clearly. However, the human brain contains about 86 billion neurons connected by 100,000 miles of axons folded (the cortex is a 4 mm thick sheet about the size of an unfolded newspaper) and packed into our skull. MRIs don’t see at the level of the cell. Imagine the brain placed in a close-fitting box divided into 1mm3 cells; each of these is a voxel, the three-dimensional version of video-screen pixels and is the spatial resolution of MRI. Each voxel contains about 95,000 neurons. The resolution of fMRI is 3mm3. Moreover, the voxels do not carve the brain at its joints but are simply imposed on the image. This means that despite their impressive appearance, MRI images are blurry (though better than those of other methods) pictures not of brain structures but of arbitrarily drawn cubes that obscure boundaries between functional brain areas. Finally, the raw readings of the BOLD signal must be transformed into images by complex mathematical/physics models of which there are more than one that produce different images from the same input.
确定正在测量的是哪种心理过程也可能很困难。奇怪的核磁共振成像体验本身会驱动大脑中的认知过程,任务中与研究者无关的方面也会产生同样的效果;回想一下在条件反射中从狗的视角看事物的问题。例如,社会神经科学中一个常用的任务是心理化,通过向参与者展示一个社交场景并要求他们描述他们所看到的人的想法来激发他们的“思维模式”。一项著名的研究(该研究获得了2011年的搞笑诺贝尔奖11)在一条死鲑鱼中发现了心理化的“场所”(Bennett,Baird, Miller, & Wolford, 2010)。Bennett, Wolford 和 Miller (2009) 提出了他们严肃的观点,即 MRI 研究中很容易产生假阳性(另见 Hong 等人,2019)。除了体验和配合 MRI 过程外,你还会识别照片中的物体,包括将人识别为人类,这本身就是一项社交任务。MRI 激活建立的是相关性,而不是因果关系,人们从实验中所能了解到的只是该过程的某些方面激活了大脑的某些区域。
It also can be difficult to determine what mental process is being measured. The odd MRI experience itself will drive cognitive processes in the brain, and so can non-relevant (to the investigator) aspects of a task; recall the problem of seeing things from the dog’s viewpoint in conditioning. For example, a popular task used in social neuroscience is mentalizing, engaging participants’ TOM by showing them a social scene and asking them to describe the thoughts of the people they see. One famous study (it won the IgNobel Prize in 201111) found the “site” of mentalizing in a dead salmon (Bennett, Baird, Miller, & Wolford, 2010). Bennett, Wolford, and Miller (2009) made their serious point, that false positives are easily generated in MRI research (also Hong et al., 2019). In addition to experiencing and cooperating with the MRI procedure, you would be doing object recognition in the photo, including recognizing the people as humans, itself a social task. MRI activations establish correlations, not causations, and all one can know from an experiment is that some aspect of the procedure is activating some area(s) of the brain.
此外,MRI必然会错过一个重要的神经过程——抑制。有时,就像我们在巴甫洛夫实验中发现的那样,动物会学会抑制反应(例如在长延迟条件反射中早期分泌唾液)。但被抑制的神经元不会放电,因此它们不会产生可供检测和显示的BOLD信号。同样,MRI图像也无法捕捉驱动、连接和修改神经活动的众多神经递质的复杂互动。
Furthermore, MRI must needs miss an important neural process, inhibition. Sometimes, as we found with Pavlov, animals learn to inhibit responses (such as early salivation in long-delay conditioning). But inhibited neurons are not firing, and so they generate no BOLD signal to detect and display. Likewise, MRI images do not capture the complex dance of the many neurotransmitters that drive, connect, and modify neural activity.
最后,神经科学研究(包括临床、实验和影像学研究)整体上也面临着与其他心理学研究相同的问题,这些问题导致了心理学的重复危机(Poldrack 等人,2017)。样本量小,阳性结果可以发表,阴性结果则被束之高阁(Rosenthal,1979;Bosco,2018),重测信度较差(Elliot 等人,2020;Noble、Scheinost 和 Constable,2021)。
Finally, neuroscience studies as a whole—clinical, experimental, and imaging—suffer from the same problems as other psychological research that gave rise to psychology’s replication crisis (Poldrack et al., 2017). Sample sizes are small, positive results get published while negative ones are lost in file drawers (Rosenthal, 1979; Bosco, 2018), and test-retest reliability is poor (Elliot et al., 2020; Noble, Scheinost, & Constable, 2021).
要点:我说过,你需要怀疑自己的大脑;你也应该怀疑其他人大脑的美丽图像。
Takeaway: I’ve said that you need to doubt your own brain; you should doubt pretty pictures of other peoples’ brains, too.
学习根本不可能。很难想象有某种机制能够满足学习所设定的条件。然而,尽管存在诸多反对学习的证据,学习有时还是会发生。
卡尔·拉什利(1890–1958),(1950 年,第 477–478 页)
Learning is just not possible. It is difficult to conceive of a mechanism which can satisfy the conditions set for it. Nevertheless, in spite of such evidence against it, learning does sometimes occur.
Karl Lashley (1890–1958), (1950, pp. 477–478)
随着功能定位观点在20世纪初占据主导地位,生物学家理查德·塞蒙(Richard Semon,1859-1918)创造了“印迹”(engram)一词,指代大脑中储存特定记忆的假想痕迹(Schacter、Eich & Tulving,1978)。自此以后,对印迹的研究一直主导着学习的生理学研究(Josselyn、Köhler & Frankland,2017;Eichenbaum,2016;Devan、Berger & McDonald,2018)。在20世纪上半叶,最勤奋的寻找印迹的人印迹理论的提出者是心理学家卡尔·拉什利(Karl Lashley),他是约翰·B·沃森(John B. Watson)的学生(Bruce,2001)。拉什利曾与沃森合作开展了一系列经典条件反射研究——这是美国首次开展此类研究——并认为行为主义心理学的未来在于将心理规律还原为生理规律(Lashley,1923)。因此,他开始探索学习的神经学基础,而学习是行为主义者的关键适应性行为。拉什利推断,如果印迹存在于大脑的特定位置,那么移除该位置就会消除特定的记忆。
As the localization of function view gained dominance around the turn of the 20th century, the biologist Richard Semon (1859–1918) coined the term engram to refer to the hypothesized trace in the brain storing a particular memory (Schacter, Eich, & Tulving, 1978). The search for the engram has dominated the physiological study of learning ever since (Josselyn, Köhler, & Frankland, 2017; Eichenbaum, 2016; Devan, Berger, & McDonald, 2018). In the first half of the 20th century, the most diligent searcher for the engram was the psychologist Karl Lashley, a student of John B. Watson (Bruce, 2001). Lashley had collaborated with Watson on a series of classical conditioning studies—the first ever performed in the United States—and believed that the future of behaviorist psychology lay in the reduction of psychological laws to physiology (Lashley, 1923). He therefore took up the quest for finding the neurological basis of learning, the key adaptive behavior for behaviorists. Lashley reasoned that if engrams exist at specific sites in the brain, then removal of the site of the engram would abolish specific memories.
经过多年艰苦的研究,拉什利让老鼠学习迷宫,并在学习之前或之后切除不同数量和位置的脑物质。拉什利的研究结果和结论与弗洛伦斯的研究结果相呼应:学习能力不会因脑部任何特定部位的损伤而受损,但随着越来越多的脑组织被切除,学习能力会逐渐丧失;同样,迷宫的记忆似乎并非存在于脑部的某个特定部位,而是随着越来越多的脑组织被切除而逐渐消失。回顾自己的研究,拉什利懊悔而又讽刺地得出结论,根据他的发现,“学习根本不可能”。拉什利信奉大脑的群体作用观,认为学习是整个大脑的活动,个体记忆储存在整个大脑中,而不是存储在不同的部位或印迹中。尽管对其研究结果的解释存在困难和争议,但拉什利的研究结果实际上阻止了 1930 年后对学习和记忆的神经基础的研究。这种情况在 1953 年发生了改变,当时一位名叫亨利·莫莱森的年轻人接受了脑部手术并患上了健忘症。
Over years of difficult investigation, Lashley had rats learn mazes, ablating varying amounts and location of brain matter either before or after learning. Lashley’s results and conclusions echoed those of Flourens: The ability to learn was not impaired by lesions to any specific site in the brain but was gradually lost as greater amounts of brain were removed; similarly, memory for a maze seemed not to reside in any particular part of the brain but seemed to be gradually erased as more and more brain was removed. In looking back on his search, Lashley ruefully but wryly concluded that, according to his findings, “learning is just not possible.” Lashley embraced a mass-action view of the brain, proposing that learning is an activity of the whole brain and that individual memories are stored in the whole brain, not at distinct sites, or engrams. Despite difficulties and controversies over the interpretation of his results, Lashley’s results virtually halted the investigation of the neural substrates of learning and memory after 1930. That changed in 1953 when a young man named Henry Molaison underwent brain surgery and developed amnesia.
健忘症分为两种:暂时性健忘症和健忘症候群。暂时性健忘症的病因包括极度情绪困扰、某些药物,或最常见的是脑外伤,13主要是跌倒和车祸造成。暂时性健忘症的特点是逆行性健忘症(失去对受伤前事件的记忆)和前行性健忘症(受伤后一段时间内无法形成新的记忆)。逆行性健忘症有轻重之分;记忆会从旧事件回到新事件,严重的情况下,一些与创伤事件相关的记忆甚至会永远消失。逆行性健忘症的轻重之分具有重要的科学意义,因为它表明大脑最终形成长期记忆需要时间,这是记忆巩固的过程(Dudai、Karni & Born,2015)。痛苦、药物和创伤会打断记忆巩固,从而调节记忆。正如我们之前从错误记忆研究中了解到的那样,巩固过程永无止境:记忆会不断被修改,尤其是在被检索和恢复时(Takamiya 等人,2020 年;Elsey、Van Ast 和 Kindt,2018 年)。
There are two kinds of amnesia, temporary amnesia and amnesic syndrome. Temporary amnesia is caused by extreme emotional distress, certain drugs, or, most commonly, traumatic brain injury,13 mainly due to falls and automobile accidents. Temporary amnesia is marked by retrograde amnesia—loss of memory for events prior to the injury—and anterograde amnesia—inability to form new memories for a period after the injury. The retrograde amnesia is graded; memories return from older events to newer ones, and, in severe cases, some memory for events near the trauma never return. The graded nature of retrograde amnesia is scientifically significant because it shows that the final formation of long-term memories in the brain takes time, resulting from a process called consolidation (Dudai, Karni, & Born, 2015). Distress, drugs, and trauma can interrupt consolidation, modulating memory. As we learned earlier from studies of false memories, the consolidation process never ends: Memories continue to be modified, especially when they are retrieved and restored (Takamiya et al., 2020; Elsey, Van Ast, & Kindt, 2018).
遗忘综合征具有类似的病因,但极为罕见,其特征是分级逆行性遗忘症和完全前行性遗忘症。14第一个定义性的病例 (Squire, 2009) 是亨利·莫莱森 (Henry Molaison, 1926–2008),直到去世才被称为病人 HM (Corkin, 2013; Dittrich, 2016 15 )。与加扎尼加的裂脑病例一样,HM 接受了脑部手术以缓解癫痫,但这次手术使他成为人类实验性损伤的一个例子。我之所以说是实验性的,是因为这项手术相对较新,并且在没有现代手术技术的情况下完成。斯科维尔在 HM 的头骨上开了两个洞,必须根据手术器械的深度和角度来估计损伤和切口的位置,然后用吸尘器吸出他想要切除的部分。斯科维尔想要切除的某些区域可能未被成功切除,而本应留在原处的区域可能受到了损伤。此外,斯科维尔在两个半球都进行了病变处理;其他外科医生可能先病变一侧以发现后果,然后再病变另一侧(Dittrich,2016)。16斯科维尔切除了 HM 的大部分内侧颞叶(图 8.12)。
Amnesic syndrome has similar causes, is extremely rare, and is defined by graded retrograde amnesia and total anterograde amnesia.14 The first, defining, case (Squire, 2009) was Henry Molaison (1926–2008), known until his death as Patient H.M. (Corkin, 2013; Dittrich, 201615). As with Gazzaniga’s split-brain cases, H.M. underwent surgery on his brain to relieve epilepsy, but the surgery made him an example of experimental lesioning in humans. I say experimental because the surgery was relatively new and done without the benefit of modern surgical techniques. Scoville cut two holes in H.M.’s skull and had to estimate where to make his lesions and incisions by the depth and angle of his surgical instruments, before vacuuming out the parts he wanted to remove. It was possible that parts of some areas Scoville wanted to remove were not removed successfully, while damage may have been done to areas meant to be left alone. Moreover, Scoville lesioned areas in both hemispheres; other surgeons might have lesioned one side to discover the consequences before proceeding to lesion the other (Dittrich, 2016).16 Scoville removed most of H.M.’s medial temporal lobes (Figure 8.12).
手术后,HM失去了形成新的自传体记忆的能力。他可以学习技能,甚至在几次训练后掌握了汉诺塔,并且表现出巴甫洛夫条件反射的基本现象,但每次都以为自己是在重新做这些任务。后来的失忆症患者也表现出正常或接近正常的内隐记忆(Schacter,2008)。在情绪上,他变得平静,愿意配合任何被要求进行的研究任务,对疼痛有抵抗力,并且无性欲。最终,他术前的记忆被“语义化”,失去了想象内容。我认为这可能意味着HM患上了心盲症以及随之而来的严重自传体记忆障碍(SDAM)。
As a result of the surgery, H.M. lost the ability to form new autobiographical memories. He could learn skills, even mastering the Towers of Hanoi over several sessions, and he displayed the basic phenomena of Pavlovian conditioning, but each time thought he was doing these tasks anew. Later amnesiacs also displayed normal to near-normal implicit memory (Schacter, 2008). Emotionally, he became placid, willing to cooperate in any research task he was asked to do, resistant to pain, and asexual. Finally, his pre-surgical memories became “semanticized,” drained of imaginal content. I think this may mean that H.M. developed aphantasia and the severely disordered autobiographical memory (SDAM) that goes with it.
HM 的案例重新激发了对记忆痕迹的研究,包括开发失忆症动物模型,以详细发现大脑的哪些部分负责用于记忆。使用动物模型来研究记忆存在一些特殊的问题,因为它们不具备社会智力。
The case of H.M. revived the search for the engram, including the development of animal models of amnesic syndrome to discover in detail which parts of the brain are responsible for memory. Use of animal models to study memory poses special problems because they don’t have social intelligence.
一位研究人员这样描述心盲症患者: “他们了解自己的过去,但却不记得。” 例如,我记得1971年我和妻子在伦敦的摄政宫酒店住了一晚,美国汽车协会(AAA)的导游说酒店所有1000间客房都配有私人浴室,但实际上没有一间,AAA大概不敢相信,所以我们不得不叫来门房来给我们开个浴室。17然而,尽管我的记忆应该生动逼真,却没有任何图像与之相伴。我倾向于同意这位研究人员的观点,用“知道”来指摄政宫的经历,而不是“记忆”。此外,说一个人“记得”某事,还有社会层面,甚至是认识论层面。首先,这表明我可以详细阐述记忆;如果你问“然后发生了什么?”,你自然会期待更多的叙述。其次,它保证了真实性。例如,在法律场合,律师可能会问证人:“你真的记得那件事吗,还是只是……”推断它?“我们在第六章中使用了“错误记忆”这个短语,正是因为记忆应该是真实的。“唾液分泌的虚假CR”这个短语毫无意义。
They know about their past, but they do not remember it, is how one researcher describes those with aphantasia. For example, I know that in 1971 my wife and I stayed a night in London at the Regent Palace Hotel, where the AAA guide said all 1,000 rooms had private baths when none of them did, which AAA presumably just couldn’t believe, so we had to call for a porter to come and open a bath for us.17 However, vivid though it ought to be, no image accompanies my knowledge. I tend to agree with the researcher, using “know” to refer to the Regent Palace experience, but not “memory.” Furthermore, there is a social, even epistemological aspect to saying one “remembers” something. First, it suggests that I can elaborate on the memory; if you ask, “And then what happened?” you reasonably expect more narrative. Second, it warrants truth. In a legal setting, for example, an attorney might ask a witness, “Do you really remember that, or just infer it?” We used the phrase “false memory” in Chapter 6 precisely because memories ought to be true. The phrase “false CR of salivation” makes no sense.
这些考虑凸显了记忆神经科学的一个关键问题:究竟什么才算是“记忆”?不同领域和不同领域的科学家使用这个词的方式不同,因此也令人困惑。有些人用“记忆”来涵盖所有行为变化,甚至巴甫洛夫条件反射和操作性条件反射,而其他人的使用则更为严格(Murray、Wise & Graham,2016)。在动物模型研究中,当我们寻找外显记忆而非内隐记忆的基础时,如何称呼记忆就变得尤为重要。在人类中,区别是程序性的;在前者中,我们直接要求参与者回忆;在后者中,我们使用启动方法来探测记忆痕迹。但我们不能要求动物回忆。我们可能会使用线索来提示使用学到的东西,但那是内隐记忆激活,而不是外显记忆。我们不知道动物是否有伴随回忆的心理意象。询问动物的自传体(情景)记忆就更加棘手。我们沿着时间线搜索情景记忆;这是图尔文提出这一方法的定义性特征。通过像普鲁斯特那样进行精神时空旅行,我们将自己投射回过去,试图将给定的记忆置于正确的位置。然而,我们不能确定动物是否有时间观念,更不用说自我投射观念了。人类的时间观念是社会建构的,分为秒、分、日、周、月、年、几十年、几个世纪和几千年。闪光灯记忆之所以能保持鲜活,是因为我们会反复回忆,比如告诉彼此“双子塔倒塌时”我们在哪里,这样的记忆将几代人联系在一起或分开。动物有生物钟,比如昼夜节律,但它们没有我们人类社会建构的线性时间观念。
These considerations highlight a critical issue with the neuroscience of memory: What, exactly, counts as “memory”? Different fields and different scientists in these fields use that word in different, and therefore confusing, ways. Some use “memory” to include all behavior change, even Pavlovian and operant conditioning, others use it more restrictively (Murray, Wise, & Graham, 2016). What to call memory becomes especially acute in animal model research when we are looking for the basis of explicit as opposed to implicit memories. In humans, the difference is procedural; in the former, we directly ask a participant to recall; in the latter, we use a priming method to probe for a memory trace. But we can’t ask animals to recall. We might use a cue to prompt use of something learned, but that’s implicit memory activation, not explicit memory. We have no idea if animals have mental imagery accompanying recall. Asking about autobiographical (episodic) memory in animals is even trickier. We search episodic memory along a timeline; doing so was its defining feature when proposed by Tulving. By mentally traveling in time, as Proust did, we project ourselves backward, searching to locate a given memory in its proper place. However, we cannot be sure that animals have a sense of time much less a sense of self to project. The human sense of time is socially constructed into seconds, minutes, days, weeks, months, years, decades, centuries, and millennia. One reason flashbulb memories are kept vivid is by repetitive recall as we tell each other where we were “when the Towers fell,” for example, and such memories bind together or divide generations. Animals have internal clocks such as circadian rhythms, but they do not have our socially structured sense of lineal time.
这些观点对于认知神经科学的开展至关重要。只有当我们知道x是什么时,才有可能寻找心理过程x 和神经过程z 之间的关联。
These points are important to the conduct of cognitive neuroscience. Looking for the correlation between mental process x and neural process z is possible only when we know what x is.
在HM案例(Scoville & Milner, 1957)发表后的几十年里,一种关于“记忆”神经基础的普遍理论——内侧颞叶理论——通过对失忆症患者的进一步研究以及对动物的损伤研究(Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991)逐渐成型。该理论总结于图8.13,该图来自权威心理学百科全书(Thompson, 2000)。请注意,图中所有形式的行为变化,从非联想学习到启动效应再到自传体记忆,都被视为记忆。
In the decades following the publication of the case of H.M. (Scoville & Milner, 1957), a general theory—the medial temporal lobe theory—of the neural bases of “memory” crystallized from further research with amnesiacs and lesion studies with animals (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). The theory is summarized in Figure 8.13, from an authoritative encyclopedia of psychology entry (Thompson, 2000). Note that in this figure all forms of behavior change, from nonassociative learning through priming to autobiographical memory, are considered memory.
主要区别在于HM和其他失忆症患者所丢失的记忆类型——陈述性(外显)记忆——以及他们保留的——非陈述性(内隐)记忆。技能和习惯包括运动学习和一些重复性的谜题学习,例如汉诺塔。启动涉及语言,因此涉及皮层。非联想性学习包括敏感化和抑制,它们是通过单个细胞间突触强度的变化习得的,这在对海蛞蝓的研究中有所揭示(Kandel,2006;Alkon,1987)。杏仁核参与情绪学习,正如我们在LeDoux身上看到的那样,小脑则参与某些形式的巴甫洛夫学习。
The major division is between the category of memory lost to H.M. and other amnesiacs—Declarative (explicit) memory—and what’s spared in them—Nondeclarative (implicit)—memory. Skills and habits include motor learning and some repetitive puzzle learning, such as the Towers of Hanoi. Priming involves language, hence the cortex. Non-associative learning includes sensitization and inhibition, which are learned by changes in synaptic strength between individual cells, revealed in studies of sea slugs (Kandel, 2006; Alkon, 1987). The amygdala is involved in emotional learning, as we saw with LeDoux, and the cerebellum in some forms of Pavlovian learning.
虽然标准模型仍然具有影响力,但实证研究结果对其提出了挑战,并提出了替代理论 (Ferbinteanu, 2019; Clark & McGuire, 2016; Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016)。一项重要的挑战是,无论如何定义印迹,它们并非稳定存在,而是始终处于神经学变化之中 (Rule, O'Leary, & Harvey, 2019)。这有助于解释记忆中的干扰效应,但却使不变记忆的本质变得扑朔迷离。一些近期的提案试图用包含ANN概念的模型来增强或取代标准模型 (Susman, Brenner, & Barak, 2019; Mau, Hasselmo, & Kai, 2020),这些概念的开发是为了应对ANN的灾难性干扰问题。
While the standard model is still influential, empirical findings have challenged it and alternative theories have been proposed (Ferbinteanu, 2019; Clark & McGuire, 2016; Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016). One important challenge is the finding that engrams, however one defines them, are not stable, but are always neurologically in flux (Rule, O’Leary, & Harvey, 2019). This helps explain interference effects in memory but makes a puzzle of memories that don’t change. Some recent proposals seek to augment or replace the standard model with ones that incorporate ANN concepts (Susman, Brenner, & Barak, 2019; Mau, Hasselmo, & Kai, 2020) that were developed to cope with ANN’s problem of catastrophic interference.
ANN 式记忆模型的出现与标准模型中另一个备受争议的论点相关,即记忆过程和存储是模块化的,发生并驻留在大脑的不同部位。我们之前讨论过 Fodor 的心理模块性概念,模块化系统的定义性特征之一——事实上,正是这种特征使它们成为模块化的——是它们在信息上彼此隔离。然而,复杂的记忆彼此关联,整合了从单一感官印象(例如“吱吱叫”)到复杂知识(关于鸟类及其鸣叫的原因)等多种“记忆”。自传体记忆和记忆图式最明显地体现了这一点,必须用将众多记忆片段整合成更大整体的神经科学理论来解释 (Gilboa & Marlette, 2017; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017; Richmond & Zacks, 2017; Cowell & Huber, 2020; Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg, 2019)。
The emergence of ANN-style models of memory relates to another contested proposal of the standard model, that memory processes and stores are modular, occurring and residing in different parts of the brain. We discussed Fodor’s concept of mental modularity earlier, and one of the defining features of modular systems—what makes them modular, in fact—is that they are informationally isolated from each other. However, complex memories hang together, integrating many kinds of “memory” from single sensory impressions (e.g., “cheep, cheep”) to complex knowledge (about birds and why they sing). This is most clearly the case for autobiographical memory and memory schemas and must be explained by neuroscientific theories that integrate the many pieces of memory into larger wholes (Gilboa & Marlette, 2017; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017; Richmond & Zacks, 2017; Cowell & Huber, 2020; Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg, 2019).
在我们即将进入最后一章——进化心理学——之际,我们的目标是回顾Murray、Wise和Graham(2016)对标准模型的批评,他们重申了对行为主义和符号系统认知架构的批评,认为标准模型的进化观过于简单,隐含着过于拉马克主义和工程化倾向,尽管他们并没有使用这些术语。我们发现,符号系统架构的一个问题在于,它把心理学理论与用来运行模拟程序的技巧区分开来。当一个优雅的理论被改造得足以运行的时候,它可能已经变成了一个概念上的混乱,充满了原始理论中没有的信息状态和过程,而这些信息状态和过程在实际的思维中可能存在,也可能不存在。
For our purposes as we approach our last chapter, on evolutionary psychology, are the criticisms of the standard model by Murray, Wise, and Graham (2016), which reprise criticisms of behaviorist and symbol-system architectures of cognition, that the standard model’s view of evolution is simplistic, being implicitly too Lamarckian and engineering oriented, although they don’t use these terms. We saw that one problem with the symbol-system architecture was separating psychological theory from tricks used to get simulation programs to run. By the time an elegant theory is hacked enough to run, it may be a conceptual mess, full of information states and processes not in the original theory and that may or may not be present in working minds.
拉马克进化论的部分吸引力在于,存在一个隐含的工程师(一种隐藏的上帝),他心中有一个目标,灭绝的生命形式是恐龙 1.0、1.1、2.3,被哺乳动物 1.0 所取代,等等,直到我们到达人类 1.Ω,达到完美。这确实是工程的目标,但黑客的存在表明,达到目标并不是一条直线。然而,真正的达尔文进化论更加混乱,因为没有目标,没有理想的、完美适应的生命形式。如果进化是一个计算机程序,那么根本不会有理论,只有一些临时发明的黑客手段,以避免灭绝的致命错误,正如马库斯(2008)在他的书Kluge(18 hack 的另一个词)中所说。
Part of the appeal of Lamarck’s theory of evolution was that there was an implicit Engineer (a sort of hidden God) with a goal in mind, and that extinct life forms were dinosaurs 1.0, 1.1, 2.3, replaced by mammals 1.0, etc. until we reach humans 1.Ω, when perfection is achieved. This is, indeed, the goal of engineering, but the existence of hacks shows that reaching the goal is not a straight line. Real, Darwinian evolution, however, is even messier because there is no goal, no ideal, perfectly adapted, living form. If evolution were a computer program, there would be no theory at all, just a collection of ad hoc hacks invented on the spot to avoid the fatal error of extinction, as Marcus (2008) argued in his book Kluge,18 another word for hack.
Murray、Wise 和 Graham (2016) 的核心论点是,标准的记忆理论过于简洁,忽视了大脑深厚的进化史,当然,这并非否认。标准理论掩盖了我们与最后共同祖先(标准模型用来替代人类的老鼠和猴子)之间数百万年的历史。他们认为,各种记忆形式是在进化的不同阶段进化而来的,这些阶段之间相隔很长一段时间,是为了解决随着物理和社会环境变化而产生的特定生存问题。从某种意义上说,每一种记忆形式都是一种“黑客”,有时位于大脑的新区域,但总是利用已有的记忆,这个过程被称为“扩展适应”(exaptation)(图 8.14)。
The central argument of Murray, Wise, and Graham (2016) is that the standard theory of memory is too neat, neglecting, while of course not denying, the brain’s deep evolutionary history. The standard theory glosses over the millions of years that separate us from our last shared ancestors with the rats and monkeys that the standard model uses as stand-ins for human subjects. They argue that forms of memory evolved at different points in evolution separated by long periods of time, to solve the particular survival problems that arose with changing environments both physical and social. In a sense, each form of memory is a hack, sometimes located in new parts of the brain but always exploiting what was already available, a process called exaptation (Figure 8.14).
认知层面理论的还原前景渺茫。对于主流计算认知科学而言,将心智还原到大脑的障碍在于多重可实现性 (Schouten & Looren de Jong,2008;Leahey,2008)。计算理论用计算机语言编写,编译成低级机器代码,可以在具有不同物理架构的计算机上运行。由于认知理论研究的是人类的心理过程,因此它们也在我们的大脑上运行,这就是为什么一些认知科学家通过上传到云端来寻求永生。尽管联结主义理论比符号系统理论更具“大脑式”特征,但它们的数学算法并不试图表征实际的神经处理,因此无法简单地归结为神经生理学。最后,一些动物,尤其是鸦科动物,拥有类似人类的认知能力(Nieder,2017),现有的认知计算理论或许可以应用于这些动物。然而,由于鸟类和哺乳动物的进化路径在3亿多年前就已分离,鸦科动物的大脑与人类大脑完全不同,如果现有的计算理论同时适用于这两种动物,它们就无法被归结为任何一种。在这种情况下,认知过程依赖于电子、人类或鸦科动物的神经生理过程,但它们无法被解释地归结为它们,因为每种情况下的物理过程都不同。
Prospects for reduction of cognitive level theories are slim. For mainstream computational cognitive science, the impediment to reduction of mind to brain is multiple realizability (Schouten & Looren de Jong, 2008; Leahey, 2008). Computational theories are written in computer languages, compiled into lower-level machine code, and can be run on computers with different physical architectures. Because cognitive theories are about human mental processes, they run on our brains, too, which is why some cognitive scientists seek immortality by being uploaded into the cloud. Although connectionist theories are more “brain-style” than symbol-system theories, their mathematical algorithms do not attempt to represent actual neural processing, and so will not neatly reduce to neurophysiology. Finally, some animals, corvids in particular, possess human-like cognitive abilities (Nieder, 2017) to which existing computational theories of cognition might apply. However, because the paths of avian and mammalian evolution separated over 300 million years ago, corvid brains are completely unlike human brains, and, if existing computational theories apply to both, they can be reduced to neither. In this case, cognitive processes supervene on electronic or human or corvid neurophysiological processes, but they cannot be explanatorily reduced to them because the physical processes are different in each case.
如果认知是具身的,那么它就不能被简化为仅仅是大脑过程。在斯金纳版本的具身认知中,操作者是一类反应,它们可能涉及不同的行为组合,甚至完全不涉及任何行为,因此它们无法映射到特定的运动或神经放电模式上。最后,非计算理论,例如经济学和行为生态学中的理论,是数学形式主义,并不主张心理现实,因此不能被简化为生理学。操作。动物和人类的行为可能符合经济规律,但动物无法计算这些规律,就像月球无法计算其绕地球的轨道一样。
If cognition is embodied, then it cannot be reduced to brain processes alone. In the Skinnerian version of embodied cognition, operants are classes of responses that can involve different ensembles of behaviors, and even no behavior at all, so they cannot be mapped onto specific movements or patterns of neural firing. Finally, noncomputational theories such as those in economics and behavioral ecology are mathematical formalisms that make no claim to psychological reality, and so can’t be reduced to physiological operations. Animal and human behavior may be consistent with the laws of economics, but animals don’t compute them any more than the moon computes its orbit around the earth.
对于主张消除理论的人来说,认知层面理论的不可约性是一个特性,而非缺陷,因为它揭示了这类理论隐晦地依赖于我们前科学的、TOM(Tom,一种基于理论的理论)概念,例如“信仰”,因此就像注定要失败的“燃素”一样。现实最终总会胜利(Churchland,2013,2019)。
For champions of elimination, the irreducibility of cognitive-level theories is a feature, not a bug, because it reveals that such theories cryptically depend on our prescientific, TOM concepts like “belief,” and therefore are as doomed “phlogiston.” Reality always triumphs in the end (Churchland, 2013, 2019).
但现实并非像消除主义者所想的那样,仅仅是物理现实;建构的社会现实也是真实的(Searle,1995)。我女儿上中学时,和德国一个家庭的女儿克里斯蒂娜交了朋友。有一天,贝丝带着一张克里斯蒂娜的小相框回家,这是她收到的礼物,但她不知道为什么。我解释说,那是德语的“du”仪式。在很多语言中(英语除外),有两个第二人称代词,正式的和熟悉的:在德语中,它们是“Sie”和“du”。所以,初次见面的人互相称呼“ Sie”,朋友之间称呼“du”,这就需要进行一种社会协商,标志着从正式关系到友好关系的转变。“du”仪式发展起来,其中地位较高的人(这里指知识渊博的人)给地位较低的人一份便宜但私人的礼物,不用说一句话,就可以被称呼为“ du”。有一个感人的故事,讲的是一位妻子的丈夫,她是一位高贵的丈夫,在第一次世界大战后的革命中,加入了自由军团(一个准军事组织),对抗左翼势力。他回到家后,变得过于军人化,只吃粗粮,睡在地板上。她对他的新身份感到如此疏远和疏离,以至于又开始称呼他为“sie”(马林诺夫斯基,2021)。
But reality is not what eliminativists think, physical reality alone; constructed social reality is real, too (Searle, 1995). When my daughter was in middle school, she made friends with Christina, the daughter of a family from Germany. One day, Beth came home with a little framed picture of Christina that she’d gotten as a present but didn’t know why. I explained that that was the German du ceremony. In many languages, but not English, there are two second-person pronouns, formal and familiar: in German, they are Sie and du. So, people who meet for the first time address each other as Sie, and friends as du, necessitating a social negotiation that signals the change from a formal to a friendly relationship. The du ceremony developed, in which the higher-status person (here, the more knowledgeable person) gives the lower status one an inexpensive but personal gift, inviting, without having to say anything, being addressed as du. There is a poignant story about a wife whose noble husband fought in a Freikorps (a paramilitary organization) against left-wing forces in the revolution that followed World War I. He returned home too much a soldier, eating only rough food and sleeping on the floor. She felt so alienated and estranged from his new personality that she returned to addressing him as sie (Malinowski, 2021).
显然, du转变及其在 1918 年悲剧性毁灭背后的所有心理过程,无论有意识还是无意识,都源于大脑过程,但它们并不等同于大脑过程,因为大脑过程本身没有意义。要理解并解释为什么贝丝收到了这张照片,而这位贵妇为何改变了称呼方式,就必须了解德国文化及其对社会等级和人际关系的处理方式。或者举一个更简单、更不感人的例子,要知道为什么在自由回忆实验中,印刷工过去会与牙医和律师一起被回忆起来,而现在却不行,你需要了解历史(Muthukrishna、Henrich 和 Slingerland,2021),而不是神经科学。
Clearly, all the mental processes, conscious and unconscious, behind the du transition and its tragic undoing in 1918 supervene on brain processes, but they are not equivalent to them because brain processes possess no meaning. To understand and explain why Beth received the picture and the noble wife changed her mode of address, it’s necessary to know about German culture and its treatment of social rank and personal relationships. Or to take a simpler, less touching example, to know why printer used to be recalled with dentist and lawyer in free recall experiments but isn’t today, you need to know history (Muthukrishna, Henrich, & Slingerland, 2021), not neuroscience.
消除主义者不太可能重写这个著名的电影场景19 :
It’s unlikely that this famous movie scene19 will be rewritten by eliminativists:
莱娅: “我爱你。”
韩: “我知道;我一直在追踪你的多巴胺、加压素和催产素水平(Acevedo 等人,2020 年; Curley & Keverne,2005 年)。但是,这些原力体是怎么回事?”
Leia: “I love you.”
Han: “I know; I’ve been tracking your dopamine, vasopressin, and oxytocin levels (Acevedo et al., 2020; Curley & Keverne, 2005). But what’s with the midichlorians?”
Mind your expensive20 brain (Figure 8.15).
虽然神经科学不太可能削弱或消除心理学,包括其作为心智理论的朴素形式,但心智就是大脑所做的事情,而大脑是智人伟大的适应性产物。然而,由于它被锁在我们的头脑中,不像长颈鹿的脖子和鸟的翅膀那样可见,我们将其视为理所当然。这张海报展示了大脑的大小,其与身体的比例远远大于其他动物。从进化的角度来看,最重要的数字是大脑使用了我们身体的多少能量:20%,产生 25 瓦的功率。人脑是大自然的宝马,建造和运输成本高昂,维护成本也高昂。21我们的大脑一定做了一些非常出色的事情才能进化出来。在最后一章中,我们将了解它的功能以及它这样做的原因。
While neuroscience is unlikely to reduce or eliminate psychology, including its naïve form as theory of mind, mind is what brain does, and the brain is Homo sapiens’ great adaptation. However, locked as it is in our head and not visible like the giraffe’s neck and birds’ wings, we take it for granted. This poster shows how big the brain is, far bigger in ratio to the size of the body than other animals. The evolutionarily most important figure is how much of our body’s energy the brain uses, 20%, generating 25 watts of power. The human brain is the BMW of nature, expensive to build and deliver and costly to maintain.21 Our brain must do something extremely well for it to have evolved. In our final chapter, we will find out what it does and why it does it.
认知神经科学的入门读物是杰米·沃德的《认知神经科学学生指南》(纽约:劳特利奇出版社,2020年)。著名神经科学家理查德·帕辛厄姆的《认知神经科学:非常简短的介绍》 (纽约:牛津大学出版社,2016年)提供了简要的介绍。莎莉·萨特尔和斯科特·利利菲尔德的《洗脑:盲目神经科学的诱惑力》(纽约:基础图书出版社,2013年)则提供了有益的质疑。
A place to start in cognitive neuroscience is Jamie Ward, The Student’s Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience (New York: Routledge, 2020). For a brief treatment, leading neuroscientist Richard Passingham has Cognitive Neuroscience: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Useful skepticism is provided by Sally Satel and Scott Lilienfeld, Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience (New York: Basic Books, 2013).
啊,真是糟糕透了!烂片太多了,首先要说的就是那些追寻大脑的僵尸。此外,还有《来自阿鲁斯星球的大脑》(飘了起来——撞上了罗兰多的裂缝!)、《来自外太空的邪恶大脑》、《不死之脑》;以及常年被评为史上最烂星际迷航剧集的《斯波克的大脑》。至少史蒂夫·马丁的《双脑人》应该还挺好笑的。
Ahh Brrraaaiiinnnsss! So many bad movies to mention, beginning with the brain-seeking zombies. Also, Brain from Planet Arous (floats—hit its fissure of Rolando!), The Evil Brain from Outer Space, The Brain That Would Not Die; and perennial candidate for Worst Trek Episode Ever, Spock’s Brain. At least Steve Martin’s The Man with Two Brains is supposed to be funny.
波士顿大学神经科学家史蒂夫·拉米雷斯 (Steve Ramirez) 推荐了一份优秀神经科学电影清单:https://www.bu.edu/articles/2018/ramirez-listicle/,而 Gizmodo 则编制了https://gizmodo.com/12-movies-and-tv-shows-that-c ommit-crimes-against-neuro-944907228 。
Boston University neuroscientist Steve Ramirez suggests a list of good neuroscience movies: https://www.bu.edu/articles/2018/ramirez-listicle/, while Gizmodo compiled https://gizmodo.com/12-movies-and-tv-shows-that-commit-crimes-against-neuro-944907228.
苏珊·布莱克斯利 (Susan Blakeslee)、斯蒂芬·马丁内斯-康德 (Stephen Martinez-Conde) 和苏珊娜·麦克尼克 (Susanna Macknik) 团队与魔术师合作,研究魔术的神经科学,研究成果为《心灵技巧:魔术是什么》魔法的神经科学揭示了我们日常的欺骗行为(纽约:亨利霍尔特,2015 年)。
The team of Susan Blakeslee, Stephen Martinez-Conde, and Susanna Macknik, has collaborated with magicians to study the neuroscience of magic, in Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals about Our Everyday Deceptions (New York: Henry Holt, 2015).
古斯塔夫·库恩是一位认知科学家、魔术师,也是SoMA的联合创始人。他著有《体验不可能:魔术的科学》 (马萨诸塞州剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,2019年),并在https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pxYVlgSzCg上发表过演讲。
Gustav Kuhn is a cognitive scientist and magician and a co-founder of SoMA. He’s written Experiencing the Impossible: The Science of Magic (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019), and has a presentation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pxYVlgSzCg.
内容
Contents
Introduction: What Are Cognitive Processes For?
Proximate and Ultimate Causation
History: Speculation to Synthesis
Variation Meets Selection: The Survival of the Fittest
Sexual (Epigamic) and Social Selection
Levels and Units of Selection: Survival of the Fittest What?
Adaptation: The Result of Selection
The Founder (Bottleneck) Effect
Types of Adaptive Relationship
What Is Evolutionary Psychology?
Comparative Psychology and the Demise of the Blank Slate
Schools of Evolutionary Psychology
Methods in Evolutionary Psychology
A Shared Framework: Tinbergen’s Four Questions
Evolution of Human Intelligence and Cognition
Behavioral Ecology of Aggression, Altruism, and Cooperation
The Era of Evolutionary Adaptation: The Pleistocene
Homo sapiens: Last Ape Standing
Has Evolution Ended? The Holocene
Is Society Natural? Installing System 2
The Scientific and Industrial Revolutions: Origins of the WEIRD People
A Computational Case Study: Mate Choice
Why It Matters: Parental Investment
更准确地说,人类心智(尤其是更高级的心理过程)赋予了类人猿和人族拥有者哪些进化优势?
More precisely, what evolutionary advantages did human minds—especially the higher mental processes—bestow on their hominid and hominin possessors?
牛顿《数学原理》的胜利,开创了一种对生物学(Mayr,1988)和心理学(Leahey,2018)发展不利的科学解释观。然而,它的影响巨大,并被逻辑实证主义者编纂成科学的秘诀。牛顿已经确立,他可以根据物体的初始位置和动量,结合他的运动定律和引力定律,预测物体的运动。因此,他能够回答埃德蒙·哈雷关于彗星何时回归的问题。
The triumph of Newton’s Principia Mathematica created a view of scientific explanation inimical to the development of biology (Mayr, 1988) and psychology (Leahey, 2018). Nevertheless, its influence was enormous, and it was codified into a recipe for science by logical positivists. Newton had established that he could predict the movements of physical objects from their initial position and momentum combined with his laws of motion and gravity. Thus, he could answer Edmund Halley’s question about when his comet would return.
实证主义者认为,解释和预测之间的唯一区别在于时间。预测准确地预示了事件的发生;而解释则表明该事件是可以预测的。实证主义的观点在解释的覆盖律模型(Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948)中得到了形式化,该模型认为,解释是一种逻辑论证,其前提是待解释系统的初始条件及其行为规律,结论是对事件的预测。赫尔的学习理论就是根据实证主义的思路写成的。一些心理学家拒绝接受效果律,理由是学习的原因——奖励——遵循它强化了反应,这与原因先于结果的理论相矛盾。斯金纳的激进行为主义哲学在某种程度上是对因果关系和解释的实证主义观点的反对,并主张后果选择(Skinner, 1984),即进化论的解释。
Positivists proposed that the only difference between explanation and prediction is time. A prediction precisely forecasts an event; an explanation shows the event could have been predicted. The positivist view was formalized in the covering-law model of explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), which said that explanation is a logical argument whose premises are the initial conditions of the system to be explained plus the laws of behavior of that system, and the conclusion was prediction of an event. Hull’s theory of learning was written according to the positivist recipe. Some psychologists rejected the Law of Effect on the grounds that the cause of learning—reward—followed the response it strengthened, which was inconsistent with causes preceding effects. Skinner’s philosophy of radical behaviorism was in part a campaign against the positivist view of causation and explanation and in favor of selection by consequences (Skinner, 1984), i.e., evolutionary explanation.
实证主义者要求解释必须基于规律的预测,这挑战了进化生物学的科学合法性,导致一些生物学家认为进化生物学与收集蝴蝶无异(Mayr,1988)。作为综合进化论的创始人之一,Mayr 与斯金纳一样,反对实证主义者以物理学为中心的帝国主义。对他们来说,科学解释有两种形式:一种处理近因,另一种处理终极因(Mayr,1961/1988;Skinner,1984;McDowell,2004)。近因是事件的直接原因,回答“如何”的问题,并遵循牛顿模式。终极因关注心理和生理过程的进化起源,并回答“为什么”的问题。图 9.1展示了不同类型的近因关系及其与终极因关系之间的关系。
The positivist demand that explanation be prediction from laws challenged the scientific legitimacy of evolutionary biology, leading some biologists to regard it as no better than butterfly collecting (Mayr, 1988). As one of the creators of the synthetic theory of evolution, Mayr, like Skinner, rejected positivists’ physics-centric imperialism. For them, there are two forms of scientific explanation, one dealing with proximate causes and the other with ultimate causes (Mayr, 1961/1988; Skinner, 1984; McDowell, 2004). Proximate causes are the immediate causes of events and answer how questions, and they follow Newton’s pattern. Ultimate causes concern the evolutionary origins of psychological and physiological processes and answer why questions. Figure 9.1 shows the relationships between different kinds of proximate causation and their relationship to ultimate causation.
举个例子,新发现的面部超级识别现象(Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009; Ramon, Bobak, & White, 2019; Rice, 2016)。超级识别者可以瞬间认出他们短暂见过的人的脸,即使是几年前见过的人。他们处于另一个极端,从超级识别者到面容失认症患者,后者无法将脸视为脸;他们只能看到线条、曲线和颜色,却无法看到整张脸的整体。
Let’s take an example, the newly discovered phenomenon of facial super-recognition (Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009; Ramon, Bobak, & White, 2019; Rice, 2016). Super-recognizers can instantly recognize the face of someone they met briefly, even years before. They are at the other end of a spectrum that runs from them to prosopagnosics, who don’t see faces as faces; they see lines, curves, and colors, but not the gestalt of a whole face.
发现超级识别者后,研究人员可能会首先对他们进行访谈,了解超级识别者的感受(Robertson 等人,2016;Hutchcraft,2020),哪些面部特征最有用,哪些没用等等,以此为基础,构建超级识别能力的计算模型(Bobak 等人,2017)。与此同时,研究人员也在研究超级识别所涉及的大脑过程(Ramot、Walsh & Martin,2019),以及其心理发展(Bennetts、Mole & Bate,2017)。在现代心理学中,应用研究至关重要(Lander、Bruce & Bindemann,2018)。这些研究方向涉及解答超级识别的直接原因,并涉及 Marr 提出的第二层(计算心理学)和第三层(生理学,以及在现代人工智能中,用人工神经网络 [ANN] 模拟人脸识别)的理论构建。马尔提出的第一层——认知层——将我们引向终极因果关系:面部识别的意义何在?它是人类的一项特殊技能吗?如果是,为什么?它是如何以及为何会通过达尔文式的选择进化而来的?
Having discovered super-recognizers, investigators might begin by interviewing them, discovering what it is like to be a super-recognizer (Robertson et al., 2016; Hutchcraft, 2020), which facial features are most useful, which are not, and so on, working toward a computational account of the ability (Bobak et al., 2017). At the same time, research proceeds on the brain processes involved in super-recognition (Ramot, Walsh, & Martin, 2019). And its psychological development (Bennetts, Mole, & Bate, 2017). In modern psychology, applications are important (Lander, Bruce, & Bindemann, 2018). These lines of research involve answering questions about the proximate causes of super-recognition and involve theorizing at Marr’s levels two (computational psychology) and three (physiology and, in modern AI, emulating face recognition in Artificial Neural Networks [ANNs]). Marr level one—the cognitive level—takes us to ultimate causation: What is face recognition for? Is it a special skill in human beings and, if so, why? How and why did it evolve by Darwinian selection?
进化不仅仅是“遗传变异”。达尔文发展了他的进化论,以解释遗传的既定事实。它与遗传学相结合,构成了综合进化论,是一个解释遗传变异如何以及为何发生的复杂理论。
There is more to evolution than descent with modification. Darwin developed his theory of evolution to explain the established fact of descent. Integrated with genetics into the synthetic theory of evolution, it is a sophisticated theory of how and why descent with modification occurred.
除了宗教偏见之外,还有更多因素阻碍着接受血统改良。它挑战了人性,特别是我们最基本的认知过程——通过模式识别形成类别。一旦我们创建了类别,就很难将其视为边缘漏洞。此外,对于像柏拉图和亚里士多德这样生活在温带气候的思想家来说,尤其容易将熊、马和人视为反映熊、马和人整洁、离散且不变的形式或本质。宗教权威后来强化了这种我们称之为类别偏见的现象,但并没有创造它。
There was also more than religious prejudice militating against acceptance of descent with modification. It’s a challenge to human nature, specifically to our most basic cognitive process, forming categories through pattern recognition. Once we’ve created categories, it becomes hard to see them as porous at the edges. Moreover, for thinkers living in temperate climates, such as Plato and Aristotle, it was especially easy to see bears and horses and people as reflecting tidy, discrete, and unchanging Forms or essences of Bear, Horse, and Person. Religious authority later strengthened this category bias, as we may call it, but did not create it.
然而,到了18世纪后期,一些发展逐渐瓦解了类别偏见。其中一些源于对世界的探索,因为新发现的动植物并不总是能被巧妙地归入现有的分类单元(类)。斑马是马吗?猴子和类人猿尤其具有挑战性。黑猩猩和大猩猩是人类的奇怪形态吗?在一幅关于非洲猿的作品中,一位艺术家将猿描绘成拟人形态(类似人类的形态)的例子(图9.2)。
By the late 18th century, however, several developments undermined category bias. Some came from exploring the world, as newly discovered animals and plants didn’t always neatly fit into existing taxa (classes). Were zebras horses? Especially challenging were monkeys and great apes. Were chimpanzees and gorillas odd forms of humans? In one work about African apes, an artist depicted apes as examples of anthropomorphæ (human-like forms) (Figure 9.2).
同样,随着工业革命的推进,铁路和公路穿山而过,地球在地质和生物层面都拥有悠久的历史。地质学家们对挖掘出的岩层进行研究,发现了灭绝物种的化石;一般来说,挖得越深,穿越的时间就越久远,远古生命也变得越奇特。将生物体划分为跨越时空的、整齐而离散的形式变得愈发困难。
Similarly, as the Industrial Revolution proceeded, rail lines and roadways were cut through mountains, and it emerged that the earth had a long history both geologically and biologically. As geologists examined the strata of rock revealed by digging, they found fossils of extinct species; in general, the deeper one dug the farther back in time one traveled and the stranger ancient life became. It began to be difficult to pigeonhole living things into neat and discrete Forms across both space and time.
显微镜发明后,胚胎学也取得了相关进展。科学家首次能够观察到胚胎从受孕到出生的发育过程,见证从单细胞到完整后代的形态学逐渐变化。此外,胚胎发育表明,地质记录下的生物演化或许具有一个自然的方向,即从受精卵的潜能到最终预定形态的演化(Richardson & Keuck,2002)。达尔文对这一思路尤其感兴趣(Richards,1989,2009)。
A related development occurred in the science of embryology following the invention of the microscope. For the first time, scientists could see embryos develop from conception to birth, witnessing gradual morphological change from the single cell to the complete offspring. Moreover, embryonic development suggested that perhaps the geologically recorded descent of living things had a natural direction, recapitulating descent from the potential of the fertilized egg to the final, pre-determined form (Richardson & Keuck, 2002). Darwin was especially intrigued by this line of thought (Richards, 1989, 2009).
第一个进化论——一个明确的进步论——是由博物学家让-巴蒂斯特·拉马克(1774-1829)提出的。任何进化论都必须至少包含两个组成部分:一个变化的引擎——某种在生物中产生新奇事物的方式;以及一个变化的保存者——某种将新奇事物传递给后代的方式。拉马克的变化引擎是生物学浪漫主义。所有生物都会通过努力做到最好来提升自身。例如,猎豹会努力捕捉尽可能多的猎物,并以此来提高它们的心血管强度。为了保存这些拉马克提出,父母习得的特质会遗传给后代。如果事实如此,进化就是进步,因为猎豹在一代又一代(通过实践)和一代又一代(通过遗传)之间变得越来越优秀。达尔文用更接近牛顿的理论取代了拉马克的理论,从而淡化了拉马克的理论,但特质如何得以保存至今仍是一个谜。
The first theory of evolution—an explicitly progressive one—was offered by naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1774–1829). Any theory of evolution must have at least two components, an engine of change—some way of generating novelty in living things, and a conserver of change—some way of passing novelties on to offspring. Lamarck’s engine of change was biological Romanticism. Every living thing improves itself by striving to be the best that it can be. Thus, for example, cheetahs strive to catch as much prey as possible, and in doing so improve their cardiovascular strength. To conserve these improvements, Lamarck proposed that traits acquired by parents are passed on to their offspring. If true, evolution is progress, as cheetahs become better and better within (by practice) and between (by inheritance) generations. Darwin de-romanticized Lamarck’s theory by replacing his engine of change with a more Newtonian one, but how traits were conserved remained elusive.
达尔文 (1809–1882) 的博物学家生涯始于他 1831–1835 年乘坐贝格尔号环游世界的旅行。从他写的关于这次航行的回忆录中,有两件事引人注目。第一,他对南美洲丛林中生物的多样性感到惊叹。第二,源于他对加拉帕戈斯群岛雀类的观察。他发现,同一物种的成员曾被风暴带到这些岛屿,经过几代人的进化,形成了适合新觅食方式的新形态。一些雀类的喙很窄,适合捕捉昆虫,而另一些则有短而粗的喙,适合啄开种子。这些变化表明了通过血统进行修改的原因:适应不同的环境而不是追求完美。
Darwin’s (1809–1882) career as a naturalist began with his 1831–1835 trip around the world on the HMS Beagle. From the memoir he wrote about his voyage, two things stand out. The first was his marvel at the extraordinary variety of living things in the jungles of South America. The second arose from his observations of finches in the Galapagos islands. It appeared that members of a single species had at one time arrived on the islands carried by a storm, which had then over generations become modified into new forms suited to new ways of foraging. Some finches had narrow beaks good for getting at insects while others had stubby ones good for cracking seeds. These changes suggested a reason for modification by descent: Adaptation to different environments rather than striving for perfection.
回到英国后,他对完整进化理论的追求受到几个问题的阻碍,其中两个对我们很重要。首先是他无法解决变化守恒的问题:有用的特性是如何传承下来的?其次是利他主义。有时动物会为其他动物冒险。众所周知,群居动物在看到掠食者靠近时会发出警报,从而引起危险的注意。达尔文想知道如何才能保存这些特性——正如它们被观察到的那样——而不因携带者的死亡而消失。1842 年,他将他未完成的理论写成手稿,并开始写一本书来推进更完整的理论。一位年轻的博物学家阿尔弗雷德·拉塞尔·华莱士(1823-1913)迫使他动笔,华莱士给他写一封信,寻求帮助推广与他自己的理论相同的理论。于是,1859 年《物竞天择物种起源》1问世。
Returning to England, his quest for a complete theory of evolution was stymied by several problems, two of which are important to us. First was his inability to crack the problem of conservation of change: How were useful traits handed down? The second was altruism. Sometimes animals risk themselves for others. Animals who live in groups are known to give alarm calls when they see approaching predators, thereby drawing dangerous attention to themselves. Darwin wondered how such traits could be preserved—as they observably were—without being extinguished by their carrier’s death. In 1842 he set down his incomplete theory as a manuscript and began a book advancing a more complete theory. His hand was forced by a younger naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), who sent him a letter seeking help promoting a theory identical to his own. So appeared On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection1 in 1859.
历史的另一个讽刺之处在于,大约在同一时间,格雷戈尔·孟德尔 (1822-1884) 奠定了群体遗传学的基础。他的工作解决了保守性问题,但达尔文进化论和孟德尔遗传学之间存在明显的不相容性。后者的核心前提是基因不可改变,这意味着进化不会发生改变。然而,在 20 世纪 30 年代,包括恩斯特·迈尔 (1982) 在内的多位生物学家将达尔文和孟德尔的理论结合起来,创立了综合进化论。综合理论表明,进化是通过改变群体中的基因频率而不是改变基因本身来实现的。当基因(在此之前是一个假设的结构)被简化为 DNA 编码序列时,保守性问题得到了彻底的解决(Watson & Crick,1953;Pray,2008)。尽管面临挑战和变化,综合理论仍然占据主导地位(Hancock、Lehmberg & Bradburd,2021)。
In another of history’s ironies, at about the same time, Gregor Mendel (1822–1884) laid out the foundations of population genetics. His work solved the problem of conservation, but there was an apparent incompatibility between Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. Central to the latter was the premise that genes are unalterable, implying that evolutionary change could not occur. However, during the 1930s a variety of biologists, including Ernst Mayr (1982) reconciled Darwin and Mendel, creating the synthetic theory of evolution. The synthetic theory showed that evolution occurred by changing gene frequencies in a population rather than by changing genes themselves. The complete solution of the problem of conservation was found when the gene, until then a hypothetical construct, was reduced to coding sequences of DNA (Watson & Crick, 1953; Pray, 2008). Despite challenges and changes, the synthetic theory remains dominant (Hancock, Lehmberg, & Bradburd, 2021).
尽管每个人都把“适者生存”这个说法与达尔文联系在一起,而且达尔文后来也采用了这个说法,但这个说法并非达尔文首创,而是赫伯特·斯宾塞(1820-1903)。斯宾塞并非科学家,但他凭借其巨著推动并塑造了19世纪英国的社会科学。达尔文并不喜欢斯宾塞自以为是的论调,但他确实认可斯宾塞作为科学传播者的价值(Paul,1988)。
Although everyone associates the phrase survival of the fittest with Darwin, and Darwin came to adopt it, he did not coin it; Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) did. Spencer was not a scientist, but through his voluminous writings, he advanced and shaped social science in 19th-century Britain. Darwin did not like him for his portentous opinion of himself, but he did recognize his value as a presenter of science (Paul, 1988).
“自然选择”一词的问题源于达尔文对动植物育种的研究。育种正在成为一门大生意,农学家培育动植物以提高产量,贵族培育马匹以提高速度。达尔文对育种感兴趣,因为育种者导致了进化,故意在几代人中改变生物。他们通过人工选择来实现这一点,比如选择产量最高的小麦并让其繁殖,同时丢弃其余的。达尔文的难题是导致自然选择的原因。他一直困惑不已,直到他读到托马斯·马尔萨斯(1766-1834)的《人口论2》(1798 年)。马尔萨斯想要解释启蒙运动关于人类进步的主张与持续存在的贫困、战争和犯罪之间的差距。他的回答是悲观的:科学、工程、农业和医学确实取得了进步,但它们的增长是线性的,而人口却呈几何级数增长。因此,贫困是不可避免的,人们为了有限的资源而犯罪、发动战争。
The problem with the term “natural selection” derived from Darwin’s studies of plant and animal breeding. Breeding was becoming a big business, as agriculturalists bred plants and animals for increased yields, and aristocrats bred horses for speed. It was of interest to Darwin because breeders caused evolution, deliberately changing living things over generations. They did so by artificial selection, taking, say, the highest yielding wheat and letting it reproduce while discarding the rest. Darwin’s puzzle was what caused selection in nature. He was stumped until he read Thomas Malthus’s (1766–1834) Essay on Population2 (1798). Malthus wanted to explain the gap between Enlightenment claims about human progress and the persistence of poverty, war, and crime. His answer was pessimistic: There was genuine progress in science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, but it grew linearly while human population grew geometrically. Thus, poverty was inescapable, and people committed crimes and fought wars over necessarily limited resources.
达尔文在“生存斗争”中看到了他完善进化论所需的自然选择力量。不仅是人类,所有生物都在无法全部生存的环境中挣扎求生、繁衍。那些拥有在生存斗争中发挥作用的特质(包括行为)的生物,就像那些被育种者淘汰的生物一样,会留下后代。而那些适应性较差的生物则会留下更少的后代,甚至不会留下后代。结果将是变化:下一代拥有受青睐特质的生物会比上一代更多,这就是自然选择。
Darwin saw in the “struggle for existence” the selective force he needed to complete his theory of evolution. Not just humans, but all living things struggled to live and reproduce in environments that could not support them all. Those possessing traits—including behavior—that worked in the struggle for existence would, like those selected by breeders, leave offspring. Those with less adaptive traits would leave fewer or no offspring. The result would be change: More creatures in the next generation would possess the favored traits than in the previous one, i.e., natural selection.
《物种起源》出版后,达尔文发现他的表述暗示了他的进化论是渐进的,因为“选择”一词带有待达成目标的含义。达尔文无奈地接受了斯宾塞的“适者生存”理论。不幸的是,这个表述也被证明具有误导性,因为它暗示了值得称赞的“适应性”只有一个维度,就像我们今天在健身房追求“健身”一样。重要的是,虽然进化适应性只有一个衡量标准——繁殖成功率——但它是跨基因、跨个体、跨物种的一系列不同特征和策略的集合。
After publication of the Origin, Darwin found that his phrase implied his theory evolution was progressive because the word “selection” carried connotations of a goal to be reached. Throwing up his hands, Darwin adopted Spencer’s “survival of the fittest.” Unfortunately, this phrase proved misleading, too, as it implied the existence of a single dimension of praiseworthy “fitness,” as when we today pursue “fitness” at the gym. Importantly, while evolutionary fitness has one measure—reproductive success—it’s a disparate collection of traits and strategies across genes, individuals, and species.
在后来的著作《人类的由来与性选择》(1871 年)中,达尔文引入了另一种选择,即性选择,或称附庸选择,它有两种形式:性内选择和性间选择。在性内选择中,同一性别的成员(通常是哺乳动物的雄性)竞争获得雌性的机会,因此选择出有利于这种竞争的性状。一个例子是性别二态性,它指的是特定物种的两性之间的身体差异。在各种动物中,例如鳍足类动物(如海豹和海象),被称为海滩主人的占主导地位的雄性会控制着雌性的后宫,阻止其他雄性与它们交配。因此,被排除在外的雄性会试图通过杀死或暴力驱逐海滩主人来取代他们。在战斗中,体型较大的雄性会获胜,导致雄性在几代之后变得更大。雄性比雌性大三到四倍,雌性不会打架,因此不会因为体型而被选择。
In a later work, Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), Darwin introduced another kind of selection, sexual selection, or epigamic selection, coming in two forms, intrasexual selection and intersexual selection. In intrasexual selection, members of one sex (typically males among mammals) compete for access to females, so that traits favorable to such competition are selected. An example occurs in sexual dimorphism, which refers to bodily differences between the sexes of a given species. In various animals, such as pinnipeds (e.g., seals and walruses), dominant males called beachmasters keep harems of females, excluding other males from copulating with them. Consequently, excluded males try to replace beachmasters by killing them or violently driving them away. In combat, size pays off, and bigger males are the victors, causing males over generations to become larger. Males are three to four times bigger than females, which do not fight and so are not selected for size.
在两性间选择中,竞争的一方(通常是雌性)可以选择与哪位追求者交配,因此选择者的标准成为了选择的基础。一些生动有趣的例子出现在陆栖鸟类中,例如草原鸡和孔雀,它们在所谓的“求偶场”行为中相互竞争。3在繁殖季节,雄性会聚集在一个叫做“求偶场”的地点,在雌性观察下进行舞蹈表演。雌性会选择最赏心悦目的舞者进行交配,因此,这种舞蹈在一代又一代中变得越来越复杂。
In intersexual selection, the competed-for sex (typically females) can choose with which suitor to mate, so that the choosers’ criteria become the basis for selection. Vivid and sometimes amusing examples occur in ground-dwelling birds, such as prairie chickens and peacocks, that compete with one another in what’s called lek behavior.3 In breeding season, males gather at a site called a lek and perform dances observed by females. The females choose the most pleasing dancers to mate with, so that dances get more elaborate over generations.
近期的理论模糊了自然选择与性选择之间的界限,并将后者的概念扩展为社会选择(West-Eberhard,1983,1991)。研究表明,雌性也会争夺雄性的注意力,通常通过相同的特征,例如争斗和生动的展示(Lyon & Robert,2012;Clutton-Brock & Huchard,2013)。社会选择也发生在非性情境中。例如,在某些类人猿中,少数雌性比其他雌性获得更多的异养帮助,从而提高了它们的适应性。由于社会互动在人类等群居物种中普遍存在,因此社会选择——任何倾向于与某个个体而非另一个个体进行富有成效的互动的行为——将成为进化变革的强大力量。并非所有社交媒体影响者的影响力都相同。
More recent theory has blurred the line between natural selection and sexual selection and broadened the conception of the latter into social selection (West-Eberhard, 1983, 1991). Research showed that females also compete for male attention, often by the same traits such as fighting and vivid displays (Lyon & Robert, 2012; Clutton-Brock & Huchard, 2013). Social selection occurs in non-sexual contexts, too. In some apes, for example, a few females receive more alloparenting help than others, increasing their fitness. Because social interaction is ubiquitous in group-living species such as humans, social selection—any preference for productive interaction with one individual over another—will be a powerful force for evolutionary change. Not all social media influencers influence equally.
进化论中一个颇具争议的问题是选择水平之争。威廉姆斯(1966,第4页)让我们想象一群鹿在我们面前飞奔,被捕食者追赶。我们看到的是什么?一群快速奔跑的鹿,还是一群快速奔跑的鹿?
A contentious issue in evolution is the levels of selection controversy. Williams (1966, p. 4), asks us to imagine a herd of deer running swiftly before us chased by a predator. What do we see, a fleet herd of deer or a herd of fleet deer?
阿尔弗雷德·丁尼生勋爵(1809-1892)在他的诗《悼念》中(1850 年)写道:“难道上帝与自然相争,/自然才会给人带来如此恶梦?/她对外表如此小心,/对单身生命如此漫不经心”(第 55 节)。虽然丁尼生的创作时间早于《物种起源》,但他的诗经常与《物种起源》联系在一起,这首诗暗示我们看到了一群速度飞快的鹿:大自然选择了整个物种以求速度,而丢弃了个体鹿,认为它们并不重要。另一方面,达尔文强调繁殖效率是衡量适应性的标准,而威廉姆斯则认为我们看到了一群速度飞快的鹿。也就是说,速度快的鹿父母比速度慢的鹿父母有更多的后代,而且鹿群速度快是因为其成员速度快。速度飞快的鹿群场景表明群体是自然选择的;速度飞快的鹿群场景则表明个体是经过选择的。
In his poem “In Memoriam” (1850), Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809–1892) wrote, “Are God and Nature then at strife,/That Nature lends such evil dreams?/So careful of the type she seems,/So careless of the single life” (Verse 55). Although Tennyson wrote before the Origin, his poem is often linked to it, and this verse suggests that we see a fleet herd of deer: Nature has selected the species as a whole for fleetness, discarding individual deer as unimportant. On the other hand, Darwin emphasized reproductive effectiveness as the measure of fitness, and Williams argued that we see a herd of fleet deer. That is, fleet deer parents have more offspring than slower ones, and the group is fast because its members are fast. The fleet herd of deer scenario says groups are selected by nature; the herd of fleet deer says individuals are selected.
威廉·汉密尔顿(William Hamilton,1964)提出了第三种解释利他主义的理论。他认为,选择的单位是基因。个体携带决定其行为方式(例如,跑得快或慢)的基因,而成功繁殖的个体会将其基因传递给后代,后代再将基因传承下去。回到丁尼生的理论,大自然对群体和个体生命都漠不关心——拥有永生潜力的生物体是基因,而基因则通过其携带者在生存斗争中竞争(道金斯,1976)。
A third option was developed by William Hamilton (1964) to explain altruism. He proposed that the unit of selection was the gene. Individuals carry genes that predispose them to behave in certain ways (e.g., run swiftly or slowly), and successfully reproducing individuals pass their genes on to their offspring, who carry them onward. Returning to Tennyson, Nature is careless about both groups and single lives—the potentially immortal living thing is the gene, and genes compete in the struggle for existence via their individual bearers (Dawkins, 1976).
威廉姆斯的书引发了一场关于群体选择是否存在的激烈争论,有时甚至尖锐化。大多数生物学家最终同意威廉姆斯的观点,认为选择发生在基因和个体层面,没有理由将生物群体具体化为自在之物(例如,戴维斯、克雷布斯和韦斯特,2012;平克,2012 4),而群体选择也有其坚定的拥护者(例如,威尔逊和索伯,1994)。最终,当人们发现作为数学模型提出的群体选择理论与个体/基因理论是等价的时,这场争议逐渐平息(克莱默和莫尼尔,2016)。
Williams’ book provoked a lively, sometimes acrimonious, debate about the existence of group selection. Most biologists came to agree with Williams that selection takes place at the gene and individual levels, and there was no reason to reify groups of organisms into things in themselves (e.g., Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012; Pinker, 20124), while group selection had its ardent defenders (e.g., Wilson & Sober, 1994). Eventually the controversy cooled when it emerged that proposed as mathematical models group selection theory and individual/gene theory are equivalent (Kramer & Meunier, 2016).
然而,还有一个对我们至关重要的问题。尽管作为正式模型,群体选择和个体/基因理论是相同的,但它们对选择原因的看法有所不同,因为“群体”的定义具有弹性 (Wilson, 2018)。有些群体比其他群体更“群体化”(Birch, 2019; Kay, Keller, & Lehmann, 2020)。我们研究的快速鹿几乎是一个偶然形成的群体。当食物来源不均匀时,像鹿这样的觅食动物会一起进食。由于彼此靠近,它们会交配并产生亲缘关系,共享基因,包括敏捷基因。这与狒狒等更具社会性的物种形成对比。它们生活在由亲缘个体组成的群体中,并以多种方式协同工作。它们互相梳理毛发以寻找寄生虫;它们进行异养,即幼崽的母亲以外的雌性可能会帮忙照顾幼崽;它们会作为一个群体一起攻击。雄性和雌性形成支配等级,为群体中的社会关系提供结构。
However, an issue remained that will be important for us. Although as formal models they are the same, group selection and individual/gene theories differ about the causes of selection because the definition of “group” is elastic (Wilson, 2018). Some groups are more “groupish” than others (Birch, 2019; Kay, Keller, & Lehmann, 2020). Our fleet deer comprise an almost accidental group. When feeding resources are patchy clumps, foragers such as deer will be found together eating. Being in proximity to one another, they will mate and come to be related, sharing genes, including ones for swiftness. Contrast this with a more social species such as baboons. They live in troops of related individuals and work together in many ways. They groom each other for parasites; they engage in alloparenting, in which females other than an infant’s mother may help care for it; they engage in aggression together as a troop. Males and females form dominance hierarchies that give structure to social relations in the group.
与偶然形成的鹿群相比,结构化的狒狒群体在生物学意义上更接近于一个个体。它很可能兴旺发达,也可能衰败。作为一个整体,鹿群的生存概率要高于一群鹿,因为鹿群的成败取决于它们自身的能力。一场极具破坏性的袭击或疾病,影响到鹿群的关键成员,可能会严重破坏鹿群的结构,以至于依赖于失去同伴的个体也可能会灭亡。这种情况是否会发生,以及群体选择是否真实存在,仍然存在争议,但一些科学家认为群体选择是人类进化的一个因果过程。
In contrast to the fortuitous herd of deer, the structured baboon group is much closer to being an individual in the biological sense. It may very well thrive or fail to survive as a whole group than the bunch of deer, who fail or succeed on their own. An especially devastating attack or disease affecting key members of a troop might so disrupt its structure that its individuals, dependent on lost comrades, might perish, too. Whether or not such scenarios occur and whether group selection is real remain controversial, but some scientists have proposed group selection as a causal process in human evolution.
不出所料,大多数关于进化的讨论都集中在定向选择上,即世代更替朝着单一方向进行。例如,当我们的鹿被越来越快的狮子追赶时,随着选择的进行,猎物和捕食者的速度都会变得更快。我们在人工选择中也能看到这一点。例如,1930年,感恩节火鸡的平均体重为13磅。然而,通过选择性育种,平均体重变成了19磅。然后,育种者遇到了一个障碍:火鸡变得太胖,无法交配!人工授精技术被引入,到2010年,平均体重为29磅。5
Most discussions of evolution focus, unsurprisingly, on directional selection, in which generational change moves in a single direction. As our deer, for example, are chased by faster and faster lions, both prey and predator become faster as selection proceeds. We see this, too, in artificial selection. For example, in 1930, the average weight of a Thanksgiving turkey was 13 lbs. However, through selective breeding the average weight became 19 lbs. Then, breeders hit a barrier: Turkeys had become so fat they couldn’t mate! Artificial insemination was introduced and by 2010 the average weight was 29 lbs.5
此外,选择既可以是稳定的,也可以是破坏性的。在稳定选择中,性状的极端值同样不适应环境,进化平衡最终会稳定在一个平均值上。例如,人类的出生体重约为7.5磅。比这小得多的婴儿,尤其是在现代医学出现之前,无法在子宫外存活,而更大的婴儿则难以通过产道。破坏性选择则相反:性状的平均值比极端值更不适应环境。达尔文的雀类喙就属于这种情况。达尔文所看到的鸟类,正如他所推测的那样,是偶然登陆加拉帕戈斯群岛的同一物种的不同后代。中等大小的喙在岛上生存不佳,而短而强壮的喙和长而弯曲的喙则生存良好,因为它们分别适合以坚果和小昆虫为食。极端形态经过自然选择,最终形成了两个新物种。正如谚语所说,“样样精通”不如“一技之长”。破坏性选择是物种形成的重要原因。当两个种群在体型、外观和行为上出现差异时,它们就会停止杂交,成为独立的群体,并可能发展成为新的物种。
In addition, selection can be stabilizing or disruptive. In stabilizing selection extreme values of traits are equally maladaptive, and evolutionary equilibrium settles on a mean value. An example is human birth weight, about 7.5 lbs. Babies much smaller than this, especially before modern medicine, are unable to survive outside the womb and larger babies have problems passing through the birth canal. Disruptive selection is the opposite: the mean value of a trait is less adaptive than more extreme values. This happened with Darwin’s finches’ beaks. The birds Darwin saw were, as he surmised, varied descendants of a single species that landed on the Galapagos by accident. Middle-sized beaks did not fare well on the islands, but beaks that were short and strong or long and curved did, as they were favorable for feeding on nuts or small insects, respectively. The extreme forms were naturally selected and eventually created two new species. As the proverb has it, being a “Jack of all trades” does not beat being “master of one.” Disruptive selection is an important cause of speciation. As two populations diverge with regard to size, appearance, and behavior, they cease interbreeding and they become independent groups, potential new species.
另一个例子是生活在多变气候中的鸟类对大脑大小的选择(Fristoe & Botero, 2019)。我们发现一些拥有较大大脑的鸟类,例如鸦科动物,通过进化出灵活的智力来应对不断变化的觅食挑战,从而适应了气候多变(例如夏季与冬季)。而其他鸟类,例如松鸡,则拥有较小的大脑,它们用智力换取了强健的体魄,它们肥胖以抵御寒冷,并能够消化坚硬的食物。此外,许多鸟类迁徙也是为了保暖。
Another example is selection for large or small brains in birds living in variable climates (Fristoe & Botero, 2019). We find birds with large brains, such as corvids, who have adapted to variability (e.g., summer vs. winter) by evolving flexible intelligence to cope with changing foraging challenges. Other birds, such as grouse, have small brains, exchanging intelligence for physical robustness, being fat to resist cold and able to digest tough foods. And many bird species migrate to keep warm.
尽管适应性在理论上很重要,但它却难以定义。例如,人们可能会认为任何生物都必须是一种适应,否则它为何存在?但正如古尔德(Gould,1993)指出的那样,男性乳头是真实存在的,但却没有任何功能。它们之所以存在,是因为它们与女性乳头同源,而女性乳头确实有功能,是一种适应。大多数理论家认为,要算作适应性,一种性状或行为必须具有自然选择所赋予的功能。自然选择是一个严格的标准,要求性状的历史与其功能之间存在因果关系(Schmitt & Pilcher,2004;Ploeger & van der Hoort,2015)。
Despite its theoretical importance, adaptation can be hard to define. For example, one might think that anything biological must be an adaptation, else why does it exist? But as Gould (1993) pointed out, male nipples are real but have no function. They exist because they are homologs of female nipples, which do function and are adaptations. Most theorists propose that to count as an adaptation, a trait or behavior must have a function resulting from natural selection, a rigorous standard, requiring causal connection between a trait’s history and its functionality (Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004; Ploeger & van der Hoort, 2015).
除了这样的适应之外,还有预适应(Underwood,1954;Ardila,2016)(也称为扩展适应)和兼性适应。预适应是一种特性,它最初被选择用于一种用途,后来被选择用于另一种用途。例如,鸟类的羽毛,最初被选择用于保温,后来被选择用于飞行。兼性适应并不总是存在,但会在某些条件下表现出来。杀人可能是人类的一种兼性适应(Roth,2014)。例如,当男性数量远远超过女性时,就像在 19 世纪的美国边疆一样,杀人案比有女性时要多得多6(Courtwright,1998)。
In addition to adaptation as such, there is also preadaptation (Underwood, 1954; Ardila, 2016) (also known as exaptation) and facultative adaptation. A preadaptation is a trait that was originally selected for one use that later is selected for a different use. An example are bird’s feathers, originally selected for insulation and later selected for flight. A facultative adaptation is one that is not always present but is expressed under certain conditions. Homicide may be a facultative adaptation in humans (Roth, 2014). For example, when men greatly outnumber women, as in the US frontier of the 19th century, homicide is much greater than when women are present6 (Courtwright, 1998).
由于遗传漂变的存在,基因变化也会在没有选择的情况下发生(Slack,2014)。随机基因突变(大多数既无有利结果也无有害结果)和有性生殖导致的基因重组会导致物种基因组发生变动,但不会对进化产生影响。由于遗传漂变是恒定的,因此将古代DNA与现代DNA进行比较可以估算化石的年龄,并揭示生物群体之间的遗传联系(Reich,2018)。由于漂变率是恒定的,它提供了一种观察适应性发生的方式。一个基因或一组基因的变化速度快于背景漂变率,则表明它们正在受到选择。
Genetic change also occurs without selection because of genetic drift (Slack, 2014). Random gene mutations (most of which have neither favorable nor deleterious outcomes) and reshuffling of genes by sexual reproduction cause a species’ genome to churn with no evolutionary effects. Because genetic drift is constant, comparing ancient DNA with modern DNA can provide estimates of the age of fossils and can indicate genetic links between living groups (Reich, 2018). Because the rate of drift is constant, it provides a way of seeing adaption taking place. A gene or set of genes that’s changing faster than background drift is under selection.
遗传漂变会引发一种被称为奠基者效应或瓶颈效应的进化现象(Mayr,1963)。想象一下,一个瓶子里装满了1000颗随机分布的珠子,其中一半是蓝色,一半是红色。现在想象一下,倒出几颗珠子,也许是20颗。由于这只是一个庞大种群中的一小部分样本,因此珠子的组合可能存在一个极值,比如15颗红色珠子和5颗蓝色珠子。如果我们将这些珠子视为一个经历了严重种群崩溃的种群中某个基因的等位基因,那么在没有自然选择的情况下,基因频率就会发生突然的变化。红色基因的适应能力并非比蓝色基因更强,只是更幸运而已。7 如果种群恢复,红色等位基因及其影响的性状将比蓝色等位基因及其影响的性状更常见。当这种情况发生时,我们会看到基因频率的变化,而没有适应性。人类种群经历了多次瓶颈效应,因此经历了奠基者事件(Diamond & Rotter,1987)。
Genetic drift can give rise to an evolutionary phenomenon called the founder or bottleneck effect (Mayr, 1963). Imagine a bottle filled with 1,000 randomly distributed beads, half of them blue and half red. Imagine now pouring out a few beads, maybe 20. Because this is a small sample of a large population, the mix of beads may have an extreme value, say 15 red and five blue. If we now think of the beads as alleles of a gene in a population that endured a severe population crash, a sudden shift in gene frequency without natural selection has occurred. The red genes were not better adapted than the blue genes, just luckier.7 If the population recovers, the red allele and the traits it affects will be more frequent than the blue one and its traits. When this happens, we see change in gene frequencies without adaptation. Human populations have passed through multiple bottlenecks and thus have experienced founder events (Diamond & Rotter, 1987).
适应性概念的最后一个难题与在多个物种中发现的相似适应性结构有关。经典的例子是翅膀和手。我们在许多哺乳动物的前爪中发现了相似的骨骼结构,例如老鼠,也包括海豚(前鳍状肢)、蝙蝠(翅膀)和人类(手)。这些结构都源自最早的哺乳动物的前爪,但就鳍状肢、手和翅膀而言,它们已经适应了不同的最终用途,因此属于预适应的例子。由于它们都源自共同的祖先,因此它们之间的关系被称为同源性。
The last wrinkle in the concept of adaptation has to do with similar adaptive structures found in several species. The classic examples concern wings and hands. We find similar skeletal structures in the forepaws of many mammals such as mice, but also in dolphins (front flippers), bats (wings), and humans (hands). These structures all descend from the forepaws of the first mammals, but in the case of flippers, hands, and wings, they have become adapted to different end uses, and therefore are examples of preadaptations. Because they all descend from a common ancestor, their relationship is called homology.
我们也发现鸟类、蝴蝶、飞鱼,甚至种子像直升机一样降落到地面的植物都有翅膀。这些生物并非拥有共同祖先,翅膀的结构也并非由同一个祖先演化而来。相反,自然选择从不同的起源中创造出相同的结构,以解决同一个问题:飞行。记住马尔的名言:不要研究羽毛,要研究飞行。这些翅膀结构之间的关系被称为类比,这种类型的进化被称为趋同进化。
We find wings also in birds, butterflies, flying fish, and even in plants whose seeds helicopter to the ground. These creatures do not share a common ancestor with a structure from which the wings evolved. Instead, selection has produced the same structure out of different beginnings to solve the same problem: Flying. Remember Marr’s saying: Don’t study feathers, study flight. The relationship between these wing structures is called analogy, and evolution of this type is called convergent evolution.
这种区别对于进化心理学 (EP) 和神经科学的方法论至关重要。如果我们认为我们自身的特征(例如智力)是从类人猿祖先缓慢进化而来的,那么我们或许可以从我们最近的亲属——类人猿——身上寻找我们认知能力早期基础的线索:同源性关系。另一方面,我们的智力或许源于我们所处的特殊生态位,我们或许可以在拥有相似生态位的无亲缘动物中寻找模型:类比关系。一个新兴的候选者是被称为鸦科的鸟类(Ackerman,2017) :蓝鸦、渡鸦和乌鸦,它们在人类城市中繁衍生息,尽管拥有截然不同的大脑(Güntürkün & Bugnyar,2016),但它们的动物智商却与类人猿相当(Pika et al.,2020)。
This distinction can be important for methodology in evolutionary psychology (EP) and neuroscience. If we think our own traits, such as intelligence, evolved slowly from ape-like ancestors, then we might look to our closest relatives, the great apes, for clues to the earlier bases of our cognitive powers: Relationship by homology. On the other hand, our intelligence may have arisen because of a peculiar ecological niche that we occupy, and we might look for models among unrelated animals that occupy a similar niche: Relationship via analogy. One emerging candidate is the class of birds (Ackerman, 2017) called corvids: Bluejays, ravens, and crows, who flourish in humans’ cities and have animal IQs equal to apes (Pika et al., 2020) despite having radically different brains (Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016).
生物学家 CH 沃丁顿 (1940) 引入了表观遗传学(“基因之上”)一词,并绘制了一张图表(Waddington,1957),用来比喻基因和环境在发育过程中的相互作用。9一个人的基因组是山顶上的球,代表环境。球下山时受到的推动或推动不同方式推动球,可产生不同的发育结果。重要的是,不要将“环境”局限于母亲的子宫或孩子的家庭,而要将整个环境(无论是否共享)纳入成年期。例如,一些具有遗传基础的精神疾病,如精神分裂症和创伤后应激障碍 (PTSD),仅在成年期的特定环境中才会显现 (Kendler,2005;Avramopoulos,2018)。
The biologist C. H. Waddington (1940) introduced the term epigenetics (“above the gene”), and a diagram (Waddington, 1957) as a metaphor for the developmental interaction of gene and environment.9 An individual’s genome is the ball at the top of the hill, which represents the environment. There are various developmental outcomes depending on how the ball is nudged or pushed as it descends the hill. It is important not to limit “the environment” to the uterus of a mother or a child’s family, but the whole environment, shared or not, through adulthood. For example, some psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), that have a genetic basis manifest themselves only in adulthood in certain environments (Kendler, 2005; Avramopoulos, 2018).
基因可以决定它们所处的环境。首先,如果当地条件对特定基因组不利,其携带者可以迁移到更适宜的环境中。其次,基因可以引导其携带者构建自己的生态位。海狸拥有一种遗传机制,可以引导它们建造水坝,改变生存环境以适应自身。人类则大规模地进行着这两件事:我们迁徙到世界各地,并构建了我们能够适应的环境。
Genes can determine the environment they are exposed to. First, if local conditions become unfavorable for a given genome, its carriers can move to more suitable ones. Second, genes can lead their bearers to build their own ecological niches. Beavers possess a genetic mechanism that leads them to build dams, altering their environment to suit them. Humans do both at scale: We’ve moved all over the globe and built the environments to which we adapt.
想象一下,你在海滩上观察一只海鸥。你扔出一块面包。海鸥需要做出一个经济决策:它应该去捡这块面包吗?这值得你花费时间和精力吗?或者,你观察一只鸟妈妈(地球上最勤劳的动物)为它的幼鸟采集虫子。它需要做出一个经济决策:它应该在返回巢穴前捡多少虫子?一只可以,但更多的虫子可以养活更多的鸟。另一方面,它可以捕捉更多的虫子,但这需要花费更多的时间和精力,而且带回家会更困难、更危险(它可能会把所有虫子都掉下来)。该怎么办?10
Imagine watching a gull on a beach. You throw a piece of bread. The gull has an economic decision to make: Should it go for the morsel? Is it worth the time and effort? Or you’re observing a parent bird (the hardest working animals on the planet) gathering bugs for its young. It has an economic decision to make: How many bugs should it pick up before returning to the nest? It can take one, but a bigger load could feed more mouths. On the other wing, it could catch more bugs but that would take more time and effort and be harder and riskier (it might drop all of them) to carry home. What to do?10
行为生态学家认为动物做出的经济决策会转化为适应度——基因传递的成功——而非效用或金钱。他们借用经济学家的工具,创建了最优模型,预测动物应该如何行为才能最大化其适应度。值得注意的是,他们的模型效果显著(Davies、Krebs & West,2012),甚至能够预测例如多代鸟类如何在繁殖季节分配繁殖,而不是在一个季节尽可能多地繁殖后代。虽然他们自己并不运行生物学家的方程式,但动物,或者像弗里德曼笔下的台球大师一样,在达尔文主义的框架下,可以被视为理性的。
Behavioral ecologists treat animals as making economic decisions that translate into fitness—gene transmission success—instead of utility or money, and they borrow economists’ tools to create optimality models predicting how animals ought to behave in order to maximize their fitness. Remarkably, their models work well (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012), even predicting how, for example, birds who live for multiple generations allocate reproduction over their breeding seasons rather than having as many offspring as possible in one. While they don’t run the biologists’ equations themselves, animals are, or, like Friedman’s billiards master, may be regarded as, rational in Darwinian terms.
达尔文的《物种起源》对心理学产生了立竿见影的影响,尤其是在英国和美国。进化论提出了两个问题,由于认知的白板理论占据主导地位(Leahey,2018)。其中一个问题是物种问题:不同动物的特征性心智是如何受到进化影响的?例如,社会性猴(如恒河猴)的心智可能与非社会性猴(如猩猩)的心智截然不同(Nagel,1974)。这个问题导致了比较心理学的产生(Romanes,1892)。另一个问题是个体问题:心智在其拥有者的生活中发挥着什么适应性功能(如果有的话)?这个问题在心理学上相当于生理学问题。我们有可能在不了解松果体进化史的情况下研究其适应性功能及其运作方式。同样,心理学家可以研究当今人类记忆的效用和机制(Ebbinghaus,1885),而不必担心其进化史。
Darwin’s Origin had an immediate effect in psychology, especially in Britain and America. Evolution created two questions that were not clearly separated given the dominance of the blank slate theory of cognition (Leahey, 2018). One question was the species question: How have the characteristic minds of different animals been shaped by evolution? For example, the minds of a social monkey, such as a rhesus macaque, might be quite unlike that of an asocial one such as an orangutan (Nagel, 1974). This question gave rise to comparative psychology (Romanes, 1892). The other question was the individual question: What, if any, adaptive function, does mind fulfill in the lives of its bearer? This question is a psychological equivalent of physiology. It’s possible to investigate what adaptive function the pineal gland serves and how it does it without knowing about the gland’s evolutionary history. Similarly, psychologists could study the utility and mechanics of memory in today’s humans (Ebbinghaus, 1885) without worrying about its evolutionary history.
经验主义和联想主义提供了一种简单的视角,似乎可以解决这两个问题。休谟早已指出,联想是人类和动物共有的。哲学家和心理学家继承了这一观点,并赋予其达尔文式的解读。根据经验主义,心智的功能是表征世界,而观念联想是其运作的心理机制。所有物种的心智都是联想形成的装置,区别仅在于不同大小的心智/大脑能够容纳和联想的观念数量(Spencer, 1897)。行为主义者的策略由此应运而生:研究少数几个合适的物种的学习规律,并确信所发现的原理适用于所有物种。正如斯金纳(1957, p. 3)所说:“推动行为实验分析发展的大部分实验工作都是在其他物种上进行的……结果令人惊讶地表明,这些结果不受物种限制。” 但严肃的比较心理学家却不禁问道:“比较心理学中的比较研究在哪里?” (Beach,1950;Shettleworth,1993,第 179 页)。
Empiricism and associationism offered a simple perspective that seemed to settle both questions. Hume had already said that association was shared by humans and animals. Philosophers and psychologists picked up this view and gave it a Darwinian gloss. According to empiricism, the job of the mind was to represent the world, and association of ideas was the psychological mechanism by which it operated. The minds of all species were association-forming devices differing only in how many ideas different-sized minds/brains could hold and associate (Spencer, 1897). Thus arose the behaviorists’ strategy: Investigate the laws of learning in a few convenient species, confident that the principles discovered would be true of all. As Skinner put it (1957, p. 3): “most of the experimental work responsible for the advance of the experimental analysis of behavior has been carried out on other species … the results have proved to be surprisingly free of species restrictions.” But serious comparative psychologists asked, “Where’s the comparative in comparative psychology?” (Beach, 1950; Shettleworth, 1993, p. 179).
最终,联想传统的研究开始削弱“白板经验主义”,因为它发现并非所有联想都同样容易建立。先驱者是托尔曼(“我的圣徒教授”,加西亚,1989)的学生约翰·加西亚。他在20世纪50年代研究一个重要的可资助课题——辐射暴露的影响——时,发现了巴甫洛夫条件反射中的条件性恶心范式。在一系列巧妙的实验中(加西亚和科林,1966;加西亚、麦高恩和格林,1972),加西亚表明,老鼠很容易将内部的“感觉”(例如恶心,这是辐射的影响,但在这里是由药物注射引起的)与内部的“感觉”(例如加味水)联系起来,从而避免饮用这种水。这在进化上是合理的(农民早已将其称为毒饵害羞)。老鼠无法通过呕吐来排出毒素,它们通过品尝新食物并等待其是否安全食用来觅食。另一方面,老鼠不会将味道与声音 CS 联系起来,但它们会将声音与冲击联系起来。
Eventually, research in the associative tradition began to undermine blank slate empiricism by discovering that not all associations are equally easy to make. The pioneer was a student of Tolman’s (“my sainted Professor,” Garcia, 1989), John Garcia, who, while investigating an important fundable topic in the 1950s, the effects of radiation exposure, discovered the conditioned nausea paradigm of Pavlovian conditioning. In a series of clever experiments (Garcia & Koelling, 1966; Garcia, McGowan, & Green,1972), Garcia showed that rats would readily associate an internal US such as nausea (an effect of radiation but caused here by drug injection) with an internal CS (such as flavored water), coming to avoid drinking the water. This made evolutionary sense (and was already known to farmers as poisoned bait shyness). Rats cannot vomit to rid themselves of poisons, and they forage by sampling new foods and waiting to see if they are safe to eat. On the other hand, rats would not associate taste with a sound CS, though they would associate sound with shock.
起初,Garcia 的发现被驳斥为“可能性不大,就像鸟屎掉进库库钟里一样”(Garcia, 1981)。然而,他的研究结果被重复(Seligman & Hager, 1972),后续研究表明,不同物种之间建立关联关系的难易程度各不相同。例如,与老鼠不同,冠蓝鸦会呕吐,而且它们学习厌恶食物的方式也不同。它们学会避免食用帝王蝶——帝王蝶在幼虫阶段会吃马利筋,并从中提取储存在腺体中的毒素——的方式是食用、呕吐,然后再也不吃。蟠螟蝴蝶进化出了模仿帝王蝶的能力;它们不吃马利筋,但长得和帝王蝶一模一样。更普遍地说,不同物种会根据其进化历史表现出不同的关联模式。生态上重要的联想是经过准备的(例如,味觉和恶心),以便于学习,而其他联想则是经过相反准备的(例如,味觉和震惊;Seligman,1970;Seligman & Hager,1972;Garcia & Robertson,1985;Shettleworth,1972)。
At first, Garcia’s findings were rejected as “No more likely than birdshit in a coocoo clock” (Garcia, 1981). However, his findings replicated (Seligman & Hager, 1972) and subsequent research showed that ease of association formation varied from species to species. For example, unlike rats, blue jays can vomit and they learn food aversion differently. They learn to avoid eating monarch butterflies—who in the larval stage eat milkweed and extract from it a poison stored in a gland—by eating them, vomiting, and never eating them again. Viceroy butterflies have evolved to mimic monarchs; they don’t eat milkweed but look just like monarchs. More generally, different species show different patterns of association depending on their evolutionary history. Ecologically important associations are prepared (e.g., taste and nausea) to be learned easily, while other associations are contra-prepared (e.g., taste and shock; Seligman, 1970; Seligman & Hager, 1972; Garcia & Robertson, 1985; Shettleworth, 1972).
尽管差异性联想能力的证明是在联想传统研究领域发现的,但它们为反对“白板理论”提供了强有力的证据。当新认知心理学削弱了联想主义本身时,进化论应用于人类的新途径就此打开。然而,正如 Shettleworth (2010) 指出的那样,某些旧思维的残余仍然存在。尽管比较心理学研究的物种范围已经扩大到包括鸦科、海豚和猿类等多种动物,但人们仍然倾向于将它们与我们进行比较,这表明科学家仍然假设从昆虫到人类的智力水平是统一的,而不是根据动物自身的特点,将它们视为聪明而独特的问题解决者。此外,正如我们所了解的,一些所谓的理性系统2思维实际上是非理性但适应性系统1启发式思维,因此,在将更高级的心理过程归因于以系统1思维为主导的动物时,我们应该持保守态度。
Although discovered by research within the associative tradition, demonstrations of differential associability provided powerful evidence against the blank slate. When the new cognitive psychology weakened associationism itself, new avenues for the application of evolutionary theory to human beings opened. Nevertheless, certain remnants of older thinking remain, as Shettleworth (2010) points out. Although the range of species examined in comparative psychology has expanded to include animals as diverse as corvids, dolphins, and apes, there remains a tendency to compare them to us, suggesting that scientists still assume a uniform scale of intelligence running from insects to humans, rather than taking animals on their own terms as intelligent but unique problem solvers. Additionally, as we have learned, some of what purports to be rational System 2 thinking is in fact non-rational but adaptive System 1 heuristic thinking, so we should be conservative in attributing higher mental processes to animals in whom System 1 thinking is the rule.
按照其奠基著作的顺序,进化心理学可分为三个学派:源自生物学的人类行为生态学(HBE)(Wilson,1975;Winterhalder & Smith,2000);源自人类学的基因-文化共同进化(GCE)(Boyd & Richerson,1985;Richerson & Boyd,2004);以及圣巴巴拉进化心理学学派(EP)(Cosmides,1989;Barkow,Cosmides & Tooby,1992)。
In order of their founding works, evolutionary psychology has three schools: From biology came Human Behavioral Ecology (HBE) (Wilson, 1975; Winterhalder & Smith, 2000); from anthropology came Gene-Culture co-Evolution (GCE) (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2004); and the Santa Barbara School of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) (Cosmides, 1989; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992).
威尔逊1975年出版的《社会生物学》一书是一本颇具争议的畅销书。书中,他综合了从昆虫(他的专长)到灵长类动物的行为生态学研究。然而,在最后一章中,他推测性地将该理论应用于人类,从而创建了人类行为生态学,这引发了争议。博伊德和里查森在他们的书中坚持认为,我们独特的文化能够创造和发展,因此用遗传学来解释智人的行为是不完整的。科斯米德斯在她的第一篇论文中将进化论思维应用于沃森选择任务,表明在包含内容的版本中,参与者的表现比在Wason 的抽象版本仅在内容涉及识别作弊者时适用。她认为这是因为参与者运用了一种遗传的物种特异性心理模块来识别作弊者。她与 John Tooby 共同在加州大学圣巴巴拉分校建立了进化心理学中心。11由于“进化心理学”一词应指代心理学学科而非其内部的一种方法,因此我将使用“EP”来指代学院(以及 HBE 和 GCE),并使用“进化心理学”来指代学科(表 9.1)。
Wilson’s 1975 book Sociobiology was a controversial best seller. In it he synthesized research in behavioral ecology from insects (his specialty) to primates. Controversy arose over his last chapter when he speculatively applied the theory to humans, creating human behavioral ecology. In their books, Boyd and Richerson insisted that we uniquely create and develop in cultures, so that genetic explanations of Homo sapiens’ behavior are incomplete. In her first paper, Cosmides applied evolutionary thinking to the Wason selection task, showing that in content-bearing versions, participants performed more “logically” than on Wason’s abstract version only when the content involved detecting cheaters. She argued that this was because participants applied an inherited species-specific mental module for cheater detection. Along with John Tooby, she established the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the University of California at Santa Barbara.11 Because the phrase “evolutionary psychology” should be a neutral term for a psychological discipline rather than one approach within it, I will use “EP” to designate the school (along with HBE and GCE) and “evolutionary psychology” to designate the discipline (Table 9.1).
| 学校 | EP | 氢能与生物能委员会 |
普通中等教育证书 |
|---|---|---|---|
原产地 Field of Origin |
心理学 Psychology |
生物学与经济学 Biology & Economics |
人类学 Anthropology |
关键理论思想 Key Theoretical Idea |
模块 Modules
|
策略 Strategies |
文化 Culture
|
解释程度 Level of Explanation |
计算 Computations |
行为 Behavior |
学习 Learning |
兴趣时代 Era of Interest |
进化适应时代 Era of Evolutionary Adaptation |
任何 Any |
任何 Any |
方法论 Methodology |
折衷主义,了解隐藏的EEA思想 Eclectic, to get at hidden EEA Mind |
行为与“表型策略” Behavior and the “Phenotypic Gambit” |
文化观察;历史 Cultural Observation; History |
EP 的独特主张在于将 Fodor (1983) 的心理模块概念扩展到整个心智(Tooby & Cosmides, 2015)。语言学家诺姆·乔姆斯基早已提出了一种非感觉模块,这是一种与生俱来的、物种特有的语言习得机制,负责儿童的语言学习(例如,Chomsky, 2011)。Cosmides (1989; Fiddick, Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2017) 添加了作弊者检测模块,用于检测违反道德互惠规范的人,此后,其他模块也相继被提出(Geary, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 2015)。有时,EP 主义者声称根本不存在通用的认知过程,只有专门的模块,就像他们将心智比喻为一把由专门模块组成的瑞士军刀一样。 EP 提出,人类心智及其模块是在他们所谓的进化适应时代(EEA)进化而来的,即在农业发明之前的旧石器时代向人类(见下文)的过渡。
EP’s distinctive claim is the extension of Fodor’s (1983) concept of mental modules to the whole mind (Tooby & Cosmides, 2015). Linguist Noam Chomsky had already proposed a non-sensory module, an innate, species-specific language acquisition device responsible for children’s language learning (e.g., Chomsky, 2011). Cosmides (1989; Fiddick, Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2017) added a cheater detection module devoted to detecting people who violate norms about moral reciprocation, and other modules have been proposed since (Geary, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 2015). Sometimes, EPists claim that there are no general-purpose cognitive processes at all, just specialized modules, as in their metaphor of the mind as a Swiss Army knife of specialized modules. EP proposes that the human mind and its modules evolved during what they call the era of evolutionary adaptation (EEA), the transition to Homo (see below) during the Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) before the invention of agriculture.
HBE 的进化心理学方法与 EP 不同,因为它植根于动物行为生态学的古老领域,并且同样适用于人类受经济启发的理论模型无法应用于人类(Hames, 2014; Scelza & Coster, 2018)。心智被不可挽回地锁定在古代环境中的概念在 HBE 框架下毫无意义(Barrett, L. & Stulp, 2018; Smith, 2020);模块化也是如此(Stephen, 2014)。无论如何,GWAS 研究表明,过去几千年来存在着强大的自然选择(Burger et al., 2020)。HBE 主义者不是计算理论家。在可行的情况下,他们会寻找支撑动物行为的生理机制,但这不是他们理论的主要关注点。HBE 在 GCE 中找到了天然的盟友。GCE 补充了 HBE 文化,因为它创造了独特的人类生态位,人类个体可以适应并创造这些生态位。 GCE 天然地注重学习,尤其是模仿,将其作为人们学习和传播文化的关键手段 (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021; Heyes et al., 2019)。鉴于 HBE 与 GCE 的结合,我将两者统称为 HBE。
HBE’s approach to evolutionary psychology is different from EP’s because it’s rooted in the older field of animal behavioral ecology, and it applies to humans the same economically inspired theoretical modelling to humans (Hames, 2014; Scelza & Coster, 2018). The concept of a mind locked irretrievably to an ancient environment makes no sense in the HBE framework (Barrett, L. & Stulp, 2018; Smith, 2020); nor does modularity (Stephen, 2014). In any event, GWAS studies show evidence for strong natural selection in the last few thousand years (Burger et al., 2020). HBEists are not computational theorists. When feasible, they look for physiological mechanisms underpinning animal behavior, but it’s not a primary focus of their theories. HBE finds a natural ally in GCE. GCE adds to HBE cultures as creating uniquely human niches to which individual humans adapt and which they create. GCE naturally focuses on learning, especially imitation, as the key means by which people learn and spread culture (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021; Heyes et al., 2019). Because of the alliance of HBE and GCE I shall refer to both together as HBE.
EP 和 HBE 之间的关键理论差异也延伸到了方法论上。由于 EP 认为现代生活非自然,它需要一些方法来挖掘 Barash (1979) 曾经称之为“内心的低语”——我们现代化意识中 EEA 所塑造的潜意识。因此,EP 科学家使用自我报告工具(例如调查问卷)来揭示当今不被接受的欲望和动机,例如男人想要娶多个妻子(例如 Buss, 1989)。相比之下,在 HBE 框架下工作的科学家则对行为本身进行建模。最值得注意的是,他们玩的是数婴儿的“表型策略”(Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycette, 2002; Barrett & Stulp, 2018)。他们相信,人类思维是灵活的,能够在各种自然生态、文化生态位以及现代化等历史事件中实现最佳适应性。 HBE还从动物BE中继承了数学/经济模型的构建和测试能力,而这在EP中是没有的。
The key theoretical differences between EP and HBE carry over into methodology. Because EP regards modern life as unnatural, it needs ways to tap into what Barash (1979) once called the “whisperings within” our modernized consciousness from the EEA-forged unconscious underneath. Thus, EP scientists use self-report instruments, such as surveys, to reveal desires and motives that are frowned on today, such as men wanting multiple wives (e.g., Buss, 1989). In contrast, scientists working in the HBE framework model behavior itself. Most notably, they play the “phenotypic gambit” of counting babies (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycette, 2002; Barrett & Stulp, 2018). They believe that the human mind is flexible, able to optimize fitness under various natural ecologies, cultural niches, and historical events such as modernization. HBE also inherits from animal BE the constructing and testing of mathematical/economic models, not found in EP.
动物行为学家尼科·廷伯根(Niko Tinbergen,1963)提出,任何关于适应性的解释都应该回答四个问题。这些问题已产生广泛影响(Bateson & Lalande,2013;Nesse,2013),包括在EP(Tooby & Cosmides,2015)和HBE(Barrett、Dunbar & Lycette,2002)中。以下是Bateson和Lalande(2013)更新的这些问题,他们仍然以鸟鸣为例。数字1对应终极因果关系,数字2至4对应近因关系。
The ethologist Niko Tinbergen (1963) proposed that explanations should answer four questions about any posited adaptation. They have become widely influential (Bateson & Lalande, 2013; Nesse, 2013), including in EP (Tooby & Cosmides, 2015) and in HBE (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycette, 2002). Here they are, as updated by Bateson and Lalande (2013), using, as they do, birdsong as an example. Number 1 corresponds to ultimate causation and numbers 2 to 4 to proximate causation.
关于人类智力进化的理论主要有两类:马基雅维利智力假说(Byrne & Whiten, 1988;Hopper, van de Waal & Caldwell, 2018),现在通常被称为社会脑假说(Dunbar, 1998, 2016);以及生态智力假说(Johnson-Ulrich, 2018;Reader, Hager & Laland, 2011;Laland & Seed, 2021;Rosati, 2017)。后者认为,人类智力是动物行为适应能力的增强版,用于解决生存、觅食和交配等常见的环境问题。
There are two groups of theories about the evolution of human intelligence, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Hopper, van de Waal, & Caldwell, 2018), now usually known as the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998, 2016), and the ecological intelligence hypothesis (Johnson-Ulrich, 2018; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011; Laland & Seed, 2021; Rosati, 2017). The latter views human intelligence as a more powerful version of animals’ behavioral adaptations for solving the usual environmental problems of survival, foraging, and mating.
社会脑假说是一系列假设的集合,这些假设认为人类智力是一种适应性行为,它创造了并利用了我们合作的社会性和文化的生态位。社会脑假说是当今最受青睐的理论。我们将首先讨论作为群体生活必要前提的适应性行为。
The social brain hypothesis is a collection of proposals treating human intelligence as adaptations that created and then exploited our ecological niche of cooperative sociality and culture. The social brain hypothesis is the theoretical favorite today. We will begin by discussing adaptations that are necessary precursors to group life.
有时,自然界会变得凶残无情,因为攻击性可以带来适应的机会。回想一下我们用来作为同性选择例子的海滩主人。他不得不用暴力驱逐前任海滩主人,他的战斗胜利为他带来了许多配偶,让他可以生育后代。但现在,他发现自己周围都是被排除在外的繁殖雄性,他们渴望效仿他的成功。但主人和挑战者都会遭遇攻击性的弊端。无论谁赢,一方或双方都可能面临死亡或重创。因此,攻击性受稳定选择的影响:因为它能带来好处,所以被选择;但因为它可能损害适应性,所以也被选择。限制暴力是社会生活的先决条件。
Sometimes nature is red in tooth and claw, because aggression can bring fitness opportunities. Recall the beach master we used as an example of intrasexual selection. He had to violently oust the previous beach master, and his fighting success brought him many mates with whom to sire offspring. But he now finds himself surrounded by excluded breeding males wishing to emulate his success. But master and challenger run into the downside of aggression. No matter who wins, death or grave damage may befall one or both combatants. Aggression is thus subject to stabilizing selection: Because it can pay, it is selected for, but because it can harm fitness, it is also selected against. Constraints on violence are a precondition for social living.
利他主义是社会动物的黏合剂,使它们能够共同完成个体无法完成的事情,但它的存在挑战了达尔文的自然选择理论。例如,许多群居物种会发出警报叫声(Davies、Krebs & West,2012)。贝尔丁地松鼠成群觅食,有时一只松鼠看到捕食者靠近,就会站起来,发出尖锐的叫声,促使其他松鼠躲进洞穴。由于叫声,警报者会吸引捕食者的注意,因此更容易被捕获。12达尔文感到困惑:如果警报叫声是一种先天行为(动物很可能如此),那么它如何避免因损害警报者的健康而遭到灭绝?
Altruism is the glue of social animals, enabling them to do together what they can’t as individuals, but its existence challenged Darwin’s theory of natural selection. For example, many group-living species exhibit alarm calling (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012). Belding’s ground squirrels forage in groups, and it sometimes happens that one squirrel sees a predator approaching, stands up, and emits a high-pitched peeping that causes the other squirrels to go underground into their burrows. Because of its cry, the alarm caller attracts the attention of the predator, and so it is more likely to be caught.12 Darwin was puzzled: if alarm calling is an innate behavior, as it is likely to be in animals, how it could avoid being wiped out as deleterious to callers’ fitness?
汉密尔顿(Hamilton,1964)在一篇或许是自达尔文以来最重要的进化论论文中给出了答案。他提出了关于某些真社会性(极度社会性)昆虫的理论,例如蜜蜂,它们拥有一种名为单倍二倍体的罕见基因构成。在蜂群中,有一只负责繁殖的蜂王,一支由不育雌性“工蜂”组成的“空军”队伍,负责维护蜂巢并采集花粉,以及几只无所事事地在蜂群中徘徊的雄蜂(Wodehouse,1982)。工蜂们极其无私,为了协助蜂王繁殖而放弃自身的繁殖。
In perhaps the most important paper on evolution since Darwin, Hamilton (1964) provided an answer. He theorized about certain eusocial (extremely social) insects such as honeybees, who have an unusual genetic makeup called haplodiploidy. In bee colonies there is one breeding queen, an air force of sterile female “worker bees” who maintain the hive and forage for pollen, and a few male drones who hang around uselessly (Wodehouse, 1982). The workers are altruistic as can be, foregoing their own reproduction to assist the queen’s.
当新的蜂王诞生时,雄蜂便迎来了它们交配的时刻。它们会飞到空中与年轻的蜂王交配。13年轻的蜂王会将配偶的精液保存在体内,然后组建新的蜂群。当它们产卵时,它们要么将精液添加到卵中,要么不添加。受精卵会发育成为工蜂,它们在基因上是单倍体,与大多数有性繁殖的生物一样,拥有两组染色体。未受精卵会发育成为雄蜂,只拥有母亲的染色体。真社会性昆虫不同寻常的基因不对称性,为汉密尔顿解决利他主义的挑战提供了关键的解决方案。
When new queens are born, the drones have their moment, flying up to mate with the young queens in the air,13 who save their mate’s semen in their bodies and then create a new bee colony. When they lay eggs, they either add semen to the egg or withhold it. Fertilized eggs become workers, and they are genetically haploid, like most sexually reproducing creatures, having two sets of chromosomes. Unfertilized eggs become drones, having only their mother’s chromosomes. Eusocial insects’ unusual genetic asymmetry provided the key to Hamilton’s solution to the challenge of altruism.
单倍体生物与其父母和兄弟姐妹的平均亲缘关系为50%,因为它们分别获得了母亲和父亲一半的DNA样本。然而,雌蜂最初继承的并非父亲的DNA样本,而是100%的DNA样本,因为它们都从父亲那里继承了相同的染色体。此外,它们还会从母亲的染色体中添加母亲的DNA样本。因此,它们之间的平均亲缘关系为75%。进化有利于基因复制的成功,因此工蜂会放弃生育与自己有50%亲缘关系的后代,而选择通过蜂王生育与自己有75%亲缘关系的姐妹,这是有利的。事实上,蜂王并非君主,而是一个被女儿们用来生产更多后代的工厂。她与女儿们只有50%的亲缘关系。
Haploid creatures are related to their parents and to their siblings on average 50%, because they get samples of half their mother’s DNA and half of their father’s. However, female bees begin by inheriting not a sample of their father’s DNA, but 100% of it because they all inherit the same chromosomes from him. To this they add a sample of their mother’s DNA from her chromosomes. As a result, they are on average related to each other 75%. Evolution favors gene-copying success, so it pays workers to give up having their own offspring, to whom they would be related 50%, in favor of producing 75% related sisters via the queen. In fact, the queen bee is not a sovereign, but a factory used by her daughters to make more of themselves. She is related to her daughters only 50%.
我们发现了一种极端的利他主义:为了亲属牺牲个人利益。更重要的是,汉密尔顿发现他的模型也可以扩展到有性繁殖的生物。如果一个人对与你共享基因的亲属表现出利他主义,那么按照达尔文的理论,你不仅能从自己的繁殖中受益,还能从他们的繁殖中受益。单二倍体昆虫是极端的例子,但一般来说,两种生物的亲缘关系越密切,它们彼此之间就应该越利他。汉密尔顿的论文奠定了之前讨论过的亲属选择和包容性适应度的理论基础。工蜂的个体适应度为0,但它的亲属选择适应度却非常高。
We find here an extreme altruism: sacrifice of one’s personal interest for the sake of one’s relatives. More importantly, Hamilton saw that his model could be extended to sexually reproducing creatures, too. If one is altruistic toward relatives, who share genes with you, you benefit, in Darwinian terms, from their reproduction as well as your own. Haplodiploid insects are the extreme case, but, in general, the more two creatures are related, the more altruistic they should be toward one another. Hamilton’s paper was the foundation of the ideas of kin selection and inclusive fitness discussed earlier. A worker bee’s individual fitness is 0, but her kin-selected fitness is very high.
亲属选择解决了达尔文关于利他主义的难题。如果警报鸣叫是基于亲属选择的利他主义,那么松鼠在有亲属在场时应该比在无亲属关系的松鼠在场时更频繁地鸣叫,而这正是我们的发现。此外,鸣叫者比听到鸣叫的松鼠更容易被捕食,这表明鸣叫是真正的利他行为,会危及鸣叫者的生存 (Daly, Krebs, and West, 2012)。
Kin selection cleared up Darwin’s problem with altruism. If alarm calling is based on kin selected altruism, then squirrels should utter them more when relatives are around than when unrelated squirrels are present, which is what we find. Moreover, the alarm callers were more likely to be predated than those who heard the call, indicating that alarm calls are genuinely altruistic, risking the survival of the caller (Daly, Krebs, and West, 2012).
利他主义的另一条途径是互惠利他主义(Trivers,1971,2006;另见 Kay、Lehmann & Keller,2019 和 Kay、Keller & Lehmann,2020,了解从互惠利他主义中分离亲属选择的困难)。互惠利他主义是谚语“你帮我挠背,我就帮你挠背”的背后含义。互惠利他主义将利他主义的范围扩展到遗传亲属之外,包括任何两个能够互相帮助的生物。其最简单的形式是互惠共生,即两个生物互相帮助解决眼前的问题。一个例子是“清洁工”鱼,它们清除鲨鱼等掠食性鱼类口中的寄生虫,而鲨鱼则通过不吃这些寄生虫、放弃容易获得的食物来回报它们。然而,对认知科学和人类思维进化而言,更重要的是在帮助与被帮助之间存在时间间隔时的互惠利他主义。这种利他主义形式是人类独有的,或几乎独有的(Bshary & Raihani,2017;Watts,2015),对人类认知过程的进化具有重要意义。
Another path to altruism is reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971, 2006; see also Kay, Lehmann, & Keller, 2019 and Kay, Keller, & Lehmann, 2020, for difficulties disentangling kin selected from reciprocal altruism.). Reciprocal altruism is behind the adage, “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine.” Reciprocal altruism extends the range of altruism beyond that of genetic relatives to include any two organisms capable of helping one another. Its simplest form is mutualism, in which two organisms help each other solve an immediate problem. An example are “cleaner” fishes who clear parasites from the mouths of predatory fish such as sharks, who reciprocate by not eating them, foregoing easy meals. More important for cognitive science and the evolution of the human mind, however, is reciprocal altruism when there is a temporal gap between helping and being helped. This form of altruism is unique or nearly unique to humans (Bshary & Raihani, 2017; Watts, 2015) and has important implications for the evolution of human cognitive processes.
EP 声称,我们的心智在 EEA 时期得到了决定性的塑造,我们只需关注当时塑造我们的选择性力量。但事实上,EEA 并非决定性因素:人类进化并未止步于旧石器时代,而是持续至今。
EP claims that our minds were decisively shaped during the EEA, and we need attend to only the selective forces that molded us then. But the EEA was not, in fact, decisive: Human evolution did not stop with the Paleolithic but continues to the present.
人类从类人猿祖先进化到智人,曾经有一个简单的线性故事。然而,研究表明,人类进化并非一条发展线,甚至不是一棵谱系树,而是一棵枝繁叶茂的灌木,尤其是在非洲,那里人属进化而来。Bergström 等人 (2021) 将这个故事分为三个章节。第一章始于大约一百万年前,当时现代人类祖先与更古老的类人种群体分离。第二章发生在6 万至 30 万年前的非洲,包括尼安德特人和丹尼索瓦人在内的人属进化而来。第三章是智人(最后存活下来的猿类)从所有古猿形态中分离出来,并开始在世界各地扩张,大约在 4 万至 6 万年前开始。从进化的角度来看,我们是一个年轻的物种,充满希望,但尚未经过充分的考验 (Liu, Mao, Krause, & Fu, 2021)。
Once there was a simple linear story of human evolution from ape-like forebears to Homo sapiens. However, research shows that human evolution is not a line of development or even a tree of descent, but a bush of many branches, especially in Africa, where the genus Homo evolved. Bergström et al. (2021) divide the story into three chapters. The first began about a million years ago with the separation of modern human ancestors from older human-like groups. The second occurred in Africa with the evolution of the genus Homo, including Neandertals and Denisovans, between 60,000 and 300,000 years ago. The third was the separation of Homo sapiens, the last ape standing, from all archaic forms and its expansion through the world, beginning about 40,000 to 60,000 years ago. Evolutionarily, we are a young species, full of promise but not fully tested (Liu, Mao, Krause, & Fu, 2021).
20 世纪古人类学最重要的发现是南方古猿阿法种(来自阿法尔山谷),它被非正式地称为“露西”,因为在《古人类起源之前》(Before Times)中,发现队的磁带播放器正在播放披头士乐队的歌曲《戴着钻石的天空中的露西》(Johanson, 1982)。15露西之所以重要,是因为与大多数仅由头骨组成的发现不同,她的颅后骨骼大部分完好无损,这解答了人类进化中一个古老的“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的难题:是先有我们的大脑和创造性智力,还是先有双足行走和用来制造工具的双手?露西的大脑大约和现代黑猩猩一样大,但她用两只脚走路。16后来的发现表明,双足行走早在露西之前就已出现,距今约1200万年 (Baras, 2019; Böhme, Spassov, & Fuss et al . , 2019)。双足行走和双手的出现远早于大脑和工具的出现。
The most important find in paleoanthropology in the 20th century was Australopithecus (southern ape) afarensis (from the Afar valley), known informally as “Lucy,” because the Beatles’ “Lucy in the sky with diamonds” was playing on the discovery team’s tape player in the Before Times without Spotify (Johanson, 1982).15 Lucy was important because, unlike most finds, which consist only of a skull, much of her post-cranial skeleton was intact, furnishing the answer to an old chicken-or-egg conundrum of human evolution: Which came first, our big brains and creative intelligence or bipedalism and the hands intelligence uses to create tools? Lucy had a brain about the size of modern chimpanzees but walked on two feet.16 Later finds suggest that bipedalism originated well before Lucy, as much as 12 million years ago (Baras, 2019; Böhme, Spassov, & Fuss et al., 2019). Bipedalism and hands came well before brains and tools.
人属的第一位成员是能人(Homo habilis,意为“能工巧匠”)。17能人发现的化石之所以得名,是因为它与简单的石器工具有关,尽管最早的人类工具很可能是棍棒和其他在考古学中遗失的易腐物品。后来,人属成员在非洲进化成不同的物种。
The first member of the genus Homo is Homo habilis (Handy man).17 The habilis find was so named because it was associated with simple stone tools, though it’s likely the earliest human tools were sticks and other perishable objects lost to archaeology. Later members of Homo developed into different species in Africa.
第一个离开非洲的人类是直立人18,这个名字有些不恰当,因为当初人们认为他们就是最初的双足人类。直立人非常成功,遍布除欧洲以外的大部分旧大陆,并在两百多万年的时间里始终保持原样。值得注意的是,他们使用的一种工具——简单的手斧——竟然保持不变,这与尼安德特人和智人使用的专业化且不断改进的工具形成了鲜明对比。直立人也是第一个定期使用火的古人类(Morton,2020)(图9.4)。
The first human to leave Africa was Homo erectus,18 somewhat misnamed because when found it was thought to be the original bipedal human. Homo erectus was very successful, spreading throughout most of the Old World except for Europe, and surviving unchanged for over two million years. Remarkably, its one tool type, a simple hand axe, remained unaltered, in sharp contrast with the specialized and ever improving tools of Homo neandertalensis and Homo sapiens. Homo erectus is also the first hominin to regularly use fire (Morton, 2020) (Figure 9.4).
不同类型的人属(Homo),它们之间的关系,以及它们如何离开非洲,构成了高威-威瑟姆(Galway-Witham)、科尔(Cole)和斯特林格(Stringer)所称的人类进化“中间的混乱”。人属(Homo)有很多种,它们都起源于非洲。学者们对人属(Homo)的数量、哪些人属离开了非洲以及它们离开的原因争论不休(Bons et al., 2019)。文化和社会发展最为成熟的物种是人属(Homo) 。尼安德特人与智人(我们)。这两个物种都生活在具有社会结构的群体中,使用各种专门用于特定任务的石器,穿戴服饰并进行装饰。智人的艺术更为发达(例如著名的洞穴壁画),并且可能拥有独特的语言,尽管这是一个难以解决的问题(Sykes,2020;Conde-Valverde 等人,2021)。尼安德特人和智人进行过杂交,如今的每个人都拥有大约 2% 到 4% 的尼安德特人 DNA。尼安德特人灭绝的原因似乎是他们无法像智人那样适应各种气候,因此也无法像智人那样适应气候变化。尼安德特人不应被视为“迈向人类的最后一步”,而应被视为一个成功的物种,只是不如智人那么成功。智人吸收了他们,而不是击败了他们 (Compton et al., 2021; Wynn, Overmann, & Coolidge, 2016; Vaesen, Dusseldorp, & Brandt, 2021; Timmermann, 2020)。他们的大脑和我们一样大,我们与他们共享的一些基因编码了额叶的发育,额叶是人类智力的核心 (McCoy, Wakefield, & Akey, 2017; Sykes, 2020),而尼安德特人的基因有助于抵抗新冠肺炎 (Zeberg & Pääbo, 2021)。
The various types of Homo, their relationships to one another, and their exits from Africa constitute what Galway-Witham, Cole, and Stringer call “the muddle in the middle” of human evolution. There are many sorts of Homo, all of whom originated in Africa, and scholars argue about how many there were, which ones left Africa, and why they did so (Bons et al., 2019). The most culturally and socially sophisticated species were Homo neandertalensis and Homo sapiens (us). Both species lived in socially structured groups, used a variety of stone tools specialized for particular tasks, wore clothing, and decorated things. Sapiens art was more developed (e.g., the famous cave paintings) and they possibly uniquely had language, though this is a difficult question to settle (Sykes, 2020; Conde-Valverde et al., 2021). Neandertals and sapiens interbred, and everyone living today has about two to four percent Neandertal DNA. It appears that Neandertals went extinct because they could not adapt to the range of climates that sapiens could, and thus could not adapt to climate change as well as sapiens. Neandertals should not be thought of as the “last step to humans,” but as a successful species that was just not as successful as Homo sapiens, who absorbed them rather than defeating them (Compton et al., 2021; Wynn, Overmann, & Coolidge, 2016; Vaesen, Dusseldorp, & Brandt, 2021; Timmermann, 2020). Their brains were as big as ours, and some of the genes we share with them code for development of the frontal lobe, the seat of human intelligence (McCoy, Wakefield, & Akey, 2017; Sykes, 2020), and Neandertal genes aid resistance to COVID-19 (Zeberg & Pääbo, 2021).
在人类进化理论中,人类的三大显著特征——双足行走、使用工具和更大的脑容量——一直存在联系。我们之前提到过双足行走与使用工具之间的联系。双足行走也与大脑进化有关。双足行走扩大了产道,使得大脑袋的婴儿能够出生。长期以来,人们一直认为双足行走至少在一定程度上是为了适应不断扩大的脑容量而产生的适应性变化,但现在我们知道双足行走早于使用工具和大脑容量的出现,因此双足行走必定是导致智人进化的关键初始适应性变化。Lovejoy(1988、2008、2010;de Silva 等人,2021)认为,我们应该将人性视为一系列特征,这些特征是作为一组相互强化的社会适应性共同进化而来的。对洛夫乔伊的理论至关重要的是,人们逐渐达成共识,认为人属并非像长期以来人们所认为的那样,是由类猿物种进化而来(Almécija 等人,2021)。在非洲大裂谷扩张之后,我们独特的适应性以及它们独特的适应性各自独立出现,从而将两条进化路线分开。
Three distinctive human traits—bipedalism, tool use, and a large brain—have always been linked in theories of human evolution. We mentioned the bipedalism-tool use link earlier. Bipedalism is linked to brain evolution, too. Bipedalism enlarges the birth canal, making it possible for large-headed human infants to be born. It had been thought for a long time that bipedalism was at least in part an adaptation that coped with the enlarging brain, but now that we know bipedalism predated tool use and big brains, bipedalism must have been the key initial adaptation leading to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Lovejoy (1988, 2008, 2010; de Silva et al., 2021) argues we should look at human nature as a suite of traits that evolved together as a mutually reinforcing set of social adaptations. Important to Lovejoy’s theory is the emerging consensus that Homo did not evolve out of ape-like species (Almécija et al., 2021) as has long been assumed. Our unique and their unique adaptations emerged independently, after Africa’s Great Rift Valley widened, separating the two lines of evolution.
洛夫乔伊的理论基于地猿始祖种(Ardipithecus ramidus),它是露西的前身,可能是人类和猿类的共同祖先(Almécija 等人,2021 年)(图 9.5)。
Lovejoy’s theory is based on the species Ardipithecus ramidus, a precursor of Lucy, and a likely common ancestor of humans and apes (Almécija et al., 2021) (Figure 9.5).
随着阿尔迪的祖先从树梢生活转移到地面生活,双足行走开始出现(图的左上角)。
Bipedalism arose (upper left box of the Figure) as Ardi’s ancestors moved from living in treetops to living near the ground.
直立的姿势使阿尔迪能够有效地收集食物并把它带回家。19由此产生的构成人类适应套件的复杂特征为早期人类面临的关键问题—— K 选择陷阱 ——提供了解决方案。物种可以根据一系列的繁殖策略进行排列。在r 选择中,父母有很多后代,但几乎不提供任何照顾;大多数后代会死亡,但仍有足够多的后代存活下来,以保持父母的基因延续。在K 选择中,父母的后代数量很少,但他们在出生后提供照顾,以便大多数后代能够成年。r选择物种的后代往往是早熟的,从出生起就能独立生存,而 K 选择物种的后代往往是晚成性的,在出生时和之后的一段时间内都无助。
Upright posture allowed Ardi to efficiently gather food and carry it home.19 The resulting complex of traits comprising the human adaptive suite provided solutions to the key problem faced by early humans, the K selection trap. Species can be arranged on a continuum of reproductive strategies. In r selection, parents have many offspring but provide little, if any, parental care; most offspring die, but enough survive to keep the parents’ genes going. In K selection, parents have small numbers of offspring, but they provide care after birth so that most reach adulthood. Offspring of r selected species tend to be precocial, able from birth to survive on their own, while those from K selected species tend to be altricial, helpless at birth and for some time afterward.
海龟是r选择的一个例子。父母在海里交配,母亲游到海滩,在沙滩上挖个洞,把许多卵埋进去,然后游走。几周后,幼龟孵化出来,争先恐后地爬向大海,只有少数幼龟为了躲避聚集在一起的捕食者而游走。鸟类是k选择的一个例子。成年鸟类至少交配一个繁殖季,筑巢,然后生下无助的幼龟,幼龟必须养育它们直到羽翼丰满。现代智人显然是k选择的,他们的后代是晚成性的,尤其是在发达国家,对父母的依赖可能会持续到成年早期。k选择的潜在死胡同是灭绝:后代数量太少,无法维持物种的生存。双足行走是减少暴力、促进合作的社会结构的基础,这一过程被称为自我驯化。 (Hare & Woods,2020;Shilton,Breski & Jablonka,2020;Wrangham,2019)自私和暴力的人——以及他们的基因——被驱逐出了早期人类群体。
An example of r selection is the sea turtle. Parents mate at sea, the mother swims to a beach, digs a hole in the sand, buries her many eggs in it, and swims away. A few weeks later, the young hatch and scramble to the sea, with only a few evading the predators who gather for easy meals. Birds exemplify K selection. Adults mate for at least one breeding season, build a nest, and give birth to helpless hatchlings whom they must provision until fledging. Modern day Homo sapiens is clearly K selected and its children altricial, especially in the developed world where dependence on parents can last into early adulthood. The potential dead end of K selection is extinction: Having too few offspring to support the species’ existence. Bipedalism was the basis for a social structure that reduced violence and fostered cooperation, a process called self-domestication (Hare & Woods, 2020; Shilton, Breski, & Jablonka, 2020; Wrangham, 2019). The selfish and the violent—and their genes—were cast out from early human groups.
群居生活的一个主要问题是雄性之间为了获得可育雌性而展开的竞争。正如我们在鳍足类动物身上所见,雄性之间的竞争可能是暴力的,甚至是致命的。黑猩猩拥有专门用于性暴力的特化特征,例如用于有效攻击的牙齿(SCC)和受腹囊保护的生殖器。阿尔迪和人类都没有SCC,而人类男性的生殖器——尤其是在直立战斗时——并没有天然的保护。雄性竞争的另一种方式是精子竞争(Baker,1996)。雄性产生的精子数量超过了使雌性受精所需的数量,在包括黑猩猩在内的许多物种中,多个雄性会与一个发情期的雌性交配,它们的精子会在她的生殖道内竞争使其卵子受精。从进化的角度来看,雌性会利用化学物质和复杂的生殖结构来抵御不良精子的侵袭,而雄性则会通过进化出阴茎来抵御这些精子(Schilthuizen,2014)。人类男性的精子竞争较为弱化 (Leivers & Simmons, 2014)。尽管它们一次射出的精子足以使北美所有女性受精,但它们产生的精子数量相对较少,比许多体型较小的灵长类动物少,而且人类的生殖器官也较为简单。综合起来,这些事实表明,人类血统很久以前就变得相对和平了(Gómez、Verdú、González-Megías & Méndez,2016)。
A major problem with group living is competition among males for access to fertile females. As we saw with the pinnipeds, male-male competition can be violent and deadly. Chimpanzees possess specializations for intrasexual violence, such as teeth specialized for effective offense (the SCC) and genitals protected in an abdominal pouch. Neither Ardi nor humans have the SCC, and human male genitals—especially when standing upright to fight—are not naturally protected. Another way males compete is by sperm competition (Baker, 1996). Males produce more sperm than is necessary to fertilize a female, and in many species, including chimpanzees, multiple males mate with a female in estrus and their sperm compete within her reproductive tract to fertilize her eggs. Evolutionarily, females defend themselves against undesirable sperm with chemicals and complex genital structures, and males respond with penises evolving to defeat them (Schilthuizen, 2014). Sperm competition is muted in human males (Leivers & Simmons, 2014). Although they produce enough sperm in one ejaculate to fertilize every woman in North America, they produce relatively fewer than many smaller primates, and human genitalia are uncomplicated. Taken together, these facts suggest that the human lineage became relatively pacific a long time ago (Gómez, Verdú, González-Megías, & Méndez, 2016).
减少群体内男性竞争的关键是社会一夫一妻制。与黑猩猩不同,雄性不会与每一位发情期的雌性竞争交配,原始人类会与一雌一雄结成配偶联盟。经过选择,晚熟的后代需要照顾,父母之间的合作纽带有助于实现这一点,同时,通过鼓励异养父母来减少群体成员之间的竞争,也有助于提高公平性 (Marshall et al., 2021)。随着人类大脑尺寸的增大,人类婴儿的大脑体积也随之增大,他们不得不在未成熟的情况下出生,这使得对他们的社会支持变得更加重要。失去发情期对于减少男性暴力至关重要,而且人类普遍且独特地选择在私密环境中交配,这样男性性唤起的伴侣就不会被其他可能变得具有竞争性的男性看到 (Mocha, 2020)。双足行走导致了面对面的交配。人类的面部特征各不相同,大脑拥有专门的面部识别通路。面对面的性行为促进了男女之间愉悦的个人联系,促使雄性为配偶和子女觅食,这进一步奠定了K选择照顾的基础。在人类中,忠诚的关系和提供育儿服务会降低诱发攻击性的激素睾酮水平(Gray等人,2004)。随着彼此之间的争斗减少,雄性可以合作狩猎和巡逻敌人。随着群体的壮大,互惠利他主义会进化成为亲属选择利他主义的强化因素,甚至可能替代亲属选择利他主义(Palmer, Coe, & Steadman, 2015; Gintis, van Schaik, & Boehm, 2015)。人类也会惩罚非利他主义者(Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003)。人类开始关心彼此的福祉,而黑猩猩却没有这样做(Silk 等人,2005 年;Vonk 等人,2008 年)。
The key to reducing intra-group male competition was social monogamy. Instead of males competing to mate with every female in estrus, as chimpanzees do, proto-humans formed pair-bonded alliances between one female and one male. K selected, altricial offspring require care, and cooperative bonding between parents aids this, as does reduced agonism between group members by encouraging alloparenting, which, in turn, increases fairness (Marshall et al., 2021). As human brain size increased, human babies’ brains got bigger and they had to be born immature, making social support for them more important. Loss of estrus was important to reducing male violence, and humans universally and uniquely mate in private so that a male’s sexually aroused mate is not seen by other males who might become competitively aggressive (Mocha, 2020). Bipedalism led to face-to-face copulation. Human faces are distinct, and the brain has specialized pathways for facial recognition. Face-to-face sex fostered pleasurable personal bonds between male and female, motivating the male to forage for his mate and his children, a further basis for K selected care. In humans, being in a committed relationship and providing childcare reduce levels of the aggression-inducing hormone testosterone (Gray et al., 2004). As fighting among themselves decreased, males could cooperatively hunt and patrol for enemies. As groups grew, reciprocal altruism would evolve as a reinforcer of, and possible substitute for, kin-selected altruism (Palmer, Coe, & Steadman, 2015; Gintis, van Schaik, & Boehm, 2015). Humans also came to punish non-altruists (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Humans came to care for each other’s welfare in ways we do not see in chimpanzees (Silk et al., 2005; Vonk et al., 2008).
这种早期进化的适应性社会适应能力,使得人类大脑后来的发育、工具的使用以及群体规模的扩大成为可能。互惠利他主义需要两种新的认知能力:识别个体(Yozinski,2017)和记住个体(Stephens & Duque,2017),尤其是关于是否信任个体(Mercier,2020;Apicella & Silk,2019;Bell & Buchner,2011)。后者的发展需要自传体记忆的进化。从生存的角度来看,条件反射和程序性记忆通常就足够了。知道火和狮子的危险很重要,但记住你第一次烧伤自己是什么时候,或者哪只狮子吃掉了你的兄弟姐妹则不那么重要。为了实现互惠利他主义,我们需要能够识别个体(对人类来说,最重要的是通过面孔),并记住我们过去与个体的互动。类人猿似乎没有自传体记忆(Pladevall 等人,2020 年)。
This early evolving adaptive suite of social adaptations made possible the later development of the human brain, tool use, and enlarged group size. Reciprocal altruism required two new cognitive abilities, recognizing individuals (Yozinski, 2017) and remembering them (Stephens & Duque, 2017), especially about whether to trust them (Mercier, 2020; Apicella & Silk, 2019; Bell & Buchner, 2011). The latter development required evolution of autobiographical memory. From the standpoint of survival, conditioning and procedural memory are usually sufficient. Knowing that fire and lions are dangerous is important, but it’s less important to remember when you first burned yourself or which lion ate your sibling. In order to carry out reciprocal altruism, we need to be able to identify individuals, in humans most importantly by faces, and to remember our interactions with them in the past. The great apes do not appear to have autobiographical memory (Pladevall et al., 2020).
语言,尤其是八卦,对互惠利他主义也至关重要。我们可以从八卦中了解谁危险谁不危险,谁值得信赖谁不值得信赖。将危险和狡猾的成员从早期人类群体中驱逐出去,是一种选择性繁殖的形式,也是自我驯化的本质。尽管语言的起源仍然是个谜,且充满争议(Pletkoff & Marslen-Wilson,2018;Chomsky,2011),尼安德特人装饰艺术的出现,尤其是智人壮观的洞穴艺术20 (Higham,2021),证明了象征性思维与人属的出现。然而,基于语言的有效和谐群体规模有一个上限,约为 150,现在被称为邓巴数字(Dunbar,2011,2017;但参见 Lindenfors、Wartel 和 Lind,2021 21)。进化心理学认为,人性是在欧洲经济区 (EEA) 中进化的,因此现代人确实是 WEIRD:更新世的头脑可以驾驶火箭飞向火星。但其他人认为,人类进化在 EEA 之后加速了(Cochrane 和 Harpending,2009):WEIRD 正在成为人性。
Also important to reciprocal altruism is language, especially gossip. We can learn from gossip who is dangerous and who is not, who is trustworthy and who is not. Expelling dangerous and devious members from early human groups was a form of selective breeding and the essence of self-domestication. Although the origins of language remain mysterious and controversial (Pletkoff & Marslen-Wilson, 2018; Chomsky, 2011), that symbolic thinking appeared with the genus Homo is attested by the appearance of decorative art among the Neandertals and especially Homo sapiens’ spectacular cave art20 (Higham, 2021). There is an upper limit, however, to effective and harmonious group size based on speech, about 150, now famous as Dunbar’s number (Dunbar, 2011, 2017; but see Lindenfors, Wartel, & Lind, 202121). Evolutionary psychology holds that human nature evolved in the EEA so that modern humans are truly WEIRD: Pleistocene minds flying rockets to Mars. But others believe that human evolution accelerated after the EEA (Cochrane & Harpending, 2009): WEIRD is becoming human nature.
虽然社会脑假说很有说服力,但支持旧生态学观点的人认为,人类认知不仅仅是社会智力(Mcelreath,2018)。具体来说,社会智力过于模块化,无法解释领域通用智力和在科学、工程、商业和其他领域明显体现的解决问题的能力。制造比直立人更精密的石器,或许推动了灵活智力在社会性需求之外的进化。
While the social brain hypothesis is persuasive, advocates of the older ecological viewpoint think there is more to human cognition than social intelligence (Mcelreath, 2018). Specifically, it’s too modular, unable to explain domain-general intelligence and problem-solving abilities clearly manifest in science, engineering, business and other areas. Making stone tools more sophisticated than those of Homo erectus may have driven evolution of flexible intelligence outside the demands of sociality.
例如,最后一批尼安德特人的一项关键创新是用于制造专门的燧石工具的准备好的核心技术22 (图 9.6),这一创新与智人共享,智人在此基础上进行了进一步的阐述。
For example, a key innovation of the last Neandertals, shared with Homo sapiens, who elaborated on it, was the prepared core technique22 for making specialized flint tools (Figure 9.6).
制作者首先要准备一大块燧石,将其削成锥形。然后,制作者通常会用骨头用力按压锥体底部的边缘,直到剥下长长的燧石薄片。燧石薄片的边缘非常锋利;如果用黑曜石制作,其锋利程度甚至比外科医生的手术刀还要锋利。这些过程需要认知能力,包括高级工作记忆 (Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010)。制作者必须选择合适的岩石来制作岩芯;规划如何将其制成岩芯;按正确的顺序执行这些步骤;选择合适的位置施加合适的压力来制作薄片;并随着薄片从岩芯上剥落而调整计划。
The maker begins with a large piece of flint which is flaked until it resembles a cone. Then, usually using a bone, the maker presses hard on the edge of the bottom of the cone until a long flake comes off. It has very sharp edges; when made with obsidian they can be sharper than surgeons’ scalpels. These processes require cognitive skills, including advanced working memory (Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010). One must choose the right rock to make the core; plan how to make it into a core; carry out these steps in the right order; choose the right locations at which to apply the right pressure the make the flakes; and adjust one’s plans as the flakes come off the core.
此外,为了使技能得以传承,模仿学习必须不断发展(Heyes,2019;2020);为了发展和完善这些技能——正如所发生的那样——创造性思维必须不断发展。最后,工具制造传统的存在表明,智人的群体规模在不断扩大。对于鸣禽等动物而言,群体规模的缩小会导致文化传统的丧失(Crates 等人,2021)。如果一位工具制造大师去世,整个群体的技能就会被夺走。群体越大,大师就越多,文化传统也更有可能延续下去。尼安德特人灭绝的最普遍共识是群体规模正在缩小(Vaesen、Dusseldorp & Brandt,2021);也许尼安德特文化在他们之前就消亡了。
Moreover, for the skills to survive, learning by imitation must evolve (Heyes, 2019; 2020); to advance and improve them—as happened—creative thought must evolve. Finally, existence of tool-making traditions suggests that group size was increasing among Homo sapiens. Among animals such as song-birds reduction in group size can cause loss of cultural traditions (Crates et al., 2021). If a master toolmaker dies, the skills are taken from the whole group. The larger the group, the more masters there will be, and cultural traditions are more likely to persist. The most agreed on cause of Neandertal extinction was decreasing group size (Vaesen, Dusseldorp, & Brandt, 2021); perhaps Neandertal culture died before they did.
当前的地质时期是全新世,距今约12000年。23人类从狩猎采集的流动生活转变为农耕的定居生活。这种转变改变了人类所适应的生态环境,带来了新的生存和繁衍问题。
The current geological period is the Holocene, dated to about 12,000 years ago.23 Humans shifted from the mobile life of hunter-gatherers to the settled life of farmers. This shift changed the ecology to which humans adapted, posing new problems of survival and reproduction.
政治理论和实际政治中的一个基本问题是,社会(即有组织的、大规模的社会群体,今天通常以国家的形式组织)是否是自然的。因为我们生活在其中,所以我们大多假设它们是自然的,但重要的思想家们对此持有不同意见。亚里士多德在其著作《政治学》(公元前380年)中声称:“显然,国家是自然的创造,而人天生就是政治动物。” 另一方面,让-雅克·卢梭(1712-1778)在其著作《论不平等》(1755年)中认为社会是一项狡猾的发明:“第一个圈出一块地并说‘这是我的’,并且发现人们足够单纯地相信他的人,才是公民社会的真正奠基人。”
A fundamental question in political theory and in practical politics is whether or not society, meaning organized, large-scale social groups, today usually organized as states, are natural. Because we live in them, we mostly assume they are, but important thinkers have disagreed. In his Politics (380 BCE), Aristotle claimed, “It is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal.” On the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) in Discourse on Inequality (1755) contended that society was a devious invention: “The man who first enclosed a piece of ground and said, ‘This is mine,’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.”
从进化的角度来看,邓巴数社会群体似乎是自然选择的产物。那么国家呢?如果你上过社会心理学课程,你可能听过亚里士多德的名言“人是社会动物”(例如,Aronson,2018),这是一个简洁却过于简化的翻译。亚里士多德提出的问题是政治学的基石:社会——亚里士多德认为的国家——是人性的一部分,还是强加于人性的(Fukyama,2011)?
From the standpoint of evolution, it appears that Dunbar-number social groups are a creation of natural selection. Are states? If you’ve had a course in social psychology, you have probably encountered Aristotle’s saying, “man is a social animal” (e.g., Aronson, 2018), a snappy but simplistic translation. The question Aristotle addressed is foundational for political science: Is society—what Aristotle takes to be the state—part of human nature or is it imposed on human nature (Fukyama, 2011)?
亚里士多德的老师柏拉图预示着邓巴的观点,他称赞小规模的村落社会是自然而有益于幸福的。在他典型的希腊式思维中,这些社会的缺陷——他称之为“猪国”——在于其日常幸福不利于成就伟业,而伟业只有在大国中才能实现。他的《理想国》 (第二十四卷,柏拉图,公元前375年)探讨了这样一个问题:尽管国家为取得卓越成就奠定了基础,但它并非自然而然,始终存在腐败的危险,最终演变为民主——人人平等,无人伟大——以及暴政——即一位领导者自私地拥有至高无上的权力。他描绘了一个理想国,该国建立在关于起源的谎言之上,由追求卓越智力的精英哲学家阶层统治,并由精英战士协助和保护。在他理想中的城市卡利波利斯,言论和思想受到严格控制,以防止腐败。与柏拉图不同,亚里士多德认为从村庄到国家的转变是自然而然的,因为国家实现了自给自足,为人类繁荣提供了必要的基础。与柏拉图一样,亚里士多德也摒弃了民主,转而推崇贵族制(由“最优秀的人”——“贵族”——统治),但他相信国家是自然的,因此他拒绝了柏拉图的乌托邦主义。
Anticipating Dunbar, Aristotle’s teacher Plato praised small-scale village societies as natural and conducive to happiness. In his typically Greek mind, their defect—he calls them “pig states”—was that their quotidian happiness was inimical to greatness, which could be achieved only in a large state. His Republic24 (Plato, 375 BCE) wrestled with the problem that although it provided the foundations for high achievement, the state is unnatural, always in danger of corruption into democracy—where all are equal and no one great—and then into tyranny—where one leader is selfishly great. He prescribes an ideal state founded on a lie of origin, ruled by a meritocratic class of philosophers pursuing greatness of intellect, aided and protected by elite warriors. In his ideal city Kallipolis, speech and thought are tightly controlled to prevent their corruption. Unlike Plato, Aristotle saw the passage from villages to the state as natural, because states achieve self-sufficiency, providing the necessary basis for human flourishing. Like Plato, Aristotle rejected democracy for aristocracy (rule by “the best,” the aristoi), but believing states to be natural, he rejected Plato’s utopianism.
全新世的决定性事件是农业的发明和城市的出现。城市规模超过了邓巴的数字,需要新的社会控制形式,而这种形式是面对面的控制和流言蜚语无法实现的。邓巴(1993)观察到,一些宗教派别,例如胡特尔派,想要避开国家正式的社会控制机制——警察和法院——当他们的人口规模远远超过邓巴的数字时,他们的社区就会分裂。
The defining event of the Holocene was the invention of agriculture and the appearance of cities. City sizes exceed Dunbar’s number and require new forms of social control that face-to-face control and gossip cannot. Dunbar (1993) observes that some religious sects, such as the Hutterites, who want to avoid the formal social control mechanisms of a state—police and courts—fission their communities when they get much past his number.
农业的行为需求给认知带来了新的选择压力。例如,狩猎采集者应该在获得食物后立即食用,因为食物无法长期储存。然而,农耕需要深思熟虑和自我克制,这在经济学中被称为延长时间偏好或时间贴现(McKerchar & Renda,2012;Da Matta、Gonçalves & Bizarro,2012)。农民必须抵制消费的诱惑他们会把所有玉米都吃掉,而是保留一些玉米种子留到下一个生长季节种植。因此,自然选择应该有利于自我控制能力的进化,这是前额叶皮层的功能,而前额叶皮层是人类大脑中相对发达的部分。
The behavioral demands of agriculture created new selection pressures on cognition. For example, hunter-gatherers should consume food as they acquire it because it can’t be stored for long. However, farming requires forethought and self-restraint, known in economics as extended time preference or temporal discounting (McKerchar & Renda, 2012; Da Matta, Gonçalves, & Bizarro, 2012). Farmers must resist the temptation to consume their entire crop, instead holding back some seed corn to plant for the next growing season. Natural selection should thus favor the evolution of self-control, a function of the prefrontal cortex, the most relatively developed part of the Homo brain.
农业创造的人类生态位的另一个新特征是资本积累。狩猎采集者的生产资本是他们的工具包以及用于创造和使用资本的知识和技能。这种资本规模较小,易于在群体迁移过程中携带。25农业的成果无需追逐,可以积累并储存以备将来使用。由于农业资本可以储存,一些人控制的资本比其他人更多,不平等现象随之产生。精英阶层,以及国家,由此诞生(Fukyama,2011;Scott,1998)。到了启蒙运动和工业革命时期,城市的规模已经比希腊城邦大了许多倍,民族国家在柏拉图或亚里士多德看来是不可想象的。
Another new feature of the human ecological niche created by agriculture was accumulation of capital. The productive capital of hunter-gatherers is their toolkit and the knowledge and skills used to create and use it. Such capital is small and easily portable as the group moves around the environment.25 The fruits of agriculture don’t need to be chased and they can be accumulated and stored for future use. Because agricultural capital can be stored, inequality arose as some people came to control more capital than others. Elites, and thus the state, were born (Fukyama, 2011; Scott, 1998). By the time of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, cities had grown many times larger than Greek city-states, and nation-states were unimaginable by Plato or Aristotle.
早期现代性中最具影响力的两位社会思想家,托马斯·霍布斯(1588-1679)和让·雅克·卢梭,都认为国家是非自然的,尽管原因不同。霍布斯(1651)认为,人们过于自私,以至于他们的生活“孤独、肮脏、野蛮、短暂”。人们要生活在庞大的群体中,需要一个强大的中央权威来压制暴力,创造合作的和平。弗洛伊德(1930)也同意这一观点。然而,对于社会大脑的演化历程而言,更重要的是卢梭对人类进化的描绘。
The two most influential social thinkers of early modernity, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Jean Jacques Rousseau, argued that states were unnatural, though for different reasons. Hobbes (1651) thought that people were so self-interested that their lives would be “solitary, nasty, brutish, and short.” For people to live in large groups requires a powerful central authority to repress violence and create cooperative peace. Freud (1930) agreed. More important for the story of the social brain, however, was Rousseau’s picture of human evolution.
卢梭认为,早期人类的动机是他所谓的“自爱”(amour de soi),字面意思是自爱。在他的用法中,这个词很难翻译;他经常用“自尊”来表达。他将其描述为一种自利的结合,包括对食物、饮料和性的渴望,以及对邻居的简单同情,这种同情可能伴随着互惠利他主义。个体之间的差异源于天性,有些人比其他人更强壮或更敏捷。
Rousseau believed that early humans were motivated by what he called amour de soi, which literally means self-love. In his usage it’s hard to translate; “self-respect” is often used. He describes it as a combination of self-interest, including desires for food, drink, and sex, and a simple compassion for neighbors that likely goes with reciprocal altruism. Differences between individuals were due to nature, some people being stronger or swifter than others.
然而,随着农业和私有财产的发明,以及资本的差异化积累,一种新的动机出现了,自恋,也意味着自爱,而且更难翻译(Kolodny,2010)。虽然经常被译为“利己主义”,但其主要指社会比较:一个人的自我价值现在与他与他人的比较息息相关。卢梭写道,“玉米首先使人类文明化,也毁灭了人性”,因为“现在人们有兴趣表现出他们实际上不是的样子。”自恋是一种虚荣,以看起来比别人好为荣,害怕失去地位。在图 9.7中,小猪被自恋所控制,尽管他并没有失去与自爱相关的任何东西。
However, with the invention of agriculture and private property, and the differential accumulation of capital, a new motive arose, amour propre, which also means self-love and is harder to translate (Kolodny, 2010). While often rendered as “egoism,” its key reference is to social comparison: One’s self-worth is now tied up with how one compares to other people. Rousseau writes that it was “corn that first civilized men and ruined humanity” because “It now became in the interest of men to appear what they really were not.” Amour propre is a kind of vanity, taking pride in appearing better than others and fearful of losing status. In Figure 9.7, Pig is in the grip of amour propre, even though he’s lost nothing relevant to amour de soi.
经济学家发展了卢梭的思想。“炫耀性消费”一词由镀金时代经济学家凡勃伦(1899)发明,用来批评他那个时代的有闲阶级。日。当然,人们总是关注并抱怨地位追求和地位宣传,但卢梭的创新之处在于将其与特定的人类生态位——农业——联系起来。早期思想家,例如柏拉图,对人类漫长的旧石器时代进化一无所知,认为自尊是人性的一部分。卢梭的设想表明,这是一种近期的适应。它也并非西方独有;在中国第一个帝国——商朝,几乎所有非农业生产都用于炫耀性消费(Wheatley,1971),并且,与欧洲一样,对地位的追求推动了后来的现代化(Rowe,2010)。
Economists developed Rousseau’s idea. The phrase “conspicuous consumption” was invented by the Gilded Age economist Veblen (1899) to criticize the leisure class of his day. Of course, people always noticed and bemoaned status seeking and status advertising, but what’s new in Rousseau was tying it to a particular human ecological niche, agriculture. Knowing nothing about the long Paleolithic evolution of Homo, earlier thinkers such as Plato had thought amour propre part of basic human nature. Rousseau’s scenario suggests it’s a recent adaptation. It is also not exclusive to the West; in the first Chinese empire, the Shang, almost all non-agricultural production was directed to conspicuous consumption (Wheatley, 1971), and, as in Europe, status-seeking drove modernization later (Rowe, 2010).
在经济学中,彰显地位的商品被称为地位商品(Solnick & Hemenway,1998;Carlsson、Johanssen-Stenman & Martinsson,2007)。26很少有东西是纯粹的地位商品,但许多商品都具有地位方面,包括收入(Easterlin,1995;Ferrer-i-Carbonell,2005)、教育水平(Durst,2021)和住房(Solnick & Hemenway,2005)。汽车就是一个很好的例子。雪佛兰和宝马在交通方面可能同样好,但后者象征着更高的地位。现在有一些商品售价数百万美元,即不可替代代币(NFTS),它们是纯粹的炫耀性消费,是与任何人都可以拥有的数字图像相同的数字图像,但经过区块链认证属于一个人。27它们唯一的经济价值在于被推特和转发。
In economics, goods that advertise status are called positional goods (Solnick & Hemenway, 1998; Carlsson, Johanssen-Stenman, & Martinsson, 2007).26 Few things are pure positional goods, but many goods have positional aspects, including income (Easterlin, 1995; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), level of education (Durst, 2021), and housing (Solnick & Hemenway, 2005). Cars are a good example. A Chevy and a BMW may be equally good for transportation, but the latter signals higher status. There are now goods selling for millions of dollars, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTS) that are pure conspicuous consumption, being digital images identical to those anyone can possess but are certified by blockchain to belong to one person.27 Their only economic value lies in being tweeted and re-tweeted about.
关于地位商品,如果人们比别人富裕,他们往往会选择客观上境况更差。例如,参与者被问及他们更愿意生活在两个世界中的哪一个。在这两个世界中,货币的购买力相同——区别在于相对收入。在A世界,你赚10万美元,你的邻居赚12万美元。在B世界,你赚8万美元,你的邻居赚6万美元。并非所有人都选择B世界,但很多人会选择(Burkett, 2006)。尤利乌斯·凯撒就是这样的。看到一小队高卢人,他说:“就我而言,我宁愿做这些人中的第一人,也不愿做罗马的第二人。”随着社会地位的提升,拥有地位商品会增强并保护购买者和拥有者的心理自尊 (Sivanathan, N., & Pettit, 2010; Dubois, Jung, & Ordabayeva, 2021)。或者,正如一位时装模特所说:“所以,工作越有声望,收入就越少”(Mears, 2011, 第50页)。
Concerning positional goods, people often choose to be objectively worse off if they’re better off than others. Participants are asked, for example, which of two worlds they would prefer to live in. In both worlds the purchasing power of money is the same—what’s different is one’s relative income. In World A, you make $100,000 and your neighbor makes $120,000. In World B, you make $80,000 and your neighbor makes $60,000. Not everyone chooses World B, but many do (Burkett, 2006). Julius Caesar did. Seeing a small band of Gauls, he said, “For my part, I had rather be the first man among these fellows than the second man in Rome.” As they elevate social status, possession of positional goods enhances and protects their purchasers’ and owners’ psychological self-esteem (Sivanathan, N., & Pettit, 2010; Dubois, Jung, & Ordabayeva, 2021). Or, as a fashion model put it, “So, the more prestigious the job, the less the money” (Mears, 2011, p. 50).
竞争社会地位的需求对认知过程提出了新的要求:人们很难“表现出并非真实的自我”。关键要求在于民间心理学,又称心智理论 (TOM),即我们预测、发现和操控他人心理状态的能力。心智理论的核心在于将心理状态(例如与我们相似的信念和欲望)归因于他人。在上一章中,TOM 的这一方面与博弈论相关。在最后通牒博弈中,当你选择向接受者提供多少报酬时,你必须预测他们的反应;因此,大多数提议者在得出结论,他们自己会拒绝 1 美元或 2 美元的分成时,会提出他们预期会被接受的 3-5 美元的提议。
The need to compete for social status made new demands on cognitive processes: It’s not easy for people “to appear what they [are] not.” The key demand was on folk psychology, aka Theory of Mind (TOM), our ability to anticipate, discover, and manipulate other people’s mental states. Central to theory of mind is the attribution to others of mental states, such as beliefs and desires like ours. In the last chapter, this aspect of TOM came up in connection with game theory. When you choose how much to offer acceptors in the Ultimatum Game, you must anticipate their responses; thus, most proposers, concluding that they themselves would reject a $1 or $2 split, make a $3–5 offer they expect will be accepted.
TOM 的发展序列规律性,以及自闭症患者的心理理论受损(Baron Cohen, 1995, 2020; Warrier & Baron-Cohen, 2018),使得一些理论家认为 TOM 存在一个心理模块(Leslie, 1994)。然而,这种解释受到了质疑(Quesque & Rossetti, 2020; Fabricius 等, 2021),另一些人则认为 TOM 是一种建立在一般智力之上的社交技能,是一种“认知工具”(Heyes & Frith, 2014; Heyes, 2019)。
The regularity of its developmental sequence and the fact that theory of mind is impaired in autism (Baron Cohen, 1995, 2020; Warrier & Baron-Cohen, 2018) have suggested to some theorists that there is a mental module for TOM (Leslie, 1994). However, this interpretation has been challenged (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020; Fabricius et al., 2021), and others argue that TOM is a social skill installed on top of general intelligence as a “cognitive gadget” (Heyes & Frith, 2014; Heyes, 2019).
毫不奇怪,从创造了“心智理论”一词的普雷马克和伍德拉夫 (1978) 开始,比较心理学家已经在灵长类动物中研究了心智理论。然而,在这个领域,理论和结果受到强烈质疑。首先,TOM 是二阶认知的一个例子,即关于认知的认知。一阶认知是关于事物的,因此,相信“那是一把椅子”就是一阶认知的一个例子。二阶认知使柏拉图着迷,他的苏格拉底要求他的学生将“椅子”定义为收集各种椅子的类,而不论其腿数、颜色、材质、尺寸等。他的形式理论可能被视为一种尝试,通过将形式视为外部事物而不是心理概念,将二阶认知简化为一阶认知。TOM 是一种二阶能力,因为我们正在思考他人的认知,特别是他们的信念和意图。灵长类动物学家们就猿类是否具有二阶认知存在争议,托马塞洛学派认为具有二阶认知(Call & Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, 2019),而波维内利学派则认为不具有二阶认知(Penn, Holyoak & Povinelli, 2008; Povinelli, 2020; Vonk, 2020)。除了最近一项必定会引起争议的研究(Kano 等人,2019 年;Martin,2019 年),大多数实验都未能建立猿类 TOM,即使是那些认为猿类具有二阶认知的理论家(Call & Tomasello;2008 年;Heyes,2017 年;Martin & Santos,2016 年)也是如此。
Unsurprisingly, comparative psychologists, beginning with Premack and Woodruff (1978), who coined the phrase theory of mind, have investigated it in primates. However, in this arena theory and result are strongly contested. To begin with, TOM is an example of second-order cognition, that is, cognition about cognitions. First-order cognitions are about things, so, believing “That is a chair” is an example of first-order cognition. Second-order cognition obsessed Plato, whose Socrates asks his students to define “chair” as a class collecting all sorts of chairs regardless of number of legs, color, materials, size, etc. His theory of the Forms might be regarded as an attempt to reduce second-order cognition to first-order cognition by seeing the Forms as external Things rather than mental concepts. TOM is a second-order ability because we are thinking about others’ cognitions, specifically their beliefs and intentions. Primatologists debate whether apes have second-order cognition at all, with the Tomasello school saying yea (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, 2019), and the Povinelli school saying nay (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008; Povinelli, 2020; Vonk, 2020). Apart from a recent and sure to be debated study (Kano et al., 2019; Martin, 2019), most experiments fall shy of establishing ape TOM, even among theorists who think apes have second-order cognition (Call & Tomasello; 2008; Heyes, 2017; Martin & Santos, 2016).
Martin 等人 (2014) 做了一个实验,将这场争议引向了新的方向。他们向成对的黑猩猩和成对的人类展示了一个匹配硬币的游戏版本。在每次试验中,计算机随机决定匹配试验和不匹配试验,并点亮参与者面前面板上两个可按下的按键。在匹配试验中,如果两个参与者按下同一个键(LL 或 RR),他们会得到少量食物或现金奖励;在不匹配试验中,如果反应不同(LR 或 RL),则会给予奖励。28黑猩猩在优化收益方面比人类更优秀、更“理性”。人类的缺点有各种各样的解释。例如,Henrich (2020) 认为,由于人类的模仿能力非常强,我们可能会过度模仿,在这种情况下,我们会在某些不匹配试验中错误地模仿——匹配——我们同事的选择。
Martin et al. (2014) did an experiment that takes this controversy in a new direction. They presented pairs of chimpanzees and pairs of humans with a version of the game matching pennies. On each trial, a computer randomly decided between a match trial and a mismatch trial and lit up two pressable keys on a panel in front of the participants. On match trials, if both participants pressed the same key (LL or RR), they got a small food, or cash, reward; on mismatch trials the reward was given if the responses were different (LR or RL).28 Chimps were better, more “rational,” at optimizing their payoffs than humans. Human shortcomings were variously explained. For example, Henrich (2020) suggested that because imitation is so powerful in humans, we may overdo it, in this case by erroneously imitating—matching—our colleague’s choice on some mismatch trials.
然而,“黑猩猩在博弈论方面非常出色” 29的说法被斯金纳的一项研究(Hachiga 等人,2018)驳斥。他们表明,鸽子也会优化自己的收益,但他们指出,马丁等人的实验只是匹配律实验的一个特例。无需巧妙地推导出纳什均衡。
However, the claim that “chimps rock at game theory”29 was deflated by a Skinnerian study (Hachiga et al., 2018). They showed that pigeons, too, optimize their payoffs, but they pointed out that the Martin et al. procedure was just a special case of matching law experiments. No clever working out of a Nash equilibrium was needed.
这项实验中,人类行为的另一种解释不言而喻。自尊心激发竞争——我们不仅渴望与邻居平起平坐,更渴望比他们更富裕。因此,我们并非像行为主义实验室中人类与计算机“对战”时那样简单地遵循匹配法则,而是试图通过竞争性地预测对手的行为来超越对手,从而“赢得”更多金钱。然而,在这种情况下,遵循匹配法则——不顾地位,竭尽所能——才是最优化的做法。我们试图超越邻居,但最终却过度思考,做出了错误的选择。
An alternative explanation for human behavior in this experiment suggests itself. Amour propre motivates competition—we desire not only to equal our neighbors, but also to be better off than they. Thus, instead of simply following the matching law, as humans do in behaviorist labs when “playing” against a computer, we attempt to out-think human opponents by trying to competitively anticipate what they will do in order to “win” more money. However, in this case following the matching law—doing the best for oneself without regard for status—is the optimizing thing to do. We try to out-think our neighbor but end up over-thinking30 the task and choose poorly.31
在上一章中,我们了解到真菌和线虫比人类更善于做出功利理性的选择,这引发了亚历克斯·塔巴罗克(Alex Tabarrok)的评论:如果经济学原理适用于除人类以外的所有物种,那才奇怪呢。我们应该认真对待这个想法:系统2自诩为理性——从柏拉图到笛卡尔再到弗洛伊德,每个人都认同这一点——很可能是错误的。系统2可能是人类非理性的根源(Oaksford & Hall,2016)。如果是这样,那么社会智力或许与功利主义推理相悖,正如卢梭对“自私自利”(amour de soi )和“地位社会智力”(amour propre )的区分所表明的那样。
In the last chapter, we learned that fungi and nematode worms make utilitarian-rational choices better than humans, provoking Alex Tabarrok’s remark that it would be weird if economic principles hold for all species but humans. We should take this idea seriously: It may very well be that the prideful claim of System 2 to rationality—endorsed by everyone from Plato through Descartes to Freud—is mistaken. System 2 may be the source of human irrationality (Oaksford & Hall, 2016). If so, perhaps social intelligence is at odds with utilitarian reasoning, as Rousseau’s distinction between amour de soi (utilitarian self-interest) and amour propre (positional social intelligence) suggests.
患有影响社会成功的临床综合征的人,例如自闭症(Rozenkrantz、D'Mello & Gabrieli,2021)和精神病(Osumi & Ohira,2010),会比对照组做出更多效用理性的选择。欠发达国家的人们与发达国家相比,受教育程度较低的人会做出更多效用理性的选择;在受教育程度较低的国家,受教育程度较低的人会比受教育程度较高的西方化人群做出更多效用理性的选择(Doces & Wolaver,2021)。幼儿的决策似乎基于一种简单的系统1效用计算(Jara-Ettinger、Gweon、Schulz & Tenenbaum,2016)。然而,安装了系统2的成年人会将经济交易视为零和博弈,一方获胜,另一方失败(Johnson、Zhang & Keil,2021)。
People with clinical syndromes interfering with social success, such as autism (Rozenkrantz, D’Mello, & Gabrieli, 2021) and psychopathy (Osumi & Ohira, 2010), make more utility-rational choices than controls. People in less developed countries make more utility-rational choices than in developed countries, and within countries less highly educated people make more utility-rational choices than more educated, Westernized people (Doces & Wolaver, 2021). Young children’s decisions appear to be based on a naïve System 1 utility calculus (Jara-Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016). Adults, however, in whom System 2 has been installed, regard economic transactions as zero-sum games in which one side wins and the other loses (Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2021).
无论如何,自尊心创造了一种进化选择压力,即地位竞争,通过非暴力对抗推动认知,即汉弗莱(1976)所称的认知军备竞赛。在地位竞争中取得成功需要社会智力,而这又要求下一代拥有更高的智力,因此随着一代又一代的进化,竞争者在社交方面会变得越来越聪明。认知军备竞赛理论是进化生物学中几个类似的理论之一,被称为红皇后理论(Strotz等人,2018)。在《爱丽丝镜中奇遇记》(1871)中,刘易斯·卡罗尔让爱丽丝与她遇到的扑克牌生物玩一场跑步游戏:
In any event, amour propre creates an evolutionary selection pressure, status competition, driving cognition through non-violent rivalry, what Humphrey (1976) called a cognitive arms race. Success at status competition requires social intelligence, which demands in the next generation more intelligence, so as generations of evolution pass, competitors become socially smarter and smarter. The cognitive arms race theory is one of several similar ones in evolutionary biology called Red Queen theories (Strotz et al., 2018). In Alice through the Looking Glass (1871), Lewis Carroll has Alice participate in a running game with the playing card creatures she encounters:
“嗯,在我们国家,”爱丽丝说着,仍然有点气喘吁吁,“你通常能到达别的地方——如果你像我们这样,跑得很快,跑很长时间。” “真是个慢节奏的国家!”女王说。“现在,你看,在这里,你得拼尽全力才能保持在原地。如果你想去别的地方,你得跑得至少是原地的两倍快!” 32
“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you ran very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.” “A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”32
在“红皇后”的设想中,达尔文进化论变成了拉马克进化论,因为它朝着单一方向发展。认知军备竞赛选择每一代都变得更聪明一些,使我们的社会大脑成为地球上最大的大脑(相对于身体大小而言)。另一方面,人类的大脑自尼安德特人时代以来就一直在萎缩。像蚂蚁这样的高度社会化物种,其大脑相对于身体大小而言较小,随着人类社会的发展,或许更多的认知处理由集体智慧完成,从而减轻了个体的认知负荷,尽管这只是推测(de Silva et al., 2021)。
In Red Queen scenarios, Darwinian evolution becomes Lamarckian because it moves itself in a single direction. The cognitive arms race selects each generation to be a little more intelligent, making our social brain the largest (relative to body size) on the planet. On the other hand, the human brain has shrunk since Neandertal times. Highly social species such as ants have small brains relative to body size, and as human society developed, perhaps more cognitive processing came to be performed by collective intelligence, reducing individual cognitive load, though this is speculative (de Silva et al., 2021).
团队里没有“我” ,但“我”对于“我们,我,研发”团队来说,确实至关重要。工业化创造了财富,受过良好教育的西方人创造、消费、投资、竞争和争论这些财富,这使得工业革命的起源成为最重要的话题。经济史。近期对工业革命起源的解释开始强调社会和智力因素(Mokyr,2017;McCloskey,2017),从而强调基因-文化共同进化,且文化进化的力量大于基因进化(Waring & Wood,2021)。
There’s no I in team, but the I is literally central to the WEIRD people. Industrialization created the riches that educated, Western people make, spend, invest, compete, and argue about, making the origin of the Industrial Revolution the most important topic in economic history. Recent explanations for the origins of the Industrial Revolution have begun emphasizing social and intellectual factors (Mokyr, 2017; McCloskey, 2017) and thus gene-culture co-evolution, with cultural evolution becoming more powerful than genetic (Waring, & Wood, 2021).
以韦伯(1912)为代表的历史学家认为,工业化促进了个人主义。前现代文化以大家庭为核心。在商朝时期的中国早期农业社会,理想的家庭是“三代同堂”(Tanner,2010),亲属家族的氏族拥有财产,并为所有人做出经济决策(Rowe,2010)。福山(2011,第49页)将这些制度称为“堂兄弟暴政”。然而,这种仁慈的暴政抑制了创新和专业化——每个人生产自己最擅长的产品,并用其他一切来交换——而这些正是经济增长的根本起点和持续动力。例如,企业家通常通过以财产作抵押的贷款来为初创企业融资,但如果财产归某个氏族所有,则必须经过整个氏族的批准。由于大家族经营企业,家族和氏族对其成员从事的职业施加着强大的、往往是决定性的控制。33例如,在中国,皇帝颁布法律,规定职业世袭(Tanner,2010;Rowe,2010)。堂表兄弟姐妹暴政的最后一个方面是亲属选择利他主义的影响。在以亲属为基础的社会中,大家庭以外的人受到的不信任与遗传距离成正比。研究表明,与个人主义相关的人格特质与社会的现代化程度(Santos、Varnum 和 Grossman,2017)以及允许个体农民生产的农业生产模式(例如小麦)相关,而非需要由家庭集体协调大规模劳动力的农业生产模式(例如水稻;Talhelm 等人,2014)。
Led by Weber (1912), historians believe industrialization promoted individualism. Pre-modern cultures are structured around extended families. In early agricultural China during the Shang dynasty, the ideal family was “three generations under one roof” (Tanner, 2010), and clans of related families owned property and made economic decisions for everyone (Rowe, 2010). Fukuyama (2011, p. 49) calls these regimes the “tyranny of the cousins.” However, this benevolent tyranny inhibits innovation and specialization—each person producing what they do best and trading for everything else—that are the essential starting points and continuing engine of economic growth. For example, entrepreneurs often finance start-ups by taking loans secured by property, but if a clan owns the property the whole group must approve. Families and clans exert powerful, often decisive, control over what line of work their members take up, as extended families run businesses.33 In China, for example, emperors decreed laws making occupations hereditary (Tanner, 2010; Rowe, 2010). A final aspect of the tyranny of cousins is the influence of kin-selected altruism. In kin-based societies, people outside the extended family are distrusted in direct ratio with genetic distance. Research has shown that personality traits associated with individualism are correlated with the degree of modernization of a society (Santos, Varnum, & Grossman, 2017) and with modes of agricultural production that allow individual farmer’s production (e.g., wheat) as opposed to modes that require coordination of large-scale labor best run by familial collectives (e.g., rice; Talhelm et al., 2014).
Schulz 等人(2019;Henrich,2020)认为,导致堂兄弟姐妹暴政衰落、个人主义兴起以及工业革命的关键因素是中世纪天主教会禁止堂兄弟姐妹结婚。在基督教出现之前,堂兄弟姐妹结婚是被允许的,甚至是受到青睐的,因为它强化了氏族内部亲属选择的利他主义,但天主教会反对这种做法,而反对的原因并非总是出于神学原因。34另一方面,最近的一项基因研究表明,在全球范围内,随着农业的出现,堂兄弟姐妹结婚的数量有所下降(Ringbauer,Novembre & Steinrücken,2021)。
Schulz et al. (2019; Henrich, 2020) propose that the key development that led to the decline of the tyranny of the cousins, the rise of individualism, and thus the Industrial Revolution, was the prohibition on marrying cousins by the medieval Catholic Church. Before Christianity, cousin marriage was allowed, even favored, because it strengthened intra-clan kin-selected altruism, but it was opposed by the Catholic Church, not always for theological reasons.34 On the other hand, a recent genetic study suggests that, globally, cousin marriage declined with the advent of agriculture (Ringbauer, Novembre, & Steinrücken, 2021).
以亲属关系为基础的社会会根据遗传距离来衡量信任。一句古老的阿拉伯谚语说:“我对抗我的兄弟,我和我的兄弟对抗我的表兄弟,我和我的表兄弟对抗陌生人”(福山,2011,第58页)。正如我们之前所言,然而,非个人化经济交换所需的互惠利他主义,依赖于一种超越亲属关系、对陌生人和亲戚都给予信任的个人主义、非个人化的道德观。约瑟夫·亨里奇(Joseph Henrich,WEIRD 的创造者)领导的团队在世界各地重复开展行为经济学研究,发现文化对人们决策的影响。例如,在独裁者博弈中,他们观察到博弈中的金额分配与文化经济现代化程度之间存在相关性。在仍然以大家庭为基础的文化中,接受者很少分享金钱,而随着经济现代化,更多的参与者提出了要约(Henrich,2016)。信任圈会随着经济发展而扩大。
Societies organized on kin lines measure trust as a function of genetic distance. An old Arab proverb says, “Me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin against the stranger” (Fukuyama, 2011, p. 58). As we remarked earlier, however, reciprocal altruism, needed for impersonal economic exchanges, depends on an individualistic, impersonal morality transcending bonds of genetic kinship and extending trust to strangers as well as relatives. Joseph Henrich (who coined the acronym WEIRD) has led a team of investigators replicating behavioral economics studies around the world, finding cultural effects on people’s decisions. For example, in the Dictator Game they observed a correlation between amount split in the game and degree of modernization of a culture’s economy. In cultures still based on extended families, little money was shared with the acceptors, whereas as economies modernized, more participants made offers (Henrich, 2016). The circle of trust expands with economic development.
Baumard(2019)运用行为生态学的生命史策略理论来解释促成工业革命的社会变革,并重点关注工业革命的发源地英国。生命史理论已被用于解释各种进化现象(Stearns,1992)。该理论认为,存在一个从快速生命史策略35到慢速生命史的维度(图9.8)。
Baumard (2019) uses behavioral ecology’s life history strategy theory to explain the social changes that created the Industrial Revolution, focusing on Britain, where it began. Life history theory has been used to explain a wide range of evolutionary phenomena (Stearns, 1992). It proposes that there is a dimension from fast life history strategies35 to slow life histories (Figure 9.8).
总体而言,这两种生活史策略反映了从早熟后代的r型选择物种向晚熟后代的k型选择物种的转变。Baumard的论点是,随着经济发展使人们变得更加富裕,他们通过更长寿、更安全的生活而变得更加EIRD(另见Wodarz等人,2020)。更长的寿命不再专注于日常生存,这使得人们有更多时间投入教育,鼓励创新,因为在富裕社会中失败的代价更低;并且,随着大家庭的政治权力被削弱,个人寻求掌控自身命运,民主也得以发展。随着人们变得更加富裕和受教育程度更高,他们也开始减少生育子女(Hugh-Jones & Abdellaoui,2021)。
In general, the two life history strategies reflect a movement from r selected species with precocial offspring to K selected species with altricial offspring. Baumard’s thesis is that as people became Wealthier due to economic development, they became EIRDer by living longer, safer lives (see also Wodarz, et. al., 2020). Longer lives not focused on day-to-day survival enabled more time to devote to Education, encouraged Innovation, because failure was less costly in a Rich society, and fostered Democracy as the political power of extended families was eroded and individuals sought to control their own destinies. As people become richer and more educated, they also start having fewer children (Hugh-Jones & Abdellaoui, 2021).
配偶选择可以看作是一种经济决策,对个体和物种具有长期进化的影响。
Mate choice can be seen as an economic decision with long-term evolutionary effects on individuals and species.
为什么会有性?这个问题看似愚蠢,却是一个深刻的进化谜题。基因复制的成功才是进化的成功,而通过分裂进行无性繁殖,复制会容易得多。
Why is there sex? seems like a silly question but is a deep evolutionary puzzle. What counts as evolutionary success is gene-copying success and doing that is much easier if you reproduce asexually by splitting.
性行为会带来风险,因此会引发我们在第七章讨论过的各种经济决策问题。性行为有机会成本:如果你交配,你就不觅食或繁殖。忙碌时存在被捕食的风险。最重要的是,存在与适应度尚不确定的同类共享基因的风险。大多数理论认为有性繁殖的优势在于通过基因重组来增加遗传变异,这样当环境发生变化时,某些变体就能做好准备 (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012; Gray & Garcia, 2013; Geary, 2019)。在本节中,我们将探讨配偶选择问题。对于任何有性繁殖物种的成员来说,配偶选择都是最重要的进化决策,尤其是那些采用慢生活史策略的物种 (Kim, Bradshaw, Durante, & Hill, 2018)。
Sex introduces risk, and thus poses the kinds of economic decision-making problems that we discussed in the chapter 7. There’s opportunity cost: If you are mating, you are not foraging or reproducing. There’s risk of predation while you are occupied. Above all, there’s the risk of sharing your genes with those of a conspecific whose fitness is undetermined. Most theories see sexual reproduction’s advantage as increasing genetic variance via genetic reshuffling, so that when the environment changes some variant form will be ready for it (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012; Gray & Garcia, 2013; Geary, 2019). In this section we will look at the problem of mate choice. It is the most important evolutionary decision made by any member of a sexually reproducing species, especially those with slow life history strategies (Kim, Bradshaw, Durante, & Hill, 2018).
理解这一挑战的关键在于亲代投资(Trivers,1972),它指的是父母双方为创造成功后代所投入的时间、精力和资源的总和。“成功”这一警示很重要,因为除非后代能够繁殖,否则其父母的适应度将被视为零,或者更准确地说,其适应度为零。很少有物种能够仅靠亲属选择生存。然而,后代的成功,对于慢生活策略物种来说,这成为一个特殊的问题,因为与短生活史物种相比,父母投资较高。
The key to understanding this challenge is parental investment (Trivers, 1972), which refers to the total investment in time, effort, and resources each parent makes to the creation of successful offspring. The caveat successful is important because, unless offspring reproduce, it will be as if its parents did not, or more precisely, had individual fitnesses of 0. Few species survive on kin selection alone. Success of offspring, however, becomes a special problem for slow life strategy species because parental investment is elevated compared to short life history species.
另一个考虑因素是,在大多数物种中,两性所需的投入程度是不对称的;为了成功繁殖,一个性别必须比另一个性别投入更多。在生物学中,配子大小决定了雄性(小配子)和雌性(大配子)。从一开始,雌性的投入就大于雄性;还要记住,雄性配子的产量要大得多。在哺乳动物中,雌性必须投入时间和生物资源(例如食物)来生育后代,然后哺育后代。在晚成性物种中,出生后仍需要父母的照顾。
Another consideration is that in most species, the degree of investment required from each sex is asymmetrical; one sex must invest more than the other to achieve successful reproduction. In biology, gamete size defines being male (small gametes) or female (large gametes). From the beginning, female investment is larger than male investment; remember, too, that male gametes are produced in much larger numbers. In mammals, the female must invest time and biological resources, such as food, to first bear and then nurse her offspring. In altricial species, parental care is required for some time after birth.
最后,两性的潜在适应度收益存在不对称。卵子价格昂贵且稀有,因此应谨慎投资。精子价格低廉且持续产生,可以大量投资。因此,男性可以生育比女性多得多的后代。蒙古领袖铁木真就是一个例子,他成为了中国元朝的第一位皇帝成吉思汗(约1158-1227年)。最近的一项基因研究发现,他是中国和中亚约8%人口的最终男性父亲,也是当今约0.5%人口(约4000万人)的最终男性父亲(Zerjal等人,2003年)。一夫多妻制不仅能提高男性的适应度,还会降低竞争对手的适应度。摩门教领袖杨百翰与27位妻子育有56个孩子,这意味着有26位男性没有妻子(Taylor,2021年)。所有这些考量都会影响配偶选择的博弈论计算。雄性和雌性在什么条件下应该采取什么策略才能最好地满足其生殖和适应性利益?
Finally, there is asymmetry in the potential fitness payoffs of the two sexes. Eggs are expensive and rare and should therefore be invested with care. Sperm are cheap and produced continuously and can be invested profligately. Thus, males can produce far more offspring than females. An example is the Mongol leader Temüjin, who became the first Yuan emperor of China, Chinggis Kahn (c. 1158–1227). A recent genetic study found that he is the ultimate male father of about 8% of people living in China and central Asia, and about 0.5% of everyone today (Zerjal et al., 2003), about 40 million people. Polygamy not only boosts a male’s fitness but reduces the fitness of rivals. Mormon leader Brigham Young had 56 children by 27 wives, meaning that 26 men had no wives (Taylor, 2021). All these considerations factor into the game theoretic calculations of mate choice. What strategies should males and females pursue under what conditions to best serve their reproductive, fitness interests?
正如简·奥斯汀(1775-1817)的名言:“举世公认的真理是,一个拥有好运的单身男人一定想要一个妻子。”奥斯汀在《傲慢与偏见》(1813)中对择偶的博弈论(Chwe, 2014)进行了大师级的阐释。
As Jane Austen (1775–1817) famously wrote, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.” Austen wrote the master class on the game theory (Chwe, 2014) of mate choice in Pride and Prejudice (1813).
我们从 Marr 的第一级,即认知级,开始描述要解决的问题,采用 Miller 和 Todd (1998) 的透镜模型(图 9.9)。
We begin with Marr’s Level 1, the Cognitive Level, to describe the problem to be solved, adopting Miller and Todd’s (1998) lens model (Figure 9.9).
分析待解决的问题,我们发现这是一个类似于感知的信息整合问题:我们感知到多个指向远侧对象(配偶质量)的近侧线索,必须将这些线索整合到对配偶适应度的整体评估中(Castellano、Cadeddu 和 Cermelli,2012;Conroy-Beam 和 Buss,2016;Lee 等人,2014;Lenton 和 Francesconi,2010;Schacht 和 Grote,2015)。但与感知不同,配偶选择具有策略性。两个参与者的兴趣和目标可能并不相同,因此我们也必须将博弈论应用于这个问题。最后,由于配偶选择的策略性,我们不能将适应度线索仅仅视为线索,而应将其视为至少部分(有时甚至完全)受发送者控制的信号。
Analyzing the problem to be solved, we see that it’s an information integration problem akin to perception: We perceive multiple proximal cues to a distal object—mate quality—that we must integrate into an overall evaluation of mate fitness (Castellano, Cadeddu, & Cermelli, 2012; Conroy-Beam & Buss, 2016; Lee et al., 2014; Lenton & Francesconi, 2010; Schacht & Grote, 2015). But unlike perception, there is a strategic aspect to mate choice. There are two participants whose interests and goals may not be identical, and so we must apply game theory to the problem, too. Finally, because of the strategic nature of mate selection, we must not regard the cues to fitness merely as cues, but as signals at least partially and sometimes wholly under the control of the sender.
鉴于亲代投入和适应度方面的性别不对称,雌性通常比雄性更需要做出明智的选择,根据可靠信号采取行动并识别误导性信号。错误的选择会浪费宝贵的卵子资源(对人类而言)和时间,还会在怀孕和分娩期间带来风险,而随着人类大脑的进化,怀孕和分娩变得越来越困难。雄性无需承担这些风险,只需投入少量廉价的精子和几分钟的时间即可。对于雄性而言,最佳的适应度策略是与尽可能多的雌性交配,而无需停下来评估雌性的潜在适应度。然而,在人类案例中,重要的是,文化(包括法律和科学)会影响两性的战略决策。
Given the sexual asymmetry of parental investment and fitness, it is usually more important for females than males to choose wisely by acting on reliable signals and detecting deceptive ones. A bad choice wastes the rare resource of an egg (in humans) and time, and it carries risks during pregnancy and childbirth, which became increasingly difficult as the human brain evolved. Males bear none of these risks and can make a minimal investment of cheap sperm and a few minutes of time. For the male the best fitness strategy is to mate with as many females as possible, without needing to pause and evaluate females’ potential fitness. However, importantly in the human case, culture (including law and science) can affect the strategic decisions of both sexes.
信号概念在行为生态学(Zahavi,1975)和经济学(Spence,1973;2000 年诺贝尔奖获得者,Spence,2001)中同时出现。Spence 考虑了信息不对称的挑战。国际象棋是一种完全信息游戏;所有棋子的价值和位置都为双方所知。但现实生活,包括择偶,很少像国际象棋,因为通常一方,例如求职者(Spence 的例子36),比面试官更了解自己的技能、责任心、抱负等,而这种知识的不对称是自我表现及其评价的一个因素。Zahavi 的论文开创了择偶理论,将身体和行为信号视为健康状况的指标,但无论是在经济学还是择偶领域(正如简·奥斯汀所熟知的,这两者常常混杂在一起),参与者识别欺骗性信号都非常重要。
The concept of signaling arose about the same time in behavioral ecology (Zahavi, 1975) and economics (Spence, 1973; Nobel Prize in 2000, Spence, 2001). Spence considered the challenge of asymmetric information. Chess is a game of perfect information; the value and positions of all the pieces are symmetrically known by both players. But real life, including mate selection, is rarely like chess because typically one side, for example, job seekers (Spence’s example36), know more about their skills, conscientiousness, ambition, and so on than a job interviewer, and this asymmetry of knowledge is a factor in self-presentation and its evaluation. Zahavi’s paper began mate selection theory, seeing physical and behavioral signals as indicators of fitness, but in both economics and mate selection (which get mixed up together, as Jane Austen well knew), it’s important for participants to detect deceptive signals.
萤火虫(Photuris versicolor)就是一个关于不诚实信号传递的鲜活例子(Lloyd,1975;Vencl,Blasko & Carlson,1994)。春季,雄性会飞来飞去,通过闪烁腹部的荧光来表明其物种和性交的准备状态。雌性看到合适的雄性发出的信号后,会发出回应的闪光,雄性发出信号和回应之间的时间间隔因物种而异。然后,雄性会飞到雌性身边进行交配。雄性飞走后,雌性会向其他物种的雄性发出欺骗性信号,这些雄性会飞来交配,但却成为雌性的第一顿美餐。她通过“廉价谈话”获得了一顿免费的午餐。因此,对于任何物种的两性来说,识别“廉价谈话”都很重要,尽管使用“廉价谈话”也是一种适应性行为。在这个领域中的战略互动是认知军备竞赛的另一个驱动力,因为双方都学会了发出越来越误导性或不诚实的信号,并设计出更复杂的防御措施来应对这些信号。
A vivid example of dishonest signaling occurs in the firefly Photuris versicolor (Lloyd, 1975; Vencl, Blasko, & Carlson, 1994). In spring, males fly about signaling their species and sexual readiness by flashing the lights on their abdomens. Seeing a signal from a suitable male, the female sends a return flash, the timing between the male’s signal and her reply being species-specific. The male then comes to the female and mates. After he’s gone, the female sends deceptive signals to males of other species who fly in for mating but become her first meal. She gets a free lunch through cheap talk. It is important, then, for both sexes of any species to detect cheap talk, although it’s also adaptive to deploy cheap talk. Strategic interaction in this arena is another driver of the cognitive arms race, as both sides learn to send increasingly misleading or dishonest signals and to devise more sophisticated defenses against them.
选择伴侣,尤其是长期伴侣,显然极其复杂,以至于遵循最大化策略并不可行。米勒和托德提出了一种非正式的满足策略(图9.10),我们将在此使用(康罗伊-比姆、戈茨和巴斯在2015年提出了一种更严谨的经济分析)。
The complexities of choosing a mate, especially a long-term mate, are clearly so demanding that following a maximizing strategy is not feasible. Miller and Todd suggest an informal satisficing strategy (Figure 9.10) that we will use here (a more rigorous economic analysis is proposed by Conroy-Beam, Goetz, and Buss, 2015).
其基本思想是通过延长线索评估时间来减少认知负荷,从评估短期标准(可用于决定短期交配机会)转向评估更难评估的长期标准,因为长期标准更容易被曲解。由于一次只需要评估几个标准,负荷也减少了。每个阶段都充当下一个阶段的过滤器,缩小候选人范围,直到理想情况下只剩下一个。我们在上一章讨论的启发式决策的两个方面适用于这一策略。首先,由于锚定效应,早期判断或误判将特别有影响力(Li 等人,2013;Hunt、Eastwick 和 Finkel,2015)。其次,出现了实时和停止(或承诺)问题,尤其是对于人类女性而言,她们的生育年限少于男性。另一种启发式方法基于模仿。观察那些特别有吸引力的人的选择会影响一个人自身的择偶偏好 (Anderson & Surbey, 2018; Rodeheffer, Proffitt-Leyva, & Hill, 2016)。基于此框架,我们将讨论一些人类择偶评估的例子。37
The basic idea is to reduce cognitive load by stretching cue evaluation over time, moving from assessing short-term criteria (which may be used to make decisions about a short-term mating opportunity) to assessing the harder to evaluate, because easier to misrepresent, long-term criteria. Load is also reduced as only a few criteria need to be evaluated at a time. Each stage acts as a filter to the next, reducing the pool of candidates until ideally one remains. Two aspects of heuristic decision making we discussed in the last chapter apply to this strategy. First, because of anchoring effects, early judgments or misjudgments will be especially influential (Li et al., 2013; Hunt, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2015). Second, real-time and stopping (or commitment) problems arise, especially for human females, whose number of fertile years are fewer than those of males. An additional heuristic is based on imitation. Observing the choices made by especially attractive people influences one’s own mate preferences (Anderson & Surbey, 2018; Rodeheffer, Proffitt-Leyva, & Hill, 2016). Using this framework, we will discuss a few examples of mate evaluation in humans.37
第一组是所有哺乳动物计算出的基因型适应度和健康的表型信号。身高、面部平均性和面部对称性表明良好的发育史。这些生理线索在寻找短期伴侣时最为重要,无论是在约会还是出轨的背景下,并且会被整合到对整体身体吸引力的判断中。社会性行为得分高的人会更自动地处理吸引力(Gangestad & Simpson, 2000),这是一种与对许多短期性关系的兴趣相关的人格特质(Owens, Rafferty, & Knight, 2021)。38重要的是,这些生理特征是日后生殖成功的真实信号(Pflüger et al., 2014),因此,尽管这种欺骗在见面时很容易被发现,但人们会在网上个人资料中谎报自己的身高(男性)和体重(女性)(Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008)。科学上最具争议的线索是女性的腰臀比。有人认为0.7的腰臀比是健康的标志,并且普遍受到男性的青睐,但这两点的证据都模棱两可(Bovet,2019)。或许可以将身体冒险添加到线索列表中。Petraitis等人(2014)发现,只有当男性的冒险行为类似于我们祖先的冒险行为(例如攀岩),而不是现代的冒险行为(例如不系安全带驾驶)时,他们才会觉得冒险具有吸引力。在滑板运动中,当女性在场观看时,男性的冒险行为和睾酮水平会上升(Ronay & von Hippel,2010)。
The first set are phenotypic signals of genotype fitness and health computed by all mammals. Height, facial averageness, and facial symmetry indicate good developmental history. These physiological cues are the most important when looking for a short-term mate, in the context of either dating or cheating, and are integrated into a judgment of overall physical attractiveness. Attractiveness is processed more automatically in people with high scores on sociosexuality (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000), a personality trait associated with interest in having many short-term sexual relationships (Owens, Rafferty, & Knight, 2021).38 Importantly, these physiological traits are honest signals of later reproductive success (Pflüger et al., 2014), and so although such deception is easily detected upon meeting, people lie about their height (males) and weight (females) in online profiles (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008). The scientifically most contentious cue is waist-hip ratio in females, the proposal being that a ratio of .7 is a sign of fitness and is preferred universally by men, but evidence on both points is equivocal (Bovet, 2019). Physical risk-taking may be added to the list of cues. Petraitis et al. (2014) found that risk-taking in males was found attractive only when the risks were like those in our ancestral past (e.g., rock-climbing) as opposed to modern ones (e.g., driving without a seatbelt). While skateboarding, male risk-taking and testosterone levels increase when females are watching (Ronay & von Hippel, 2010).
一些适应性的生理信号颇具讽刺意味。扎哈维(1975)在提出信号传递概念时,也提出了他的障碍原则,其中最典型的例子就是孔雀的尾巴。孔雀的尾巴让达尔文感到困扰,因为它们似乎会降低适应性,因此应该被淘汰。例如,一只孔雀在逃离捕食者时,会因其巨大而沉重的尾巴而减慢速度,最终被捕获并淘汰。来自基因库。扎哈维的回答完全正确!因为尾巴这种缺陷在自然选择中幸存了下来,所以它只能是因为尾巴本身就是一种缺陷,表明拥有它的个体必须特别适应环境。研究支持了扎哈维的理论(Loyau 等人,2008),并表明雌性对雄性羽毛中“眼睛”的数量做出反应(Yorzinski 等人,2013)。此外,花式尾巴这种缺陷是十分有用的适应环境的标志,以至于它在孔雀及其近亲的谱系中独立进化了好几次(Sun 等人,2014)。
Some physiological signals of fitness are ironic. When Zahavi (1975) introduced the concept of signaling, he also introduced his handicap principle, of which the prime example is the peacock’s tail. Peacock’s tails bothered Darwin because they appear to reduce fitness, and so should be selected against. For example, a peacock fleeing a predator would be slowed down by his huge and heavy tail and be caught and eliminated from the gene pool. Zahavi’s reply was exactly! Because the tail is a handicap that has survived natural selection, it can only be because the tail, by being a handicap, signals that its bearer must be especially fit. Studies have supported Zahavi’s theory (Loyau et al., 2008) and showed that the specific stimulus to which females respond is the number of feather “eyes” in a male’s plumage (Yorzinski et al., 2013). Moreover, the handicap of a fancy tail is so useful a sign of fitness that it has independently evolved several times in the lineages of peafowls and their relatives (Sun et al., 2014).
第二组信号与智力有关,因此与更新世社会大脑的早期演化有关。首先,外貌吸引力与智力相关(Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004),因此在智力成为一种理想特质之前,选择就已开始。如今,智力比性格更能体现择偶的倾向,尽管人们在选择伴侣时往往会更多地提及性格因素(Escorial & Martín-Buro, 2012; Driebe et al., 2021)。对幽默的欣赏与智力相关,研究表明,女性喜欢风趣的男性,而男性喜欢认为自己(男性)风趣的女性(Bressler, Martin, & Balshine, 2006)。一组关于胡扯技巧(定义为对事物进行伪深刻描述的能力)的有趣研究,为社会大脑假说提供了支持。人们确实会被关于艺术的胡扯式解释所打动,尤其是当它反映了现实世界的艺术语言时 (Turpin et al., 2021)。39因此,这是一种传递智力信号的有效方式。此外,它是一种诚实的信号,因为它与智力相关 (Turpin et al., 2019)。有趣的是,擅长胡扯的人并不特别擅长识别它40 (Littrell, Risko, & Fugelsang, 2021)。Miller (2000) 认为幽默、讲故事、艺术和诗歌是人类孔雀的尾巴。
The second set of signals concern intelligence and thus the early evolution of the social brain in the Pleistocene. To begin with, physical attractiveness is associated with intelligence (Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004), so selection for intelligence began before it became a desirable trait. Today, intelligence is subject to stronger assortative mating than personality, even though people tend to cite personality factors more when asked about mate choices (Escorial & Martín-Buro, 2012; Driebe et al., 2021). Appreciation of humor is linked to intelligence, and studies show that women like men who are funny and men like women who think that they (the man) are funny (Bressler, Martin, & Balshine, 2006). An interesting set of studies of bullshitting skill, defined as the ability to generate pseudo-profound descriptions of things, provide support for the social brain hypothesis. People are genuinely impressed by bullshit explanations of art, especially when it mirrors real-world art-speak (Turpin et al., 2021).39 Thus, it’s an effective way of signaling intelligence. Moreover, it’s an honest signal because it’s correlated with intelligence (Turpin et al., 2019). Interestingly, people good at bullshit aren’t especially gifted at detecting it40 (Littrell, Risko, & Fugelsang, 2021). Miller (2000) proposes that humor, storytelling, art, and poetry are the human peacock’s tail.
第三组信号将我们从更新世带入全新世,始于地位线索。我们已经看到,在更新世时期,男性之间的身体竞争可能有所减少,但随着自尊心的兴起,一种新的动机(Anderson、Hildreth & Howland,2015)和一种新的男性竞争形式——地位竞争——也成为了女性选择的基础。随着生育和哺育人类后代变得越来越耗时耗力,对资源的需求也越来越大,男性和女性结成长期伴侣,投入到更长久的产后亲代照料中就变得愈发重要。因此,评估男性资源(通过社会地位来表达)的线索变得至关重要。由于这些线索是社会地位的线索,它们在不同文化中会有所不同,并且尤其容易受到自我夸大操纵的影响,因为男性会竞相展现自己的高地位,即使他们实际上并不高。
The third set of signals takes us from the Pleistocene to the Holocene, beginning with cues to status. We’ve already seen that physical competition among males probably decreased during the Pleistocene, but with the rise of amour propre came a new motive (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015) and a new form of male competition, for status, that became a basis for female choice. As bearing and nursing human offspring became more time consuming and resource demanding, the more important it became for males and females to form long-term pairs investing in extended post-natal parental care. Thus, evaluating cues to a male’s resources expressed by social standing became important. Because they are social status cues, they will vary from culture to culture and be especially subject to self-aggrandizing manipulation as males compete to present themselves as high in status even when they are not.
当然,我们正处于《傲慢与偏见》的领域。伊丽莎白是一位博弈论大师(Chwe,2014),她对达西的优秀程度心存疑虑,于是趁达西不在的时候,她前往了他的庄园彭伯利庄园:
We are, of course, in the territory of Pride and Prejudice. As a grandmaster game theorist (Chwe, 2014), Elizabeth is skeptical about Darcy being as good as he seems, and she takes a trip to visit his estate, Pemberley, when he’s not there:
伊丽莎白欣喜若狂。她从未见过一个地方,大自然如此造化,如此自然的美景却如此少受庸俗的审美的干扰。大家都对这里赞叹不已;此刻,她觉得,能成为彭伯利庄园的女主人,或许也算得上是一番成就了!
Elizabeth was delighted. She had never seen a place for which nature had done more, or where natural beauty had been so little counteracted by an awkward taste. They were all of them warm in their admiration; and at that moment she felt that to be mistress of Pemberley might be something!
这本小说美极了,而且对伊丽莎白来说最重要的是,彭伯利庄园的每个人都对达西的评价极高。当我大声朗读给妻子听时——这是她最喜欢的小说,我们的女儿也是伊丽莎白家的——我说,彭伯利庄园这栋房子促成了这段浪漫的姻缘。如今,房产的重要性已有所下降,但评估地位线索在遗传学上仍然很重要,因为终生收入的遗传率约为40%(Hyytinen等人,2019),而共同环境的影响约为0,这符合行为遗传学第二定律。
It’s gorgeous, and, most important to Elizabeth, everyone at Pemberley has the highest opinion of Darcy in every regard. When reading it aloud to my wife—it’s her favorite novel and our daughter is an Elizabeth—I said that real estate—Pemberley—sealed the romantic deal. Evaluating status cues today, when property is less important, remains nevertheless genetically important because the heritability of lifetime earnings is about 40% (Hyytinen et al., 2019), with the effect of shared environment about 0, consistent with the second law of behavioral genetics.
Dunn 和 Searle (2010) 的一项名为“可爱”的研究揭示了感知地位效应的典型发现。研究人员拍摄了一对吸引力匹配的男性和女性模特的照片,模特分别驾驶一辆地位较高的汽车(宾利)或一辆地位较低的汽车(福特嘉年华),并要求参与者对模特的吸引力进行评分。结果显示,无论驾驶哪款汽车,男性都认为男女模特的吸引力相同。女性认为驾驶宾利的男性明显比驾驶福特的男性更有吸引力;汽车本身对女性模特的评分没有影响。在一项相关研究中(Nave 等人,2018),男性对质量相同但地位不同的品牌物品的偏好进行了评分。在睾酮的影响下,他们对地位品牌(即地位商品)的偏好有所增加。这很重要,因为操纵睾酮会增强男性的社会性行为(Longman 等人,2018)。对地位展现的关注在儿童早期就已出现。在米歇尔著名的棉花糖测试中,那些被告知独处时能否忍住不吃棉花糖的孩子,他们的父母或老师会知道,他们比那些名誉没有受到威胁的孩子控制得更好(Ma 等人,2020 年)。41
A cute study by Dunn and Searle (2010) illustrates typical findings on the effects of perceived status. Photos of a male and a female model matched for attractiveness were taken with the model in a high-status (Bentley) or a low-status (Ford Fiesta) car, and participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of the model. Males rated both the female and male models as equally attractive regardless of the car. Females rated the male in the Bentley as significantly more attractive than the same male in the Ford; the car had no effect on ratings of the female model. In a related study (Nave et al., 2018), males rated their preferences for pairs of objects of equal quality but different status brands. Under the influence of testosterone, their preference for status brands, i.e., positional goods, increased. This is important because manipulating testosterone increases male sociosexuality (Longman et al., 2018). Concern for status presentation appears early in childhood. In Mischel’s famous marshmallow test, children who were told that whether they could resist eating marshmallows when left alone would be known to their parents or teachers controlled themselves better than those without their reputations at stake (Ma et al., 2020).41
现实生活中一个绝佳的地位广告案例是,一款为初代iPhone设计的、很快就从应用商店下架的应用。它的作用只是将默认屏幕换成了一颗红宝石,但售价高达5000美元。42这款名为“我很有钱”的应用,其理念是告诉人们:“我太有钱了,买得起这个愚蠢的应用!” 又一个——或许是假的——孔雀尾。也是一种新的推广方式。43
A wonderful example in real life of status advertising was an app for the first iPhone that was quickly withdrawn from the app store. All it did was change the default screen to a picture of a ruby, but it cost $5,000.42 It was the “I am rich” app, the idea being to say, “I’m so rich I can afford this stupid app!” Another—perhaps phony—peacock’s tail. And a new approach.43
根据状态线索做出明智的选择很重要,但保持警惕也是必要的,因为误报的代价很高。
Choosing wisely based on status cues is important, but vigilance is necessary because the price of false alarms is high.
第四组线索表明潜在伴侣愿意在长期关系中分享资源。我之前指出,基于性格的择偶选择很少,但这个结论指的是人格心理学中研究的心理测量学衍生的特质。然而,这些特质并非普通人在寻找潜在伴侣时所指的性格特质,例如幽默感。心理测量学家的特质是可遗传的(Jang、Livesley 和 Vernon,1996;Power 和 Pluess,2015),但它们并不用于择偶决策。相反,人们会寻找那些看起来有良好长期伴侣前景的潜在伴侣。
The fourth set of cues signal a potential partner’s willingness to share resources in a long-term relationship. Earlier I observed that there’s little assortative mating based on personality, but that conclusion refers to the psychometrically derived traits investigated in personality psychology. However, these are not what ordinary people mean by the personality traits they look for in potential mates, such as sense of humor. Psychometricians’ traits are heritable (Jang, Livesley, & Vernon, 1996; Power & Pluess, 2015), but they are not used in mating decisions. Instead, people look for potential mates who seem like good long-term mating prospects.
利他主义似乎概括了米勒和托德列出的合作特质。希腊人只有一个词,kalos,既有美丽的意思,也有善良的意思。事实证明,有吸引力的人往往利他(Farrelly、Lazarus & Roberts;Konrath & Handy,2021),而且由于我们知道吸引力是可遗传的,并且是选择性交配的基础,因此利他主义的选择很可能在更新世被间接选择,然后在全新世被直接选择。在经济博弈中背叛的人会受到惩罚,甚至惩罚者也要付出代价,这被称为利他惩罚(Fehr & Gachter,2002;Fowler,2005)。这是自我驯化过程的一部分,在这个过程中,反社会的人类及其基因被排除在繁殖之外。鉴于近年来政治两极分化加剧,值得指出的是,夫妻会根据政治偏好进行选择性交配(Klofstad、McDermott & Hatemi,2013),而且政治意识形态具有遗传性;同样,共同环境的影响为零(Kandler、Bleidorn & Riemann,2012)。
Altruism seems to summarize the cooperative traits listed by Miller and Todd. The Greeks had a single word, kalos, that meant both beautiful and good. It turns out that attractive people tend to be altruistic (Farrelly, Lazarus, & Roberts; Konrath & Handy, 2021), and since we know attractiveness is heritable and a basis for assortative mating, it appears that selection for altruism was probably indirectly selected for in the Pleistocene before becoming directly selected in the Holocene. People who defect in economic games are punished even at cost to the punisher, called altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fowler, 2005). This is part of the self-domestication process, by which anti-social humans, and their genes, were excluded from reproduction. Given the increasing political polarization that’s occurred in recent years, it’s worthwhile pointing out that couples assortatively mate on political preferences (Klofstad, McDermott, & Hatemi, 2013) and that political ideology is genetically heritable; again, the effect of shared environment is nil (Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012).
我没有谈论浪漫爱情,因为它的本质、历史起源,甚至跨文化的存在,都是许多学科领域热议的话题。但浪漫爱情可以解决择偶的两个关键问题(Frank,1988):一个是现实问题——我们何时应该停止寻找“完美伴侣”;另一个是承诺问题——既然稳定的婚姻能带来终生幸福,那么夫妻该如何维系感情?坠入爱河有助于终止伴侣的寻找,因为它会迫切地告诉一个人,自己的爱人已经找到了。
I haven’t said anything about romantic love because its nature, historical origin, and even existence across cultures are hotly debated topics in many disciplines. But romantic love can solve two strategic problems of mate choice (Frank, 1988), the real-time problem—when should we stop searching for the “perfect mate”—and the commitment problem—given that stable marriages bring lifetime happiness, how do couples stay together? Falling in love helps terminate mate search by urgently telling one that one’s beloved has been found.
爱情体现了一个人对一段关系的承诺。弗兰克将其与冷战时期的“相互保证摧毁”战略进行了类比。美苏两国制造的核弹头数量远超摧毁整个世界所需的数量,更不用说摧毁敌人了。表面上看,这似乎不合理:花费数十亿美元和卢布来实现过度杀伤。然而,正因为不合理,该战略才奏效,因为它表明了对同样不合理的决定的承诺,即发动报复性打击,最终只会造成更大的破坏。双方都让对方相信,他们已经疯狂到可以不费吹灰之力就摧毁世界,而这种承诺维护了和平。
Love demonstrates one’s commitment to a relationship. Frank draws a parallel with the strategy of mutually assured destruction employed in the Cold War. The US and the USSR built many times more nuclear warheads than was needed to destroy the whole world, much less the enemy. On the surface, this appears irrational: Spending billions of dollars and rubles to achieve overkill. However, precisely because it was irrational the strategy worked by indicating commitment to the equally irrational decision to launch a retaliatory strike resulting only in greater destruction. Each side convinced the other they were crazy enough to destroy the world for nothing, and this commitment kept the peace.
同样,浪漫爱情的迹象——“你没疯,你只是坠入爱河”——也表明了对爱人同样非理性的,即情感上的,承诺。更广泛地说,针对因脑损伤而失去情感的患者进行的研究表明他们的生活因做出错误的决定而崩溃(Damasio,1994)。最后,Makhanova等人(2021)可能发现了一种与爱情相关的基因。携带CD38基因的人至少在婚姻的前三年报告了更高的满意度。与不携带CD38基因的人相比,他们对伴侣更加友善、信任和感激。
Similarly, the signs of romantic love—“you’re not crazy, you’re just in love”—indicate similarly irrational, i.e., emotional, commitment to the beloved. More broadly, research with patients suffering from brain damage that left them without emotions has shown that their lives fall apart because they make bad decisions (Damasio, 1994). Finally, Makhanova et al. (2021) may have found a gene for love. People with the gene, CD38, report higher satisfaction in at least the first three years of marriage. They feel more kindness, trust, and gratitude toward their partners than those without CD38.
我想你们大多数人肯定(至少在心里)都跳得前仰后合,大喊:“约会应用怎么样!它们应该是择偶研究的宝库!”没错,但这其中存在方法论问题(Chopik & Johnson,2021)。关于约会应用的研究并非直接使用它们,而是模拟它们或调查应用用户。这些应用是专有的,因此其开发者不会透露其工作原理,这使得理论验证变得困难。所有社交媒体都存在着深层次的隐私问题。此外,不同的应用会招募不同的用户,并根据不同的标准进行匹配,因此一个应用的结果可能与另一个应用的结果不一致,而且两种结果也可能不适用于所有人群。大多数用户会出于不同目的使用多个应用,并且可能在每种服务上都有不同的个人资料,从而对同一参与者给出令人困惑的结果。约会应用因虚假陈述而臭名昭著。只有0-2%的人认为网络上其他人说的是真话;互联网上每个人都在撒谎,因为互联网上每个人都在撒谎(Drouin等人,2016)。
I suspect that most of you have been jumping up and down (at least in your heads) yelling, “What about dating apps! They should be a treasure trove for mate selection research!” True, but there are methodological problems (Chopik & Johnson, 2021). Research concerning dating apps doesn't use them directly but simulates them or surveys app users. The apps are proprietary, so their makers won’t reveal how they work, making theory testing difficult. There are deep privacy issues, too, endemic to all social media. Additionally, different apps enroll different users and base their matches on different criteria, so results from one app might disagree with results from another and neither might be true of the population. Most users employ several apps for different purposes and probably have different profiles on each service, giving confusing results about the same participants. Dating apps are notorious for misrepresentation. Only 0–2% of people think others tell the truth on the net; everyone lies on the Internet because everyone lies on the Internet (Drouin et al., 2016).
最后,约会软件的用户可能是最“怪异”的群体,他们揭示的择偶方式的未来远比过去更甚。如今,择偶理论和研究悄悄假设个体会选择自己的伴侣,但这只在“怪异”社会中成立。我们缺乏关于更新世择偶的信息,但最重要的线索可能是短期策略所青睐的生理特征。之后,从全新世到工业革命的几千年里,家族为其成员选择配偶,在崇尚表亲结婚的社会中,这堪称真正的“表亲暴政”。
Finally, users of dating apps are probably the WEIRDest of the WEIRD and reveal more about the future of mate choice than its past. Theory and research on mate choice today quietly assume that individuals choose their mates, but this is true only in WEIRD society. We have no information about mate choice in the Pleistocene, but the most important cues would probably be for the physiological traits favored by short-term strategies. Then, for the millennia from the Holocene to the Industrial Revolution, families made mate choices for their members, a true tyranny of the cousins in societies that favored cousin marriages.
社会学家将全新世婚姻的发展分为三个阶段(Cherlin,2004)。第一阶段是制度化阶段,由亲属群体包办婚姻。Miller 和 Todd 列出的许多长期标准都是由亲属群体评估的——例如,以贵族头衔或聘礼和嫁妆来衡量的地位和财富——但首要考虑往往是加强将亲属群体凝聚在一起的亲属关系,因此才出现了表亲婚姻或敌对宗族之间的和解婚姻。虽然这似乎违反直觉,但包办婚姻可以和自愿选择的婚姻一样幸福(Epstein、Pandit 和 Thakar,M.,2013;Regan、Lakhanpal 和 Anguiano,2012)。
Sociologists distinguish three stages in the development of marriage in the Holocene (Cherlin, 2004). The first is the institutional stage of marriages arranged by a person’s kin group. Many of the long-term criteria listed by Miller and Todd are evaluated by kin groups—for example, status and wealth, as measured by aristocratic titles or bride price and dowry—but prime consideration is often given to strengthening kinship ties that bind kin groups together, hence the existence of cousin marriages or peacemaking marriages between rival lineages. While it seems counter-intuitive, arranged marriages can be as happy as self-chosen ones (Epstein, Pandit, & Thakar, M., 2013; Regan, Lakhanpal, & Anguiano, 2012).
第二阶段是伴侣式婚姻,配偶期望找到爱情和伴侣关系。《傲慢与偏见》写于工业革命初期,奥斯汀敏锐地观察到了择偶观的变化。与包办婚姻类似,迫不得已的婚姻以夏洛特·卢卡斯和柯林斯先生为代表,他们虽然没有爱情,但似乎已经安定下来。伊丽莎白的妹妹莉迪亚让浪漫的爱情——然后是……在诗歌和小说中广为流传——坏男孩威克姆在青春期早期就过早地解决了她停止的问题,几乎酿成灾难。伊丽莎白是一位谨慎评估健康暗示的人,但她仍然为爱而结婚,寻求一段伴侣式的婚姻。家人和朋友(Loving,2006)会提供建议和见解,但最终决定权在她自己。在伴侣式婚姻中,夫妻双方都能在履行传统角色中找到满足感(Cherlin,2004)。
The second stage is companionate marriage in which spouses expect to find love and partnership. Pride and Prejudice was written at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and Austen insightfully observes the changing mate choice landscape. Marriage of necessity, like arranged marriages, is represented by Charlotte Lucas and Mr. Collins, who aren’t in love but seem to settle down. Elizabeth’s sister, Lydia, lets romantic love—then being popularized in poems and novels—for bad-boy Wickham solve her stopping problem too soon, in early adolescence, and disaster nearly ensues. Elizabeth is the careful evaluator of fitness cues, but still marries for love, too, seeking a companionate marriage. Family and friends (Loving, 2006) provide advice and insights, but the decision is hers. In companionate marriages, each spouse finds satisfaction in fulfilling traditional roles (Cherlin, 2004).
第三阶段是个体化婚姻。在这一阶段,婚姻被推迟,并被视为发展个人身份认同的一种方式。这一阶段始于20世纪60年代,并在70年代更为普遍,标志着人们对婚姻的期望出现了“从角色到自我”的转变(Cancian,1987)(图9.11)。
The third stage is individualized marriage, in which marriage is postponed and is seen as a means for developing one’s sense of identity. It began in the 1960s and grew more common in the 1970s, marking a turn “from role to self” (Cancian, 1987) in expectations about marriage (Figure 9.11).
基于互联网的会议直到1995年才开始兴起,到2010年便迅速发展成为主流形式。除了酒吧和餐馆之外,其他所有会议方式都已衰落(数据收集于新冠疫情之前)。相比之下,不妨考虑一下我自己的情况。1964年,主要的聚会方式是通过朋友、家人或学校(我们当时还在读高中——仍然已婚)。需要注意的是,互联网会议基本上蚕食了通过朋友或工作进行的会议。其他会议方式只是继续着它们长期的衰落,而现代主义的另一个产物——公共场所会议,则继续兴起,尽管速度较慢。
Internet-based meeting did not take off until 1995, when it skyrocketed to become the dominant form by 2010. All the other meeting ways have tanked except bars and restaurants (data collected pre-COVID). For contrast, consider my own case. In 1964 the dominant way to meet was through friends, family, or school (us, in high school—still married). Note that Internet meetings mostly cannibalized meeting through friends or at work. The other ways simply continued their long-term declines, while meeting in public, another product of modernism, continued to gain, albeit more slowly.
从进化的角度来看,婚姻向个体化转变,个人成为择偶的唯一中心,以及晚期现代主义下日常生活中日益增长的个人主义,都取决于人们选择哪些适应性特征。遗传地位正在急剧下降;福布斯富豪榜如今被企业家财富所主导(马斯克、贝佐斯)。而不是遗传的(洛克菲勒、肯尼迪)。44已取得甚至潜在地位的线索是健康状况的标志。“我很有钱”应用程序已经消失,但现在财富是通过奢华的求婚来宣传的45婚礼非常昂贵,情侣们可以竞争获得免费婚礼或免费抵押贷款。46生理健康状况的线索通常用于短期交配决定,现在却是未来成功的诚实线索。在针对高层管理人员和首席执行官的首个 GWAS 研究中,Lin 和 Zhao(2021)发现风险承受能力和冒险行为(例如多次超速罚单和性伴侣)与商业成功相关,尤其是在 CEO 级别。冒险行为相关性对男性和女性都成立,而社会性行为和商业成功之间的联系只存在于女性中。他们还发现成功与基因 rs7035099(ZNF618, 9q32)之间存在联系,该基因与冒险精神有关,当然,还有其他基因参与其中。克拉克 (2007, 2021) 认为,对原始智力(即基因型而非表型(由教育表示)智力)的选择自中世纪晚期以来就在英国发生,并促成了英国在工业革命中的领先地位。
From the perspective of evolution, the shifts to individualized marriage, the individual becoming the sole locus of mate choice, and the increasing individualism of daily life under late modernism lie in what fitness traits are chosen. Inherited status is in sharp decline; the Forbes list of richest people is now dominated by entrepreneurial fortunes (Musk, Bezos) rather than inherited ones (Rockefeller, Kennedy).44 Cues to achieved and even potential status are signs of fitness. The “I am rich” app is gone, but now wealth is advertised with lavish marriage proposals45 and weddings are so expensive couples can compete to get a free wedding or a free mortgage.46 Cues to physiological fitness, usually used for short-term mating decisions, are now honest cues to future success. In the first GWAS study of top managers and CEOs, Lin and Zhao (2021) found that risk tolerance and risky behavior, such as having many speeding tickets and sex partners, is correlated with business success, especially at the CEO level. The risky behavior correlations hold for both men and women, while the link between sociosexuality and business success holds only among women. They also found a connection between success and the gene rs7035099 (ZNF618, 9q32), which is associated with adventurousness, though, of course, other genes are involved. Clark (2007, 2021) believes that selection for raw—that is, genotypic rather than phenotypic (signaled by education) intelligence—has been going on in Britain since the late Middle Ages and contributed to Britain’s leading role in the Industrial Revolution.
Lin 和 Zhao 的一个令人惊讶的发现是,认知能力与成功并不相关。然而,由于智力和教育程度已知存在关联,他们重新进行了分析,并校正了这种相关性,发现认知能力强烈地预测了成功,这表明,对于一个蓬勃发展的职业生涯来说,原始智力比教育更为重要。另一方面,Izadi 和 Tuhkuri(2021a,10 月 22 日 b)发现,“行动导向”的性格特征(例如外向性)比较为安静的性格特征(例如尽责性)更能预测工作成功和从被解雇中恢复的能力。
A surprising finding by Lin and Zhao was that cognitive ability did not correlate with success. However, because intelligence and education are known to be associated, they reran their analysis correcting for the correlation, finding that cognitive ability strongly predicted success, indicating that raw intelligence is more important than education to a high-flying career. On the other hand, Izadi and Tuhkuri (2021a, b October 22) found that “action-oriented” personality traits such as extraversion predict job success and recovery from being laid off better than quieter ones such as conscientiousness.
在本章中,我们探讨了两种不同的认知演化方法:圣巴巴拉进化心理学派和生物学家的版本——人类行为生态学与基因-文化协同进化的结合。我认为,我们对配偶选择的探索表明,进化心理学(EP)中极端的模块性假设是不必要的。人类行为生态学(HBE)表明,解释思考和决策的一般认知过程可以在变化的进化情境中解释它们。进化心理学可以为人类行为生态学增添适应性行为的计算建模,这是人类行为生态学忽略的一个科学解释方面。如果我们采用一种新的方法,模块性也可以保留下来。Fodor 或 EP 最初未曾使用过这种隐喻。我们每个人都携带着既通用又专用的设备:我们的智能手机及其应用程序。手机操作系统(iOS 或 Android)中存在通用计算进程,用于运行和监控专用应用程序。不同的人会下载和使用不同的应用程序,我们可以将这一概念扩展到通过社交化安装不同应用程序的文化,以及进化和历史,因为新的应用程序是由创新者开发并通过模仿和指导传播的。Heyes(2019)在其“认知小工具”的概念中提出了类似的思维进化方法。
In this chapter we considered two different approaches to the evolution of cognition, the Santa Barbara School of Evolutionary Psychology and the biologists’ version, Human Behavioral Ecology in alliance with Gene-Culture Co-evolution. Our foray into mate choice has, I think, shown that the extreme modularity assumption of EP is unnecessary. HBE demonstrates that the general cognitive processes that account for thinking and decision making can account for them in changed evolutionary contexts. What EP can add to HBE is computational modeling of adaptive behavior, an aspect of scientific explanation that HBE has neglected. Something can remain, too, of modularity if we adopt a new metaphor unavailable to Fodor or EP at its inception. We all carry devices that are general purpose yet specialized: Our smart phones and their apps. There are general purpose computational processes in the phones’ operating systems, iOS or Android, that run and monitor the specialized apps. Different people will download and use different apps, and we can extend the idea to cultures that install different apps through socialization, and to evolution and history, as new apps are developed by innovators and spread by imitation and instruction. Heyes (2019) has suggested a similar approach to the evolution of mind in her idea of Cognitive Gadgets.
随着现代生活变得越来越奇怪和安全,并且个人成为具有重大遗传意义的决策的主要制定者,进化的未来更多地取决于社会选择而不是自然选择。
As modern life becomes WEIRDER and safer, and the individual becomes the chief maker of genetically significant decisions, the future of evolution lies more in social than natural selection.
明智地选择。
Choose wisely.
对于进化的一般处理,我将遵循进化生物学家 Jerry Coyne ( https://whyevolutionistrue.com )的建议:Douglas Futuyma 和 Mark Kirkpatrick,《进化》,第 4 版。(纽约:Sinauer Associates,2018 年)。
For general treatment of evolution, I’ll follow the recommendation of evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne (https://whyevolutionistrue.com): Douglas Futuyma and Mark Kirkpatrick, Evolution, 4th ed. (New York: Sinauer Associates, 2018).
关于进化心理学的书籍有很多,但大多数都侧重于社会心理学而非认知心理学。两本认知心理学书籍分别是:D.B. Boles 的《认知进化》(纽约:Taylor & Francis 出版社,2019 年)以及 Dan Sperber 和 Hugo Mercier 的《理性之谜》(马萨诸塞州剑桥:哈佛大学出版社,2017 年)。一本更老、如今正逐渐崭露头角的著作是人类学家 Donald Brown 的《人类普遍性》(纽约:McGraw-Hill 出版社,1991 年)。迄今为止,该领域最重要的人物是 Joseph Henrich,他集心理学家、经济学家、人类学家和历史学家于一身,本章中多次提及他。网址:https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu。
There are many, many books on evolutionary psychology, but the focus of most is social rather than cognitive psychology. Two cognitive ones are D. B. Boles, Cognitive Evolution (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2019), and Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier, The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). An older book that’s coming into its own now is by anthropologist Donald Brown, Human Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). By far the most important figure in the field is Joseph Henrich, a combination psychologist, economist, anthropologist, and historian, cited throughout this chapter. Website: https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu.
想要了解基因组学和人类进化的最新进展,遗传学家 Razib Kahn 的博客“无监督学习”(https://razib.substack.com )是个不错的选择。他精通遗传学,收集预印本,采访过重要的基因组学科学家,并将研究成果清晰地置于人类进化的更广阔视角中。
A great place to keep up with genomics and human evolution is the blog of geneticist Razib Kahn, Unsupervised Learning, at https://razib.substack.com. He knows the genetics, gets the preprints, interviews key genomics scientists, and puts the findings readably into the larger perspective of human evolution.
行为遗传学家凯瑟琳·佩奇·哈登的《基因彩票:DNA为何对社会平等至关重要》(新泽西州普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,2021年出版)探讨了人类遗传学和基因组学的既定科学事实及其对社会政策的影响。相关著作有弗雷迪·德波尔的《对智能的崇拜:我们破碎的教育体系如何延续社会不公》(纽约:圣马丁学院出版社,2020年出版)。他的网站是https://freddiedeboer.substack.com。
Behavioral geneticist Kathryn Paige Harden’s The Genetic Lottery: Why DNA Matters for Social Equality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021) addresses the established scientific facts about human genetics and genomics and their implications for social policy. Related is Freddie DeBoer, The Cult of Smart: How Our Broken Education System Perpetuates Social Injustice (New York: St. Martin’s, 2020). His website is https://freddiedeboer.substack.com.
关于人类进化的优秀纪录片有很多,但遗憾的是,至今没有一部能够反映出那些正在彻底改变古考古学的基因学研究的重要发现。一部至今仍能展现人类进化各个阶段的电影是《火之探索》(1981年)。尼安德特人一如既往地饱受诟病,但其他主要物种的演化却相当出色,尽管他们并非同时代 人。这部电影甚至还融入了洛夫乔伊的部分自我驯化理论。
There are many fine documentaries about human evolution, but unfortunately none yet reflect the important findings from genetic studies that are revolutionizing paleoarchaeology. One movie that still works as a general picture of the broad stages of human evolution is Quest for Fire (1981). Neandertals get a bad rap as usual, but the other main species are done well, although they did not live at the same time. The movie even incorporates part of Lovejoy’s theory of self-domestication.
与进化相关的电影列表请参见:https://www.themoviedb.org/keyword/311-human-evolution/movie ?language=en- US。
A list of evolution related movies is proposed at: https://www.themoviedb.org/keyword/311-human-evolution/movie?language=en-US.
我没什么关于进化的魔术,但如果你谷歌一下“约会魔术”,你会找到一些用魔术来约会或表演的有趣技巧。不过,也要长高一点。
I don’t have any magic tricks about evolution, but if you Google “Magic tricks dating” you’ll get amusing tips on using magic tricks to get and/or perform on, dates. But, be taller, too.